Moffett v. Prudential Life Insurance Company of America ( 2012 )

SUMMARY OPINION AND ORDER; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COLEMAN SCOTT MOFFETT,
on his own behalf and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 09-cv-1915 (RLW)
v.
PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA; HILDA L.
SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary
of the United States Department of Labor,
Defendants.
CHRISTOPHER C. OUELLETTE,
on his own behalf and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 11-cv-454 (RLW)
v.
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. (d/b/a
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA; and HILDA L. SOLIS
(Secretary of the Department of Labor),
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
1
This unpublished memorandum opinion is intended solely to inform the parties and any
reviewing court of the basis for the instant ruling, or, alternatively, to assist in any potential
future analysis of the res judicata, law of the case, or preclusive effect of the ruling. The Court
has designated this opinion as “not intended for publication,” but this Court cannot prevent or
prohibit the publication of this opinion in the various and sundry electronic and legal databases
(as it is a public document), and this Court cannot prevent or prohibit the citation of this opinion
by counsel. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a). Nonetheless, as stated in the operational handbook
adopted by our Court of Appeals, “counsel are reminded that the Court’s decision to issue an
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SUMMARY OPINION AND ORDER; NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTERS
This action centers on Plaintiff Coleman Scott Moffett’s (“Moffett”) and Christopher C.
Ouellette’s (“Ouellette”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) challenge to Prudential Life Insurance
Company of America’s (“Prudential”) employer-based disability plan. In short, Plaintiffs
contend that the structure of Prudential’s plan—through which Prudential not only makes initial
determinations on participants’ eligibility for benefits, but also reviews those determinations
through an internal appeals process—does not provide for a “full and fair” review of
participants’ claims by a neutral party. Moffett’s and Ouellette’s Complaints were consolidated
by the Court on March 31, 2011, as both cases asserted nearly identical claims against the same
defendants—(1) alleging Fifth Amendment due process violations against Prudential; (2)
alleging Fifth Amendment due process claims against Hilda L. Solis, in her official capacity as
the Secretary of the Department of Labor; and (3) challenging the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, and various United States Department
of Labor Rules and Regulations as unconstitutional under the due process clause.
Both Prudential and the Secretary moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaints, and on
September 21, 2011, the Court granted their motions and dismissed these consolidated cases with
prejudice. (Dkt. Nos. 27, 28). 2 The Court held that Plaintiffs’ due process claims against
Prudential, which derived from the Fifth Amendment, were invalid as a matter of law because
Prudential is not a state actor subject to constitutional scrutiny. (Id.). In addition, the Court
ruled that Plaintiffs’ claims against the Secretary were invalid because Plaintiffs were unable to
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of Article III standing to pursue those claims. (Id.).
unpublished disposition means that the Court sees no precedential value in that disposition.”
D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 43 (2011).
2
Unless otherwise indicated, the Court’s docket references herein are to the docket for the
lead case of these consolidated actions, Moffett, et al. v. Prudential Insurance, et al., 09-cv-1915.
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IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTERS
Plaintiffs have since filed several post-judgment motions, which are now before the
Court. First, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the Court’s judgment, under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e). (Dkt. No. 29). Through that motion, Plaintiffs principally assert that
the Court’s ruling as to their claims against Prudential through Count I “directly conflicts” with a
recent Supreme Court decision, Cigna Corp. v. Amara, _ U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 179 L. Ed. 2d
843 (2011). They also contend that the Court’s standing analysis, which disposed of Counts II
and III against the Secretary, overlooked the allegations of Ouellette’s Complaint, which
Plaintiffs argue did allege a cognizable injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III. Along with
their Rule 59(e) motion, Plaintiffs also filed a motion to amend their complaints under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) and for relief of judgment of dismissal under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 60(a) and (b)(6). (Dkt. No. 30).
Having considered Plaintiffs’ motions, Prudential’s and the Secretary’s opposition
briefing, and Plaintiffs’ replies, for the following reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiffs’
motions in all respects.
ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Under Rule 59(e)
Motions to alter or amend under Rule 59(e) “are disfavored and relief from judgment is
granted only when the moving party establishes extraordinary circumstances.” Niedermeier v.
