Com. v. Harvey, S. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S51017-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    SEAN HARVEY
    Appellant                No. 3440 EDA 2013
    Appeal from the PCRA Order November 22, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1300783-2006
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                      FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2016
    Sean Harvey appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common
    Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post-
    Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.        After careful
    review, we affirm.
    In 2007 Harvey was convicted by a jury, the Honorable Renee
    Cardwell Hughes presiding, of first-degree murder for the death of 19-year-
    old Henry Snell, aggravated assault for injuries to Jeremiah Speakes,
    violation of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA), and possessing an instrument
    of crime.    The murder victim, Snell, had killed Harvey’s nephew, Wendell
    Porter, in connection with an ongoing string of gang violence, but Snell
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S51017-16
    never faced charges in connection with Porter’s death. Subsequently, Snell
    and a friend, Jeremiah Speakes, were leaving a barbershop, aware that
    Harvey and another individual had been circling the block.       Snell and
    Speakes were unable to drive away because two of the tires on their vehicle
    had been deflated. Harvey approached the vehicle with a loaded gun and
    fired repeatedly, killing Snell and injuring Speakes.
    The trial court summarized the facts as follows:
    Two rival gangs, the Master Street Boys and the Lansdowne
    Avenue Boys, engaged in warfare on the streets of Philadelphia
    for many years. On March 10, 2005, Wendell Porter (“Peanut”),
    [Harvey’s] nephew, shot Roger Anderson while he was riding in a
    car past Media Street with his cousin, David Kennedy (“Little
    Dave”). Tension between the rival gangs escalated. David
    Kennedy, Devon Skates and Henry Snell (“Little Henry” or “Boo
    Boo”) went to talk to Porter on March 10, 2005[,] to “squash”
    the feud between the two gangs. While talking to Porter, Snell
    heard [Harvey] “on a chirp [the sound made by Nextel cell
    phones that include a walkie-talkie feature] telling Porter to
    shoot that ni**a.” Snell saw the gun and shot first, killing
    Porter. A fully loaded handgun was found on his body. The next
    day two men shot at Kennedy’s house.          Snell was never
    apprehended for Wendell Porter’s death.
    On April 21, 2005, Jeremiah Speakes (“Q”) drove home from
    college for the weekend.        Speakes arrived in his West
    Philadelphia neighborhood around 3:00 pm and saw Snell on the
    corner of Redfield and Lansdowne Avenue. The two spoke and
    Snell accompanied Speakes to the barbershop at 55th and Poplar
    Avenue. While Speakes waited in line for his barber, Snell chose
    to have his hair cut by a different barber. Snell finished his
    haircut and borrowed Speakes’ phone to call Cornell Drummond
    (“Nell”), his cousin. They spoke for about a minute. Snell asked
    Drummond to come pick him up because [Harvey] and Baker
    Green (“Bakir”) were circling the block and looking for him to
    retaliate for Wendell Porter’s death. Snell went back upstairs
    and told Speakes that he wanted to go back towards Lansdowne
    Avenue because someone was coming to the barbershop from
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    J-S51017-16
    Master Street. Speakes agreed to leave. The two went out to
    Speakes’ car parked on the corner of 55th and Poplar Streets.
    Snell got into the passenger side and while Speaks was entering
    the car he saw [Harvey] creeping up to the passenger side of the
    car. Speakes saw [Harvey] holding a gun, heard five or six
    shots, then saw Snell slump down in the seat. Speakes heard
    [Harvey] say to Snell, “I got you.”
    Police and medics responded to the scene. While the medics
    attended to Snell, police found Speakes in the barbershop and
    transported him to the hospital. Henry Snell died as a result of
    multiple gunshot wounds, while Speakes suffered multiple
    gunshot wounds to the legs.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/11/08, at 2-3 (citations and footnotes omitted).
    Following    his    conviction,   the     court   sentenced     Harvey     to   life
    imprisonment      for    murder   and   to    an   aggregate    concurrent     term    of
    imprisonment of 16 to 32 years on the remaining convictions.                   On direct
    appeal, this Court affirmed.       See Commonwealth v. Harvey, No. 2427
    EDA 2007 (Pa. Super., filed March 26, 2009) (unpublished memorandum).
    The   Pennsylvania        Supreme       Court      denied   allowance     of     appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Harvey, 
    604 Pa. 704
     (Pa. 2009).                     The United States
    Supreme    Court denied Harvey’s             petition for   certiorari.   Harvey v.
