Jane Orie v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm ( 2019 )


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  •                                         PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No. 16-1685
    _______________
    JANE C. ORIE,
    Appellant
    v.
    SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS
    _______________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2-15-cv-01153)
    Magistrate Judge: Honorable Robert C. Mitchell
    _______________
    Argued June 5, 2019
    Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and MATEY, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: )
    _______________
    William C. Costopoulos [ARGUED]
    Costopoulos Foster & Fields
    831 Market Street
    P.O. Box 222
    Lemoyne, PA 17043
    Counsel for Appellants
    Ronald M. Wabby, Jr.      [ARGUED]
    Allegheny County Office of District Attorney
    436 Grant Street
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Counsel for Appellees
    _______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _______________
    BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
    Forging evidence is one way to get a mistrial. Jane Orie, a
    former Pennsylvania state senator, introduced forged evidence
    at her trial in state court. So the judge declared a mistrial. (The
    exhibits that triggered the mistrial are appended to this opin-
    ion.) During Orie’s second trial, the court excluded her expert
    witness because his testimony would have been irrelevant. Af-
    ter her second trial, a jury convicted her of forgery, theft of
    services, Pennsylvania Ethics Act violations, and related
    crimes. Orie now brings a federal habeas petition challenging
    these convictions.
    We hold that Orie’s convictions do not warrant habeas re-
    lief. To start, we lack jurisdiction to consider her challenge to
    her Ethics Act convictions because she is not in custody for
    those convictions. On the merits, the state appellate court rea-
    sonably upheld the trial court’s finding that a mistrial was
    2
    manifestly necessary because the forged documents could have
    tainted the jury’s verdict. So the mistrial and retrial did not
    amount to double jeopardy. And Orie did not show that her
    senate-rules expert’s testimony would have been material, so
    she had no constitutional right to call this witness. As to the
    Ethics Act convictions, we will thus vacate and remand with
    instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We will other-
    wise affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Orie used her government-funded legislative staff to do po-
    litical fundraising and campaigning for her reelection. When
    the Commonwealth started investigating that behavior and
    other alleged misconduct, she tried to hide and destroy docu-
    ments. The Commonwealth then charged Orie with several
    crimes related to using state employees for personal gain and
    later trying to cover it up. Her sisters, Joan Orie Melvin, a
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice, and Janine Orie, Mel-
    vin’s aide, were charged with similar crimes.
    A. Orie’s first trial and the forged exhibits
    In February 2011, Orie’s case went to trial in Pennsylvania
    state court. At trial, she argued that she had consistently in-
    structed her staff not to do political work on legislative time.
    She accused her chief of staff, Jamie Pavlot, of disobeying her
    instructions by letting staff do campaign work on the taxpay-
    ers’ dime. Orie introduced and authenticated a number of ex-
    hibits with directives from her to Pavlot not to do political work
    on legislative time. But Orie claimed that Pavlot disregarded
    these directives.
    3
    Pavlot, who testified for the prosecution, said she did not
    recall seeing these directives. Orie’s lawyer found this incred-
    ible. Both in his cross-examination of her and in his closing
    argument, he repeatedly questioned Pavlot’s failure to recog-
    nize the documents.
    But the prosecution quickly determined that at least two of
    these exhibits had forged signatures. See infra Appendix. Dur-
    ing the cross-examination of Orie, the prosecution pointed out
    that Pavlot’s signature line on one exhibit did not line up with
    the other words on the page. See infra Appendix Ex. 101B. And
    the prosecution claims that it noticed during jury deliberations
    that Pavlot’s signature on a different exhibit seemed to have
    been copied and pasted from another document. Compare infra
    Appendix Ex. 101A (original signature), with id. Ex. 110 (cop-
    ied-and-pasted signature). The prosecution made this discov-
    ery only three days after the defense belatedly turned over these
    exhibits.
    The court immediately held a hearing to figure out what to
    do about the alleged forgeries. At the hearing, the prosecution
    called a handwriting expert, who testified that the signatures
    on the documents had been copied and pasted. The defense
    chose neither to cross-examine the prosecution’s expert nor to
    introduce any evidence to contradict the expert’s testimony.
    The prosecution asked the court to give the jury a special in-
    struction on these forged documents. The defense objected to
    any new jury instructions, saying that it would prefer a mistrial
    to a new instruction. But Orie also objected to a mistrial and
    simply asked that jury deliberations resume. The court found
    that the forged documents were “a fraud on the Court,” the
    4
    jury, and the justice system; “call[ed] into suspicion every doc-
    ument that the defense offered”; and could undermine any ver-
    dict that the jury might reach. App. 1573a. So it declared a mis-
    trial.
