Forever Green Athletic v. , 804 F.3d 328 ( 2015 )


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  •                                          PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 14-3906
    In re: FOREVER GREEN ATHLETIC FIELDS, INC.,
    Debtor
    CHARLES C. DAWSON; KELLI DAWSON,
    Appellants
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 2-14-cv-00641)
    District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell
    _____________
    Argued: July 9, 2015
    Before: FUENTES, NYGAARD, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: October 16, 2015)
    Aris J. Karalis, Esq. [ARGUED]
    Robert W. Seitzer, Esq.
    Maschmeyer Karalis
    1900 Spruce Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Attorneys for Debtor, Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc.
    Steven K. Eisenberg, Esq. [ARGUED]
    Stern & Eisenberg
    1581 Main Street
    Suite 200
    Warrington, PA 18976
    Attorney for Appellants, Charles C. Dawson and Kelli
    Dawson
    Frederic J. Baker, Esq.
    United States Department of Justice
    Office of the Trustee
    833 Chestnut Street
    Suite 500
    Philadelphia, PA 19107
    Attorney for Trustee, Frederic J. Baker
    Robert H. Holber, Esq.
    41 East Front Street
    Media, PA 19063
    Attorney for Trustee, Robert H. Holber
    2
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
    Creditors who file an involuntary bankruptcy petition
    against a debtor must satisfy several statutory requirements
    before obtaining relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 303. Everyone
    agrees the creditors who filed the petition in this case met
    those requirements. The question is whether their petition
    may nonetheless be dismissed as a bad-faith filing. We hold
    that bad faith provides an independent basis for dismissing an
    involuntary petition. For the following reasons, we will
    affirm.
    I.
    The parties are familiar foes. Founded by Keith Day,
    Forever Green Athletic Fields sells artificial turf playing
    fields. In 2005, Forever Green sued one of its competitors,
    ProGreen, for $5 million for diversion of corporate assets (the
    “Bucks County Action”). Charles Dawson, who is an owner
    of ProGreen and a former Forever Green sales representative,
    would be liable if damages are awarded in that suit.
    That same year, Charles and his wife, Kelli Dawson,
    sued Forever Green for unpaid commissions and wages (the
    “Louisiana Action”). On March 2, 2011, after years of
    litigation, the Louisiana court entered a consent judgment in
    favor of the Dawsons. With interest and other costs, this
    judgment now totals more than $300,000. To date, Forever
    Green has not paid a penny on this judgment.
    3
    While the Louisiana Action was still running its
    course, the parties to the Bucks County Action agreed to
    arbitrate their claims. However, on March 30, 2011, just a
    few weeks after the consent judgment was entered in the
    Louisiana Action, ProGreen filed a motion to terminate the
    arbitration. In support of this motion, ProGreen argued that
    “it has become clear that [Forever Green] is insolvent” and
    that Keith Day does not “have the ability or desire to pay the
    Arbitrator’s fees and expenses.” Supp. App. 505. In
    addition, ProGreen said that “Charles and Kelli Dawson have
    a $300,000+ judgment against [Forever Green] and expect
    judgments in the same amount against [Day] very soon. As
    such, any monies paid as advance deposits to the Arbitrator
    by [Forever Green] are subject to execution and
    garnishment.” 
    Id. The next
    month, the Dawsons transferred
    their judgment in the Louisiana Action to Pennsylvania and
    obtained a writ of execution against the arbitrator and his law
    firm. At that point, with his fees in peril, the arbitrator
    recognized he was adverse to the Dawsons, so he suspended
    the arbitration until the fee issue was resolved.
    During his deposition, Charles Dawson offered some
    strategic insight into these actions. With the consent
    judgment in hand, he intended to “[f]ind any available asset
    that Forever Green may have and try to use the lien to seize
    it.” 
    Id. at 710.
    He testified, “I’m going to use that judgment
    to levy any monies I can find anywhere, whether it be the
    arbitrator or anyone else. So, yeah, if we can get the lien
    paid, that’s my number one objective. If I can get it paid, I’m
    very happy.” 
    Id. at 711.
    In response to the suspension of the arbitration,
    4
    Forever Green filed a complaint in state court trying to
    reinstate the arbitration (the “Philadelphia Action”). Day
    testified that Forever Green was forced to file this complaint
    because “Charles Dawson and his counsel were determined to
    derail the arbitration and this was our own legitimate response
    to it.” 
    Id. at 198.
    According to Day, Charles Dawson and his
    counsel had “threatened to put [Forever Green] into
    bankruptcy” if Forever Green did not agree to terminate the
    arbitration. 
    Id. at 199.
    After Forever Green commenced the
    Philadelphia Action, the Dawsons’ counsel sent a letter to
    Forever Green saying that the arbitration was in an “indefinite
    state of suspension” and “[u]nless and until the [consent
    judgment] for about $300,000.00 is paid off in full, that
    indefinite state of suspension will continue.” 
    Id. at 568.
    The judge in the Philadelphia Action issued a
    scheduling order for the parties to brief the issues identified in
    Forever Green’s complaint. The Dawsons’ brief was due on
    May 3, 2012. They never filed it. Instead, they chose a
    different tack.
    Two weeks before their brief was due, the Dawsons
    and the law firm Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall & Furman,
    which was owed $206,000 from Forever Green, filed an
    involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against Forever
    Green. Justifying this decision, Charles Dawson said that his
    counsel “suggested the best way to get to [Forever Green’s]
    assets would be involuntary bankruptcy.” App. 268. It is
    undisputed that the Dawsons and Cohen Seglias satisfied the
    statutory criteria for commencing an involuntary bankruptcy
    case because (1) they are three creditors, (2) they each hold
