United States v. Eric Nabried , 310 F. App'x 529 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-11-2009
    USA v. Eric Nabried
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 08-2480
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Eric Nabried" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1880.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1880
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 08-2480
    _____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    ERIC NABRIED,
    Appellant
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 03-cr-00309)
    District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
    _______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 2, 2008
    Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges,
    (Filed: February 11, 2009)
    _______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _______________
    JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
    Defendant Eric Nabried appeals the District Court’s May 12, 2008, order denying
    his motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for modification of his sentence in light of
    the recent retroactive amendments to the crack cocaine Sentencing Guidelines. See 18
    U.S.C. 3582(c) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. Because the District Court properly concluded
    that the amendments would have no impact on Nabried’s sentence since he was sentenced
    as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, we will affirm.
    I.     Background
    Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Nabried pled guilty on November 2, 2004 to
    one charge of crack distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). As part of his plea
    agreement, Nabried stipulated that he possessed between 5 and 15 grams of cocaine base
    and that the applicable offense level, absent a career offender finding, would be 26. He
    also agreed that the applicable offense level, should the court find him to be a career
    offender, was 32. The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) included the conclusion
    that Nabried qualified for “career offender” status under section 4B1.1, which would
    result in a sentencing range of 151 to 188 months. Without a career offender finding, the
    applicable guidelines range was 84 to 105 months. The plea agreement explicitly
    preserved Nabried’s right to challenge a finding that he was a career offender.
    Nabried was sentenced on April 5, 2005. Following argument, during which
    defense counsel argued that the career offender provision over-represented Nabried’s
    criminal history, the District Court imposed a sentence that “would not be a guideline
    sentence, but it will be a sentence that’s considered your argument, including your
    argument about the career offender status of this defendant.” (App. at 63.) The Court
    rejected Nabried’s request for an 87 month sentence, which would have been within the
    -2-
    applicable guideline range absent a career offender finding, and imposed a sentence of
    110 months.1 The Court stated its belief that the 110 month sentence “satisfied ... the
    purposes that are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” (App. 64.)
    Nabried timely appealed his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred in
    applying the career offender provision because United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005), made that provision of the Guidelines advisory and that a lesser sentence would
    have accomplished the goals of sentencing. In rejecting those arguments, we concluded
    that, as part of calculating the correct sentence under the Guidelines, a district court must
    consider the career offender provision where it is applicable. Nabried v. United States,
    199 Fed. Appx. 102, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2006). We further concluded that the District Court
    was required to, and properly did, consider the career offender provision in Nabried’s
    case because his prior convictions for distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to
    distribute marijuana rendered section 4B1.1(a) applicable. 
    Id. We also
    rejected
    Nabried’s argument that his sentence was unreasonable, concluding that the District Court
    had adequately examined and reasonably applied the §3553(a) factors. 
    Id. at 105-06.
    On March 20, 2008, Nabried filed a motion for modification of his sentence as
    allowed by the recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the applicable
    1Nabried received a 3 level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, making his
    total offense level at sentencing 29. His criminal history category was enhanced from V
    to VI as required under the career offender provision of the Guidelines.
    -3-
    range for crack cocaine offenses. On May 12, 2008, the District Court denied the motion,
    finding that
    the defendant was determined to be a career offender and Amendments 706,
    711, and 715 have no impact on the computation of the Sentencing
    Guidelines. Therefore he does not qualify for a sentence reduction. It is
    further noted that the Court imposed a non-guideline sentence pursuant to
    18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and United States v, Booker 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005) and a
    further reduction is not appropriate.
    (App. 3.) Nabried timely appealed that decision.
    II.    Discussion 2
    Effective November 1, 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission adopted
    Amendment 706 which modified the Guideline ranges applicable to crack cocaine
    offenses. Amendment 706, which applies retroactively, generally lowers the applicable
    base offense level by two levels. See United States v. Wise, 
    515 F.3d 207
    , 220 (3rd Cir.
