Joey Jackson v. State of New Jersey, Departmen , 465 F. App'x 82 ( 2012 )

DLD-119 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1057
___________
JOEY W. JACKSON,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
DIVISION OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-02592)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 16, 2012
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 23, 2012 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Joey Jackson, a pro se plaintiff, filed this lawsuit in May of 2011. He complained
of his treatment by the New Jersey Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD), which
was allegedly “retaliating” against him and refusing to comply with a state administrative
1
decision regarding his care and treatment plan. Jackson referred to the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)1 as the basis for his suit, although he also mentioned his rights
under the United States Constitution. The District Court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice, and we will affirm its decision for the following reasons.2
Under the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.”3 Jackson’s complaint does not show that he has been the victim of discrimination
or otherwise has been denied benefits. To the contrary, the documents he attached
suggest that the state agencies are attempting to meet his needs, although perhaps not as
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.
2
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise full and complete
review of the District Court’s decision, assuming the truth of all well-pleaded allegations
in the complaint and drawing reasonable inferences in Jackson’s favor. Capogrosso v.
Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). In coming to our
conclusion, we have looked at the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits
attached to it, and matters of public record. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White
Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). “[W]e are free to affirm the
judgment of the district court on any basis which finds support in the record.” Bernitsky
v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
Given some of the language in Jackson’s submissions, suggesting that he complains of
independent constitutional injuries, we do not agree that the suit is barred by Rooker-
Feldman. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159,
166 (3d Cir. 2010). Because we affirm the District Court on other grounds, we do not
reach the non-jurisdictional question of abstention/preclusion. See McLaughlin v.
Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 314 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989).
3
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
2
quickly or comprehensively as he would prefer. We cannot conclude that the complaint
contains enough well-pleaded facts to show entitlement to ADA relief.4
Elsewhere, Jackson complains that his constitutional rights are being violated.
Even if these claims were properly presented, they do not have enough factual support.
As Jackson himself observes, he requires constant supervision and has numerous,
challenging disabilities which he manages with inconsistent success. This supervision,
however, does not mean that he is constitutionally guaranteed twenty-four-hour
transportation to locations of his choosing, or that his demands must be immediately met
by staff and administrators. His desire for additional freedom and autonomy is
understandable, as is his preference for placement in a location where he may enjoy
additional activities, but it appears from the record that his requests are being taken
seriously.
In 2010, we issued an opinion in another, similar lawsuit by Jackson. Today, as
then, we conclude that the complaint does not “permit the reasonable inference that the
DDD engaged in any actionable misconduct.”5 In light of both the numerous, additional
deficiencies in the complaint identified by the District Court and Jackson’s filing history
in this case and elsewhere, we further conclude that amendment would be futile.6
4
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).
5
Jackson v. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 394 F. App’x 950, 952 (3d Cir. 2010).
6
Id.; see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
3
“Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm
the District Court’s judgment.”7 As the appeal lacks merit, Jackson’s request for counsel
is denied.8 To the extent that Jackson’s numerous filings on appeal request independent
relief, they are also denied.
7
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
8
See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993).
4