Jill Mancini v. Northampton County , 836 F.3d 308 ( 2016 )


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  •                                     PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 15-2790
    No. 15-2873
    No. 15-3012
    ___________
    JILL E. MANCINI,
    Appellant in No. 15-2873
    v.
    NORTHAMPTON COUNTY; JOHN BROWN, IN HIS
    INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
    VICTOR E. SCOMILLIO, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND
    OFFICAL CAPACITY
    Northampton County,
    Appellant in Nos. 15-2790 and 15-3012
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 5-14-cv-00963)
    District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez
    ____________________________________
    Argued: March 14, 2016
    Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, and RESTREPO,
    Circuit Judges
    (Filed: September 9, 2016)
    _____________
    Samuel E. Cohen, Esq.
    Patrick J. Reilly, Esq.    [ARGUED]
    Gross McGinley
    33 South 7th Street
    P.O. Box 4060
    Allentown, PA 18105
    Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
    David L. Schwalm, Esq. [ARGUED]
    Jill L. Walsh, Esq.
    Thomas Thomas & Hafer
    305 N. Front Street
    P.O. Box 999
    Harrisburg, PA 17108
    Jill L. Walsh, Esq.
    Thomas, Thomas & Hafer
    1550 Pond Road
    Suite 210
    Allentown, PA 18104
    Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
    ___________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    2
    RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
    Jill Mancini, a former assistant county solicitor in
    Northampton County, Pennsylvania, brought this 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action against Northampton County, County Executive
    John Brown, and County Solicitor Victor Scomillio, in
    connection with their termination of her employment.
    Mancini, a Democrat, alleged that she was a protected career
    service employee and that the newly elected Republican
    administration wrongfully dismissed her in violation of the
    Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the First
    Amendment. A jury found that Northampton County, but not
    Brown or Scomillio, violated Mancini’s procedural due
    process rights and awarded her $94,232 in damages. The jury
    found in favor of all Defendants on Mancini’s First
    Amendment claims. We conclude that the able trial judge
    appropriately handled the numerous issues raised by the
    parties, and we will affirm.
    This case requires us to consider whether there is an
    exception to the ordinary requirements of procedural due
    process when a government employee with a protected
    property interest in her job is dismissed as part of a
    departmental reorganization that results in the elimination of
    her position. We have not previously considered this so-
    called “reorganization exception.”        We hold that a
    reorganization exception to constitutional procedural due
    process cannot apply as a matter of law where, as here, there
    is a genuine factual dispute about whether the reorganization
    was pretext for an unlawful termination.
    I.
    3
    A. Factual Background
    1. Mancini’s Employment in Northampton
    County
    Mancini began her employment with Northampton
    County in 2001 as a part-time assistant district attorney. In
    December 2006, the Northampton County Council approved
    a request from Karl Longenbach, then County Solicitor, to
    create one full-time assistant county solicitor position. Prior
    to that time, the Northampton County assistant solicitors were
    all part-time employees. The County Council eliminated a
    vacant part-time assistant county solicitor position when it
    created the full-time position. In February 2007, Mancini was
    hired into the newly created full-time position, which she
    believed was part of the Northampton career service. In
    2012, the Northampton County Council created a second full-
    time assistant county solicitor position, which was filled in
    early 2013.
    In November 2013, Defendant John Brown was
    elected County Executive of Northampton County. He
    tapped Defendant Victor Scomillio to serve under him as
    County Solicitor. Before taking office, Brown and Scomillio
    decided that they would make changes to the staffing of the
    Solicitor’s Office. According to Mancini, Scomillio told her
    on December 23, 2013, that her position would be eliminated
    on January 7, 2014.
    On January 7, 2014, Brown formally requested that the
    County Council eliminate the two full-time assistant county
    solicitor positions and replace them with two additional part-
    time positions. Mancini filed a grievance that same day
    4
    challenging her forthcoming dismissal on numerous grounds,
    including that her discharge violated Northampton’s Home
    Rule Charter, its Career Service Regulations, and
    Northampton County Employee Policy No. 3.525, “Reduction
    in Force and Recall” (the “Layoff Policy”).
    The County Council acted on Brown’s request on
    January 23, 2014, eliminating the two full-time positions and
    creating the requested part-time positions. Mancini’s last day
    of work was Friday, January 24, 2014, the last business day
    before the reorganization took effect. She was suspended
    with pay until her February 17, 2014 termination. Mancini
    was not offered either of the newly created assistant county
    solicitor jobs, and she was not permitted to displace an
    existing part-time assistant county solicitor.
    Mancini did not receive formal written notice of her
    termination until a letter dated January 27, 2014, advised her
    that on January 23 her position had been eliminated. The
    elimination of her position was the only ground Northampton
    provided for Mancini’s dismissal. In the notice, the County
    took the position that the “full time assistant county solicitor
    positions were career exempt positions.” J.A. 3416.
    Northampton County held an informal hearing on
    Mancini’s grievance on February 19, 2014, two days after it
    stopped paying her, and nearly a month after she was relieved
    of her duties. She was not permitted to have counsel present
    at the hearing. The County denied Mancini’s grievance.
    Mancini appealed to the Northampton Personnel Appeals
    Board (the “Board”), which held two hearings on her
    grievance—one in May 2014 and one in June 2014. Months
    passed with no decision. Finally, in response to an inquiry
    5
    from her lawyer, the Board informed Mancini by letter dated
    November 19, 2014, that the Board was “hopelessly
    deadlocked.” J.A. 3425. No further action was taken on
    Mancini’s appeal, and the Board never reached or
    communicated a final decision to Mancini.
    2. The Northampton County Career Service
    Under the Northampton Home Rule Charter, members
    of the career service can only be dismissed for “just cause”
    and they have the right to appeal to the Northampton
    Personnel Appeals Board for a pretermination just cause
    determination. See 
    id. at 3326, 2688
    . The distinction
    between career service and exempt service has important
    consequences for Northampton employees, and for our
    analysis of Mancini’s due process claim. While Mancini’s
    status as a career service employee is not at issue on appeal, it
    was contested at trial.
    The Northampton Home Rule Charter 1 states that all
    County employees “shall be members of the career service,”
    except for nine discrete categories of exempt employees. 
    Id.
    1
    Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, counties “have
    the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters.”
