Julius Cephas v. International Longshoremen's ( 2019 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 18-3231
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JULIUS CEPHAS, on behalf of himself and the members of LOCAL 1694-1,
International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO; PAUL CUTLER;
EMMETT FOSTER; SALLY CHAPMAN
v.
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION; HAROLD J. DAGGETT,
individually and as the presiding officer of the International Longshoremens Association;
WILLIAM ASHE, JR., as trustee for Local 1694-1, International Longshoremens
Association, AFL-CIO; BRIAN WITIW, as trustee for Local 1694-1, International
Longshoremens Association, AFL-CIO
Julius Cephas,
Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 1-16-cv-00316)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 10, 2019
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Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: September 11, 2019)
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OPINION*
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a union dispute in which Appellee International
Longshoreman’s Association, AFL-CIO (“ILA”) imposed a trusteeship over Local
1694-1,1 removed all of its officers, and barred Appellant Julius Cephas from running for
any union office for three years. These measures resulted from a hearing in which the
ILA hearing committee found that Local 1694-1’s officers had maintained an unfair and
discriminatory seniority system and had impeded an investigation into complaints about
this system. Cephas and his fellow officers instituted this action seeking to dissolve the
trusteeship, to seek reinstatement to their positions, and to rescind the suspension of
Cephas’s right to run for office. The trusteeship was lifted during the pendency of the
proceedings below, so, on August 9, 2018, the District Court dismissed the claims
regarding dissolution and reinstatement as moot.
Cephas informed the District Court that he continued to seek rescission of his
suspension, which began on April 25, 2016 and would not end until April 25, 2019. The
District Court exercised jurisdiction over the remaining claims on that premise and
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
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Local 1694-1 represents individuals working in cargo handling and warehousing
functions at the Delaware State Port Corporation.
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granted summary judgment in favor of the ILA on September 10, 2018. Cephas v. Int’l
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 2018 WL 4326939, at *2–3, *5 (D. Del. 2018).
Cephas timely appealed to us, but the suspension ran its course during the pendency of
his appeal. So now mootness is again implicated.
The doctrine of mootness is one of the limitations to the federal judicial power
contained in the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III of the Constitution. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl.1. It persists throughout the life of the lawsuit, including on appeal.
Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 2017). Along with mootness, the object
of the suite of requirements stemming from the Case or Controversy Clause is to ensure
that we, the federal judiciary, respect the proper role of the courts in a democratic society.
Id. at 334–35 (referring to mootness, standing, ripeness, the political-question doctrine,
and the prohibition on advisory opinions). Mootness in particular is implicated when
“developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s
personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the
requested relief.” Id. at 335 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The latter is
the case here: that the ban against Cephas has run its course means that we are unable to
grant him the relief he seeks. In other words, we cannot bring an end to something that
has already ended.
Cephas asks that we nonetheless take up his case through an exception. The
exception to mootness that he invokes applies where “the issue is deemed a wrong
capable of repetition yet evading review.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In his efforts to have the ban rescinded, Cephas’s principal argument has been
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that he was not provided the requisite notice that the ILA hearing—which he
characterizes as solely a trusteeship proceeding—could result in his being disciplined.
As a consequence, he contends that, in the absence of a Court ruling on the issue, “other
union members will inevitably find themselves facing member discipline in a trusteeship
proceeding.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 17.
To support this contention, Cephas directs us to the Supreme Court’s decision in
International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown, 498 U.S. 466 (1991).
The case involved a candidate for union office in a prior election who complained about a
union rule that prevented his being provided mailing labels containing the names and
addresses of union members in advance of the union’s nominating convention. Id. at
468–70. “[E]ven though [the candidate’s] campaign literature ha[d] been distributed and
even though he lost the election by a small margin,” the Court held that the case was not
moot. Id. at 473. It deemed the controversy “sufficiently capable of repetition to
preserve [its] jurisdiction” because (1) the complainant “may well” run for office again,
and (2) “the [u]nion’s rule would again present an obstacle to preconvention mailing
. . . .” Id.; see also id. n.8 (noting that the “Secretary of Labor ha[d] persuaded the
District Court to order a new election” and that the “Respondent remain[ed] a
candidate”).
This case is inapposite, and we are unpersuaded.
As an initial matter, nothing in the record indicates that the ILA has adopted a rule
that it will discipline union members by way of proceedings that are designated as only
pertaining to trusteeship. At every turn, the ILA has urged that it provided Cephas the
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requisite notice of the charges against him, and the District Court granted judgment in its
favor in that regard. Cephas, 2018 WL 4326939 at *4 (“The [ILA hearing committee]
properly heard all charges against Cephas under both . . . [the] disciplinary provisions and
. . . the trusteeship provision in a consolidated hearing.” (emphasis added)).
By the same token, the exception Cephas identifies is a narrow one that “applies
only in exceptional situations where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short
to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”
Hamilton, 862 F.3d at 335 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphases
added). Unlike the union rule at issue in Brown, the wrong Cephas complains of is
“necessarily predicated on the unique features of a particular series of events . . . .” Id. at
336 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light, 772 F.2d 25, 33 (3d Cir. 1985)). To again be subject to the same restrictions on his
ability to run for office in the same manner, Cephas would not only have to run for office,
but he would also have to be elected, he and his new band of fellow officers would have
to engage in behavior that is viewed as warranting the ILA’s intervention, and, despite
those charges “referenc[ing] allegations of violations” of disciplinary provisions,
Appellant’s Op. Br. 12, he would have to not receive sufficient notice that discipline was
in play. “Nothing on this record apprises us of the likelihood of a similar chain of events
. . . .” Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d at 33.
We will dismiss accordingly.
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