William Staples v. Howard Hufford , 497 F. App'x 169 ( 2012 )

BLD-267 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1573
___________
WILLIAM STAPLES,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN H.L. HUFFORD, Warden at FCI-SCH
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00184)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon
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Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 23, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed September 18, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
William Staples appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the
District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
In May 2005, Staples pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one
count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1); 924(g). At
sentencing in October 2005, the District Court classified Staples as a career offender
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on four
Wisconsin state court convictions. He was sentenced to 200 months of incarceration.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Staples’
contention that three of his Wisconsin convictions had been discharged, and therefore
should not have been used to enhance his sentence under the ACCA. United States v.
Staples, No. 05-4037, 2007 WL 1140286, at *1 (7th Cir. 2007) (not precedential) (noting
that “Staples presented no evidence that his rights were restored”). Next, Staples filed a
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, again alleging
that he was improperly sentenced under the ACCA because Wisconsin, in discharging his
convictions, had restored his right to possess firearms. The District Court denied the
§ 2255 motion and Staples did not appeal. Thereafter, Staples filed numerous § 2255
motions in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, all of which were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because Staples did not have the required authorization to file a second or
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successive § 2255 motion. When Staples requested such authorization from the Seventh
Circuit, it was denied.
Staples filed the instant § 2241 petition in January 2012. The District Court
dismissed the petition, holding that Staples failed to demonstrate that a motion under
§ 2255 would be an inadequate or ineffective remedy. Staples filed a timely notice of
appeal.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its
findings of fact. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court is the presumptive
means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. See
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). A petitioner can seek relief
under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention. In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997). A
§ 2255 motion is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely because the petitioner cannot
meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255, Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120, or
because the sentencing court does not grant relief, Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner,
290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Rather, the “safety valve” provided under
§ 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply in unusual situations, such as
those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for a
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crime later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law. Okereke, 307
F.3d at 120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). For example, in Dorsainvil, we
allowed the petitioner to proceed under § 2241 because an intervening change in the law
decriminalized conduct for which he had been convicted, and he had no earlier
opportunity to challenge that conviction. Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d at 251.
Staples claims that he was improperly classified as a career offender under the
ACCA because three of his predicate Wisconsin convictions had been “discharged” and
his right to possess firearms had been restored. In support of this allegation, Staples
relies on United States v. Vitrano, 405 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2005). In that case, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant challenging an ACCA sentencing
enhancement must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his right to ship,
transport, possess, or receive firearms specifically has been reinstated. Id. at 510 (stating
that an ACCA sentence enhancement is not permitted where a state “creates . . . a false
sense of security” by “employ[ing] language in discharging a prisoner that will lull the
individual into the misapprehension that civil rights have been restored to the degree that
will permit him to possess firearms.”). We conclude, however, that Staples’ challenge to
his sentence under Vitrano is not the rare situation rendering § 2255 inadequate or
ineffective. Importantly, we note that Vitrano, which was issued several months before
Staples was sentenced, cannot represent a change in law made after his § 2255 motion
was adjudicated. Thus, we conclude that the exception identified in Dorsainvil is
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inapplicable here, and Staples may not evade the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255 by
seeking relief under § 2241.1
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
1
To the extent that Staples argues that he is innocent of the underlying § 922(g) firearms
offense, we similarly conclude that the narrow “safety valve” provided under § 2255 does
not apply. In addition, we conclude that none of the other arguments raised in Staples’
§ 2241 petition entitle him to relief.
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