Shawn Little v. Gregory Hammond ( 2018 )

ALD-219 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-1463
___________
SHAWN DOUGLAS LITTLE,
Appellant
v.
GREGORY J. HAMMOND;
37TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WARREN COUNTY COURTHOUSE;
EVA C. STROUP; ANDMORGAN C. THOMAS;
SHAWN M. ESTES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 16-cv-00107)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect,
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 24, 2018
Before: MCKEE, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 6, 2018)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Appellant Shawn Douglas Little appeals from the order of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil action.
Little’s complaint contained allegations of conspiracy, illegal actions, constitutional
violations, and other wrongdoing relating to his criminal and child custody proceedings
in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas, the 37th Judicial District of Pennsylvania
(“the 37th Judicial District”). We will affirm.
We briefly summarize Little’s complaint. The defendants include the 37th
Judicial District and Judge Gregory J. Hammond. Judge Hammond presided over several
of Little’s criminal proceedings. According to Little, Judge Hammond was displeased by
Little’s acquittal in one case, leading to retaliation against Little and civil liberties
deprivations. As an example, Little stated that, at a hearing on post-sentence motions,
Judge Hammond entered a sentencing condition that he have no contact with his children,
evidencing gender-based discrimination in favor of Little’s former wife, Eva Stroup.
Little also named Stroup as a defendant, because the prosecution argued for the
sentencing condition upon Stroup’s request. Little also named as a defendant Shawn M.
Estes, the presiding hearing officer in the child custody dispute, who allegedly altered or
omitted hearing testimony from a transcript when issuing his case report in order to
deprive Little of his constitutional rights. As for the 37th Judicial District, Little asserted
that it allowed the constitutional violations to occur. Lastly, Little included among the
defendants Andmoragan Thomas, who was Judge Hammond’s law clerk during Little’s
2
criminal proceedings; Thomas later began employment with the law firm representing
Judge Hammond, and she also became Stroup’s attorney in the child custody dispute.
Little alleged that the defendants acted in concert and were responsible for loss of
liberty, libel and discrimination, due process and equal protection violations, and
“vindictive persecution/prosecution.” (Complaint ¶III.) As relief, Little sought a cease
and desist order, change of venue of his state court proceedings to a court outside of
Warren County, sanctions imposed on the defendants, and damages.
All of the defendants filed motions to dismiss, and Little filed responses to each
motion. The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1). The Magistrate Judge granted the motions to dismiss and dismissed all of
Little’s claims. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Judge Hammond, Hearing Officer
Estes, and the 37th Judicial District were entitled to judicial immunity, and that Thomas
was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for actions taken during her employment as Judge
Hammond’s law clerk. Concerning Stroup and Thomas, the Magistrate Judge concluded
that Little’s claims failed because they are not state actors for purposes of liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and because the allegations were insufficient to state a claim for relief.
This appeal followed.
First, we consider the question of our appellate jurisdiction. Initially, it appeared
that Little’s notice of appeal was untimely, as it was filed beyond the time allowed under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A). Because Little’s notice of appeal
contained allegations and exhibits germane to the question of timeliness, we held this
3
appeal in abeyance and remanded the matter to the District Court for determination
whether cause existed to extend or reopen the time for filing a notice of appeal pursuant
to Rule 4(a)(5) or Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Following
an evidentiary hearing and consideration of supplementary record materials submitted by
Little, the Magistrate Judge granted relief under Rule 4(a)(5). In light of this ruling, the
timing of Little’s notice of appeal no longer presents a jurisdictional hurdle.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 US.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s dismissal order. See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d
Cir. 1996). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)).
Upon review, we conclude that the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint was
appropriate. It is well-settled that a judge is immune from suit for monetary damages
arising from judicial acts, unless those actions are “taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S 9, 12 (1991). “A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess
of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Little’s complaint
concerns Judge Hammond’s actions while engaging in judicial actions as a state court
judge, and Judge Hammond is immune from suit. Indeed, Little conceded this point in
his response in opposition to Thomas’s motion to dismiss. (See Response, Docket #42 at
4
3.) To the extent that Little’s complaint sought injunctive relief, such relief is foreclosed
by the text of § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04
(3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (explaining that “injunctive relief shall not be granted” in a
§ 1983 action against a state or federal judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity. . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable”). Also, we agree that Thomas is entitled to immunity for actions
taken in her capacity as Judge Hammond’s law clerk, see, e.g., Gollomp v. Spitzer,
568 F.3d 355, 365 (2d Cir. 2009), and that Estes has immunity for actions taken while
conducting proceedings as a hearing officer assigned to Little and Stroup’s child custody
case, see Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2001); Gallas v. Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000).
We conclude that dismissal of the complaint as to the 37th Judicial District was
appropriate, but for different reasons. Absent a state’s consent, the Eleventh Amendment
generally bars a civil rights suit in federal court that names the state as a defendant;
Pennsylvania specifically has withheld consent pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 8521(b). See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981). As argued by
the 37th Judicial District, Pennsylvania’s judicial districts are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d
193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008); Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d. 233, 240-41 (3d
Cir. 2005) (recognizing that Pennsylvania judicial districts are state entities). Moreover,
5
the 37th Judicial District is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989).
We now turn to the remaining allegations concerning Thomas and Stroup. Little
did not contend that they are state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability. Rather, Little
alleged that they acted under color of state law by virtue of a conspiracy with the state
court defendants. Although a private party who conspires with a state official to act in
violation of another’s constitutional rights can be liable under § 1983, proof of the
conspiracy is required to show that the private party acted under color of state law.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). We agree with the Magistrate
Judge’s conclusion that Little’s complaint did not present a sufficient factual basis for a
civil rights conspiracy claim concerning Thomas or Stroup. In support of his allegation
that Thomas and Stroup acted in concert with Judge Hammond, Little cited Thomas’s
employment history with Judge Hammond, her attorney-client relationship with Stroup,
and her employment with the same law firm that represents Judge Hammond. Little’s
description of the Thomas’s and Stroup’s actions does not support an inference that they
had formed a conspiratorial agreement with Judge Hammond, which is required to
properly plead the existence of an unconstitutional conspiracy. See Great W. Mining &
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010). As alleged in his
pleadings, Little’s conspiracy claim appears to stem from his suspicions arising from
Thomas’s employment history. However, speculations do not suffice for pleading the
existence of a conspiracy between a private party and a judge, even when a “strong
6
appearance of impropriety” is suggested. See id. at 178-79 (distinguishing Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), noting the absence of allegations of specific conduct by the
private parties that caused the judges to enter into a conspiracy).
Furthermore, we note that Little alleged that “the defendants” engaged in a cover-
up concerning what transpired at the hearing before Hearing Officer Estes, for which the
record of proceedings was lost or destroyed. (Mem. In Support of Complaint,
unnumbered p.13.) Aside from stating that “the defendants” notified the presiding judge
that the recording was unavailable, Little does not allege any specific conduct by Thomas
or Stroup to support an inference that they formed a conspiratorial agreement with Estes
or another judicial defendant. See Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28 (“merely resorting to the courts
and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a
joint actor with the judge”).
Because no substantial question is presented in this appeal, we will affirm the
judgment entered in the District Court. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
7