Office of Max S. Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Anyanwwutaku v. Moore,
151 F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). As this Circuit has explained, a Rule 59(e) motion “need
not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling
law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
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IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTERS
injustice.” Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Consequently, “a losing party may not use a
Rule 59 motion to raise new issues that could have been raised previously.” Kattan by Thomas
v. Dist. of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Nor is a Rule 59 motion a means by
which to “reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled,” New York v. United
States, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995), or “a chance . . . to correct poor strategic choices,”
SEC v. Bilzerian, 729 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2010).
Through their motion, Plaintiffs conclusorily assert that all of the potential Rule 59(e)
grounds for relief require the Court to revisit its dismissal ruling. (Dkt. No. 33 (“Pls.’ Reply”) at
2). But Plaintiffs do not point to any “new evidence” that impacts the Court’s analysis, nor do
they identify any “intervening change in controlling law” that would dictate a different result.
Rather, Plaintiffs appear to solely contend that the Court should amend its decision because it
was premised on “clear legal error” and/or creates “manifest injustice.” As explained below,
Plaintiffs fail to establish that they are entitled to Rule 59(e) relief on these grounds as to any of
their previously-dismissed claims.
First, with respect to Count I, Plaintiffs principally contend that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cigna Corporation v. Amara, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 179 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2011),
somehow undermines this Court’s dismissal of their claims against Prudential. Plaintiffs are
wrong. In Amara, the Supreme Court was presented with the specific issue of whether the
district court, upon determining that Cigna violated ERISA’s disclosure obligations in
connection with the change of its pension plan, properly “reformed” the terms of that plan
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and, if so, whether the court applied the appropriate legal
standards in reforming the plan. Amara, 131 S. Ct. at 1870-71. In sum, the Court concluded that
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§ 1132(a)(1)(B) did not authorize such a reformation but explained that “a different equity-
related ERISA provision . . . authorizes forms of relief similar to those that the court entered.”
Id. at 1871 (citing to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). The Court then outlined the relevant “equitable
principles that the court might apply on remand” and remanded the matter for further
proceedings. Id.In relying on Amara, Plaintiffs appear to ignore the actual holding of the Court, instead
choosing to seize upon the Justices’ discussion of a single rejected argument advanced in support
of affirmance—that the district court had not really “reformed” Cigna’s plan, it simply enforced
the plan’s terms as written, including certain terms encompassed by the plan’s disclosures and
summary plan descriptions. See id. at 1877. The Court disagreed with that argument because,
among other reasons, it was unwilling to find that “the terms of statutorily modified plan
summaries (or summaries of plan modifications) necessarily may be enforced . . . as the terms of
the plan itself.” Id. Put differently, the Amara Court declined to find that terms of the summary
plan descriptions should be characterized as terms of the plan itself.
Plaintiffs now argue that this passage from the Amara case requires the reinstatement of
their due process claims against Prudential. Of course, this Court previously dismissed those
claims on the ground that Prudential was not a “state actor” susceptible to constitutional due
process claims under the Fifth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 27 (“Mem. Op.”) at 8-15). On that issue,
Plaintiffs now attempt to assail the Court’s reasoning that Prudential’s authority to determine a
plan participant’s benefit eligibility and to review those initial determinations “was created, not
through governmental enactment but by the contract between Plaintiffs’ employers and
Prudential.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 4-5). Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent the Court looked to
Prudential’s summary plan documents rather than the actual plan terms themselves to support its
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reasoning, its holding cannot stand. The Court does not agree. Not only do Plaintiffs
misunderstand Amara’s impact, they also oversimplify the Court’s basis for dismissing their
claims against Prudential in the first place.
First, the Amara decision has absolutely no impact on this Court’s conclusion that
Prudential is not a “state actor.” In reality, other than the fact that Amara also involved an
employee-benefits plan administered under ERISA’s broad statutory scheme, that case has
almost nothing in common with the instant matter. As Prudential correctly points out, the critical
issue underlying the Court’s dismissal of the claims in this case was not whether certain plan
terms were properly included in Prudential’s summary plan documents, rather than within the
four corners of the plan document itself. (Dkt. No. 31 (“Prud. Opp’n”) at 4). Instead, the critical
issue was whether Prudential’s authority is rooted in a private agreement with Plaintiffs’
employers or in some governmental delegation, and the Court concluded that it was the former.