    Pennsylvania, 
    562 U.S. 903
     (2010).
    Harvey filed a timely PCRA petition. The Commonwealth filed a motion
    to dismiss, and the Honorable Shelly Robins New dismissed the petition,
    without a hearing, on November 22, 2013.
    Harvey filed a timely notice of appeal.           He raises eleven claims of
    ineffectiveness of counsel, asserting he was denied “his rights under Article
    1 § 9 [of] the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the
    -3-
    J-S51017-16
    Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America to
    effective assistance of counsel in that[:]
    1. Trial counsel failed to object and ask for a mistrial
    related to testimony and argument by the prosecutor
    about the Anderson shooting when it was previously
    ruled that it was inadmissible;
    2. Trial counsel failed to object and request a mistrial after
    admission of testimony and related argument by the
    prosecutor about the Skates shootings when it was
    previously ruled that it was inadmissible;
    3. Trial counsel failed to object to testimony and related
    argument by the prosecutor about the shooting outside
    the Kennedy house when it was previously ruled that it
    was inadmissible;
    4. Trial counsel failed to investigate, interview and
    effectively cross-examine and clarify prejudicially
    confusing testimony from Cornell Drummond;
    5. Trial counsel failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress
    and to object to showing the jury/admission of Porter’s
    gun and ammunition;
    6. Trial counsel failed to object and preserve for appeal
    the court’s ruling denying a Kloiber charge;
    7. Trial counsel incorrectly advised Appellant that he
    should not testify on his own behalf because he could
    be impeached with prior arrests that did not result in
    convictions;
    8. Trial counsel failed to object to the Commonwealth’s
    assertion that Appellant “ran everything” on Master
    Street;
    9. Trial counsel violated Appellant’s rights under the
    Confrontation Clause when counsel stipulated to the
    testimony of a physician which was based on inaccurate
    information;
    10. Trial  counsel,   without    Appellant’s    permission,
    abandoned several meritorious claims on direct appeal;
    -4-
    J-S51017-16
    11. The cumulative effect of the above-cited ineffectiveness
    of counsel prejudiced Appellant, denying him due process
    of law and a fair trial.
    Our standard and scope of review for the denial of a PCRA petition is
    well settled:
    Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited
    to examining whether the evidence of record supports the
    court’s determination and whether its decision is free of legal
    error. This Court grants great deference to the findings of the
    PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings.
    A petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of
    right; the PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there is no
    genuine issue concerning any material fact and the petitioner is
    not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose
    would be served by any further proceedings. A reviewing court
    on appeal must examine each of the issues raised in the PCRA
    petition in light of the record in order to determine whether the
    PCRA court erred in concluding that there were no genuine
    issues of material fact and in denying relief without an
    evidentiary hearing.
    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    121 A.3d 1049
    , 1052 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (citations and quotations omitted). Additionally,
    [i]t is well-established that counsel is presumed to have provided
    effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and
    proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of
    arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any
    objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's
    interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a
    reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s
    error. The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness claim if the
    petitioner’s evidence fails to meet a single one of these prongs.
    Moreover, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating
    counsel's ineffectiveness.
    See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 
    990 A.2d 795
    , 797 (Pa. Super. 2010)
    (citations omitted). Our courts use the Strickland actual prejudice test for
    -5-
    J-S51017-16
    ineffectiveness claims, which requires a showing of a reasonable probability
    that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for
    counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance.       See Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 694 (1984); see also Commonwealth v.
    Sepulveda, 
    55 A.3d 1108
     (Pa. 2012).        “[A] reasonable probability is a
    probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
    proceeding.”   Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    84 A.3d 294
    , 312 (Pa. 2014).
    Following a thorough review of the parties’ briefs, the relevant law and
    the certified record, we affirm based on the PCRA court opinion, authored by
    Judge Robins New. We direct the parties to attach a copy of that opinion in
    the event of further proceedings.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/22/2016
    -6-
    SSl6t1-I~
    Circulated 08/25/2016 03:02 PM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
    CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
    COMMON\VEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                                              CP-51-CR1300783-2006
    CP-51-CR-1300783-2006 _comm v. Harvey, Sean
    v,                            Opinion
    FILED
    SEAN HARVEY
    l\11111111111111111111111                                   NOV 2 2015
    7364686981
    OPINION OF THE COURT                                     Post Trial Unit
    Appellant, Sean Harvey appeals from this Court's denial of relief pursuant to the
    Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.                          §9541, et. seq. On July 10, 2007,
    following a jury trial before the Hon. Renee Cardwell Hughes, Appellant was convicted
    of First Degree Murder, Aggravated Assault and related offenses.                      The charges involved
    the April 21, 2005, shootings of Henry Snell and Jeremiah Speaks.                      Henry Snell died of
    his injuries. Jeremiah Speaks survived. Subsequently Judge Hughes sentenced Appellant
    to life imprisorunent       for murder and imposed additional concurrent sentences for the
    other offenses. 1 The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Superior Court docketed
    at 2427 EDA 2007.         Allocatur was denied by the Supreme Court, docketed at 195 EAL
    2009.