    an uncontested claim against Forever Green, and (3) their
    claims aggregate at least $15,325 more than the value of liens
    5
    on Forever Green’s property. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b).
    Despite the petitioning creditors’ facial compliance with the
    statute, Forever Green moved to dismiss the petition as a bad-
    faith filing.
    The Bankruptcy Court convened an evidentiary
    hearing on the motion. In addition to receiving evidence of
    the parties’ course of conduct in the years leading up to the
    filing, the Bankruptcy Court heard testimony about Forever
    Green’s financials. It was established that Forever Green has
    essentially shut down its business—in 2012, its operating
    account had no activity and its balance never exceeded $30.
    Forever Green’s focus has been on winding down its affairs
    and recovering assets for its approximately 50 creditors. As
    for the balance sheet, Forever Green has $6 million in assets,
    the largest by far being its claims against ProGreen for $5
    million. On the other side of the ledger, Forever Green has
    $2.3 million in debts, including a $1.3 million secured line of
    credit.
    Although Forever Green itself has not been paying any
    of its debts, Day has personally paid off hundreds of
    thousands of dollars of Forever Green debt. He explained
    that he has paid debts for which he had “financial personal
    guarantees.” App. 256. Day acknowledged that neither he
    nor Forever Green has paid anything to the Dawsons, but he
    said that secured creditors and certain unsecured creditors are
    ahead of them in the pecking order. Day also is personally
    funding all of Forever Green’s current litigation, including
    this suit and the suspended arbitration against ProGreen.
    After the parties made their pitches as to whether the
    petition was filed in bad faith, the Bankruptcy Court ruled in
    6
    Forever Green’s favor and granted the motion to dismiss. It
    explained that, because bankruptcy courts are courts of
    equity, a petitioning creditor (for involuntary bankruptcies) or
    debtor (for voluntary bankruptcies) must come to the court for
    a proper purpose. Involuntary Chapter 7 proceedings, it said,
    are intended to protect creditors from debtors who are making
    preferential payments to other creditors or from the
    dissipation of the debtor’s assets. Creditors who file petitions
    for other reasons—such as to collect on a personal debt, to
    gain an advantage in pending litigation, or to harass the
    debtor—act in bad faith. The Bankruptcy Court concluded
    that, even though the petitioning creditors met the statutory
    filing requirements, Charles Dawson was a bad-faith creditor
    because he was motivated by two improper purposes: to
    frustrate Forever Green’s efforts to litigate its claim against
    ProGreen and to collect on a debt. The District Court
    affirmed. The Dawsons (without Cohen Seglias) filed this
    appeal.1
    II.
    We discuss three issues on appeal. First, whether an
    involuntary petition may be dismissed as a bad-faith filing.
    Second, whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding bad
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
    158(a)(1), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
    158(d)(1) and 1291. We employ the same standard of review
    over the Bankruptcy Court’s decision as that exercised by the
    District Court. We review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of
    fact for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. In re
    Zinchiak, 
    406 F.3d 214
    , 221-22 (3d Cir. 2005).
    7
    faith. And third, whether other good-faith creditors could
    have cured the petition.
    A.
    Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs
    involuntary cases under Chapter 7 or 11, contains three
    requirements for commencing an action against a debtor who
    has twelve or more creditors: (1) there must be three or more
    petitioning creditors; (2) each petitioning creditor must hold a
    claim against the debtor that is not contingent as to liability or
    the subject of a bona fide dispute; and (3) the claims must
    aggregate at least $15,325 more than the value of liens on the
    debtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). It is undisputed
    that the Dawsons and Cohen Seglias satisfied these three
    requirements. The Code further provides that the court “shall
    order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case . . . only
    if . . . the debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as
    such debts become due.” 
    Id. § 303(h)(1).
    The parties agree
    Forever Green is not paying its debts.
    Section 303 has one reference to bad faith. It says that
    if the court dismisses an involuntary petition, it may award
    damages against any creditor “that filed the petition in bad
    faith.” 
    Id. § 303(i)(2).
    As one might expect, because the only
    mention of bad faith is in § 303(i)(2) and deals with post-
    dismissal damages, the vast majority of litigation concerning
    bad faith centers on that provision. In the typical case, the
    creditors do not satisfy the § 303(b) requirements for filing
    the petition in the first instance (e.g., fewer than three
    creditors filed the petition or the creditors’ claims were
    subject to bona fide disputes). Following dismissal, debtors
    8
    invariably file motions for damages under § 303(i)(2),
    arguing the petition was filed in bad faith.2
    Less often litigated is the issue here, namely, whether
    bad faith may serve as a basis for dismissal even where the
    criteria for commencing a suit are satisfied and where the
    debtor is admittedly not paying its debts as they become due.
    According to the Dawsons, we cannot engage in a bad-faith
    inquiry in these circumstances. They say a creditor’s
    subjective motivations are irrelevant because § 303(b)(1)
    contains objective criteria for who may file an involuntary
    petition, and if they are satisfied, § 303(h)(1) provides that the
    court “shall order relief” against a debtor who is not paying
    its debts. Some courts have been receptive to this position.3
    2
    See, e.g., In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 
    439 F.3d 248
    , 257 (6th Cir. 2006); In re Bayshore Wire Prods. Corp.,
    
