Rosa Perez v. Borough of Berwick , 507 F. App'x 186 ( 2012 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-1695
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ROSA PEREZ, Individually and o/b/o W.P. and L. P., Minors;
ELVIS PEREZ; W. P.; L. P.,
Appellants
v.
BOROUGH OF BERWICK; HEATHER ROOD; COLOMBIA COUNTY; TROY
MANEVAL; ROGER BODWALK; GREG MARTIN; CHRISTOPHER WILSON;
KIMBERLY MULLINGS; DAVID CHRISTINO; TWO UNKNOWN AGENTS OF
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;
STEVE LEVAN; TIFFANY PANETTA; PATRICK CAWLEY
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(No. 4:07-cv-02291)
District Judge: Hon. Robert D. Mariani
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 15, 2012
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 12, 2012)
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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Rosa Perez, individually and on behalf of then-minors W.P. and L.P., and Elvis
Perez — collectively, “the Perez family” — appeal the grant of summary judgment to all
defendants in a civil rights lawsuit brought in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. Although the District Court found that the Borough of
Berwick, Columbia County, and individual officers from those localities and from the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency did violate the Perez family‟s Fourth
Amendment rights, the District Court held that no remedy could be granted pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court made this determination because it found that the Perez
family failed to establish a policy or custom on the part of Borough of Berwick and
Columbia County, because Columbia County is entitled to immunity from suit in federal
court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, and because
the individual officers and agents sued were entitled to qualified immunity. For the
following reasons, we will affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties‟ benefit, we recite only the facts essential
to our disposition. The Perez family initiated this lawsuit after officers from the Borough
of Berwick Police Department (“Berwick”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”), and the Columbia County Adult Probation and Parole Department entered their
home on March 21, 2007 to execute bench and administrative warrants on different
individuals who allegedly lived there. The Perez family‟s complaint, brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the family‟s right to be free from unreasonable searches,
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, was violated by
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the following entities and individuals: Berwick; Columbia County; individual ICE
agents1 Kimberly Mullings and David Christino; individual Berwick Police Officers
Heather Rood-Comstock (“Rood”), Troy Maneval, Roger Bodwalk, Steve Levan, Greg
Martin, and Christopher Wilson; and individual Columbia County Adult Probation and
Parole Officer Tiffany Panetta. The District Court found that the entry into the Perez
family‟s home was unconstitutional because it involved execution of administrative and
bench warrants only for “summary offenses and low grade misdemeanors,” Appendix
(“App.”) 36, at the family‟s private residence at an hour well before dawn.2 The Perez
family also contended that its constitutional rights were violated because the officers and
agents allegedly failed to knock and announce themselves before entering the home, and
because several officers and agents allegedly entered in an unnecessarily prolonged and
violent manner, with at least some of the agents and officers wearing masks and drawing
their guns on the unarmed Perez family. The District Court did not directly address these
claims.
Despite the finding of a constitutional violation, the District Court granted
summary judgment for all defendants (and, consequently, also denied the Perez family‟s
own motion for summary judgment) because it found that all defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity. The Perez family filed a motion for reconsideration only on the
1
Pursuant to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, the Perez family voluntarily moved to
dismiss ICE agent Cawley when he was called upon to serve overseas in early 2011. The
motion was granted and Cawley was dismissed from the case on June 14, 2011.
2
The Perez family claimed the entry occurred at 4:00 a.m., while the defendants argued
that it took place at 5:00 or 5:30 a.m. The District Court properly took the facts in the
light most favorable to the Perez family, adopting 4:00 a.m. as the time of entry. App. 5.
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grounds that Berwick and Columbia County are not eligible for qualified immunity. The
District Court recognized its error in having ruled that these entities received qualified
immunity, but maintained that summary judgment should be granted as to Berwick
because the Perez family failed to show, as required by Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that Berwick followed a policy or practice of performing
the kind of unconstitutional execution of warrants experienced by the Perez family. The
District Court also found that Columbia County had been erroneously granted qualified
immunity, but that it was nevertheless entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it concluded that the Probation and
Parole Department of Columbia County is a branch of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, rather than an agency of Columbia County.
The Perez family appeals on the grounds that the District Court erred in finding no
genuine issue of material fact as to the Perez family‟s Monell claim, and also erred in
finding that Columbia County was entitled to immunity from suit in federal court. The
Perez family also contends that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the
individual officers acted reasonably in light of clearly established law, such that they
should receive qualified immunity from liability for the constitutional violations found by
the District Court. Finally, the Perez family argues that their constitutional rights were
violated in additional ways not recognized by the District Court — namely, by the
officers‟ failure to comply with the knock-and-announce requirement, the protracted and
violent nature of the entry, and the officers‟ unlawful search of the home.
II.