    Subsequently, Appellant, through counsel filed a PCRA Petition.                         The matter
    initially was assigned to Judge Hughes.                 After Judge Hughes left the bench, the matter
    was assigned to this Court. In response, the Commonwealth filed a Motion to Dismiss.
    After reviewing the pleadings, the record and the law and after complying with all
    1 Specifically Appellant received concurrent sentences of ten ( I 0) to twenty (20) years for Aggravated
    Assault; three anda half (3 Yi) to seven (7) years for a firearms violation and two and a half (2 ~) to five
    (5) years for PIC. As noted above all sentences were deemed to run concurrently with the sentence for
    murder.
    procedural rules, th.is Court denied the petition without a hearing.   The instant timely
    appeal followed.
    The facts as summarized by the trial court and by the Superior Court in the direct
    appeal demonstrated that the instant shooting was retaliatory and the killing was resulted
    from escalating gang activity involving two rival neighboring gangs, the Master Street
    Boys and the Lansdown A venue Boys. Specifically, the facts as found by the jury were
    as follows: In March, 2005, Appellant's nephew, Wendell Porter, known as Peanut shot
    Roger Anderson. With Anderson was his cousin, known as Little Dave.               On the
    following day, Little Dave and others including the instant decedent, Henry Snell, who
    had multiple nicknames including Boo Boo then went to talk to Peanut apparently in an
    attempt to deescalate the feud. The talks went poorly as Boo Boo ended up shooting and
    killing Peanut, who also was armed during these alleged peace talks. Evidence was
    introduced to show that Peanut was the initial aggressor and Boo Boo shot in self-
    defense.
    Violence between the gangs escalated. The next day shots were fired at Little
    Dave's house. Evidence was presented to show that Appellant was highly placed in the
    Master Street gang and was "looking for Boo Boo."
    About five weeks later, on April 21, 2005, the other instant shooting victim,
    Jeremiah Speaks, known as Q returned home from college and saw Boo Boo on the street
    corner. They spoke and went to a barber shop. After Boo Boo finished, he called his
    cousin asking for a ride because Appellant and others were circling the block looking for
    him. Eventually Q and Boo Boo walkedto Q's car. Boo Boo got in. As Q was entering
    the car, he saw Appellant holding a gun. He heard five or six shots, saw Boo Boo
    2
    slumped down on the seat and heard Appellant say to Boo Boo, "I got you." Q who was
    shot in the leg survived. Boo Boo died.
    Appellant's PCRA Petition alleged ten substantive2 claims of ineffective
    assistance of counsel. As will be more fully set forth below, he is entitled to no appellate
    relief.
    "Ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that we
    review de novo" United States v. Blaylock, 
    20 F.3d 1458
    , 1464-5 (1994). The United
    States Supreme Cami in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 685 (1984), stated,
    "The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines
    the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
    Amendment including the Counsel Clause." The Supreme Court also states, "That a
    person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is
    not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the
    right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is
    critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is
    entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role
    necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." 
    Id.
     Due to the reason above, the Supreme Cami
    has acknowledged that the right to counsel is the right to effective counsel. 
    Id. at 686
    .
    The law presumes that counsel was effective and, therefore Appellant has the burden to
    show that counsel was ineffective. Conunonwealth v. Baker, 
    614 A.2d 663
    , 673 (Pa.
    1993).
    2 In addition, the Petition also raises a "cumulative impact" claim. As no substantive claim was of
    arguable merit, we need not address the "cumulative impact" claim. See Commonwealth v. Koehler.
    36 A.3d. 121, 161 (Pa. 2012).
    3
    The Strickland Court set out a test where a defendant would have to show that ( 1)
    his attorney's performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional standards and
    (2) that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors; the
    result would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, at 687-90. In reviewing the
    PCRA, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Douglas, 
    645 A.2d 226
    ,
    230 (Pa. 1994), stated, "To prevail on such a claim, Appellant must demonstrate that (1)
    the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel's course of conduct was without a
    reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interest; and (3) that he was prejudiced by
    counsel's ineffectiveness."     To show prejudice defendant must establish that, but for
    counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Commomvealth v.