    209 F.3d 100
    , 102-03 (2nd Cir. 2000); In re Express Car &
    Truck Rental, Inc., 
    440 B.R. 422
    , 433 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010);
    In re Skyworks Ventures, Inc., 
    431 B.R. 573
    , 578-79 (Bankr.
    D.N.J. 2010); In re Silverman, 
    230 B.R. 46
    , 49 (Bankr. D.N.J.
    1998).
    3
    See, e.g., In re WLB-RSK Venture, No. BAP CC-03-1526-
    MOPMA, 
    2004 WL 3119789
    , at *6 n.13 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
    Nov. 24, 2004) (“Section 303 sets forth the standards for
    granting or denying an order for relief on an involuntary
    petition. If the grounds for relief exist under section 303, the
    good or bad faith of the petitioning creditor appears
    irrelevant . . . .”); In re Knoth, 
    168 B.R. 311
    , 315 (D.S.C.
    1994) (“[T]he motivation of the petitioning creditors is
    irrelevant on the question of whether the involuntary petition
    should be granted.”).
    9
    Section 303, furthermore, discusses bad faith only in the
    context of assessing damages after a petition has been
    dismissed. If Congress wanted bad faith to be a separate
    basis for dismissal, one could argue, the Code would have
    included language to that effect. And although this Court has
    repeatedly held that a voluntary petition may be dismissed for
    bad faith, the provisions of the Code at issue in those cases
    permitted dismissal for “cause.”4 Section 303, by contrast,
    does not have any similar statutory hook for allowing bad-
    faith dismissals. Congress must have intended something by
    this distinction, the argument goes.
    We disagree that the text of § 303 forecloses bad-faith
    dismissals. The Dawsons make much of the fact that they
    satisfied § 303(b)(1)’s three requirements for commencing an
    involuntary petition. But meeting the § 303(b)(1) criteria,
    like pleading a prima facie case in many actions, is just the
    first hurdle. It does not bear on other defenses that may
    support dismissal. In other words, if the three filing
    requirements are not satisfied, we agree the bankruptcy court
    must dismiss the case; but if the three requirements are
    satisfied, that doesn’t mean the bankruptcy court can’t
    4
    See, e.g., In re Myers, 
    491 F.3d 120
    , 125 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A
    bankruptcy filing made in bad faith may be dismissed ‘for
    cause’ under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).”); In re Tamecki, 
    229 F.3d 205
    , 207 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Section 707(a) allows a bankruptcy
    court to dismiss a petition for cause if the petitioner fails to
    demonstrate his good faith in filing.”); In re SGL Carbon
    Corp., 
    200 F.3d 154
    , 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a
    “Chapter 11 petition is subject to dismissal for ‘cause’ under
    11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) unless it is filed in good faith”).
    10
    dismiss the case.
    The one reference to bad faith in § 303 supports our
    conclusion. Section 303(i)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to
    award damages following dismissal against “any petitioner
    that filed the petition in bad faith.” Under the Dawsons’
    reading, courts may engage in a bad-faith inquiry only after
    they have dismissed a case for the creditors’ failure to comply
    with the statutory filing requirements. We see no reason why
    the Code would permit the imposition of damages (including
    punitive damages) for bad-faith filings but not allow the same
    conduct—such as using involuntary bankruptcy as a litigation
    tactic in pending proceedings—to provide a basis for
    dismissing the petition. The better view is that, by including
    an express reference to bad faith in § 303, Congress intended
    for bad faith to serve as a basis for both dismissal and
    damages.
    Section 303(h)(1), moreover, does not provide that a
    bankruptcy court “shall order relief” against a debtor who is
    not paying its debts. Rather, the court shall order relief “only
    if” the debtor is not paying its debts, meaning a debtor not
    paying its debts is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
    ordering relief. An “if” or “if and only if” clause would have
    been more favorable to the Dawsons.
    The bigger flaw in the Dawsons’ argument is that it
    overlooks the equitable nature of bankruptcy. Time and
    again, we have emphasized that “good faith” filing
    requirements have “strong roots in equity.” In re SGL
    
    Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161
    ; see also In re 
    Tamecki, 229 F.3d at 207
    . “At its most fundamental level, the good faith
    requirement ensures that the Bankruptcy Code’s careful
    11
    balancing of interests is not undermined by petitioners whose
    aims are antithetical to the basic purposes of bankruptcy.” In
    re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 
    384 F.3d 108
    , 119 (3d
    Cir. 2004). As courts of equity, bankruptcy courts are
    equipped with the doctrine of good faith so that they can
    patrol the border between good- and bad-faith filings. See In
    re SGL 
    Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161
    ; In re Little Creek Dev. Co.,
    
    779 F.2d 1068
    , 1072 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the
    “good faith” requirement protects the “integrity of the
    bankruptcy courts by rendering their powerful equitable
    weapons . . . available only to those debtors and creditors
    with ‘clean hands’”). We will not depart from this general
    “good faith” filing requirement in the context of involuntary
    petitions for bankruptcy. The majority of courts agree.5
    5
    See, e.g., In re U.S. Optical, Inc., No. 92-1496, 
    1993 WL 93931
    , at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 1993) (unpublished) (“Courts
    are duty bound to conduct an inquiry, if requested, to
    determine whether an involuntary petition has been filed in
    good faith. Bad faith filings are to be dismissed.” (citations
    omitted)); In re Bock Transp., Inc., 
    327 B.R. 378
    , 381 (B.A.P.
    8th Cir. 2005) (“A bad faith filing can also be cause for the
    dismissal of a[n] [involuntary] petition.”); In re Tichy Elec.
    Co., 
    332 B.R. 364
    , 373 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (same); In re
    Alexander, No. 00-10500, 
    2000 WL 33951465
    , at *3 (D. Vt.
    Aug. 29, 2000) (“[I]nvoluntary petitions filed in bad faith
    should be dismissed.”); In re Manhattan Indus., Inc., 
    224 B.R. 195
    , 201 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (“Section 303(b) of
    the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly refer to good faith
    filings. Involuntary filings must be made in good faith and
    consequences flow if they are not. Dismissal is one possible
    consequence.”).
    12
    Policy considerations lend further support to this
    conclusion. “[T]he filing of an involuntary petition is an
    extreme remedy with serious consequences to the alleged
    debtor, such as loss of credit standing, inability to transfer
    assets and carry on business affairs, and public
    embarrassment.” In re Reid, 
    773 F.2d 945
    , 946 (7th Cir.
    1985). Given these serious consequences, courts should be
    wary of creditors who may find alluring the “retributive
    quality” of thrusting a debtor into bankruptcy.6 Allowing for
    the dismissal of bad-faith filings will encourage creditors to
    file petitions for proper reasons such as to protect against the
    preferential treatment of other creditors or the dissipation of
    the debtor’s assets. See In re 
    Silverman, 230 B.R. at 53
    .
    Accordingly, we hold that an involuntary petition filed under
    11 U.S.C. § 303 may be dismissed for bad faith.
    B.
    We review the decision to dismiss the case as a bad-
    faith filing for abuse of discretion. In re 
    Myers, 491 F.3d at 125
    . The determination of bad faith is “a fact intensive
    6
    Brad E. Godshall & Peter M. Giluhy, The Involuntary
    Bankruptcy Petition: The World’s Worst Debt Collection
    Device?, 53 Bus. Law. 1315, 1315 (Aug. 1998); see also
    David S. Kennedy et al., The Involuntary Bankruptcy
    Process: A Study of the Relevant Statutory and Procedural
    Provisions and Related Matters, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1, 58
    (Fall 2000) (explaining that creditors should not “invoke the
    involuntary bankruptcy process . . . based on personal whim
    or vindictiveness seeking to collect an unpaid debt”).
    13
    determination better left to the discretion of the bankruptcy
    court.” In re Lilley, 
    91 F.3d 491
    , 496 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations
    omitted). In terms of allocating burdens of proof, creditors
    are presumed to have acted in good faith. See In re 
    Bayshore, 209 F.3d at 105
    . To dismiss the petition, the debtor must
    show by a preponderance of the evidence that the creditors
    acted in bad faith. In re Petralex Stainless Ltd., 
    78 B.R. 7389
    , 743 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
    At the outset, we must decide on the standard for
    evaluating bad faith, which is not defined in the Code. On
    this issue, courts have applied a dizzying array of standards,
    mostly with regard to post-dismissal motions for damages
    under § 303(i)(2). See In re 
    Bayshore, 209 F.3d at 105
    -06
    (reviewing different standards); Gen. Trading Inc. v. Yale
    Materials Handling Corp., 
    119 F.3d 1485
    , 1501-02 (11th Cir.
    1997) (same). Some courts, for instance, apply an “improper
    use” test, which asks whether a “petitioning creditor uses
    involuntary bankruptcy procedures in an attempt to obtain a
    disproportionate advantage for itself, rather than to protect
    against other creditors obtaining disproportionate advantages,
    particularly when the petitioner could have advanced its own
    interest in a different forum.” In re K.P. Enter., 
    135 B.R. 174
    , 179 n.14 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Other courts apply an “improper purpose” test,
    which looks to whether the filing “was motivated by ill will,
    malice, or a desire to embarrass or harass the alleged debtor.”
    In re 
    Bayshore, 209 F.3d at 105
    . Still others apply an
    “objective test,” which assesses what a reasonable person
    would have believed and what a reasonable person would
    have done in the creditor’s position. In re Wavelength, Inc.,
    