    After the mistrial, the prosecution had the Secret Service
    test the authenticity of thirty-four original defense exhibits.
    The Secret Service found that well over a dozen of these ex-
    hibits had handwriting that “may have been reproduced via
    photocopies.” App. 1695a. It also found evidence that Pavlot’s
    signature had been copied and pasted into three exhibits. As
    discussed below, after her second trial, Orie was convicted of
    forgery and evidence tampering for introducing fake exhibits
    during her first trial.
    B. Orie’s second trial and exclusion of her expert
    witness
    In February 2012, Orie went to trial again on both her orig-
    inal charges and new charges related to the fake exhibits. Dur-
    ing this second trial, the prosecution called an expert who tes-
    tified that Orie’s office lease barred her staff from using that
    office for anything besides legislative work. Orie asked to call
    an expert in rebuttal. She said that her expert would testify that
    the senate rules let staff do political work from senators’ legis-
    lative offices on comp time. (Compensatory time, often called
    comp time, is time that an employee may take off work in re-
    turn for having worked extra hours. See, e.g., 
    29 U.S.C. § 207
    (o).)
    The prosecution argued that the senate rules were irrele-
    vant. It pointed out that Orie’s behavior could break the law
    5
    even if her behavior did not violate the senate rules. The court
    agreed. The court also worried that the jury might think her
    expert was opining on the law. So it excluded her senate-rules
    expert.
    The jury convicted Orie of theft of services, conspiracy to
    commit theft of services, evidence tampering, and forgery. It
    also convicted her of using her political position for personal
    gain, in violation of the Pennsylvania Ethics Act, 
    65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1103
    (a) (conflict of interest). See also 
    id.
     § 1102 (defin-
    ing conflict of interest). The court sentenced Orie to prison for
    her theft-of-services, conspiracy, evidence-tampering, and for-
    gery convictions. But on the Ethics Act convictions, it imposed
    “[n]o further penalty.” App. 1066a; see Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9723.
    C. Post-conviction proceedings
    Orie appealed her convictions in state court, but to no avail.
    Commonwealth v. Orie, 
    88 A.3d 983
     (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal
    denied, 
    99 A.3d 925
     (Pa. 2014). She then filed this federal ha-
    beas petition, which the District Court rejected on the merits.
    We granted a certificate of appealability. On appeal, she makes
    three arguments: first, that the Pennsylvania Ethics Act is un-
    constitutionally vague; second, that her retrial violated the
    Double Jeopardy Clause; and third, that excluding her senate-
    rules expert violated her constitutional right to call witnesses
    in her defense.
    Besides disputing these claims on the merits, the Common-
    wealth raises two procedural issues: First, it argues that we lack
    jurisdiction over Orie’s Ethics Act claim, because she received
    no further penalty. Second, it argues that she failed to exhaust
    6
    her Sixth Amendment claim. Her habeas appeal was consoli-
    dated with those of her sisters, who were also convicted of var-
    ious crimes. We will issue separate opinions in each case.
    D. Standard of review
    On federal habeas review of state convictions, we defer to
    state courts. “[W]e review the ‘last reasoned decision’ of the
    state courts on the petitioner’s claims.” Simmons v. Beard, 
    590 F.3d 223
    , 231–32 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Bond v. Beard, 
    539 F.3d 256
    , 289–90 (3d Cir. 2008)). We must presume that the
    state court’s factual findings are correct. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (e)(1). A petitioner can rebut this presumption only by
    offering “clear and convincing evidence.” 
    Id.
    We also defer to state courts on issues of law: We must up-
    hold their decisions of law unless they are “contrary to, or in-
    volve[ ] an unreasonable application of, clearly established
    Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
    States.” 
    Id.
     § 2254(d)(1). So on federal habeas, “even ‘clear er-
    ror’ will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 
    572 U.S. 415
    , 419
    (2014) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 
    538 U.S. 63
    , 75–76
    (2003)). Instead, the state court must be wrong “beyond any
    possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 420 (quoting
    Harrington v. Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 103 (2011)).
    II. WE LACK JURISDICTION OVER ORIE’S
    ETHICS ACT CLAIM
    Orie is not in custody for her Pennsylvania Ethics Act con-
    victions. We thus lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of her
    claim that the Ethics Act is unconstitutionally vague.
