Solomon Miller v. PECO Exelon ( 2019 )

ALD-231 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-1569
___________
SOLOMON MARCELLUS MILLER,
Appellant
v.
PECO EXELON; LYNN R. ZACK;
PHILADELPHIA WATER REVENUE;
(PGW) PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 19-cv-00231)
District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 11, 2019
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 20, 2019)
_________
OPINION*
_________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Solomon Miller, a self- represented litigant, filed a complaint and amended com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, com-
plaining primarily that the named Defendants are liable to him because they refused to
accept “Government Obligations Remittance Coupons” he had prepared as “tender” for
payment of his utility bills. As the District Court noted, Miller’s logic appears to be based
on, inter alia, his understanding of the Uniform Commercial Code and a belief that “there
is no lawful money.” See Am. Compl. at 3 (ECF No. 10). After granting Miller’s appli-
cation to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), the District Court screened the complaint and
dismissed it as legally frivolous. The court also denied a “Motion Appointing Executors”
that had been filed by Orlando Antonio Acosta, a person who apparently holds a power of
attorney “for beneficiary of the Mr. Miller’s estate.” See Mot. at 1 (ECF No. 5). The court
noted that it was unclear whom Acosta was claiming to represent and that, in any event, he
may not represent Miller given the fact that he is not an attorney.
Like the District Court, we have an obligation under the IFP screening provisions
to determine if “the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We have determined that there is no merit to this appeal. See Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (explaining that an appeal is frivolous where none
of the legal points has arguable merit). Other than baseless assertions, Miller provides no
factual or legal support for the conclusion that Defendants’ refusal to accept his coupons
as payment for the monies he owes for utility services gives rise to a federal cause of action.
2
Moreover, granting Miller further leave to amend his complaint would have been futile in
this case. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).1 We
thus will dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
1
We likewise find no fault with the District Court’s denial of the “Motion Appointing
Executors.” As the District Court noted, we have previously informed Miller and Acosta
that, because Acosta is not a licensed attorney, he may not represent Miller in federal
court. See Miller v. Burt, 765 F. App’x 834, 836 (3d Cir. 2019).
3