    61 B.R. 614
    , 620 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). And yet other
    courts have applied a broad “totality of the circumstances”
    14
    standard, which effectively combines all the tests and looks to
    both subjective and objective evidence of bad faith. In re
    John 
    Richards, 439 F.3d at 255
    n.2.
    We adopt the “totality of the circumstances” standard
    for determining bad faith under § 303. This standard is most
    suitable for evaluating the myriad ways in which creditors
    filing an involuntary petition could act in bad faith. It also is
    the same standard we apply when reviewing allegations that a
    debtor filed a voluntary petition in bad faith. See In re 
    Myers, 491 F.3d at 125
    ; In re 
    Lilley, 91 F.3d at 496
    . In conducting
    this fact-intensive review, courts may consider a number of
    factors, including, but not limited to, whether: the creditors
    satisfied the statutory criteria for filing the petition; the
    involuntary petition was meritorious; the creditors made a
    reasonable inquiry into the relevant facts and pertinent law
    before filing; there was evidence of preferential payments to
    certain creditors or of dissipation of the debtor’s assets; the
    filing was motivated by ill will or a desire to harass; the
    petitioning creditors used the filing to obtain a
    disproportionate advantage for themselves rather than to
    protect against other creditors doing the same; the filing was
    used as a tactical advantage in pending actions; the filing was
    used as a substitute for customary debt-collection procedures;
    and the filing had suspicious timing.
    Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we
    conclude that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its
    discretion in finding that Charles Dawson filed the
    involuntary petition in bad faith. In the Bankruptcy Court’s
    view, “Dawson’s prepetition conduct indicates that his
    litigation strategy was to use any means necessary to force the
    payment of the Consent Judgment and the abandonment of
    15
    Forever Green’s claims against [ProGreen].” In re Forever
    Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 
    500 B.R. 413
    , 427 (Bankr. E.D.
    Pa. 2013). In the weeks after Dawson obtained the consent
    judgment in the Louisiana Action, he filed a motion to
    terminate Forever Green’s arbitration proceedings against
    ProGreen, which arose from the separate Bucks County
    Action and sought $5 million in damages. Light on
    meritorious arguments, Dawson’s plan was to use the consent
    judgment to garnish the arbitrator’s fees, thereby forcing the
    arbitrator to halt the arbitration. Dawson and his counsel said
    they would keep the arbitration suspended until Forever
    Green paid on the consent judgment. They also threatened to
    file an involuntary petition unless Forever Green agreed to
    stop the proceedings. Keeping his word, Dawson filed an
    involuntary petition after Forever Green tried to reinstate the
    arbitration.
    As the Bankruptcy Court found, Dawson’s actions ran
    counter to the spirit of collective creditor action that should
    animate an involuntary filing. He put his own interests above
    all others. By trying to end the arbitration, Dawson was
    obstructing Forever Green from pursuing its largest asset, the
    potential proceeds of which Forever Green could have used to
    pay its creditors. He was also using the bankruptcy process to
    exert pressure on Forever Green to pay the consent judgment
    without regard to Forever Green’s other creditors, many of
    which had higher priority claims. Courts routinely find it
    improper for creditors to use the bankruptcy courts to gain a
    personal advantage in other pending actions or as a debt-
    16
    collection device.7
    Nor is there any evidence that Dawson engaged in the
    type of due diligence and sober decision-making process that
    should precede any involuntary filing. Instead, the suspicious
    timing of Dawson’s filing—days before his responsive brief
    was due in the Philadelphia Action—and his threatening
    comments to Day suggest he was just using bankruptcy as an
    alternative weapon for stopping the arbitration and cashing in