Nothing in Amara changes that result. Indeed, even if the Court were to credit Plaintiffs’
argument to some degree, which it does not, they would be no closer to establishing that
Prudential is a “state actor” subject to constitutional scrutiny. At most, Plaintiffs might raise a
credible issue as to whether certain terms in the summary plan documents are terms that the
Court can “enforce” within the meaning of § 1132(a)(1)(B). See Amara, 131 S. Ct. at 1876-78.
But that question is obviously not before the Court and has no bearing on its prior holding.
In addition, Plaintiffs’ arguments surrounding the Amara case are weakened by the fact
that these same arguments were available to them earlier. Kattan by Thomas, 995 F.2d at 276;
Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Amara decision was issued
on May 16, 2011, more than two weeks before Plaintiffs filed their supplemental memorandum
in opposition to Prudential’s and the Secretary’s motions to dismiss on May 31, 2011. (Dkt. No.
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24). To the extent that Plaintiffs found Amara supportive of their position, they could have
advanced these arguments at that time, but they did not. Plaintiffs concede as much, (see Dkt.
No. 34 (“Pls.’ Sec’y Reply”) at 3-4), but proceed to criticize Prudential for failing to apprise the
Court of the Amara decision, strongly suggesting that its failure to do so amounted to a violation
of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, (id. at 4-5). This sort of mudslinging is altogether
unpersuasive and unseemly, particularly given the Court’s conclusion that Amara is not even
germane to the issues of this matter, let alone “outcome determinative,” as Plaintiffs contend. In
sum, Plaintiffs fail to establish any basis for relief under Rule 59(e) with respect to the Court’s
dismissal of their claims against Prudential (Count I).
Turning to Plaintiffs’ claims against the Secretary, the Court dismissed those claims
because it found that Plaintiffs failed to allege a cognizable injury-in-fact. Specifically, the
Court explained that Plaintiffs’ Complaints were “carefully crafted” to avoid alleging a claim
under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B), instead asserting
procedural injuries—i.e., that they were purportedly unable to obtain an impartial review of their
benefits determinations under Prudential’s plan. (Mem. Op. at 15-17). Insofar as those
procedural-type allegations were speculative and devoid of any “particularized injury,” the Court
held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims against the Secretary. (Id.).
Plaintiffs now assert that this finding was in error, arguing that Ouellette’s Complaint did
allege a claim for benefits due under § 1132(a)(1)(B). To this end, they point to the prefatory
paragraphs of Ouellette’s Complaint, which state that “this Court has authority to grant
individual relief to the named Plaintiff pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for benefits due
him under the terms of his plan.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 6 (quoting Ouellette v. Prudential Insurance, et
al., 11-cv-0454 Dkt. No. 1 (“Ouellette Compl.”) at ¶ 5)). They also cite to language from
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Ouellette’s prayer for relief, which seeks “the benefits due him.” (Id. (quoting Ouellette Compl.”
at ¶ 59)). Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs argue that Ouellette “plainly states a claim for
benefits due” and has standing to pursue his claims against the Secretary. 3 The Court disagrees.
As both Prudential and the Secretary rightly argue, Plaintiffs failed to advance this theory
in opposing the dismissal of their claims in the first place. To be sure, this precise issue was
squarely teed up by the Secretary, who, in pressing for the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims, argued
as follows:
To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are rooted in purported procedural
deficiencies in the Regulations themselves (as opposed to the denial of his claim
for disability benefits), as Plaintiff appears to assert in his opposition, Plaintiff
lacks standing . . . .