    7
    A federal court has habeas jurisdiction only if the petitioner
    is “in custody.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (a). She is in custody when
    she suffers a “non-negligible restraint on [her] physical liberty”
    because of a particular conviction. Piasecki v. Court of Com-
    mon Pleas, 
    917 F.3d 161
    , 166 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quota-
    tion marks omitted). We gauge custody for each offense inde-
    pendently. Maleng v. Cook, 
    490 U.S. 488
    , 490–92 (1989). In
    other words, a defendant convicted of multiple offenses can be
    in custody for one but not for another.
    Orie was sentenced to “[n]o further penalty” on her Ethics
    Act convictions. App. 1066a. She received no sentence of in-
    carceration or confinement of any kind on those counts. So
    Orie suffered no physical restraint and thus was never in cus-
    tody for these offenses.
    Orie claims she was in custody for her Ethics Act convic-
    tions because she suffered one “general sentence” for all her
    offenses. Appellant’s Br. 24. But her sentencing order imposed
    a discrete sentence for each count of conviction. And the order
    said that she would not be punished beyond a determination of
    guilt for her Ethics Act convictions.
    Orie also argues that she was in custody for her Ethics Act
    convictions because her conspiracy and theft-of-services con-
    victions were “predicated” on her Ethics Act convictions. 
    Id.
    This argument fails as well. Her conspiracy conviction was
    predicated instead on her agreement to commit theft of ser-
    vices. And the theft-of-services statute does not depend on any
    other offense. See 
    18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3926
    (b). Her convictions
    may have been based on the same behavior, but Orie’s Ethics
    Act convictions were separate from her other convictions. She
    8
    is in custody for her conspiracy and theft-of-services convic-
    tions, not her Ethics Act convictions. We thus lack habeas ju-
    risdiction over her Ethics Act claim.
    III. THE SUPERIOR COURT PROPERLY UPHELD
    ORIE’S RETRIAL
    The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause ordinarily
    bars retrials. But a retrial after a mistrial does not amount to
    double jeopardy when the mistrial was manifestly necessary.
    Arizona v. Washington, 
    434 U.S. 497
    , 505 (1978). Though
    manifest necessity requires a “high degree of necessity,” mak-
    ing that judgment call is “reserved to the broad discretion of
    the trial judge.” Renico v. Lett, 
    559 U.S. 766
    , 774 (2010) (in-
    ternal quotation marks omitted). We scrutinize a mistrial more
    closely if the trial judge has not exercised his “sound discre-
    tion” or if the prosecutor appears to be “harass[ing]” or gaining
    a “tactical advantage over the accused.” Arizona v. Washing-
    ton, 
    434 U.S. at 508
    , 510 n.28. But absent such prosecutorial
    misconduct, if a trial judge grants a mistrial to prevent a jury
    verdict from being tainted by other trial misconduct, that judg-
    ment “is entitled to special respect.” 
    Id. at 510
    .
    We are even more deferential on federal habeas review. We
    look to the last reasoned state-court decision, which here is the
    Pennsylvania Superior Court’s affirmance on direct appeal.
    We do not ask whether the trial judge should have declared a
    mistrial, nor whether it abused its discretion by doing so. Ra-
    ther, we ask only whether the state appellate court’s finding
    that there was no abuse of discretion was “an unreasonable ap-
    plication of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined
    9
    by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1); accord Renico, 
    559 U.S. at
    772–73.
    A. The Superior Court’s decision was reasonable
    The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision more than sat-
    isfies our deferential standard of review. To begin, it reasona-
    bly set forth the federal principles governing appeals of a man-
    ifest-necessity finding. It explained that it was reviewing for
    abuse of discretion, deferring to the trial court’s superior ability
    to gauge potential bias and jury prejudice. 
    88 A.3d at
    995–97;
    see Renico, 
    559 U.S. at
    772–73 (standard of review); Arizona
    v. Washington, 
    434 U.S. at 510
     (deference). And it warned that
    trial courts should not declare mistrials too readily and should
    resolve any doubts in favor of the defendant. 
    88 A.3d at 996
    ;
    see Renico, 
    559 U.S. at
    772–74.
    Next, the Superior Court reasoned that the trial court had
    legal authority to grant a mistrial once it discovered that the
    exhibits were forged. It reasonably held that “[o]nce the trial
    judge realized forged documents had been admitted into evi-
    dence, he could not allow those documents to enter into the
    jury’s deliberation and verdict.” 
