Nathaniel Coleman v. United States Parole Commissio ( 2018 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 16-2645
_____________
NATHANIEL COLEMAN,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION,
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
WARDEN FORT DIX FCI
_____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey
(District Court No.: 1-15-cv-03586)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
_____________________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on February 9, 2018
Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: March 13, 2018)
O P I N I O N*
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
After Nathaniel Coleman had served thirty years of a life sentence, the Parole
Commission denied him parole because it concluded that there was a reasonable
probability he would commit future crimes if released. The Commission based its
conclusion on Coleman’s violent criminal history and his failure to acknowledge the
wrongfulness of his criminal actions. Coleman filed a habeas corpus petition in the
District of New Jersey. The District Court upheld the Commission’s decision and
dismissed the petition. Coleman appealed.
We will affirm the District Court’s order. A court must uphold a Commission’s
decision to deny parole to a prisoner unless it lacks a rational basis in the record. Furnari
v. Warden, Allenwood FCI, 218 F.3d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 2000). Under the Parole Act,
parole must be denied when there is a reasonable probability that a prisoner would
commit additional crimes if released. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d). Several factors, including
Coleman’s disciplinary record, his age, and his poor health, reduced the likelihood that he
would commit additional crimes if released. However, given Coleman’s criminal history,
plus his inability or unwillingness to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his actions, we
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
cannot say that the Commission’s decision lacked a rational basis. We therefore affirm
the order of the District Court.
I. Background
Coleman was sentenced to life in prison in August 1987. Coleman’s sentence is
subject to the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (“Parole Act”), Pub. L. No. 94-
244 § 2, 90 Stat. 219 (1976) (formerly codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-18).1 Under the
Parole Act, a prisoner serving a life sentence is entitled to parole after he has served thirty
years of his sentence, unless the Parole Commission “determines [1] he has seriously or
frequently violated institution rules and regulations or [2] that there is a reasonable
probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d)
(emphasis added).
Coleman received a mandatory thirty-year parole hearing in 2015. Pursuant to 28
C.F.R. § 2.23(a), a panel of three hearing examiners conducted the hearing. Two of the
three examiners concluded that there was a reasonable probability Coleman would
commit additional crimes if released and therefore recommended the Commission deny
parole. 2 A written report accompanied the examiners’ recommendation and noted that
Coleman’s “age, health issues, and his spotless disciplinary record all serve to diminish
his risk.” (A102). Nonetheless, the examiners found that there was a reasonable
1
The Parole Act was repealed effective November 1, 1987, but it “remains in effect for
individuals who committed an offense before that date.” Mitchell v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,
538 F.3d 948, 950 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008).
2
Under 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.13, 2.23-2.24, at least two of the three examiners must concur on
a recommendation, which is then submitted to the Commission.
3
probability Coleman would commit additional crimes if released, given his criminal
history and his unwillingness to recognize the wrongfulness of his criminal acts.
The Commission accepted the examiners’ recommendation and denied parole. The
Commission’s Notice of Action explained the decision:
The Commission finds there is a reasonable probability that
you will commit a new Federal, State, or local crime based on
your criminal history that began in 1958 at age 17, after you
were placed on probation in connection with the shooting
death of another individual, and includes a prior conviction in
1978 for Aggravated Assault. The current offense involves
the killing of a government witness for which you continue to
deny responsibility. In addition, at your hearing, you admitted
that you were previously a loan shark and pimp, but stated
that you were only helping the community. The Commission
finds that your violent criminal history and your
unwillingness to recognize the wrongfulness of your criminal
acts makes you a continued risk to commit additional crimes.
(A104).
Coleman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
in the District Court for the District of New Jersey. He argued that the Parole
Commission had violated his due process rights by arbitrarily denying him parole. In
response, the government argued that the Commission’s decision to deny parole should
be upheld on the merits.3 The District Court upheld the Commission’s decision because it
was based on a conclusion that Coleman was reasonably likely to commit future crimes,
and that conclusion was supported by the “petitioner’s criminal history and his failure to
3
The Government also argued that Coleman’s petition should be dismissed for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies. The District Court did not address the exhaustion
argument. Because we will uphold the Commission’s decision on the merits, we also
decline to address the exhaustion argument.
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take responsibility for his crimes.” Coleman v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, Civ. No. 15-3586,
2016 WL 1337258, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2016). This timely appeal followed.
II. Analysis4
“[T]he Parole Commission enjoys a great deal of deference as to decisions
regarding whether to grant parole to a particular individual[.]”Wilson v. U. S. Parole
Comm’n, 193 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 1999). Out inquiry is limited to “whether there is a
rational basis in the record for the [Commission’s] conclusions[.]” Furnari, 218 F.3d at
254 (quoting Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir. 1976)). Given Coleman’s
criminal history and his inability or unwillingness to acknowledge the wrongfulness of
his actions, the Commission had a rational basis to conclude that there was a reasonable
probability Coleman would commit additional crimes if released.