    on the consent judgment.         If Dawson had done an
    investigation prior to filing, he would have learned that
    Forever Green was not making preferential payments to its
    creditors. Although Day was using his personal assets to pay
    some of Forever Green’s creditors who also happened to be
    his creditors, the Dawsons offer no argument as to why we
    should attribute these payments to Forever Green. Further
    absent from the record is any evidence of Forever Green’s
    7
    See, e.g., In re Nordbrock, 
    772 F.2d 397
    , 400 (8th Cir.
    1985) (“A creditor does not have a special need for
    bankruptcy relief if it can go to state court to collect a debt.”);
    In re 
    Tichy, 332 B.R. at 374
    (“Bad faith has been found to
    exist when a creditor’s actions amount to an improper use of
    the Bankruptcy Code as a substitute for customary collection
    procedures.”); In re WLB-RSK Venture, 
    296 B.R. 509
    , 515
    (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[Creditor] filed this involuntary
    petition against the alleged debtor as a litigation tactic . . . .”);
    In re 
    Silverman, 230 B.R. at 53
    (“Filing an involuntary
    petition with the intent to gain a strategic advantage . . .
    constitutes an improper purpose.”); In re Dami, 
    172 B.R. 6
    ,
    10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (“Where the purpose of the
    bankruptcy filing is to defeat state court litigation without a
    [bankruptcy] purpose, bad faith exists.”).
    17
    assets depleting. The only supposed evidence of asset
    dissipation is Forever Green’s prosecution of its claims
    against ProGreen. But Forever Green is not even footing the
    bill for any of its litigation—Day is. And more importantly,
    as the Bankruptcy Court said, it is difficult to “credit[] the
    notion that the pursuit of Forever Green’s only asset that may
    yield a meaningful recovery to its creditors can be
    characterized as a dissipation of estate assets. To the
    contrary, the very act of prosecuting this claim would be
    instrumental to the marshaling of assets integral to any
    bankruptcy administration.” In re Forever 
    Green, 500 B.R. at 429-30
    . Accordingly, the record supports the Bankruptcy
    Court’s decision to dismiss the petition as a bad-faith filing.
    C.
    The Dawsons’ final argument is that, even if Charles
    Dawson acted in bad faith, other good-faith creditors should
    have been given the chance to cure the petition. This
    argument arises from 11 U.S.C. § 303(c), which provides that
    “[a]fter the filing of a petition . . . but before the case is
    dismissed or relief is ordered” other creditors may join the
    petition. This provision provides for joinder of creditors as a
    matter of right. See In re FKF Madison Park Grp. Owner,
    LLC, 
    435 B.R. 906
    , 907-08 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
    An interesting question percolating in the courts is the
    application of the so-called “bar to joinder” rule. Under this
    rule, a petition that was filed in bad faith cannot be saved by
    joining good-faith creditors under § 303(c) prior to dismissal.
    Most courts find this type of curing impermissible and would
    18
    dismiss such a petition.8 A growing minority, however, find
    this rule unjustified because it blindly lumps good- and bad-
    faith filers together and needlessly punishes everyone.9 The
    Dawsons would like us to adopt the latter view and allow
    their petition to be cured.
    We need not take a stance on this issue because, even
    if we found the “bar to joinder” rule misguided, it is too late
    for any creditor to save the petition. The text of § 303(c)
    allows creditors to join a petition “before the case is
    dismissed.” In the cases discussing the “bar to joinder” rule,
    creditors actually sought to join the involuntary petition prior
    to dismissal. The courts had to decide whether to dismiss the
    petition because of a bad-faith creditor even though other
    creditors, if allowed to join, could have cured the
    deficiencies. By contrast, there is no evidence here that any
    creditor tried to join the petition before the case was
    8
    See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Mw. Processing Co.,
    
