Stacy Patterson v. AFSCME 2456 , 320 F. App'x 143 ( 2009 )

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-26-2009
Stacy Patterson v. AFSCME #2456
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-2597
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2597
___________
STACY ANN PATTERSON,
Appellant
v.
AFSCME # 2456
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:07-cv-00965)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 26, 2009
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Stacy Ann Patterson appeals pro se from a May 14, 2008, District Court order
entering summary judgment against her. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I. Background
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will set forth only those
facts necessary to our analysis. Patterson is a former Pennsylvania state employee who
worked as an Information Technology Technician for the Pennsylvania Office of the
Inspector General (“OIG”). She allegedly suffers from two neurological conditions:
hydrocephalus, which impacts her vision, and post concussion syndrome, which interferes
with her short term memory and her ability to multitask. She was terminated from her
position with the OIG in October 2002, ostensibly for performance-related reasons.
In May 2007, proceeding pro se, she initiated a civil action against her former
union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”)
Local #2456. She claims that individuals at AFSCME knew of her medical conditions
and, during the course of representing her in various employment-related grievances
against the OIG,1 unlawfully discriminated against her on account of her disabilities in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.,
and its state-law equivalent, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa.
C.S. §§ 951 et seq. She also claims she suffered retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
1
Beginning in 2001, AFSCME apparently filed at least eight grievances on Patterson’s
behalf, concerning such issues as Patterson’s performance evaluations and performance-
related reprimands, alleged harassment suffered by Patterson, Patterson’s job
classification and failure to promote, and Patterson’s October 2002 termination.
2
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 et seq.2
AFSCME moved for summary judgment and Patterson opposed the motion. The
District Court concluded that Patterson failed to establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the ADA or the PHRA, or of retaliation under Title VII. It therefore
granted summary judgment in AFSCME’s favor. Patterson has pursued a timely appeal.
II. Analysis
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of AFSCME, and review the facts in the light most favorable to Patterson. See
Roberts v. Fleet Bank, 342 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2003).
As an initial matter, the District Court determined that Patterson’s claims are
limited by the statute of limitations. Under the ADA and Title VII, a complainant has 300
days from the alleged unlawful employment practice to file a charge of employment
discrimination with the EEOC where, as here, the complainant initially filed a complaint
with a state or local agency with authority to grant relief for such unlawful practices.3
See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); § 2000e-5(e)(1). There is no dispute that Patterson initially
2
Patterson’s briefs discuss extensively discrimination by the OIG that she allegedly
suffered, including failure to properly accommodate her disabilities, denial of training,
failure to promote, and sexual harassment. Although these allegations underlie many of
the grievances that AFSCME filed on Patterson’s behalf, we need not address them in
detail because they do not directly implicate AFSCME.
3
The statute of limitations is shorter under the PHRA; claims must be filed within 180
days after the alleged act of discrimination. See 43 Pa. C.S. § 959(h). However, the
District Court considered Patterson’s claims under the ADA’s more generous statute of
limitations.
3
filed her claim with the relevant Pennsylvania agency (as well as the EEOC) on January
12, 2004. Thus, the District Court held that the statute of limitations barred it from
considering any allegedly discriminatory conduct taking place more than 300 days prior –
i.e., before March 19, 2003.
In response, Patterson argues that AFSCME’s conduct prior to March 19, 2003, is
“crucial to support her claims,” that AFSCME invoked the statute of limitations “just so
that it could hide its acts,” and that AFSCME engaged in “a pattern of discriminatory
behavior.” To the extent Patterson is attempting to argue that AFSCME’s post-March 19,
2003, conduct is a continuation of a course of discriminatory conduct that began prior to
that date, we note that the Supreme Court has held that “each incident of discrimination
and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable
‘unlawful employment practice’” that may start a new limitations period for filing a
charge. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). Patterson
raised allegations concerning AFSCME’s pursuit of at least eight separate grievances, and
all but two of these grievances were disposed of before the March 19, 2003, limitations
date.4 These discrete, individually-actionable instances of alleged discrimination were not
4
The final two grievances - concerning Patterson’s suspension and termination from
her position with the OIG - were consolidated. Although they proceeded to a first-step
hearing in February 2003 (prior to the limitations date), the second-step and third-step
hearings took place after the limitations date. With regard to these grievances,
Patterson’s claim is that AFSCME should have pursued her claims beyond the third-step
hearing by seeking arbitration, but failed to do so. This claim survives the statute of
limitations.
4
raised within the applicable limitations period, and are therefore time-barred. See
O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006).
Under certain circumstances, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be
appropriate and may bring otherwise time-barred activity under the court’s consideration.