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a), and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District
Court‟s grant of summary judgment. Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299,
310 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Perez family and draw all justifiable, reasonable inferences in their favor. Id. We affirm
only if there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to one or more elements of
the Perez family‟s claim and if the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A.
We will begin with the District Court‟s finding that the Columbia County
Probation and Parole Department receives immunity from this federal lawsuit pursuant to
the Eleventh Amendment because the Probation and Parole Department is “not part of
Columbia County,” but rather “an agency of the Commonwealth” of Pennsylvania. App.
33-34. As this Court has pointed out, “the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits against
subunits of the State.” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193,
198 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984)). Moreover, “[w]e have held that Pennsylvania‟s judicial districts, including their
probation and parole departments, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
Haybarger, 551 F.3d at 198.
The Perez family‟s Second Amended Complaint names Columbia County — not
the Columbia County Probation and Parole Office — as a defendant, and avers that
“Defendant Columbia County is a municipality within the Commonwealth of
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Pennsylvania that, at all times relevant hereto, operated the Columbia County Probation
Department.” App. 1220. However, Columbia County denied this claim in its answer,
stating that “it is specifically denied that Columbia County operated the County Probation
Department with respect to the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint,” and
asserting that “Defendant Panetta was acting as an officer of the court, which is a branch
of the state for purposes of the alleged claims.” App. 1288. This assertion is supported
by the rule this Court articulated in Benn v. First Judicial District of Pa., 426 F.3d 233,
241 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that Pennsylvania‟s Judicial Districts are entitled to
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment), which we underscored in
Haybarger, 551 F.3d at 198 (elucidating that the Judicial Districts‟ immunity from suit
extends to probation offices as well). The fact that Probation Officer Panetta testified
that she “work[ed] for Columbia County as a probation/parole officer,” App. 493, does
not change that Pennsylvania probation and parole departments are legally part of the
Commonwealth‟s Unified Judicial District. Accordingly, if the Columbia County
Probation Office is, indeed, the entity the Perez family sued in the instant matter, we
conclude that it is entitled to immunity from suit.
Alternatively, we conclude the Perez family improperly named the municipality of
Columbia County as a defendant in this lawsuit, since the municipality took no actions in
the allegedly unconstitutional entry underlying the instant matter. The Perez family
appears to dispute that the municipality of Columbia County had no involvement in the
March 21, 2007 entry into their home, arguing that Panetta worked for and was an agent
of Columbia County, which had an unconstitutional policy of executing bench warrants
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in the middle of the night. Therefore, they claim, the county is liable under Monell v.
Department of Social Services. See 436 U.S. at 691 (holding that, although
municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, no municipal
liability lies under that statute “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of
some nature caused a constitutional tort”). The Perez family presents testimony that “the
policy of Columbia County” is that “[a] bench warrant can be served anytime 24/7.”
Perez Br. 20. However, despite being characterized as “Columbia County‟s testimony,”
that statement was actually given by Panetta, even though the very fact it seeks to prove
is whether Panetta‟s actions and testimony can be attributed to Columbia County — that
is, whether Panetta can be considered an agent of Columbia County. Id. As a result, we
conclude that summary judgment was properly granted to the Columbia County
defendant, regardless of whether the defendant named by the Perez family is the
Columbia County Probation Office, or the municipality of Columbia County. We hold
that Panetta was not an agent of the municipality when she entered the Perez family
home, as the Perez family points to no evidence that would rebut the Columbia County
defendant‟s assertion — and this Court‟s law — that a probation officer works for a unit
of the state, even if the probation office has the name of a county in its title.
B.
The Perez family further argues that the District Court erroneously granted
summary judgment on its § 1983 claim against Berwick. The District Court found that
the Perez family failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a
Berwick policy or practice of allegedly unconstitutional conduct, so that the Perez
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family‟s municipal liability claim against Berwick was deficient under Monell.
Moreover, the Perez family also appears to be raising a question as to exactly what
constitutional violation the District Court found.
In its December 29, 2011 opinion granting summary judgment to the defendants,
the District Court analyzed the following factors to conclude that Berwick (and other
defendants) had violated the Perez family‟s constitutional rights: “(1) time of the service
of the warrants, (2) the fact that an arrest was made . . . , (3) the existence of any exigent
circumstances, . . . and (4) the absence of a finding by a neutral magistrate that a
nighttime execution was reasonable.” App. 19. In particular, the District Court focused
on the fact that the entry took place at 4:00 a.m., explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court‟s
long established jurisprudence . . . indicates a clear preference against the execution of
warrants in the middle of the night.” App. 20-21. The Perez family points to evidence
showing that Berwick did, indeed, maintain “policies or customs permitting the execution
of bench and arrest warrants for misdemeanors and summary offenses any time day or
night.” App. 37. Specifically, the Perez family presented the following testimony from
the deposition of Berwick‟s chief of police: “Q: „Is it the policy of the Borough of
Berwick that arrest warrants and bench warrants can be served any time day or night?‟
A: „Yes.‟” App. 1106.