    Pa. Const. art. IX, § 2. A county “which has a home rule
    charter may exercise any power or perform any function not
    denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the
    General Assembly at any time.” Id.; see 
    53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2961
    .
    6
    at 3325. We agree with the parties that Mancini’s position
    did not fall within the meaning of any one of the nine
    enumerated exemptions. 2        The Resolution that created
    Mancini’s full-time assistant county solicitor position did not
    state whether the position was exempt or career service.
    However, former County Solicitor Longenbach testified that
    he intended the full-time assistant county solicitor position to
    be part of the career service, and that he believed the position
    the County Council approved, and that Mancini occupied,
    was, in fact, a career service position. Linda Markwith, a
    personnel analyst in the Northampton County Human
    Resources Department responsible for recruitment and hiring
    when Mancini was hired as a solicitor, testified that
    Mancini’s position was designated as career service from the
    outset and the designation never changed. An email from
    Markwith to Longenbach confirmed that Mancini’s position
    was “included in the Career Service category.” 
    Id. at 3388
    .
    Meanwhile, defendant Scomillio testified that, based on his
    research in 2013, he believed Mancini was not a member of
    2
    The nine exemptions from the career service are:
    (1) all elected officials; (2) the heads of agencies immediately
    under the direction and supervision of the County Executive;
    (3) one confidential or clerical employee for each of the
    above officials, except for members of the County Council;
    (4) the Clerk of Council and the staff of the County Council;
    (5) the members of authorities, boards, and commissions; (6)
    permanent, part-time professional employees; (7) provisional,
    probationary, and temporary employees; (8) officers and
    employees required to be included in a state merit or civil
    service system; and (9) officers and employees whose
    inclusion in the career service would be prohibited by the law
    of Pennsylvania. J.A. 3325.
    7
    the career service and that she could be laid off as part of a
    reorganization. But, he conceded, if it were determined that
    she was a career service employee, the County could not
    terminate her without just cause.
    B. Procedural History
    Mancini filed a Complaint in the District Court against
    Northampton County, Brown, and Scomillio (collectively, the
    “Defendants”) under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . Relevant to these
    appeals, she alleged the Defendants violated her Fourteenth
    Amendment right to procedural due process when they
    terminated her without a pretermination hearing or just cause
    determination, and they violated her First Amendment rights
    when they terminated her based on her political affiliation.3
    The Defendants responded in their motion to dismiss that
    Mancini failed to state a claim on either theory because she
    was an exempt, or at-will, employee and her position was
    eliminated pursuant to a legitimate, cost-driven reorganization
    of the Solicitor’s Office. Mancini countered that the
    “reorganization” was pretext for an unlawful termination and
    that, as a Northampton County career service employee, she
    was entitled to pretermination due process, which she did not
    receive. The District Court denied the Defendants’ motion to
    dismiss.
    The Defendants moved for summary judgment on all
    claims. They argued that Brown and Scomillio were entitled
    to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate
    3
    Mancini’s equal protection claims were dismissed
    before the case was submitted to the jury and are not a subject
    of these appeals.
    8
    any clearly established rights. As to Mancini’s due process
    claims, they also argued that Mancini had failed to establish
    that she held a protected property interest in her position or
    that she was entitled to due process when her position was
    eliminated by reorganization. The District Court granted
    Brown and Scomillio qualified immunity for all claims
    brought against them in their individual capacities. As to the
    remaining claims, the court reserved judgment on the
    Defendants’ due process arguments and on all claims against
    Northampton.
    Mancini tried her claims against Northampton County,
    and Brown and Scomillio in their official capacities. After a
    five-day trial, the jury returned a split verdict. It found that
    Northampton violated Mancini’s procedural due process
    rights, but that Brown and Scomillio did not. Significantly,
    the jury also found that Mancini’s full-time assistant county
    solicitor position was a career service position. The jury
    found no violation of Mancini’s First Amendment rights. The
    jury awarded Mancini $94,232 in damages and the District
    Court entered judgment consistent with the verdict.
    Northampton moved for judgment as a matter of law
    or a new trial under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure. It asserted four bases for relief: (1) a miscarriage
    of justice would result if the verdict were allowed to stand
    because it was contrary to law, the evidence was insufficient
    to support the verdict, and the verdict was against the weight
    of the evidence; (2) the elimination of Mancini’s position fell
    within a so-called “reorganization exception” to constitutional
    procedural due process; (3) Northampton County law and
    policy do not require procedural due process where a position
    is eliminated as part of a reorganization; and (4) Pennsylvania
    9
    assistant county solicitors are employed at-will as a matter of
    law and are not entitled to pretermination procedural due
    process. Northampton advances these same four arguments
    on appeal.
    The District Court denied Northampton’s Rule 50
    post-trial motion.     Over Northampton’s objections, the
    District Court granted Mancini $186,018.60 in attorney’s fees
    and costs as the prevailing party under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    .
    These timely appeals followed. In Appeal No. 2790,
    Northampton appeals the denial in part of its motion for
    summary judgment and the denial of its post-trial motion for
    judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. In Appeal No. 15-
    3012, Northampton appeals the District Court’s award of
    Mancini’s attorney’s fees and costs. 4
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction over this civil rights
    action pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
     and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1343
    .
    We have jurisdiction over the final decisions of a district
    court. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    4
    Mancini cross-appealed seeking a new trial on her
    First Amendment claims (Appeal No. 15-2873), but at oral
    argument before this Court she withdrew her appeal, agreeing
    with the Court that a second trial would be redundant. We
    therefore do not reach the issues she presented in her cross-
    appeal. In addition, even if Mancini had not withdrawn her
    cross-appeal, we have reviewed her arguments regarding her
    First Amendment claims and find those arguments
    unconvincing in view of the jury’s factual determinations.
    10
    Our review of orders entered on motions for summary
    judgment is plenary. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
    