    2008). A defendant sentenced prior to the amendments may seek to have their sentence
    reduced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Reduction, however, is not automatic and is
    left within the discretion of the District Court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (“[T]he court may
    reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)
    to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable
    policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”) (emphasis added).3 Further, a
    2 The District Court had jurisdiction to review Nabried’s motion for modification
    of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    3 We review de novo a district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.
    United States v. Wood, 
    526 F.3d 82
    , 85 (3d Cir. 2008). Although we have not explicitly
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    “reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not consistent with the policy
    statement and therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) if ... an amendment
    listed in subsection (c) does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
    Guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). When determining whether a defendant
    is entitled to modification of his sentence under the crack cocaine amendments, courts
    “shall leave all other Guideline application decisions unaffected.” U.S.S.G. §
    1B1.10(b)(1).
    Nabried argues that the District Court erred by refusing to lower his sentence
    because the Court had previously granted his motion for a downward departure on the
    basis that the career offender provision over-represented his criminal history, and because
    the sentence imposed was therefore not based on the career offender provision but on §
    2D1.1, which contains the crack cocaine sentencing ranges. He urges us to conclude that
    set forth the applicable standard of review of a district court’s decision to grant or deny a
    sentence modification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)(2), circuits which have considered
    the issue apply an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Carter, 
    500 F.3d 486
    ,
    490 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Rodriguez-Pena, 
    470 F.3d 431
    , 432 (1st Cir. 2006).
    Courts which have considered the interplay between the career offender provisions of the
    Guidelines and the recent amendments to the crack cocaine ranges have applied a de novo
    standard of review to the district court’s interpretation of the impact of the amendments
    on the Sentencing Guidelines and an abuse of discretion standard to the court’s
    determination of whether to grant a particular defendant’s motion for a sentence
    modification under those amendments. United States v. Sharkey, 
    543 F.3d 1236
    , 1238-39
    (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Moore, 
    541 F.3d 1323
    , 1327 (11th Cir. 2008). We will
    do the same.
    -5-
    the amendments to the crack cocaine Guidelines would alter the applicable Guideline
    range to 92-115 months.
    Nabried’s argument fails because the District Court did apply § 4B1.1(b)(1) in
    sentencing him. We stated in his earlier appeal that the “District Court determined that
    the career offender provision of the Guidelines was applicable,” Nabried, 199 Fed. Appx.
    at 104, and Nabried may not use this appeal as a vehicle to relitigate that point. His
    assertion that the District Court granted his motion for a downward departure from the
    career offender provision is baseless.4 While the District Court indicated that it was
    somewhat swayed by defense counsel’s arguments at sentencing, it made sufficiently
    clear, both at sentencing and in its order denying Nabried’s motion for modification of his
    sentence, that it imposed a non-Guideline sentence that took account of Nabried’s career
    offender status and the § 3553(a) factors. Because § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines,
    rather than the crack cocaine provisions in § 2D1.1, was a foundation for Nabried’s
    sentence, the District Court correctly concluded that his sentence is not affected by the
    amendments to the crack cocaine Guidelines. See 
    Sharkey, 543 F.3d at 1239
    (“Amendment 706 had no effect on the career offender Guidelines in § 4B1. 1”); 
    Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327
    (refusing to reduce sentence where defendant sentenced as career
    4Even Nabried acknowledges that in the Judgment imposing sentence the District
    Court did not check the box required for a departure under § 4A1.3 regarding the
    adequacy of criminal history.
    -6-
    offender because “Amendment 706’s effect on the defendants’ base offense levels would
    not lower the sentencing ranges upon which their sentences were based”).
    Additionally, as Nabried concedes, where the original sentence is a non-Guidelines
    sentence determined, at least in part, by the court’s evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors, a
    “further reduction generally would not be appropriate.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). The
    District Court clearly imposed a non-Guidelines sentence which it believed satisfied “the
    purposes that are set forth in 18 U.SC. § 3553(a).” (App. at 64.) It therefore correctly
    refused to reduce Nabried’s sentence.
    III.   Conclusion
    Because the District Court correctly interpreted the Guidelines and the recent crack
    cocaine amendments, and because the Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Nabried’s motion, we will affirm its order.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-2480

Citation Numbers: 310 F. App'x 529

Filed Date: 2/11/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023