    Bond, 
    819 A.2d 33
    , (Pa. 2002). Appellant's failure to satisfy all the prongs of the test
    should result in the dismissal of the ineffective counsel claim. Commonwealth v. Fulton,
    
    876 A.2d 342
    , (Pa. 2003).
    To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant
    must "set forth an offer to prove at an appropriate hearing sufficient facts upon which a
    reviewing     court can conclude      .. . counsel     may have, in fact, been ineffective."
    Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 
    715 A.2d 420
    , 422 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Cornrnonwealth v.
    Pettus,    
    424 A.2d 1332
    ,   1335   (Pa.   1981)).     As the facts present no basis       for
    ineffectiveness, no hearing was necessary.
    Appellant's first few claims allege ineffective      assistance of trial counsel for
    failing to object to various portions of testimony.         Specifically, his first three claims
    concern the failure to object to brief references in the prosecutor's opening statement and
    4
    in the testimony to the shooting of Roger Anderson and Devon Skates as well as to the
    shooting of David Kennedy's home.
    In this case evidence of the killing of Anderson was necessary, as it was the initial
    act which was part of the sequence of events that formed the history of the case.              It
    motivated the unsuccessful meeting between Boo Boo and Peanut which resulted                111
    Peanut's, which motivated the instant shooting.
    Similarly, evidence of the shooting of Skates, which came from Rachel Snell, also
    was relevant. This shooting occurred after the shooting of Peanut and before the instant
    shooting. It involved members of the rival gangs, again was part of the chain of events,
    and it put Appellant in the chain of events.
    Similarly, evidence of the shooting at Kennedy's home, which occurred a day
    after the shooting of Peanut, again involved members of the rival gangs and was part of
    the chain of events leading to the instant shooting. Indeed it was the initial strike after the
    unsuccessful meeting in which Anderson participated that resulted in Peanut's death.
    First, concerning the shooting of Anderson, upon review of the record, it was
    clear to this Court that that the use of this evidence did not identify Appellant as being
    involved in the shooting of Anderson and was not exploited by the prosecutor.
    Moreover, it was relevant and admissible. See Commomvealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d.
    983 (Pa. 2002); Pa.R.Evid. 404 (b) (2).
    Similarly, the prosecutor's reference in his opening and the testimony concerning
    the shooting of Skates was brief and clearly was not exploited by the prosecutor.         The
    prosecutor discussed the shooting in his opening, as he reasonable expected Skates to
    testify at trial. Skates did not appear and the prosecutor made no mention of the Skates
    5
    shooting in his closing.    The only reference to the Skates shooting was a brief reference
    in the testimony of Rachel Snell, whose testimony primarily provided evidence in which
    the jury could conclude that Boo Boo shot Peanut in self-defense. However, her brief
    reference in her testimony to the Skates shooting also was relevant and admissible for the
    reasons set forth above.
    Similarly, the prosecutor's reference in his opening and the testimony concerning
    the shooting of Anderson's       house was brief and clearly was not exploited by the
    prosecutor.   Again, for the reasons set forth above, this testimony was relevant and
    admissible.
    In addition, in order to avoid any possible prejudice Judge Hughes gave a detailed
    cautionary instruction concerning the limited use of all of this evidence and specifically
    instructed the jury that it may not infer Appellant's guilt from the use of that evidence.
    See N.T. 7/9/07, 118-119.    Accordingly, this claim is baseless.
    Next, Appellant alleges ineffective assistance     of counsel claiming that counsel
    should have confronted witness, Cornell Drummond, with a letter purportedly written by
    Drummond disavowing his police statement. \\'e are at a loss to understand the claim as
    Appellant failed to produce such letter in his PCRA Petition. Moreover, even assuming
    such a letter did exist, we are at a loss to understand this claim as Drummond disavowed
    the statement in his trial testimony. Accordingly, this Claim, too is baseless.
    In a related claim, Appellant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
    object to portions of Drummond's police statement.         After Drummond disavowed his
    police statement which inculpated Appellant, the police detective to whom the statement
    was given testified as to the circumstances under which the statement was taken and read
    6
    the statement to the jury.    Clearly this was permissible pursuant to Commonwealth       v.
