A. H. v. Colonial School District ( 2019 )


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  •                                                           NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 18-2698
    _____________
    A. H., by and through her Parent, K. P.,
    Appellants
    v.
    COLONIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware
    District Court No. 1-16-cv-00726
    District Judge: The Honorable Richard G. Andrews
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    June 24, 2019
    Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, and GREENAWAY, JR.,
    Circuit Judges
    (Filed: July 10, 2019)
    _____________________
    OPINION*
    _____________________
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
    not constitute binding precedent.
    SMITH, Chief Judge.
    A.H., a minor student (Student), by and through K.P, her parent (Parent),
    initiated this civil action pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
    (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Parent challenged the refusal of the Colonial
    School District (Colonial) to provide, at public expense, an Independent Educational
    Evaluation (IEE). After the District Court ruled in favor of Colonial, this timely
    appeal followed.1 For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment of
    the District Court.
    I.
    Student started kindergarten in 2011 at Colonial. By the fall of 2014, Student
    was repeating second grade. In mid-September, an Evaluation Summary Report
    (ESR) was prepared to determine whether Student had a disability under the IDEA
    and if so, her educational needs. The ESR set out:
    1.   information from Parent regarding Student’s family life;
    2.   classroom behavior and performance;
    3.   teacher observations;
    4.   an occupational therapy assessment addressing Student’s visual perceptual
    skills, fine motor skills, visual motor skills, and educational needs related to
    school-based occupational therapy; and
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 20 U.S.C.
    § 1415(i)(2). We have final order jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    2
    5. the assessment by school psychologist, Emily Klein, based on not only
    interviews with Student, Parent, teacher, and her own observation, but also a
    review of Student’s record and several assessment tests.2
    Ms. Klein’s report acknowledged that Student’s cognitive ability and academic skills
    were a concern and that her emotional/behavioral needs, which included disruptive
    and atypical behaviors, affected her classroom functioning.          The ESR team
    concluded that Student had an Emotional Disturbance, which qualified as a
    disability. The ESR discussed the focus on Student’s emotional and behavioral
    difficulties, and acknowledged that although Student displayed some aspects
    consistent with an Autism Spectrum Disorder, the team believed that classifying
    Student with an Emotional Disturbance was the most appropriate determination at
    that time given her history of trauma and abuse. After completing the ESR, the team
    prepared an Individualized Education Program (IEP).
    Student advanced to third grade in the fall of 2015. Documentation on
    October 1, 2015, noted that Student’s behavior was problematic with outbursts and
    conduct that created safety concerns for Student and others present. Two weeks
    later, Student’s behavior was again disruptive and she used a threatening gesture that
    was accompanied by an oral statement of her intent to kill those present. Student
    2
    The tests included the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, 5th Edition (SB-V); the
    Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement, 2nd edition (KTEA-II); the Behavior
    Assessment Scale for Children – 2nd Edition (BASC-2); and the Gilliam Asperger’s
    Disorder Scale (GADS).
    3
    was admitted to the Terry Children’s Psychiatric Center and diagnosed with a mood
    disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; psychiatric medication was
    prescribed. After a week, Student was discharged. Arrangements were made for
    homebound instruction. Student’s placement later changed to Southern Elementary
    School Intensive Learning Center.
    Thereafter, Parent advised Colonial that she disagreed with the September
    2014 ESR and requested that the school pay for an IEE assessing Student in the
    following areas: neuropsychological assessment, occupational therapy, psychiatric
    assessment, and a functional behavior assessment. Colonial denied the request. In
    early February 2016, Colonial requested a due process hearing before a Delaware
    Due Process Hearing Panel. Colonial continued to update its evaluations and
    assessment of Student’s abilities.
    At the April 2016 Due Process Hearing, several witnesses appeared for
    Colonial and Psychologist Kara Schmidt testified on behalf of Parent. Dr. Schmidt
    opined that the September 2014 ESR was “incomplete” and that additional testing
    should have been performed. On May 23, 2016, the Hearing Panel concluded that
    Colonial’s evaluation was appropriate and that the IEE testing requested by Parent
    at the public’s expense was not required.