    767 F.3d 247
    , 265 (3d Cir. 2014). “‘[W]e may affirm the
    District Court on any grounds supported by the record,’ even
    if the court did not rely on those grounds.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Nicini v. Morra, 
    212 F.3d 798
    , 805 (3d Cir. 2000)). “In
    considering an order entered on a motion for summary
    judgment, ‘we view the underlying facts and all reasonable
    inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
    opposing the motion.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Pa. Coal Ass’n v.
    Babbitt, 
    63 F.3d 231
    , 236 (3d Cir. 1995)). If the “non-
    moving party fails sufficiently to establish the existence of an
    essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of
    proof at trial, there is not a genuine dispute with respect to a
    material fact and thus the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” 
    Id.
    Our review of orders concerning post-trial motions for
    judgment as a matter of law is also plenary and we apply the
    same standard as the district court. Lightning Lube, Inc. v.
    Witco Corp., 
    4 F.3d 1153
    , 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). The motion
    may be granted “only if, viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage
    of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient
    evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.”
    
    Id.
     We “may not weigh the evidence, determine the
    credibility of witnesses, or substitute [our] version of the facts
    for the jury’s version.” 
    Id.
     “Because the jury returned a
    verdict in favor of the plaintiff, we must examine the record
    in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, giving her the benefit
    of all reasonable inferences, even though contrary inferences
    might reasonably be drawn.” In re Lemington Home for the
    11
    Aged, 
    777 F.3d 620
    , 626 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Dudley v. S.
    Jersey Metal, Inc., 
    555 F.2d 96
    , 101 (3d Cir. 1977)).
    We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for
    abuse of discretion, unless it was based on an application of
    law, in which case our review is plenary. McKenna v. City of
    Phila., 
    582 F.3d 447
    , 460 (3d Cir. 2009). An abuse of
    discretion occurs if a “court’s decision rests upon a clearly
    erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion of law or an
    improper application of law to fact” or “when no reasonable
    person would adopt the district court’s view.” Blunt, 767
    F.3d at 265 (quotation marks omitted).
    We similarly review the reasonableness of attorney’s
    fees awarded under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     for abuse of discretion.
    Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
    892 F.2d 1177
    , 1182 (3d Cir. 1990).
    III.
    A. Northampton County’s Appeal of the Due
    Process Judgment
    Northampton appeals the denial of its post-trial motion
    for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, and the partial
    denial of its motion for summary judgment. The County
    reasserts on appeal the same four arguments it made in its
    post-trial motion.
    1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    The District Court held that sufficient evidence
    supported the jury’s verdict that Northampton violated
    Mancini’s due process rights. We agree.
    12
    In response to special interrogatories, the jury found by
    a preponderance of the evidence that “Jill Mancini’s position
    as a full time assistant county solicitor in Northampton
    County was a career service position” and that Northampton
    County “violated Jill Mancini’s due process rights by not
    providing her with a meaningful pre-termination opportunity
    to respond to the elimination of her position.” J.A. 1634.
    Northampton did not challenge the sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Mancini held a
    career service position. See Br. of Northampton at 51-55.
    Northampton has therefore waived any such argument. See
    Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler
    Energy Corp., 
    26 F.3d 375
    , 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is
    waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief”). We
    accept in this appeal, as we must, that Mancini was in fact a
    career service employee. See Lightning Lube, Inc., 
    4 F.3d at 1166
    . Nevertheless, given the significance of Mancini’s
    status as a career service employee to our decision, we review
    the evidence from which the jury could have concluded that
    Mancini was a career service employee.
    The plain text of the Northampton Home Rule Charter
    states that all non-exempt County employees are members of
    the career service. Full-time professional employees are not
    listed among the exemptions, and none of the exemptions
    could fairly include a full-time permanent assistant county
    solicitor such as Mancini. Karl Longenbach, the County
    Solicitor who headed the Solicitor’s Office when Mancini
    was hired and who presented the concept of a full-time
    assistant county solicitor to the County Council, testified that
    Mancini occupied a career service position. Linda Markwith,
    13
    the Northampton Human Resources representative who
    handled Mancini’s hiring, further testified that the
    Northampton Human Resources information system
    designated Mancini as a member of the career service during
    the entire time she held the position. Defendant Scomillio
    testified that even though he thought Mancini was an at-will
    employee, he and Brown decided to eliminate her position
    though a reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office, rather than
    terminating her like the other at-will employees they
    dismissed.       Based on these facts, had Northampton
    challenged this aspect of the jury’s verdict, we would have
    concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the
    finding that Mancini was a member of the Northampton
    County career service.
    The evidence was also sufficient to establish that
    Northampton did not provide Mancini the meaningful process
    she was due. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
    Amendment prohibits a State from “depriv[ing] any person of
    life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