Coleman argues that the Commission should not have considered his criminal
history, which included crimes committed over fifty years ago. However, the
Commission was free to rely on Coleman’s criminal records. In fact, the Parole Act
instructs the Commission to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (“In making a [parole]
determination . . . the Commission shall consider . . . official reports of the prisoner’s
prior criminal record, including a report or record of earlier probation or parole
experiences[.]”). Coleman’s criminal record was long in violent. It began in 1958, when
he was placed on probation for his role in the shooting death of a young man. It also
included a July 1968 arrest for blackmail, assault and battery, pointing a deadly weapon,
4
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This Court has jurisdiction
to review the District Court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5
carrying a deadly weapon, obscene literature, and robbery; a 1978 arrest for attempted
murder and aggravated assault; and a 1979 heroin distribution charge. Coleman had also
admitted to loan-sharking and pimping. The fact that some of these crimes occurred
several decades ago does not render them irrelevant for purposes of a parole
determination. Coleman received a mandatory parole hearing under the Parole Act
because he had served thirty years of his life sentence. Thus, his criminal history
necessarily included crimes committed several decades earlier. Given Coleman’s violent
criminal history, the Commission had a rational basis to conclude that there was a
reasonable probability Coleman would commit more crimes if released.
Nor was the Commission prohibited from considering Coleman’s failure to accept
responsibility or acknowledge the wrongfulness of his criminal activities. The
Commission may consider a number of factors when making a parole decision. U.S. ex
rel. Goldberg v. Warden Allenwood Fed. Prison Camp, 622 F.2d 60, 63 (3d Cir. 1980)
(“[T]he Commission is granted wide discretion to review material that would be helpful
in its determination whether to release a prisoner on parole.”). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4207
(instructing the Commission to consider “such additional relevant information concerning
the prisoner . . . as may be reasonably available”). Given his inability or unwillingness to
accept the wrongfulness of his previous conduct and his criminal history, the
Commission had a rational basis to conclude that there was a reasonable probability
Coleman would commit additional crimes if released.
Coleman also argues that, since a district court considered his criminal history
when he was sentenced, using that same criminal history to also deny him parole would
6
constitute “double counting.” The Third Circuit has indeed prohibited double counting.
See Harris v. Martin, 792 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1986). However, using an individual’s
criminal history for both sentencing and parole decisions is not the kind of “double
counting” prohibited by the Third Circuit and other courts. “Double counting” occurs
when the Commission uses the same factor to both (1) determine a prisoner’s severity
level, which is then used to identify a suggested term of imprisonment under the Parole
Commission guidelines, and (2) decide whether to deviate from the suggested term of
imprisonment. See Romano v. Baer, 805 F.2d 268, 271 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The Parole
Commission[] . . . cannot use aggravating factors to continue a prisoner beyond the
guidelines when such factors were used initially to place the prisoner in a particular
severity category. Such a practice is known as ‘double-counting’ and constitutes an abuse
of discretion.”) (citing Harris, 792 F.2d 52; Torres-Macias v. U. S. Parole Comm'n, 730
F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing the “general proposition against double
counting” as “the [C]ommission cannot use information to determine offense severity or
salient factor score, and then use the same information as a justification for going beyond
the guidelines”).5
5
Moreover, even if the Commission, when deciding whether to grant a prisoner parole,
were prohibited from considering factors used to determine a prisoner’s severity level,
the Commission did not do so. The factors the Commission used to determine Coleman’s
severity level were different from those used to determine that he should not be granted
parole. According to the Commission, “[Coleman’s] offense behavior [was] rated as
Category Eight severity because [he] conspired to violate the civil rights of a government
witness with death resulting.” (A37). It never mentioned his criminal history or his failure
to accept responsibility or recognize the wrongfulness of his conduct—the factors upon
which the Commission’s parole decision was based.
7
Finally, Coleman argues that the Commission erred because the Notice of Action
explaining its decision did not mention various “mitigating factors” or provide its
reasoning for the decision. See 18 U.S.C. § 4206(b) (requiring the Commission to provide
a “written notice” of its determination that “state[s] with particularity” its reasons for
denying parole). Coleman identifies three mitigating factors, none of which are explicitly
mentioned in the Notice of Action: Coleman’s disciplinary record, a letter of
recommendation from a prison official, and Coleman’s health problems. The
Commission presumably considered these mitigating factors, since they were highlighted
in the report that accompanied the hearing examiners’ recommendation. And although the
Commission did not explicitly refer to these factors in its Notice of Action, it was not
required to do so under the statute or accompanying regulations. The Commission also
provided a “formal statement of reasons” for its decision that “reveal[ed] reasoning, and
[did] not simply present conclusions[.]” Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 942-43 (3d
Cir. 1988). The Notice of Action made it clear that the Commission’s decision to deny
Coleman parole was based on Coleman’s violent criminal history and failure to
acknowledge the wrongfulness of his actions, which created a reasonable probability he
would commit additional crimes if released.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we will affirm the Order of the District Court.
8