    Parent then initiated this civil action in the District Court, seeking payment by
    Colonial of the expense of an IEE. A few months later, Dr. Schmidt performed a
    4
    neuropsychological evaluation and made multiple recommendations. Although
    Parent sought to supplement the administrative record with Dr. Schmidt’s
    neuropsychological evaluation, the District Court denied the request. Thereafter, the
    District Court denied Parent’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record
    and affirmed the Hearing Panel’s order denying the request for payment of the IEE.
    Even though the Administrative Record had not been supplemented with
    Dr. Schmidt’s report, the District Court referred to Dr. Schmidt’s report in its
    analysis, noting that consideration of the report would not have affected its ruling.
    Parent appealed, presenting two issues for review. First, she contends that the
    District Court erred by denying the motion to supplement the record with Dr.
    Schmidt’s report. Second, she asserts that District Court erred in upholding the
    Hearing Panel’s decision.
    II.
    We review a district court’s order denying a motion to supplement the
    Administrative Record for abuse of discretion. Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 
    70 F.3d 751
    , 760 (3d Cir. 1995). In deciding whether to allow supplementation, a
    district court “must exercise particularized discretion in its rulings so that it will
    consider evidence relevant, non-cumulative and useful in determining whether
    Congress’ goal has been reached for the child involved.” 
    Id. 5 We
    conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
    request to supplement the Administrative Record with Dr. Schmidt’s report. The
    Court acknowledged that the report had some relevance even though it had been
    conducted more than two years after the September 2014 ESR. Yet the report was
    cumulative of Dr. Schmidt’s testimony before the Hearing Panel and would bolster
    that testimony by elaborating upon it. As a result, the District Court reasoned that
    the admission of Dr. Schmidt’s report would be prejudicial because Colonial would
    not be able to rebut its substance. The District Court’s reasoning is sound, and we
    conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying
    supplementation.
    III.
    We also reject Parent’s contention that the District Court erred in upholding
    the Hearing Panel’s decision not to require Colonial to pay for the requested IEE. In
    the IDEA context, “[w]e review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error, but
    we exercise plenary review over the legal standards that a district court applies and
    over its legal conclusions.” D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 
    602 F.3d 553
    , 564 (3d
    Cir. 2010).
    Under the IDEA, states are required to provide children with disabilities a
    “free appropriate public education,” which meets the needs of each individual
    student. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a); 
    Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
    To that end, school districts must
    6
    conduct an evaluation of a child with a disability and determine that child’s
    educational needs by developing an IEP. See 
    id. § 1414(a)(1)(A),
    (d)(2)(A); Holmes
    v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 
    205 F.3d 583
    , 589 (3d Cir. 2000). The objective is “to
    confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.” Bd. of Educ. of
    Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 
    458 U.S. 176
    , 200 (1982).
    Parents of a disabled child are entitled to participate in the process used to
    develop the plan for the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1). If a parent disagrees with an
    evaluation completed by the school, “[a] parent has the right to an IEE at public
    expense.” P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 
    585 F.3d 727
    , 740
    (3d Cir. 2009). But where a parent requests an IEE at public expense, a school
    district can, as Colonial did in this instance, request a due process “hearing to show
    that its evaluation is appropriate.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)(i). If the school district
    successfully proves that its own evaluation was appropriate, a parent is not entitled
    to an IEE at public expense. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(3); see also 
    Holmes, 205 F.3d at 590
    –91. Whether Colonial’s evaluation was “appropriate is a question of fact.”
    
    D.S., 602 F.3d at 564
    .
    In this case, the District Court refused to set aside the Hearing Panel’s decision
    that Colonial’s evaluation of Student was appropriate and that Colonial did not have
    to bear the expense of the IEE.         It considered the IDEA’s requirements for
    conducting educational evaluations and concluded that Colonial’s September 2014
    7
    ESR complied with those requirements. The Court noted that a variety of tools and
    strategies had been employed in evaluating Student, which were “technically sound
    instruments.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A), (C). In the Court’s view, although the
    Hearing Panel had improperly relied upon Student’s educational progress and the
    absence of a timely request for the IEE, Colonial had appropriately considered all of
    Student’s assessments and did not rest its decision on a single criterion. See 
    id. § 1414(b)(2)(B).