    Const. amend. XIV, § 1. For a discharged government
    employee to succeed on a violation of procedural due process
    claim, the employee must first prove that she possessed a
    constitutionally protected property right in her continued
    employment. See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 
    475 F.3d 166
    , 177
    (3d Cir. 2007). A “unilateral expectation of continued
    employment” does not amount to a constitutionally protected
    property interest in one’s job. Elmore v. Cleary, 
    399 F.3d 279
    , 282 (3d Cir. 2005). Where, however, an employee can
    only be fired for “just cause,” the employee develops a
    cognizable property interest in her continued employment,
    and the government may not fire her without providing
    procedural due process. Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 
    549 F.3d 225
    , 230-32 (3d Cir. 2008).
    14
    The Northampton Home Rule Charter provides that no
    member of the career service shall be “dismissed . . . except
    for just cause.” See J.A. 3326. We have already established
    that Mancini was a career service employee. Because career
    service employees in Northampton can only be terminated for
    just cause, we conclude that Mancini had a protected property
    interest in her job, and she was entitled to notice and an
    opportunity to be heard on the cause for her termination prior
    to dismissal.
    Fundamentally, procedural due process requires notice
    and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 333, 348 (1976). The hearing must be “at a
    meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 
    Id. at 333
    .
    Except in emergency situations not present here, procedural
    due process requires that when the government seeks to
    discharge an employee who possess a protected property
    interest in her job, “it must afford notice and opportunity for
    hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the
    termination becomes effective.” Dee, 
    549 F.3d at 232
    (emphasis added).
    Mancini did not receive adequate due process. Even
    now, Northampton maintains that, in light of the
    reorganization, it did not need just cause to terminate Mancini
    and that it would have been idle to provide her with due
    process. Northampton is incorrect that no process was due.
    At a minimum, Mancini’s protected property interest in her
    continued employment entitled her to “notice of the charges
    against [her], an explanation of the [Defendants’] evidence,
    and an opportunity to present [her] side of the story.”
    Schmidt v. Creedon, 
    639 F.3d 587
    , 596 (3d Cir. 2011)
    15
    (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. 532
    ,
    546 (1985)). The process she received was deficient on all
    fronts.
    Mancini was notified that the full-time assistant county
    solicitor position was being changed to a part-time position,
    but the Defendants did not inform her of their charges against
    her or their reasons for selecting her for dismissal. 5 Without
    knowing the Defendants’ rationale for selecting her for layoff,
    Mancini was not able to present her side of the story.
    Furthermore, the Defendants did not hold a hearing on
    Mancini’s termination until after she was fired, despite the
    fact that she had promptly and properly availed herself of the
    Northampton grievance procedure several weeks before her
    termination. We hold that this evidence was sufficient to
    support the jury’s verdict that Northampton did not provide
    Mancini a meaningful pre-termination opportunity to respond
    to her planned dismissal. The finding was not contrary to
    law, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying Northampton a new trial on Mancini’s due process
    claims.
    2. A “Reorganization Exception” to Procedural
    Due Process?
    Northampton asks us to excuse its conduct by adopting
    and applying an exception to the ordinary requirements of
    constitutional procedural due process. Northampton argues
    that “[a]lthough a property right and procedural due process
    5
    Evidence supporting a finding that the purportedly
    neutral, cost-driven reorganization was in fact pretext for
    targeting Mancini is discussed in the next section.
    16
    typically go hand-in-hand triggering a requirement for some
    kind of hearing before discharge, [there is] a limited
    reorganization exception to due process that eliminates the
    need for a hearing where a reorganization or other cost-
    cutting measure results in the dismissal of an employee.” Br.
    of Northampton at 37 (alterations in original) (quoting
    Whalen v. Mass. Trial Ct., 
    397 F.3d 19
    , 24 (1st Cir. 2005))
    (quotation marks omitted). Northampton contends it was not
    required to provide Mancini with any procedural due process
    before, or after, it terminated her, because once the
    reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office occurred, Mancini’s
    position no longer existed. Any challenge to the injustice of
    Mancini’s dismissal would have been “futile,” according to
    Northampton, because as a factual matter there was no longer
    room for her in the County government. 
    Id. at 39
     (quoting
    Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel, 
    658 F.3d 125
    , 130 (1st Cir. 2011)).
    We have not previously considered the existence of
    this so-called “reorganization exception” to procedural due
    process, and we decline to apply any exception to
    Northampton’s conduct in this case. Because the jury could
    have reasonably concluded that the reorganization of the
    Solicitor’s Office was pretext for unlawfully terminating
    Mancini, we do not reach the question of whether there are
    exceptions to the requirements of procedural due process
    where the government engages in a legitimate person-neutral
    reorganization.
    Although the jury was not directed to make a specific
    finding on pretext, the jury found that Northampton violated
    Mancini’s due process rights, and we agree with the District
    Court that Mancini presented sufficient evidence of pretext to
    17
    support that finding. Mancini presented evidence from which
    a jury could reasonably conclude that the Defendants’
    purported concern for cost-savings did not actually animate
    the reorganization. There was ample evidence that the