    769 F.2d 483
    , 486 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Mylotte, David &
    Fitzpatrick, No. 07-11861, 
    2007 WL 2033812
    , at *9 (Bankr.
    E.D. Pa. July 12, 2007); In re R & A Bus. Assocs., Inc., No.
    99-2171, 
    1999 WL 820859
    , at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1999); In
    re Centennial Ins. Assocs., Inc., 
    119 B.R. 543
    , 546-47 (Bankr.
    W.D. Mich. 1990).
    9
    See, e.g., Fetner v. Haggerty, 
    99 F.3d 1180
    , 1181 (D.C. Cir.
    1996) (per curiam); In re Hrobuchak, No. 5-14-bk-02098-
    JJT, 
    2015 WL 1651074
    , at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Apr. 8,
    2015); In re Houston Reg’l Sports Network, L.P., 
    505 B.R. 468
    , 477 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014); In re 
    FKF, 435 B.R. at 908
    ; In re Kidwell, 
    158 B.R. 203
    , 207 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
    19
    dismissed, leaving only two good-faith creditors when the
    statute requires three. And there was plenty of time for Kelli
    Dawson or Cohen Seglias to recruit other potentially curing
    creditors—approximately nine months lapsed between the
    hearing on the motion to dismiss and the issuance of the
    Bankruptcy Court’s decision. Section 303(c), therefore,
    provides no aid to the Dawsons. See In re DSC, LTD., 
    486 F.3d 940
    , 948 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the language of
    § 303(c) “means that a would-be joining creditor must join, if
    at all, before the Court has dismissed an involuntary petition.”
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of
    the District Court.
    20
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-3906