       The District Court carefully discussed the record evidence
    regarding the four areas of the IEE requested and explained why the Hearing Panel
    permissibly concluded that additional testing was not necessary.
    Parent contends the District Court erred because, despite refusing to
    supplement the record with Dr. Schmidt’s report, the Court relied upon it in reaching
    its conclusion. The District Court cited to the report in a footnote, noting only that
    even if the Court had admitted the report, its contents would not have changed the
    Court’s determination as to the appropriateness of Colonial’s ESR and whether
    Student was entitled to an IEE at public expense. Although Parent asserts this was
    unfair, we are not persuaded. Mindful of the significance of its decision, the Court
    took the extra step of reconsidering whether Dr. Schmidt’s report would have made
    a difference had it been admitted as a supplement to the record. This thoughtful
    analysis provided information to Parent regarding the merits of the dispute in the
    event the order denying supplementation was later overturned on appeal.
    8
    Parent also argues that the District Court erred in upholding the Hearing
    Panel’s credibility finding as to Dr. Schmidt’s testimony.           A credibility
    determination by a Hearing Panel is “due special weight” unless there is “non-
    testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record [that] would justify a contrary
    conclusion.” 
    D.S., 602 F.3d at 564
    (quoting Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v.
    P.S. ex rel. P.S., 
    381 F.3d 194
    , 199 (3d Cir. 2004)). The Hearing Panel accorded
    due weight to Colonial’s ESR, which was based on multiple assessments, as well as
    observations of Student and interviews with her Parent and teachers. The Panel
    highlighted the decision to classify Student with an Emotional Disturbance, which
    entitled her to special education services to address her behaviors. The Hearing
    Panel was well aware that additional testing could have been completed, see 5A; its
    focus, however, was on whether the ESR was appropriate for Student given both the
    behavior she was exhibiting and her Emotional Disturbance classification, which
    includes some behaviors consistent with an autism diagnosis. The focus was not,
    nor should it have been, on whether the ESR explored all facets of Student’s
    disabilities.
    Consistent with this focus, the Hearing Panel discounted Dr. Schmidt’s
    testimony regarding the additional testing she believed was warranted, pointing out
    that she had neither met nor observed Student, was not aware of Student’s programs
    in her current placement, and was not familiar with the most recent data collected
    9
    for Student. We conclude these were legitimate grounds for finding Dr. Schmidt’s
    testimony not fully credible.
    Parent further argues that Dr. Schmidt’s testimony was presented to address
    the inadequacy of Colonial’s ESR, not Student’s status. As such, Parent submits
    that Dr. Schmidt’s acquaintance with Student and familiarity with her programming
    was an improper basis for discrediting Dr. Schmidt’s opinion that additional testing
    should be conducted.      The Hearing Panel’s focus on Student’s ESR and its
    responsiveness to Student’s demonstrated behaviors—and Colonial’s superior
    knowledge of that demonstrated behavior—was a permissible basis for discounting
    Dr. Schmidt’s testimony that additional testing was warranted. See 
    Holmes, 205 F.3d at 592
    (“In addition, we find persuasive the School District’s argument that
    their staff in some ways was better-qualified than the WPSD’s staff to evaluate
    Rebecca. For instance, the School District’s staff were familiar with the curriculum
    at Belle Valley and with Rebecca and the progress she was making.”).
    Finally, Parent contends the District Court improperly accepted Colonial’s
    explanation that it did not obtain a psychiatric evaluation because one had been done
    by the Terry Children’s Psychiatric Center. Parent asserts there is no support in the
    record that any psychiatric evaluation was actually performed. We disagree. The
    Intake Services Higher Level of Care Referral form dated October 19, 2015 indicates
    that Student was being treated on an inpatient basis at Terry Children’s Psychiatric
    10
    Center and had been treated at some point around 2013-2014 by a psychiatrist. And
    Parent consented to the release by the Center to Colonial of the admission and
    discharge summaries, as well as the psychological and psychiatric evaluations. The
    Terry Children’s Psychiatric Center Discharge Summary documented that a
    psychiatric evaluation had been completed and a Transfer Instruction Sheet set out
    Student’s diagnoses and psychiatric medications.
    IV.
    For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District
    Court. We grant the motion to seal Volume III of the Appendix.
    11