    Defendants decided to eliminate the two full-time assistant
    county solicitor positions, and replace them with part-time
    positions, based not on identity-neutral, cost-driven reasons,
    but based on their knowledge of Mancini and the people who
    would come to occupy the part-time positions. 6
    Evidence of pretext included the following. Scomillio
    and Brown decided to reorganize the Solicitor’s Office
    shortly after Brown was elected County Executive in
    November 2013, even before he took office. Brown testified
    that when he asked Scomillio to consider a reorganization,
    Brown did not know what the budget of the Solicitor’s Office
    was and he did not have any personal knowledge of whether
    the office was running efficiently. Without any investigation,
    without asking Human Resources to conduct a desk audit to
    determine the volume of work, and without looking at
    solicitors offices in comparable counties, Scomillio
    recommended, based on his knowledge of who was on the
    staff of the Solicitor’s Office, that they shift the work of the
    6
    Northampton is incorrect in its view that the jury
    found that the reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office was
    legitimate. The jury found that Mancini’s political affiliation
    was not a substantial or motivating factor in the elimination
    of her position. However, this does not rule out a multitude
    of other improper bases for her termination, including the
    possibility that Northampton orchestrated a sham
    reorganization to target Mancini and circumvent the process
    she was due as a member of the career service.
    18
    full-time solicitors to part-time solicitors. Scomillio had
    experience with the individuals he planned to hire as part-
    time solicitors and he believed they would work more
    efficiently than the existing staff.
    When they decided to conduct the reorganization,
    Brown and Scomillio had concerns about the competency of
    the Solicitor’s Office in general, and about Mancini in
    particular. Brown testified that the “reputation of the
    [Solicitor’s Office] was not strong.” J.A. at 2496. Scomillio
    testified that his prior experience with Mancini, when she
    worked in the district attorney’s office, “wasn’t good” and he
    “didn’t come off with a good experience about her abilities.”
    Id. 2657. Scomillio had no interest in keeping Mancini on
    staff after she reacted negatively to his suggestion of a
    reorganization and informed him that she could only be fired
    for cause. Scomillio also testified that Daniel Spengler, his
    predecessor, 7 advised him to retain the position of full-time
    assistant solicitor but was “equivocal at best regarding his
    feeling about Attorney Mancini and her . . . work ability.”
    J.A. at 2650. Instead of taking Spengler’s advice to keep the
    full-time positions but not Mancini, the Defendants
    eliminated the full-time positions and told Mancini that her
    job no longer existed. They redistributed Mancini’s work to
    part-time solicitors—both old and new—without giving her
    the option to remain employed with the County.
    Evidence that Northampton failed to comply with its
    Layoff Policy casts further doubt on its claim that it engaged
    7
    Longenbach resigned as County Solicitor at the end
    of 2012. Daniel Spengler was appointed to serve the final
    year of Longenbach’s term.
    19
    in a bona fide reorganization plan. Under the Layoff Policy,
    career service employees are entitled to retention priority over
    part-time employees, to notice of existing vacancies and the
    right to displace less senior employees in the same or lower
    job title, and to be placed on a recall list to fill subsequent
    vacancies in the same or lower job title. The Layoff Policy
    thus favors regular and full-time career service employees
    over part-time employees, and requires the County to give
    notice of vacancies to career service employees who are
    subject to layoff.       Despite these enumerated rights,
    Northampton laid-off Mancini, a regular, full-time career
    service employee, and distributed her work to part-time
    employees of the same title without allowing her to displace a
    less senior assistant county solicitor or to assume one of the
    newly created positions.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
    Mancini and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor,
    the evidence was more than sufficient for a jury to determine
    that the Defendants targeted Mancini based on her personal
    performance, and that the reorganization was pretext for
    firing her. Northampton’s argument that “pre-termination
    hearings are not required by due process where a bona fide
    government reorganization plan bases dismissals on factors
    unrelated to personal performance” is therefore misplaced.
    Br. of Northampton at 39 (quoting Rodriguez-Sanchez, 
    658 F.3d at 130
    ) (emphasis added). The cases on which
    Northampton relies do not apply where a reorganization was
    pretextual. See id. at 35-40. 8
    8
    In Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Court, the First
    Circuit held that a “limited ‘reorganization exception’” did
    not apply to a court clerk because his job performance and
    20
    other individual qualifications were decisive factors in the
    decision of the Springfield District Court to terminate him
    during a deficit-driven layoff. 
    397 F.3d at 22-26
    . The First
    Circuit held that the Government violated Whalen’s due
    process rights because it targeted him, not his position, in the
    layoff. 
    Id. at 25-26
    . Similarly, Mancini was one of only two
    people “reorganized” out of a job in the Solicitor’s Office and
    there was evidence that the Defendants targeted her based on
    her individual qualifications and not her position.
    In Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel,
    the First Circuit did permit the government to lay off
    employees during a reorganization without the process they
    were otherwise due, but the neutral reduction in force in that
    case bears little resemblance to the evidence Mancini
    presented. See 
    658 F.3d at 132
    . Rodriguez-Sanchez involved
    the claims of ninety-eight terminated employees of the
    Municipality of Santa Isabel, Puerto Rico. See 