    88 A.3d at 998
    . No Supreme
    Court case suggests otherwise. On the contrary, in so holding,
    the Superior Court cited and reasonably interpreted the Su-
    preme Court’s guidance. See 
    id.
     (citing trial court’s opinion as
    in turn citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,
    
    322 U.S. 238
     (1944)); see also Hazel-Atlas, 
    322 U.S. at 246
    (“The public welfare demands that the agencies of public jus-
    tice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and help-
    less victims of deception and fraud.”).
    10
    The Superior Court also reasonably upheld the trial court’s
    “initial factual determination that the documents were forger-
    ies.” 
    88 A.3d at
    998–99. In doing so, it made a series of rea-
    sonable observations: The jury did not have enough evidence
    to resolve that question. 
    Id. at 998
    . Though the prosecution
    brought out Exhibit 101B’s defects on cross-examination of
    Orie, it did not discover Exhibit 110’s forgery until after the
    jury had started deliberating. 
    Id.
     The jury was never instructed
    what to do if it found that documents were forged. 
    Id.
     And be-
    cause the defense did not let the prosecution inspect the docu-
    ments until the second-to-last day of trial, the prosecution
    could not have discovered the forgeries earlier. So the prose-
    cution could not introduce evidence to help the jury evaluate
    the exhibits. 
    Id.
     at 998–99. The record amply supports each of
    these observations.
    Further, the Superior Court reasoned that the forged exhib-
    its were material to the trial’s outcome. As it noted, Orie had
    argued “that Pavlot had the complete authority to direct the
    staffers and that Pavlot acted on her own initiative and against
    Orie’s directives that no improper political activity occur in the
    office.” 
    Id. at 999
    . The forged documents supported that read-
    ing. Orie had introduced these documents to show that Pavlot
    had disobeyed Orie’s directives and let the staff do campaign
    work on legislative time. These and similar documents were
    the basis of Orie’s argument to the jury that Pavlot, not Orie,
    was responsible for the staffers’ actions. And when Pavlot
    could not remember any of the directives on cross-examina-
    tion, the defense impugned her credibility.
    11
    Pavlot’s credibility was at the heart of the case. As Orie’s
    lawyer argued in closing, “[t]he Commonwealth’s case rises
    and falls on [Pavlot’s] truthfulness.” Tr. Pt. 7, 1st Trial (Mar.
    2, 2011), p. 3180. So Pavlot’s forged signatures on those doc-
    uments greatly inflated the force of Orie’s arguments and her
    cross-examination of Pavlot.
    Finally, the Superior Court emphasized that while the trial
    court had solicited and weighed alternative remedies, it had
    reasonably found that nothing short of a mistrial would coun-
    teract the fraud. 
    88 A.3d at
    998–99. That reasoning is sound.
    The trial court repeatedly asked the parties what it should do
    about the forgeries, both before and after hearing from the
    handwriting expert. Twice, the prosecution suggested a cura-
    tive instruction. But twice, the defense balked, insisting that
    “[b]efore you do that then declare a mistrial” and that giving
    an instruction “is absolutely not an option here.” App. 1557a,
    1571a. Orie’s only proposed remedy, as the Superior Court
    noted, was to do nothing. See 
    88 A.3d at
    999 & n.13; see also
    App. 1572a (“We are asking that [the jury’s] deliberations re-
    sume immediately, and we are opposed to a mistrial.”). Given
    the importance of the forged documents, the threat to the integ-
    rity of the verdict, and the lack of a good alternative remedy,
    the only solution was a mistrial. So we cannot say that the Su-
    perior Court’s decision to uphold the grant of a mistrial was
    unreasonable.
    B. Orie’s objections fail
    Orie challenges the decision upholding the mistrial on five
    grounds. Not one succeeds.
    12
    First, she criticizes the trial court’s decision to halt jury de-
    liberations and seize the questioned exhibits after speaking
    only with the prosecution. But even if that is what happened,
    there is nothing wrong with that. When they learn of possible
    misconduct, judges often tell juries to stop deliberating without
    first telling counsel. E.g., United States v. Bristol-Mártir, 
    570 F.3d 29
    , 36 (1st Cir. 2009). To resolve the forgery allegation
    here, the trial court needed the challenged exhibits, which the
    jury had. And there is no reason to think that asking for a pause
    caused incurable harm. The trial court told the jury only that
    “there is a legal matter before the Court” and warned the bailiff
    to retrieve the exhibits without talking to anyone. App. 1541a.