However, as the District Court underscored in its February 10, 2012 memorandum
opinion, its December 29, 2011 opinion “did not find Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure 431(A)(1) and (2), which permit the execution of bench warrants at any time,
constitutionally impermissible.” App. 35. Rather, the District Court came to the
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“narrow” conclusion, “premised upon specific facts,” that “Berwick enforced an
otherwise constitutional practice with regard to enforcement of arrest or bench warrants
in circumstances rendering the otherwise lawful practice impermissible.” App. 35-36.
We agree that the constitutionality of Berwick‟s entry into the Perez family home is to be
determined by more than just the time it took place. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559 (1979) (“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application. . . . Courts must consider the scope of the
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it,
and the place in which it is conducted.”). In the instant case, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether or not Berwick‟s entry was unconstitutional, given the time
the entry occurred, the length of the search that allegedly ensued, the fact that at least
some officers (potentially Berwick‟s agents) wore masks and drew weapons on the
family, and the alleged failure of the officers to knock and announce their presence.
Moreover, the District Court did not consider whether Berwick‟s nighttime entry is
customarily accompanied by these other aggravating factors, such that Berwick can be
said to follow a policy or practice of entering homes in this way.3 Accordingly, we will
3
Although the ICE defendants argue before this Court that the Perez family waived its
right to assert a knock-and-announce claim by failing to raise it below, it is evident that
the Perez family‟s complaint did, indeed, claim a violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights in connection with defendants‟ entry into their home. See, e.g., D.I. 13 (Am.
Compl.), ¶ 27 (“As Rosa Perez opened the door, the defendants pushed her aside and
swarmed into the plaintiffs‟ living room.”). Moreover, the Perez family did include
extensive discussion of the alleged knock-and-announce violation in their opposition to
the defendants‟ summary judgment motion. D.I. 153, 17-21. The District Court did not
address this argument.
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vacate and remand to the District Court for it to determine whether summary judgment is
appropriate as to Berwick‟s Monell liability.
C.
Finally, the Perez family argues that the District Court erred in granting qualified
immunity to the individual officers and agents who participated in the entry into the Perez
family home. In assessing a government official‟s entitlement to qualified immunity
from suit, we determine whether a plaintiff‟s constitutional right was violated, and
whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that a
reasonable person in the official‟s position would have known that his or her conduct
violated it. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); see also Grant v. City of
Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1996) (clarifying that test for a “clearly established”
right is an objective one). We need not decide whether a constitutional violation took
place if we find a constitutional right was not clearly established. Pearson, 555 U.S. at
236. The Perez family argues that the officers should not receive the protection of
qualified immunity because they violated the family‟s clearly established constitutional
rights by executing the bench and administrative warrants at night, failing to comply with
the knock-and-announce requirement, unlawfully searching their home, and executing an
unnecessarily long and violent entry.
As far as the Perez family‟s right to be free from nighttime execution of
administrative warrants is concerned, even if such a right does exist, we doubt that it was
clearly established at the time of the incident, as the Perez family points to no statutes or
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case law clearly establishing that principle.4 See Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392,
396 (3d Cir. 1997) (“„Clearly established rights‟ are those with contours sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”).
Nevertheless, we conclude that other allegations made by the Perez family — that
the officers failed to abide by the knock-and-announce requirement, that the scope and
length of their search was unreasonable and that they used excessive force in entering the
Perez family‟s home — raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the individual
officers are entitled to qualified immunity. To begin with, the knock-and-announce
requirement is a clearly established point of constitutional law. Kornegay, 120 F.3d at
396-97. Furthermore, as a general matter, it is clearly established that an official search
that exceeds the bounds of reasonableness is a constitutional violation, as is the use of
excessive force by an officer — though both inquiries are intensely fact-driven. See U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 515 (3d Cir. 2003) (“To
state a claim for excessive force as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). To determine whether the individual officers are
entitled to qualified immunity, the District Court was required to consider whether, under
the factual scenario of this case, the officers were reasonable to believe that their actions
did not violate the Perez family‟s clearly established rights. The District Court did not
pursue this inquiry as to any claims other than the nighttime execution of the search
4
Moreover, the officers appeared either to be relying on their municipality‟s habitual
practice (which they would reasonably have assumed was constitutional), or, in the case
of the ICE agents, relying on the practice of the local officers.
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warrant. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand so that the District Court may analyze
the issue of qualified immunity on the Perez family‟s knock-and-announce, unreasonable
search, and excessive force claims.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary
judgment to Columbia County. We will vacate the grant of summary judgment as to
Berwick and the individual officers, and remand to the District Court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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