Com. v. Wasiakowski, C. ( 2015 )

J-S34009-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CORY FRANCIS WASIAKOWSKI,
Appellant No. 1361 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 21, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002782-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2015
Cory Francis Wasiakowski appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed by the trial court after it found him guilty of two counts of driving
under the influence (“DUI”). We affirm.
Pennsylvania State Trooper Karri Dodson was on patrol in a marked
police cruiser with her partner at approximately 11:00 p.m. Trooper Dodson
was in the passenger seat. A truck traveling in the opposite direction
crossed the center line as it negotiated a curve. The troopers turned around
and began to follow the vehicle. While following the vehicle, Trooper Dodson
observed the operator of the truck drive in the middle of the roadway. At
that point, the officers activated the police vehicle’s lights and sirens and
effectuated a traffic stop. Trooper Dodson testified that she and her partner
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pulled the driver of the vehicle over because the truck had violated 75
Pa.C.S. § 3309, roadways laned for traffic, and possibly was DUI.
When Trooper Dodson approached and asked Appellant for his license
and registration, he did not immediately respond. Trooper Dodson indicated
that she instantly detected the odor of alcohol. Appellant’s eyes were
bloodshot and he failed field sobriety tests. Appellant was arrested and
taken for a blood draw. Appellant’s blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was
.281%.
Appellant litigated a suppression motion contesting the validity of the
traffic stop. The suppression court determined that police had both probable
cause and reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The matter proceeded
to a bench trial. The court found Appellant guilty of DUI--general
impairment and DUI--highest rate. Thereafter, on July 21, 2014, the court
sentenced Appellant to twelve months county intermediate punishment.
This timely appeal ensued.1 Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is as follows.
Whether the trial court erred in denying Wasiakowski’s motion to
suppress evidence where the results of a blood alcohol test and
field sobriety testing were preceded by an unlawful stop and
arrest in violation of Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the 4th and 14th Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
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1
The trial court did not direct Appellant to file and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, but indicated that the
reasons for its suppression ruling could be elicited from its findings of fact
and conclusions of law issued after the suppression hearing.
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Appellant’s brief at 2.
In evaluating a suppression ruling, we consider the evidence of the
Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below, and any evidence of the
defendant that is uncontradicted when examined in the context of the
suppression record. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 330
(Pa.Super. 2012). This Court is bound by the factual findings of the
suppression court where the record supports those findings and may only
reverse when the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Id.Appellant argues that police effectuated a traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion that he was driving under the influence or probable
cause that he violated the Motor Vehicle Code by crossing over into another
lane of traffic. He submits that “[t]here is no indication that [his] crossing of
the center line was done unsafely[.]” Appellant’s brief at 6. Appellant adds
that he was “negotiating a curve in the roadway[,]” and that Trooper Dodson
acknowledged that it is “common for cars to cross center lines when
negotiating curves in a roadway.” Id.The Commonwealth responds that Appellant ignores the applicable
standard of review. It contends that the suppression court determined that
Appellant drove his truck over the center lane of traffic and police observed
the vehicle drifting from lane to lane. Accordingly, it reasons that the court
did not err in determining that police had reasonable suspicion to pull
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Appellant over for suspicion of drunk driving and Appellant’s violation of the
vehicle code.
Instantly, Appellant has failed to ensure that the suppression court
transcripts, with the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law contained
therein, or the transcript of trial are in the certified record. The certified
record does not contain an indication that Appellant requested these records
be transcribed. Accordingly, Appellant’s issues could be construed as
waived. See Commonwealth v. Osellanie, 597 A.2d 130 (Pa.Super.
1991); compare Commonwealth v. Williams, 715 A.2d 1101, 1106 (Pa.
1998). However, these documents are contained in the reproduced record.
While this Court generally may only consider facts that have been duly
certified in record, Commonwealth v. Young, 317 A.2d 258, 264 (Pa.
1974), where the accuracy of a document is undisputed and contained in the
reproduced record, we may consider it. Commonwealth v. Brown, 52
A.3d 1139, 1145 n.4 (Pa. 2012). Thus, we have reviewed the transcripts
and find that the trial court’s legal conclusions are supported by its factual
findings.
We add that there is a video recording of the incident, which is in the
certified record. That video demonstrates that police witnessed Appellant
driving in the middle of the roadway despite not traversing around a curve at
that particular juncture. In addition, the recording depicts Appellant’s
vehicle crossing over the center lane on multiple other occasions. Thus,
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police had probable cause to find that Appellant violated the Motor Vehicle
Code by weaving between lanes. Further, police had reasonable suspicion to
conclude that Appellant was driving under the influence based on the same
facts. The court’s suppression ruling was not in error.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/22/2015
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