    Brady, 507 A.2d. 66 (Pa. 1986) and Commonwealth v. Lively, 464 A.2d. 7 (Pa. 1992),
    and their progeny.   Appellant's specific claim is that counsel should have objected to a
    portion of the statement in which Drummond stated that Appellant and another' "run
    everything at 601h and Market."     As discussed above, that portion of the statement was
    relevant and admissible.      It placed Appellant in the gang hierarchy and gave further
    context as to the motive        for the instant shooting.      Appellant   claims   that the
    Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that the recanting witness had a basis upon which
    he could have concluded that Appellant "ran" the comer. We have reviewed the record,
    which established the witness' knowledge of the players. That knowledge provided an
    adequate basis for reaching the conclusion that Appellant was a major player in the
    Master Street gang.    Accordingly, had any objection been made, it would have been
    overruled. Accordingly, this claim, too is baseless.
    Next, Appellant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek
    preclusion of all evidence of the shooting of Peanut. As discussed above, the testimony
    was relevant and admissible.     Accordingly the claim is baseless.    Moreover, the claim
    was raised and rejected in the direct appeal. Accordingly it also was previously litigated
    and not the cognizable under the PCRA.
    Appellant's next claim concerns the testimony of Jeremiah Speaks, who did not
    identify Appellant when he first had contact with the police. During trial, counsel sought
    a Kloiber charge based upon the failure to identify. That request was denied. Appellant
    now alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to preserve that claim for appeal.
    It is obvious why counsel chose not to preserve this issue as there was no reason to give a
    7
    Kloiber charge. As the trial court fully explained on the record, a Kloiber charge was
    inappropriate because Speak's failure to identify was the product of fear, not an inability
    to identify. See N.T. 7/9/07 47-48. Accordingly, this claim, too fails.
    Next, counsel alleges ineffective assistance of assistance of counsel for failing to
    present Appellant as a witness to present alibi testimony. No ineffective assistance.
    occurred here, as the decision not to testify was made on the record by defendant after a
    colloquy. See N.T. 7/9/07, 44, "I made the decision." Appellant's mere assertion, in an
    affidavit years later that he did so because counsel said that he was not going to put
    Appellant on the stand is belied by his sworn trial testimony. Moreover, he was in no
    way prejudiced by failing to testify to his alibi as counsel presented two independent alibi
    witness. The mere fact that the jury, by its verdict, rejected that alibi testimony affords
    no basis for relief.
    Next, Appellant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel
    stipulated to the authenticity and accuracy of his own medical records.               Appellant
    concludes that this, somehow violated his constitutional right to confrontation. By way
    of background, after Appellant was arrested and before he was transported, he stabbed
    himself in the stomach. These medical records were the records of that treatment. The
    Commonwealth introduced evidence of this stabbing, along with other evidence
    including a changed appearance, multiple use of false names3, and hiding to support their
    argument of consciousness of guilt.
    Clearly evidence that this self-stabbing while awaiting transportation to the police
    district properly was admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt. We are at a loss to
    understand, and Appellant has provided no compelling authority to demonstrate how
    3 If fact   "Sean Harvey" appears to be a false name.
    8
    these medical      records     are "testimonial"       thereby evoking the protections     of the
    confrontation clause.        \Ve can conceive of no reason that the trial court would have
    excluded this evidence on this basis. Moreover, even if the trial court found, for some
    other reason these records to be inadmissible such as not being authentic or accurate or
    not being admissible "business records," the Commonwealth would have been permitted
    to introduce this evidence in some other way, such as calling the treating doctor, nurse or
    first responder.    Therefore no prejudice occurred.            Accordingly,    this Claim, too is
    baseless.
    Finally, Appellant, in an undeveloped claim faults counsel because he chose to
    pursue on appeal only four of the seven claims raised in his 1925(b) statement in the
    direct appeal. Significantly, Appellant makes no substantive claim, nor does he provide
    any legal analysis to demonstrate that any of the three discarded claims would have been
    successful.   As such, he has fallen far short of his burden of pleading sufficient facts
    which, if proven would entitle him to PCRA relief.               Accordingly,    this claim too is
    baseless.
    Accordingly as none of his claims were of arguable merit on its face, no hearing
    was necessary and no PCRA relief was due. For the reasons set forth above, the Order
    denying PCRA relief should be affirmed.
    9
    .   '
    For the reasons set forth above, the Order denying PCRA relief should be
    affirmed.
    BY THE COURT:
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3440 EDA 2013

Filed Date: 9/22/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/23/2016