Guinn v. Rispoli , 323 F. App'x 105 ( 2009 )

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-22-2009
Guinn v. Rispoli
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-4281
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BLD-129 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4281
TYRONE GUINN,
Appellant
v.
MARCELLO RISPOLI; LISE M. MERSON;
THOMAS CARROL; DAVID PHILLIPS;
MICHAEL MCCREANOR; VICTOR GONZALEZ
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-00075)
District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 12, 2009
Before: McKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 22, 2009)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Tyrone Guinn, an inmate at James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, appeals pro se
from an order by the District Court granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Appellees filed a motion for summary affirmance. For the reasons provided by the
District Court, we will grant the motion and affirm.
On February 3, 2006, Guinn filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that defendants had violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he was placed in
isolation for disciplinary reasons. According to an incident report, on June 30, 2004,
Guinn was standing alone in the Security Housing Unit (SHU) yard for recreation. As
two officers walked by escorting another inmate, Guinn pulled out and threw a container
of human waste on them. Officers escorted Guinn to an isolation unit where he remained
for 14 days while he waited to receive a hearing for the disciplinary charges. In his
complaint, Guinn alleged that defendants put him “in the hole,” stripped him of his
clothes, and left him in his undershorts without sheets and blankets for fourteen days.
When he requested clothing or blankets, defendants said no. Guinn filed a grievance,
which was returned to him with a note that his issue was “non-grievable.” Guinn
included the warden in his action, alleging that he is liable for his correctional officers’
training and skill.
Defendants argued that the record is devoid of factual evidence that defendants
acted with deliberate indifference in failing to provide Guinn with humane conditions of
confinement. Defendants cited to the institutional logbook to corroborate that during his
confinement, Guinn was provided with food and shelter, routine medical visits, access to
shower, a time to exercise, and laundry services. To the extent that Guinn experienced
any discomfort during this time, he never sought medical treatment. Defendants thus
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alleged that Guinn had provided no evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that
defendants were aware of a substantial risk to Guinn’s health or safety and affirmatively
disregarded that risk.
Defendants also argued that Guinn failed to demonstrate personal involvement
with respect to the warden, that Guinn failed to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Guinn did
not file a response to defendants’ motion, but filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order.
The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment on September 16,
2008. The court determined that the conditions of Guinn’s confinement did not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation. Although he alleged that he was not provided with
sheets or blankets while in isolation, the court determined that Guinn did not provide
evidence that he sustained a serious physical harm. The court also found that the lack of
clothing was not an Eighth Amendment violation where only minimal injury was alleged
and Guinn otherwise failed to establish that he was denied “the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Thus, the District
Court held that Guinn failed to satisfy both the objective and subjective standards to show
deliberate indifference. The District Court declined to address defendants’ remaining
grounds in support of their motion for summary judgment and denied as moot Guinn’s
motions for a temporary restraining order and to appoint counsel. Guinn appealed.
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We have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because
Guinn is proceeding in forma pauperis in this appeal, we must dismiss the appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B) if it is legally frivolous. We may summarily affirm if Guinn’s
appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
We exercise plenary review over a district court's order of summary judgment.
See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment
is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue of material fact exists only
if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates from cruel and unusual
punishment. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. However, not all deficiencies and
inadequacies in prison conditions amount to a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional
rights. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351,
364 (3d Cir. 1992) (segregated detention must not be foul, inhuman, or totally without
penological justification). To show a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must
allege that (1) the deprivation be, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison
official possess a sufficiently culpable state of mind in acting deliberately indifferent to
the inmate's safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
Guinn has not provided any evidence that could raise a genuine issue of material
fact regarding the condition of his confinement. The record shows that the prison
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complied with constitutional standards at the most basic level, and Guinn does not
provide any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that his health and
safety were at risk. See Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1988); see also
Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995) (constitutional analysis of strip cell
conditions). Although defendants do not dispute that Guinn had the barest of clothing,
Guinn does not provide any evidence to show that as a consequence of his limited
clothing or the temperature of the strip cell, he suffered a serious physical harm.1 Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834. Guinn lacks evidence to prove the first prong of an Eighth Amendment
violation, and relying on his allegations alone are insufficient at the summary judgment
stage. Id. Moreover, the record indicates that prison officials provided him with
sufficient nutrition, shelter, and medical care. Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 426 (3d
Cir. 1990). Therefore, the District Court properly granted the motion for summary
judgment.
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Guinn stated at his deposition that temperatures were freezing, but he did not
provide any evidence to specifically support this allegation. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.
Defendants also provided incident reports indicating that Guinn previously flushed his
clothing down the toilet. Although they did not explicitly argue that Guinn’s conduct
provided a legitimate penological basis for denying him clothing, the District Court
appeared to rely on this justification in its constitutional analysis. See also Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 346 (“Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those that are
‘totally without penological justification.’” (citations omitted)); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 546-47 (1979) (maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order are
essential goals that may require limitation on the constitutional rights of prisoners); see
also Young, 960 F.2d at 363-64.
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We note that Guinn filed a document in support of this appeal on November 24,
2008, in which he states that he received defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
January 23, 2007, but did not receive the supporting Memorandum of Points and
Authorities. Guinn argues that the District Court should not have granted summary
because he was not properly served. Our review of the certificates of service for
defendants’ Motion and Memorandum reflect identical name and address information.
The Motion for Summary Judgment also references that it is supported by the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, which was filed simultaneously. Furthermore,
the District Court Clerk sent Guinn a letter regarding the status of the case on July 3,
2008, and attached a print-out of the docket, which included entry of both the Motion for
Summary Judgment and the Memorandum. Thus, Guinn had both notice and time to file
a response.
Finally, given the district courts’ broad discretion to determine whether
appointment of counsel is warranted, we find the denial of Guinn’s motions did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993).
Guinn’s filings reflect that he was able to present and litigate his case and did not show
that without counsel, he would be prejudiced. Id.; Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26
(3d Cir. 1984). The District Court also did not err in denying Guinn’s motion for a
temporary restraining order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
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As Guinn’s appeal presents no substantial question, we grant Appellees’ motion
and summarily affirm the District Court judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir.
I.O.P. 10.6.
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