    Besides, there was no significant ex parte communication.
    The prosecutor said exactly two sentences to the judge before
    the judge told him to wait for defense counsel. When the judge
    told him to wait, “[d]efense counsel was just entering the court-
    room.” App. 1589a. The judge did not see the forged docu-
    ments, hear the prosecutor’s arguments, or start to discuss a
    mistrial before defense counsel got there. Nor is there any ban
    on declaring a mistrial sua sponte. United States v. Wecht, 
    541 F.3d 493
    , 504 (3d Cir. 2008).
    Second, Orie claims that the prosecution had repeatedly
    questioned the defense exhibits’ credibility and meaning, so
    the jury was already on notice of potential forgery. But ques-
    tioning evidence’s credibility and meaning is quite different
    from showing that it is forged. The specter of forged trial ex-
    hibits came up only briefly at trial—most notably when the
    prosecution questioned Exhibit 101B’s authenticity on cross-
    examination.
    13
    Third, Orie argues that the trial judge usurped the jury’s
    factfinding role. She argues that the jury should have decided
    the question of forgery, not the judge. But there is no legal or
    logical reason why courts cannot find facts in granting mistri-
    als. Indeed, they must do so, especially where the impropriety
    giving rise to the mistrial could prejudice the jury.
    Fourth, Orie blames the prosecution for seeking a tactical
    advantage and intentionally provoking a mistrial. But the pros-
    ecution never asked for a mistrial, even after the court dis-
    cussed that possibility and even after the handwriting expert
    testified. Indeed, the remedies it did request were quite tame
    and reasonable. At first, it asked the court to instruct the jury
    to compare the two signatures and draw its own conclusions.
    After the expert testified, the prosecution sought an instruction
    or stipulation that the documents were forged and an instruc-
    tion to consider the significance of the forgery. But Orie re-
    fused to consider these options, instead preferring a mistrial. If
    anyone provoked a mistrial, it was Orie herself.
    Finally, Orie says that the trial court erred by “convicting”
    her of forgery and fraud without evidence that she intentionally
    did anything wrong. Appellant’s Br. 50. She also objects that
    Pavlot had custody of the documents and so she could have
    been responsible for the forgery. But the trial court never ac-
    cused Orie herself of forgery. Rather, it said: “I don’t know
    who among the parties involved for the defense has done this,
    but I cannot allow this jury to continue with fraudulent infor-
    mation in front of them.” App. 1573a.
    What is more, the trial court acted reasonably in blaming
    the defense for the forgeries. Orie’s counsel told the court that
    14
    the documents “were and are in [the defense’s] possession” un-
    til trial; the prosecution said that, as far as it knew, the docu-
    ments had come from Orie’s office; and Orie never contested
    that statement. App. 1555a.
    In short, we see no basis to disturb the Superior Court’s re-
    jection of Orie’s double-jeopardy claim.
    IV. EXCLUDING ORIE’S ETHICS EXPERT WAS PROPER
    Orie argues that the trial court violated her constitutional
    right to present her defense by excluding her expert witness on
    the senate rules. Though Orie may not have preserved this
    claim, the Commonwealth waived the exhaustion requirement.
    Still, this claim is meritless. She had no right to call her witness
    because the witness’s testimony would have been immaterial.
    A. We will address the merits of Orie’s constitutional
    claim
    The Commonwealth waived its argument that Orie did not
    exhaust her constitutional claim. Before we can review a state
    habeas petition, the petitioner must first exhaust her state rem-
    edies. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (b)(1)(A). But a state can waive exhaus-
    tion if it does so explicitly through counsel. 
    Id.
     § 2254(b)(3).
    That waiver is valid even when lack of exhaustion would oth-
    erwise have barred the petitioner’s claim. Sharrieff v. Cathel,
    
    574 F.3d 225
    , 229 (3d Cir. 2009).
    Here, in its answer to Orie’s habeas petition, the Common-
    wealth waived the exhaustion requirement. It conceded that
    “Petitioner’s claims are exhausted” and “Petitioner’s claims
    are not procedurally defaulted.” D.C. ECF No. 64, pp. 34–35.
    15
    These statements were in the answer signed by the Common-
    wealth’s counsel and filed in the District Court. So the Com-
    monwealth waived exhaustion. We will decide her claim on the
    merits.
    The parties quibble over whether Orie’s constitutional
    claim was before the Superior Court. Orie insists that she has
    all along framed her challenge to the expert’s exclusion in con-
    stitutional terms. (She now phrases it primarily in terms of the
    Sixth Amendment, but also touches lightly on due process.)