For instance, equitable tolling may be permitted “when a claimant received inadequate
notice of her right to file suit, where a motion for appointment of counsel is pending or
where the court has misled the plaintiff into believing that she had done everything
required of her,” or when plaintiff “in some extraordinary way” was prevented from
asserting her rights. See Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir. 1999). Patterson failed to set forth any basis for the application of equitable tolling,
and our review of the record reveals none. We therefore find no error in the District
Court’s determination limiting Patterson’s claims to actions alleged to have occurred after
March 19, 2003.
The District Court next assessed whether Patterson’s surviving allegations were
sufficient to raise a prima facie case of disability discrimination. To make a prima facie
case, Patterson was required to demonstrate that she (1) is disabled within the meaning of
the ADA; (2) can perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable
accommodations; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action as a result of
5
discrimination based on her disability.5 Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir.
2000); Gaul v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 1998). The District Court held
that Patterson failed to establish both the first and third prongs of her prima facie case.
We first will consider the District Court’s determination that Patterson failed to
establish the third prong – that she suffered an adverse employment action as a result of
discrimination based on her disability. Patterson claimed that AFSCME discriminated
against her after March 19, 2003, when it failed to pursue two pending grievances to
arbitration on her behalf. The District Court concluded that Patterson failed to show that
AFSCME’s actions were because of discrimination based on her disability. To the
contrary, the record established that AFSCME was prohibited from pursuing Patterson’s
grievances to arbitration because it was barred from doing so by the relevant procedures.
There is no dispute that AFSCME pursued Patterson’s grievances through a third-
step grievance hearing. In addition, there is no dispute that the procedures set forth in
AFSCME’s governing collective bargaining agreement provide that arbitration is
available after a third-step grievance hearing only where the third-step grievance hearing
results in a deadlocked decision.6 In Patterson’s case, the third-step grievance hearing did
5
The analysis of Patterson’s ADA claim applies equally to her PHRA claim, as
Pennsylvania courts interpret the PHRA in accord with the ADA. See Kelly v. Drexel
Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).
6
The collective bargaining agreement, appearing in the record as Exhibit A to the
affidavit of AFSCME director Michael Fox, provides that “[a]n appeal from a deadlocked
decision at Step 3 may be initiated by the Union.”
6
not result in a deadlock. Rather, there is no dispute that the third-step grievance hearing
yielded a unanimous decision denying Patterson’s grievances. Thus, the record
demonstrates that there was no disputed issue of material fact concerning whether
AFSCME was contractually barred from pursuing arbitration on Patterson’s behalf. The
District Court did not err in concluding that, as a result, Patterson failed to show that
AFSCME’s failure to pursue arbitration was a result of discrimination based upon her
disabilities.
To fulfill the first prong of her discrimination claim, Patterson was required to
demonstrate that she qualifies as “disabled” by virtue of: (1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) a record of such
an impairment; or (3) that she is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102. Largely because of her repeated references to a “perceived disability,” the
District Court considered only whether Patterson showed that AFSCME regarded her as
disabled, and concluded that she did not. On appeal, Patterson contends that this was
error, arguing that she met the first definition of disabled; i.e., that she showed that she
has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” However, because we will affirm the District Court’s conclusion that
Patterson failed to establish the third prong of her prima facie discrimination claim, we
need not address this issue.
Next, the District Court considered Patterson’s Title VII claim. Title VII prohibits
7
discriminatory employment practices based upon an individual’s “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2. A plaintiff carries the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). Although the precise contours of a prima facie showing vary depending upon
the circumstances at issue, every Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, that she
suffered discrimination based upon her membership in a class protected under Title VII.
See, e.g., Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003); Bennun v.
Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 171 (3d Cir. 1991). Here, Patterson did not claim she
suffered discrimination on the basis of a characteristic protected by Title VII. See 42
U.S.C. § 200e-2. Rather, she argued that she suffered discrimination on account of her
cognitive disabilities.7
Construing her pro se pleadings liberally, the District Court considered whether
Patterson raised a Title VII claim that she suffered retaliation because she accused her
former supervisor of sexually harassing her. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected employee
activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous
with the protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and
the adverse action. Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001). Reporting
7
Although Patterson cites repeatedly the portion of Title VII providing that it
“prohibits discrimination because of . . . race,” Patterson’s does not claim to have
suffered discrimination on account of her race.
8
sexual harassment qualifies as a protected employee activity for these purposes. Id.
The District Court concluded that Patterson’s claim of retaliation failed on the
third prong, because she “provided no evidence, which would establish that her filing of
the sexual harassment claim . . . caused the Union not to bring her final grievances to
arbitration.” Indeed, as previously discussed, the record reflects that AFSCME was
prohibited from pursuing her grievances to arbitration by the applicable grievance
procedures. Thus, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
AFSCME on Patterson’s Title VII retaliation claim.
Finally, Patterson argues that she was denied Due Process because the District
Court did not permit her to present her case to a jury. This claim lacks merit. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is proper where “there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” The District Court properly determined that the record did not present a
material dispute of fact requiring a trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1985).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.