Vincent Bruce v. Matthew Cate , 560 F. App'x 660 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             MAR 3 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VINCENT C. BRUCE,                                No. 12-15982
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:09-cv-04649-JW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MATTHEW L. CATE; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    James Ware, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 18, 2014**
    Before:        ALARCÓN, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    California state prisoner Vincent C. Bruce appeals pro se from the district
    court’s summary judgment in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging retaliation and
    interference with his legal mail. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review de novo. Brodheim v. Cry, 
    584 F.3d 1262
    , 1267 (9th Cir. 2009). We
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bruce’s retaliation
    claim because Bruce failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
    his re-validation as an associate of a prison gang was because of defendants’
    retaliatory motives and advanced no legitimate correctional goal. See 
    id. at 1269, 1271
     (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context, and noting
    that “a plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was the substantial or
    motivating factor behind the defendant’s conduct” (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted)).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bruce’s claim that
    defendants improperly opened his confidential mail outside of his presence because
    Bruce failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the mail at
    issue met the sender identification requirements for confidential mail, or whether
    those requirements were not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
    See Turner v. Safley, 
    482 U.S. 78
    , 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation
    impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
    related to legitimate penological interests.”); Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    ,
    576-77 (1974) (prison officials may require that mail from attorneys be identified
    as such); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
    544 U.S. 709
    , 725 n.13 (2005) (“[P]rison
    2                                     12-15982
    security is a compelling state interest, and . . . deference is due to institutional
    officials’ expertise in this area.”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bruce’s discovery
    requests. See Hallett v. Morgan, 
    296 F.3d 732
    , 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth
    standard of review and describing trial court’s broad discretion to deny discovery);
    Margolis v. Ryan, 
    140 F.3d 850
    , 853 (9th Cir. 1998) (in making a motion for
    further discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the movant must make clear “what
    information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bruce’s request for
    injunctive relief regarding alleged inadequate prison law library access because
    Bruce failed to demonstrate that it caused him an actual injury. See Lewis v.
    Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    , 348-53 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires plaintiff to
    show that defendants’ conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim);
    Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 
    654 F.3d 989
    , 993-94 (9th Cir.
    2011) (setting forth standard of review and requirement for injunctive relief that
    the plaintiff must show likelihood of success on the merits).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bruce’s motions to
    appoint counsel because Bruce failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
    See Palmer v. Valdez, 
    560 F.3d 965
    , 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of
    3                                     12-15982
    review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for appointment of
    counsel).
    Bruce’s request to augment the record on appeal, filed on May 24, 2013, is
    denied.
    Bruce’s requests for judicial notice, filed on May 24, 2013 and August 1,
    2013, are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                  12-15982