    The Commonwealth tells us that in state court, Orie made only
    an evidentiary argument. And the Superior Court, for its part,
    reasoned in evidentiary terms. 
    88 A.3d at
    1000–01.
    But we need not decide whether the Superior Court’s ruling
    implicitly addressed the merits of Orie’s constitutional argu-
    ment, and so would merit deference on habeas. Whether habeas
    deference applies or not, the trial court’s exclusion of the evi-
    dence did not violate the Constitution. See Berghuis v. Thomp-
    kins, 
    560 U.S. 370
    , 390 (2010).
    We have seen “apparently little, if any, difference in the
    analysis” of excluding evidence under compulsory process or
    due process. Gov’t of the V.I. v. Mills, 
    956 F.2d 443
    , 445 n.4
    (3d Cir. 1992). So we will focus, as Orie does, on the Sixth
    Amendment.
    B. Orie had no right to put on a senate-rules expert
    because his testimony would not have been material
    to her trial
    Orie’s senate-rules expert would not have offered material
    testimony, so she had no Sixth Amendment right to call him.
    16
    The Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause guar-
    antees a defendant the right to call witnesses in her defense.
    Washington v. Texas, 
    388 U.S. 14
    , 19 (1967). But it does not
    give a defendant the right to introduce any testimony she likes.
    Taylor v. Illinois, 
    484 U.S. 400
    , 410 (1988). Courts may ex-
    clude incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible testi-
    mony under the rules of evidence. Id.; Montana v. Egelhoff,
    
    518 U.S. 37
    , 42 (1996).
    To make out a violation of this Sixth Amendment right to
    compulsory process, the defendant must show that the wit-
    ness’s “testimony would have been both material and favorable
    to [the] defense.” United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 
    458 U.S. 858
    , 867 (1982). Not all relevant evidence is material. To be
    material, it must be reasonably likely to affect the trial’s out-
    come. 
    Id.
     at 873–77.
    Orie’s expert testimony was unlikely to affect her trial’s
    outcome. Her witness was an expert on the senate’s rules. He
    would have testified that these rules let staff do political work
    in legislative offices using comp time. But Orie was not ac-
    cused of telling her staff to do political work during comp time.
    Orie conceded as much. So the jury could not have convicted
    her for that. Instead, to convict, the jury had to find that she
    told her staff to do political work on the state’s time. And her
    expert testimony about what employees could do on comp time
    could not have affected that finding.
    Orie’s rejoinder depends on a misreading of the record. She
    argues that the prosecution’s expert had inaccurately testified
    that the senate rules forbade all political work in legislative of-
    fices. So, she says, she needed her expert to rebut that
    17
    falsehood. But the prosecution’s expert never made such a
    statement. The prosecution’s expert had testified that Orie’s of-
    fice lease, not the senate rules, barred using the office for any-
    thing but legislative work. So her expert would not have rebut-
    ted the prosecution’s expert.
    Not only was Orie’s expert testimony immaterial, but it
    could have confused the jury. Judges may exclude evidence
    that risks “confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.” Pa.
    R. Evid. 403. Her expert could have led the jury to confuse
    what the senate rules allowed with what Pennsylvania law al-
    lowed. The trial court wanted the jury to learn the law from the
    court’s instructions rather than from a witness’s testimony. The
    court’s reasonable exclusion of evidence under the “standard
    rules of evidence” does not violate the Sixth Amendment.
    Egelhoff, 
    518 U.S. at 42
     (quoting Taylor, 
    484 U.S. at 410
    ).
    * * * * *
    All three of Orie’s arguments fail. She is not in custody for
    her Ethics Act convictions, so we lack jurisdiction to hear her
    challenge to that statute. The Superior Court reasonably af-
    firmed the trial court’s finding that the forged documents made
    a mistrial manifestly necessary, so retrying her did not amount
    to double jeopardy. And Orie’s expert testimony about senate
    rules was immaterial to her case, so excluding her expert wit-
    ness did not violate her constitutional right to put on her de-
    fense. As to the Ethics Act convictions, we will thus vacate and
    remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We
    will otherwise affirm.
    18
    Appendix
    Exhibit 101A
    (Compare Pavlot’s signature with Exhibit 110)
    19
    Exhibit 101B
    20
    Exhibit 110
    (Compare Pavlot’s signature with Exhibit 101A)
    21