Fin Associates LP v. Hudson Specialty Insurance Co ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 16-3541
    _____________
    FIN ASSOCIATES LP; SB MILLTOWN ASSOCIATES LP; LAWRENCE S.
    BERGER; ROUTE 88 OFFICE ASSOCIATES LTD; SB BUILDING ASSOCIATES
    LP; ROUTE 18 CENTRAL PLAZA LLC,
    Appellants
    v.
    HUDSON SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for
    the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-02245)
    District Court Judge Susan D. Wigenton
    ______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    July 12, 2017
    ______________
    Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: July 25, 2018)
    _____
    OPINION *
    _____
    RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not an Opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
    does not constitute binding precedent.
    Appellants appeal the decision of the District Court granting the motion of
    Appellee Hudson Specialty Insurance Company (“Hudson”) to compel arbitration. We
    will affirm.
    I
    Hudson, a property and casualty company based in New York, issued a policy to
    insure a group of New Jersey property owners in July of 2012. The policy covers twenty
    properties, nineteen of which are located in New Jersey and one of which is located in
    Pennsylvania. The insured properties’ value exceeds $9,000,000, 1 and the policy owners
    initially paid a base premium insurance rate of $250,000. Appellants (“the Insureds”)
    employed a commercial insurance broker to negotiate the terms of the policy, 2 which
    states that it was “written in a form bargained for, reviewed, and accepted by the parties.”
    App. 72. The policy contains a choice-of-law provision, which states that “[t]his policy
    shall be interpreted solely according to the law of the State of New York.” App. 72. The
    policy also contains an arbitration clause, providing that any dispute as to the terms and
    conditions of the policy, or as to the adjustment or payment of a claim, “shall be
    submitted to the decision of a Joint Arbitrator that the Insured and Company shall appoint
    jointly.” App. 72.
    In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy damaged many of the New Jersey properties and,
    1
    While the total value of all the insured properties is unclear from the record, one of
    the properties is valued at $9,000,000.
    2
    The Appellants are owned and managed by US Land Resources, which is the
    named insured on the policy.
    2
    in 2013, the Insureds filed suit asserting several causes of action related to Hudson’s
    alleged refusal to adjust their insurance claims.      Hudson filed a motion to compel
    arbitration or to dismiss the operative Complaint. On August 18, 2016, the District Court
    granted the motion to compel arbitration and denied the motion to dismiss the complaint
    as moot. On appeal, the Insureds argue that the choice-of-law provision should not be
    enforced and that under New Jersey law the arbitration clause is unenforceable.
    II
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    . We have
    jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order compelling arbitration and denying
    appellee’s motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    The District Court’s interpretation of the terms of the insurance policy is a
    question of law, over which we exercise plenary review. Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins.
    Co., 
    814 F.3d 660
    , 674 (3d Cir. 2016). We review the District Court’s findings of fact
    for clear error and will set aside these findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
    III
    The Insureds contend that the District Court erred by enforcing the choice-of-law
    provision and granting Appellee’s motion to compel arbitration. We disagree.
    A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction generally applies the choice-of-
    law rules of the forum state, which in this case is New Jersey. See Hammersmith v. TIG
    Ins. Co., 
    480 F.3d 220
    , 226 (3d. Cir. 2007) (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,
    
    313 U.S. 487
     (1941)). New Jersey courts generally uphold contractual choice-of-law
    3
    provisions in insurance agreements so long as they do not “violate New Jersey’s public
    policy.” Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 
    614 A.2d 124
    , 133
    (N.J. 1992). The public policy exception — intended to protect less powerful parties in
    asymmetric negotiations — is generally not violated when similarly sophisticated parties
    have negotiated the choice-of-law provision and the plain language of the policy conveys
    that both parties intended for the laws of the named state to govern the provisions of the
    insurance contract. See Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
    609 A.2d 440
    , 460 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-
    Graphics, Inc., 
    607 A.2d 703
    , 707 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1992). Choice-of-law
    provisions allow the parties to provide uniformity of interpretation when the policy
    insures properties in multiple states, and will be enforced if the contract was freely
    entered into by two commercial entities with relatively equal bargaining power. See
    Walters v. Am. Home. Assur., No. 09-4637, 
    2011 WL 4409170
    , *8 (D. N.J. Sept. 21,
    2011) (upholding a choice-of-law provision in a multistate policy between two equally
    sophisticated corporations); ERG Renovation & Const., LLC v. Delric Const. Co., 
    2014 WL 7506759
    , *6-7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 12, 2015); Johnson Matthey Inc. v.
    Pennsylvania Mfrs.’ Ass’n Ins. Co., 
    593 A.2d 367
     (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
    Here, the District Court properly found that Appellants are owned and managed by
    “a sophisticated commercial entity with insurable interests in over twenty different
    properties,” one of which, as noted, was valued at $9,000,000. App. 7. The Insureds
    obtained their policies with Hudson by employing the use of a commercial insurance
    broker. While the insured properties were primarily located in New Jersey, a provision
    4
    designating a governing body of law was reasonable given that the policy also insured
    property in Pennsylvania and potentially insured mortgages originating in other states as
    well. Further, the plain language of the choice-of-law provision clarifies that the clause
    “is written in a form bargained for, reviewed and accepted by the parties,” which conveys
    that the policy terms were the result of individualized negotiations between the
    policyholder and insurance provider. App. 72. Given that the terms of the policy were
    negotiated by a policyholder with relatively equal bargaining power, the District Court
    correctly found the policy’s choice-of-law provision enforceable. Accordingly, New
    York law governs whether the policy’s arbitration clause is enforceable.
    IV
    The Insureds also contend that the arbitration clause would fail under New Jersey
    law because the plain text does not explicitly waive the right to litigate a dispute in
    court. They concede, however, that if New York law controls, the District Court
    properly applied New York law in finding the clause enforceable. Appellant Br., 24.
    While we take no position concerning New Jersey law in this regard, we agree no such
    waiver is required by New York jurisprudence. See Williams v. Progressive
    Northeastern Ins. Co., 
    41 A.D.3d 1244
    , 1245 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Matter of Ball
    (SFX Broadcasting), 
    236 A.D.2d 158
    , 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Where, as here, an
    agreement enforced by New York law contains a broad arbitration provision, “the
    court’s inquiry is limited to whether or not the subject matter of this dispute is
    encompassed by its provisions.” Shazo v. Hierschler, 
    282 A.D.2d 257
    , 258 (N.Y. App.
    Div. 2001). The Insureds’ claims arise from Hudson’s alleged failure to pay or adjust
    5
    insurance claims, which fall within the purview of the policy’s arbitration clause. 3 We
    therefore affirm the District Court’s ruling to grant Appellee’s motion to compel
    arbitration.
    3
    The Arbitration Clause Endorsement of the insurance policy is as follows:
    If there is any dispute or disagreement as to the interpretation of the terms
    and conditions of this policy or the development, adjustment, and/or payment
    of any claim, they shall be submitted to the decision of a Joint Arbitrator that
    the Insured and Company shall appoint jointly. App. 72.
    6