    id. at 129
    . An
    independent accounting firm determined that Santa Isabel’s
    $7 million deficit was largely due to the size of the city’s
    workforce. 
    Id. at 127, 130
    . There was no question that the
    system-wide layoff plan alleviated the deficit problem. 
    Id. at 130
    . Significantly, the record in Rodriguez-Sanchez was
    devoid of evidence of pretext, and the mayor had no
    knowledge of the identities of the individuals selected for
    layoff. 
    Id. at 130-31
    . The First Circuit was thus satisfied that
    Santa Isabel had engaged in a bona fide reduction in force in
    response to a deficit crisis. 
    Id. at 130-32
    . Unlike the system-
    wide, identity-neutral layoff scenario the First Circuit
    confronted in Rodriguez-Sanchez, Mancini was one of only
    two solicitors laid-off for purported budgetary reasons, and
    her identity was well known to County Executive Brown.
    There was no independent evaluation of the cost-savings that
    21
    Finally, we reject Northampton’s argument that a “due
    process claim is not available if a layoff was made pursuant to
    a reorganization in fact, regardless of a possible improper
    motive behind the reorganization.” See Reply Br. of
    Northampton at 23. We are aware of no court that has
    permitted the government to subvert the requirements of the
    Fourteenth Amendment with a sham reorganization. If the
    government were allowed to undertake sham reorganizations
    to dismiss an employee who was otherwise entitled to due
    process, Northampton’s proposed “reorganization exception”
    would eviscerate a public employee’s procedural due process
    rights altogether.
    In conclusion, we will not permit the government to
    target an individual for dismissal and then violate that
    individual’s procedural due process rights under the guise of a
    reorganization. “To hold otherwise would allow government
    officials to cry ‘reorganization’ in order to circumvent the
    constitutional and statutory protections guaranteed” to
    government employees who may only be fired for cause.
    Misek v. City of Chicago, 
    783 F.2d 98
    , 101 (7th Cir. 1986).
    There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
    conclude that the reorganization was a pretext for targeting
    Mancini. Northampton was therefore not exempt from
    providing Mancini, a protected career service employee, with
    procedural due process when it selected her for dismissal.
    3. Northampton County’s Grievance Procedure
    would result from the Defendants’ plan, and there was
    evidence that the Defendants considered Mancini’s individual
    qualifications when selecting her for layoff.
    22
    Northampton next argues that its own law and policy
    contain a reorganization exception that permitted the County
    to terminate Mancini without providing her procedural due
    process. See Br. of Northampton at 40-45. The District
    Court properly denied Northampton’s request for judgment as
    a matter of law on this basis. The Northampton Home Rule
    Charter, Grievance Policy, and Layoff Policy entitled
    Mancini to a hearing before the Personnel Appeals Board to
    challenge the legitimacy of her discharge, despite the
    purported reorganization.
    The Northampton Home Rule Charter, as discussed
    above, establishes the right of career service employees to
    remain employed, except on a finding of “just cause.” The
    Charter makes no exception or special provision for
    reorganizations. Mancini, as a member of the Northampton
    career service, was therefore entitled to a pretermination just
    cause determination, regardless of any bona fide
    reorganization plan. See Dee, 
    549 F.3d at 232
    ; Elmore, 
    399 F.3d at 282
    .
    Under Northampton County Employee Policy No.
    3.15, “Grievance Procedure” (the “Grievance Policy”), career
    service employees have the right to appeal “a suspension or
    discharge from employment,” or to challenge “an alleged
    violation of the County’s Home Rule Charter, Administrative
    Code, Career Service Regulations, County policy, or
    departmental procedure relating to terms and conditions of
    employment.” J.A. 3374. The four-step escalated grievance
    process culminates in a formal hearing before the
    Northampton County Personnel Appeals Board. 
    Id.
     at 3376-
    78. Following the hearing, the Board must issue to the parties
    a final written adjudication that contains the “findings and
    23
    reasons as adopted by the majority of the Board.” Id. at 3378.
    Like the Home Rule Charter, the Grievance Policy contains
    no exceptions for employment actions taken as part of a
    reorganization or cost-driven layoff. Mancini, a career
    service employee, properly filed a grievance after receiving
    notice of her impending dismissal. She alleged wrongful
    discharge, unlawful discrimination, and violations of
    Northampton’s Career Service Regulations and Layoff
    Policy. She was therefore entitled to pursue her claims
    through the Northampton County grievance process.
    Northampton boldly asserts that its Layoff Policy
    “does not offer a right to due process in response to a
    legitimate reorganization.” Br. of Northampton at 43. The
    Layoff Policy, however, does not provide the escape hatch
    Northampton seeks. It, too, entitled Mancini to due process.
    The Layoff Policy governs dismissals where the “County may
    need to institute a Reduction in Force (RIF, Layoff) due to
    economy, efficiency, restructuring, reorganization, or other
    related reasons.” J.A. 3380. By its own terms, the policy
    applies “to all County employees.” Id. 9 The Layoff Policy
    permits employees to appeal a layoff to the Personnel
    Appeals Board on the grounds that the “Career Service
    Regulations were not followed, or that the decision to select
    this layoff unit was arbitrary, capricious, or a violation of
    law.” Id. at 3383. Mancini was therefore entitled under the
    9
    The Layoff Policy applies to all County employees,
    “except    where      collective  bargaining    agreements,
    Pennsylvania State regulations, and/or State Civil Service
    regulations conflict,” but none of these exceptions are
    implicated here. J.A. 3380.
    24
    policy to appeal her discharge precisely because the County
    called it a layoff. Mancini’s grievance specifically referenced
