Keith Webb v. Warden Allenwood USP ( 2019 )

DLD-227 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-2110
___________
KEITH BRYAN WEBB-EL,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN ALLENWOOD USP
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-00321)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 2, 2019
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 29, 2019)
_________
OPINION *
_________
PER CURIAM
Keith Brian Webb-El (also known as Keith Bryan Webb, BOP Reg. No. 19665-
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
080) is a federal prisoner who has been serving a life sentence since 1985 for the second-
degree murder of his six-year-old son. He has an extensive history of challenging that
conviction. Last year we affirmed the dismissal of another of his habeas petitions under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Webb v. Warden Allenwood USP, 735 F. App’x 42, 42-43 (3d
Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Webb-El argued in that petition, as he had before, that he is
innocent of second-degree murder because that count was not properly charged in his
superseding indictment. See id. at 42.
About six months after our mandate issued, Webb-El filed with the District Court
the motion at issue here. He characterized it as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and
he again asserted his claim based on the superseding indictment. He also argued that the
District Court erred in dismissing his § 2241 petition. The District Court denied Webb-
El’s Rule 60(b) motion on the ground that Webb-El had shown no basis to disturb its
ruling.
Webb-El now appeals, and we will affirm. In ruling on Webb-El’s motion, the
District Court applied the standard that governs motions for reconsideration under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) instead of the standard that governs Rule 60(b) motions. We will affirm,
however, because Webb-El stated no arguable basis for Rule 60(b) relief. Webb-El did
not rely on any new facts or new law. Instead, he merely argued that the District Court
erred in dismissing his petition for reasons that, if they had merit, would have been a
basis for relief on his previous appeal. “Rule 60(b) may not be used as a substitute for
appeal, absent extraordinary circumstance.” Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 336 (3d Cir.
2
1999). Webb-El has alleged no such circumstances here, and his arguments lack merit in
any event. 1
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. To the extent
that Webb-El’s document titled “expedited motion” seeks an expedited ruling, his request
is denied. To the extent that Webb-El’s filings can be construed to request any other
form of relief, they are denied as well.
1
Webb-El argues, for example, that the District Court recharacterized his § 2241 petition
as an initial motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in violation of Castro v. United States, 540
U.S. 375 (2003). The District Court, however, did not recharacterize Webb-El’s § 2241
petition and instead properly dismissed it on the ground that he could not proceed under §
2241. See Webb, 735 F. App’x at 42. Even if the District Court had recharacterized
Webb-El’s petition as a § 2255 motion, it would not have been his first. See id.
3