Terry Walker v. Steven Glunt , 654 F. App'x 531 ( 2016 )

ALD-324 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-1724
___________
TERRY WALKER,
Appellant
v.
STEVEN GLUNT, Superintendent; DORETTA CHENCHARICK,
Supt. Asst./Grievance Coordinator, SCI Houtzdale; CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER DIEHL; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER UNCLES; LIEUTENANT GLASS;
SHIRLEY MOORE SMEAL, Executive Deputy Secretary of (DOC); JOHN E.
WETZEL, Secretary of (DOC); CAPTAIN BRAUMBAUCH; HEATHER MOORE,
Mail Room Supervisor; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
(D.O.C.) SCI Houtzdale
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00249)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 30, 2016
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 11, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Appellant Terry Walker appeals from a district court order granting Appellees’
motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that this appeal presents no
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir.
LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Walker, a prisoner at SCI – Frackville acting pro se, filed this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional Officer Diehl, Correctional Officer Uncles,
Lieutenant Glass, and Captain Braumbaugh.1 Walker alleged that, while incarcerated at
SCI – Houtzdale, they violated his rights provided by the Eighth Amendment by failing
to protect him when they transferred another inmate, Christian Guzman, into his cell
knowing that Guzman had threatened to harm him. Walker’s claims stem from an
incident that occurred on August 13, 2013. That morning, Guzman allegedly threatened
to harm Walker for being a snitch and implied that Diehl was going to assist him. Walker
alleged that Diehl and Uncles heard this, but nonetheless transferred Guzman into
Walker’s cell and uncuffed Guzman, allowing him to assault Walker, who was
handcuffed behind his back, before returning Guzman to his cell. Walker also alleged
that Glass subsequently accused him of fighting with Guzman and that Glass, Diehl, and
Uncles tried to conceal Guzman’s attack by not allowing medical personnel to take any
pictures or x-rays of Walker and by not providing him with any medical care other than
seven stiches he received on his right arm.
1
The other defendants named in the Amended Complaint were dismissed from the
action pursuant to a motion to dismiss.
2
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge
recommended granting the motion on all claims and the District Court did so over
Walker’s objections. Walker filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which the District
Court denied. Walker now appeals both District Court orders.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of
orders granting motions for summary judgment is plenary. See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413
F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). The standard of review for a denial of a motion for
reconsideration is abuse of discretion. United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d
Cir. 2010). We will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4
and I.O.P. 10.6.
As an initial matter, in adopting the Magistrate Judge’s thorough Report and
Recommendation, the District Court correctly held that Walker had failed to produce
evidence suggesting that Captain Braumbaugh was personally involved or had actual
knowledge of, and acquiesced to, the commission of any alleged constitutional violation.
We agree.
Here, Walker only broadly alleged that Braumbaugh received his “request slip”
after the incident, but did not respond. Walker has not alleged Braumbaugh’s knowledge
and acquiescence with the required particularity, nor has Walker offered evidence tending
to show that Braumbaugh had the necessary level of involvement in the underlying
allegedly unconstitutional conduct for the claim against him to survive summary
judgment. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 642, 677 (2009); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
3
F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a plaintiff must allege “with appropriate
particularity” that the defendants “have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs
[which] . . . can be shown through allegations of personal direction,” and noting that the
governor’s awareness of plaintiff’s grievances filed with his office of administration is
insufficient to establish personal involvement in, and actual knowledge of, the conduct
complained of by plaintiff). Put more simply, even if one were to assume an incident did
occur, there is no evidence that Braumbaugh was personally involved in the violation of
Walker’s constitutional rights.
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment to Glass, Diehl, and
Uncles on the ground that Walker had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
relative to those claims. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a), requires that, before bringing claims with respect to prison conditions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law, prisoners must first exhaust the administrative
remedies that are available. In particular, an inmate must comply with all established
procedural requirements of the grievance review process in order to fully exhaust an
issue. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289,
292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000).
The District Court correctly found that Walker did not exhaust his administrative
remedies. Evidence of record establishes that Walker did not sign his grievance, an
important procedural requirement set by the institution. Moreover, specific evidence
shows that the grievance was signed by another inmate known for being litigious.
Walker’s response is to assert that the prison officials are not handwriting experts.
4
However, scientific expertise is not necessary in this instance. The finding was upheld on
multiple levels of grievance review and Walker put forth no actual evidence to contradict
it at summary judgment.2 Walker acknowledges that this was the basis for the rejection
of his grievance, as opposed to some other reason without basis in fact. In short, Walker
cannot escape the grievance he submitted and the signature it bore. By filing a
procedurally defective grievance and appeal, Walker failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Summary judgment was therefore properly granted on Walker’s claims against
Glass, Diehl, and Uncles.3
III.
For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting the defendants
summary judgment on Walker’s complaint. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We
will also affirm the denial of Walker’s motion for reconsideration. Given our disposition
of this appeal, we grant Walker’s Motion for Leave to Proceed on Original Record and
deny his Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
2
On appeal, Walker essentially takes issue with the process employed by prison officials.
For example, he argues that the defendants have never properly explained where prison
policy makes an improper signature a reason for rejecting a grievance. However, by
making the signature a required element of the grievance form, prison officials did just
that.
3
Summary judgment was also properly granted on the claim that Glass, Diehl, and
Uncles “conspired” to have Walker’s grievance rejected. “To constitute a conspiracy,
there must be a ‘meeting of the minds.’” Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183,
205 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970)).
Walker offered nothing more than conclusory statements that these officials conspired to
reject his grievance; no evidence suggests that they agreed, plotted, or even discussed
doing so.
5