(Dkt. No. 18 (“Sec’y Opp’n”) at 4-5). If Plaintiffs disagreed with that characterization—and
truly believed they were advancing traditional benefits-due claims under § 1132(a)(1)(B)—they
could have argued as much in their initial briefing. They chose not to do so, and the Court will
not permit them to belatedly make these arguments now. Kattan, 995 F.2d at 276; Fox, 389 F.3d
at 1296. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to establish the requisite “clear error” or
“manifest injustice” that would entitle them to relief under Rule 59(e) with respect to their claims
against the Secretary (Counts II and III). 4
3
Plaintiffs make no argument that Moffett alleged such a claim or that he otherwise
possesses Article III standing to pursue his claims against the Secretary. Instead, Plaintiffs
argue, in conclusory fashion, that because Moffett is a member of the class that Ouellette seeks
to represent, “the complaints should remain consolidated.” (Ouellette Compl. at ¶ 59). While
the Court is not convinced that Moffett’s membership in Ouellette’s alleged class, without more,
would warrant the revival of his independently-alleged claims against the Secretary, the Court
need not reach this issue because it finds that Ouellette is not entitled to relief under Rule 59(e)
in the first place.
4
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiffs had advanced this newly-minted standing theory sooner,
the Court does not find their argument that Ouellette did assert a claim under § 1132(a)(1)(B) to
be particularly persuasive, given that the only allegations Plaintiffs point to are from the
prefatory jurisdictional statement and the prayer for relief of his Complaint. As the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently held, “the prayer for relief is no part of the cause of action.” Coll v.
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B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaints Under Rule 15(a)
Plaintiffs also seek leave to amend their Complaints under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a). As the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly held, however, “once a final judgment has
been entered, a court cannot permit an amendment unless the plaintiff ‘first satisfies Rule 59(e)’s
more stringent standard’ for setting aside that judgment.” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 673
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208). Insofar as Plaintiffs fail to establish any
entitlement to relief under Rule 59(e), their request for leave to amend under Rule 15(a) is
therefore denied as moot.
C. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Correct Judgment Under Rule 60
Lastly, Plaintiffs appear to seek relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(a) and
60(b)(6), which allow for relief from a judgment or order under limited circumstances. Other
than a bald reference to Rule 60 in the caption of their motion, however, Plaintiffs do not
otherwise discuss the applicable standards under Rule 60, let alone explain how they believe it
would entitle them to relief in this case. As Prudential correctly points out, Rule 60(a) is clearly
inapplicable because it only permits the Court to correct “clerical mistake[s],” FED. R. CIV. P.
60(a), none of which is alleged here. While Rule 60(b)(6), on the other hand, empowers the
Court to relieve a party from judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief,” our Circuit has
First Am. Title Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 876, 901 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Jovanovic v. US-Algeria
Business Council, 561 F. Supp. 2d 103, 108 n.2 (D.D.C. 2008). Jurisdictional and prefatory
statements are similarly construed. See Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d
853, 863 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiff’s conclusory reference to a statutory provision in
the complaint’s jurisdictional allegations, without more, “did not give the opposing party fair
notice of such a claim”). Along these lines, Plaintiffs do not and cannot point to any separately-
and explicitly-pled claim for benefits under ERISA’s enforcement provision, § 1132(a)(1)(B),
and the Court would be hard-pressed to read such a claim into Ouellette’s Complaint based
solely on the allegations Plaintiffs now identify.
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made clear that this rule only applies to “extraordinary situations . . . and should only sparingly
be used.” Twelve John Does v. Dist. Of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(internal citations omitted); Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). Insofar as Plaintiffs purport to rely on the same unsuccessful arguments underlying
their Rule 59(e) request for relief, the Court finds no basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) either. 5
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ motions (Dkt. Nos. 29, 30)
must be DENIED in all respects. An order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Digitally signed by Judge Robert L.
Wilkins
Date: November 30, 2012 DN: cn=Judge Robert L. Wilkins,
o=U.S. District Court, ou=Chambers
of Honorable Robert L. Wilkins,
email=RW@dc.uscourt.gov, c=US
Date: 2012.11.30 16:29:09 -05'00'
ROBERT L. WILKINS
United States District Judge
5
Further, given that Plaintiffs failed to even address Rule 60 in their reply briefing, the
Court treats these arguments as conceded. Newton v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 840
F. Supp. 2d 384, 397 (D.D.C. 2012) (“When a party files an opposition addressing only certain
arguments raised in a dispositive motion, a court may treat those arguments that the non-moving
party failed to address as conceded.”); Day v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 191
F. Supp. 2d 154, 159 (D.D.C. 2002) (“If a party fails to counter an argument that the opposing
party makes in a motion, the court may treat that argument as conceded.”).
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