Citation Numbers: 804 F.3d 328

Filed Date: 10/16/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023

Authorities (24)

Bock Transportation, Inc. v. Paul (In Re Bock ... , 327 B.R. 378 ( 2005 )

Jaffe v. Wavelength, Inc. (In Re Wavelength, Inc.) , 61 B.R. 614 ( 1986 )

In Re Ernest R. Lilley, Jr., Debtor. Ernest R. Lilley, Jr. , 91 F.3d 491 ( 1996 )

in-re-sgl-carbon-corporation-debtor-official-committee-of-unsecured , 200 F.3d 154 ( 1999 )

in-re-bayshore-wire-products-corp-debtor-lubow-machine-co-inc-and , 209 F.3d 100 ( 2000 )

In Re: Ronald M. Tamecki, Sr., Debtor Ronald M. Tamecki, Sr.... , 229 F.3d 205 ( 2000 )

In Re Dsc, Ltd., a Michigan Corporation, Debtor. Riverview ... , 486 F.3d 940 ( 2007 )

In the Matter of Little Creek Development Company, Debtor. ... , 779 F.2d 1068 ( 1986 )

In Re John Richards Homes Building Co., L.L.C., Debtor. ... , 439 F.3d 248 ( 2006 )

13-collier-bankrcas2d-500-bankr-l-rep-p-70666-basin-electric-power , 769 F.2d 483 ( 1985 )

in-re-integrated-telecom-express-inc-aka-integrated-technology , 384 F.3d 108 ( 2004 )

in-re-kenneth-zinchiak-dba-zinchiak-manufacturing-co-debtor-kenneth , 406 F.3d 214 ( 2005 )

in-re-zadock-reid-debtor-appellant-dale-r-schmid-dds-ralph-f , 773 F.2d 945 ( 1985 )

In Re Margaret J. Myers, Debtor. Margaret J. Myers , 491 F.3d 120 ( 2007 )

In Re KP Enterprise , 135 B.R. 174 ( 1992 )

In Re Centennial Ins. Associates, Inc. , 119 B.R. 543 ( 1990 )

In Re Manhattan Industries, Inc. , 224 B.R. 195 ( 1997 )

In Re Wlb-Rsk Venture , 296 B.R. 509 ( 2003 )

bankr-l-rep-p-70651-in-re-gerald-l-nordbrock-debtor-bankers-trust , 772 F.2d 397 ( 1985 )

In Re Fkf Madison Park Group Owner, LLC , 435 B.R. 906 ( 2010 )

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