    violations of the Career Service Regulations as well as
    violations of the Layoff Policy.         If, as Northampton
    maintains, Mancini was dismissed pursuant to a layoff, under
    the Layoff Policy she was entitled to a hearing on her claims.
    We reject Northampton’s selective reading of its own laws. 10
    We hold instead that those laws required the County to
    provide Mancini with a pretermination hearing. 11
    ***
    In sum, we agree with the District Court that
    Northampton County is not entitled to a judgment that, as a
    matter of law, it was not required to provide Mancini with
    procedural due process prior to terminating her employment.
    We will therefore affirm the orders of the District Court
    10
    We note the irony of Northampton’s argument that
    the Layoff Policy deprived Mancini of rights, when in fact, as
    discussed above, the policy enumerates the array of rights and
    privileges Northampton grants to full-time career service
    employees in the event of a reduction in force.
    11
    We also find no merit to Northampton’s contention
    that Ness v. Marshall, 
    660 F.2d 517
     (3d Cir. 1981), dictates
    the outcome of Mancini’s Due Process claims. Ness
    concerned the First Amendment rights of solicitors for the
    City of York, who, under that city’s administrative code, were
    political appointees and could be terminated at-will. 
    Id. at 521-22
    . Contrary to Northampton’s suggestion, we have
    never held that every town or county solicitor in Pennsylvania
    is employed at-will as a matter of law.
    25
    denying Northampton’s motion for summary judgment and
    denying its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law
    or a new trial.
    B. Attorney’s Fees
    Over Northampton’s objection, the District Court
    awarded Mancini $186,018.60 in attorney’s fees and costs as
    the prevailing party under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    . Northampton
    argues that Mancini’s requested attorney’s fees were not
    reasonable because she “prevailed only minimally, on a single
    claim out of 15 available claims, receiving a jury award that
    was 5% of the damages requested.” Br. of Northampton at
    55; see 
    id. at 55-58
    ; Reply Br. of Northampton at 31-32
    (“Plaintiff was negligibly successful, recovering $94,232
    where she had sought nearly two million dollars.”). 12 The
    District Court reduced the fees by the amount Mancini’s
    counsel incurred preparing for oral argument on her post-trial
    motion ($1,627.67), and subtracted an additional $126 to
    adjust for a duplicative entry on a bill. After these
    adjustments, the District Court awarded Mancini her
    requested fees, explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has
    expressly rejected the County’s proffered ‘mathematical
    12
    Northampton does not contest the reasonableness of
    Mancini’s lawyers’ rates. See Br. of Northampton at 55-58.
    Northampton also does not contest the reasonableness of the
    award of costs and expenses. See 
    id.
     These issues are
    therefore waived. See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-
    CIO, 
    26 F.3d at 398
    .
    26
    approach.’” J.A. 37-8 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 435, n.11 (1983)).
    Under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
    , a “prevailing plaintiff” in a
    civil rights action should ordinarily recover her attorney’s
    fees. See Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 429
    . A plaintiff is a
    “prevailing party” for the purposes of an attorney’s fee award
    if she succeeds “on any significant issue in litigation which
    achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing
    suit.” Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 
    290 F.3d 159
    , 163 (3d
    Cir. 2002) (quoting Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 433
    ). Where a
    plaintiff does not succeed on every claim, the Supreme Court
    has rejected a fee calculation approach that compares the total
    number of issues in the case with the number of issues on
    which the plaintiff prevailed. See Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at
    435
    n.11. Rather, where the plaintiff’s claims involve a “common
    core of facts,” or are based on “related legal theories,” but the
    plaintiff obtained only partial or limited success, the district
    court may choose to reduce the award if a full compensatory
    fee would be unreasonable in consideration of the degree of
    success obtained. 
    Id. at 435-36
    . How to measure the degree
    of success is left to the district court’s discretion. 
    Id.
     at 436-
    37.
    The District Court in this case held that Mancini’s
    claims all shared “a common core of facts” because “[a]ll
    three claims emerged from how and why Mancini was
    terminated from her employment.” J.A. 38. Furthermore,
    Mancini “prevailed on a crucial issue which informed
    inquiries into all three claims and occupied much of the
    trial testimony: The jury found she was a career service
    employee.” 
    Id.
     The District Court therefore concluded that
    “although Mancini ultimately prevailed only on one claim
    27
    and received a portion of the relief she sought, reduction
    would be inappropriate because her claims are
    interconnected.” 
    Id.
    The District Court did not abuse its discretion.
    Mancini prevailed on her due process claim against
    Northampton as well as a central issue in the case. There was
    substantial overlap in the evidence required to prove
    Mancini’s due process, First Amendment, and equal
    protection claims, including the circumstances surrounding
    the creation of the full-time assistant solicitor positions and
    the decision to eliminate those positions and replace them
    with part-time assistant solicitors.      The District Court
    considered the extent of Mancini’s success and made a
    reasoned judgment that the time Mancini’s attorneys spent on
    her unsuccessful claims did not warrant a reduced fee.
    Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the District
    Court’s award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
    Court’s judgment and we will dismiss Mancini’s cross-
    appeal.
    28
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-2790

Citation Numbers: 836 F.3d 308

Filed Date: 9/9/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (19)

Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Court , 397 F.3d 19 ( 2005 )

Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel , 658 F.3d 125 ( 2011 )

McKenna v. City of Philadelphia , 582 F.3d 447 ( 2009 )

Karen Elmore v. Donald Cleary Eugene Turner Kenneth Naugle ... , 399 F.3d 279 ( 2005 )

james-d-truesdell-v-the-philadelphia-housing-authority-a-body-corporate , 290 F.3d 159 ( 2002 )

john-wilson-frank-kryjer-donald-jones-v-mvm-inc-united-states-marshals , 475 F.3d 166 ( 2007 )

Dee v. Borough of Dunmore , 549 F.3d 225 ( 2008 )

Maggie Dudley, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for ... , 555 F.2d 96 ( 1977 )

anthony-nicini-jr-v-edward-morra-new-jersey-department-of-health-and , 212 F.3d 798 ( 2000 )

Schmidt v. Creedon , 639 F.3d 587 ( 2011 )

vivian-m-rode-and-jay-c-hileman-v-nicholas-g-dellarciprete-john , 892 F.2d 1177 ( 1990 )

pennsylvania-coal-association-an-unincorporated-association-v-bruce , 63 F.3d 231 ( 1995 )

lightning-lube-inc-laser-lube-a-new-jersey-corporation-v-witco , 4 F.3d 1153 ( 1993 )

laborers-international-union-of-north-america-afl-cio-in-no-93-5208-v , 26 F.3d 375 ( 1994 )

Glen Misek and Richard J. Krakowski v. The City of Chicago, ... , 783 F.2d 98 ( 1986 )

harry-m-ness-v-elizabeth-n-marshall-individually-and-in-her-capacity-as , 660 F.2d 517 ( 1981 )

Mathews v. Eldridge , 96 S. Ct. 893 ( 1976 )

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill , 105 S. Ct. 1487 ( 1985 )

Hensley v. Eckerhart , 103 S. Ct. 1933 ( 1983 )

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