Elman Marroquin v. Attorney General United States ( 2019 )


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  •                                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 18-1662
    ___________
    ELMAN JOAQUIN MARROQUIN,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    ____________________________________
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Agency No. A208-934-654)
    Immigration Judge: Leo A. Finston
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    November 7, 2018
    Before: MCKEE, COWEN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: October 29, 2019)
    ___________
    OPINION *
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    Elman Joaquin Marroquin petitions for review of an order of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s
    (“IJ”) removal order. We will deny the petition for review.
    Marroquin, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was charged as removable for being
    present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. He conceded the
    allegations against him and sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
    The IJ ordered Marroquin removed. The IJ concluded that Marroquin was ineligible for
    cancellation because he could not show good moral character under the statute after
    having been in jail for 180 days as a result of a conviction. On appeal, the BIA agreed
    with the IJ and dismissed the appeal. Marroquin filed a timely petition for review. 1
    Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we lack jurisdiction to review “any judgment
    regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1229b.” However, that provision
    applies only to discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of removal. See
    Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 
    338 F.3d 176
    , 178 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We join the other
    circuits and conclude that, for nondiscretionary factors, the Court maintains jurisdiction,
    but as to discretionary decisions we lack jurisdiction.”). Thus, we would have
    jurisdiction to consider some aspects of the BIA’s decision here, such as whether
    Marroquin met the statutory requirements to be potentially eligible for cancellation of
    removal. 2
    1
    We granted his motion for a stay of removal.
    2
    To be eligible for cancellation of removal, Marroquin had to establish that he met
    four requirements: continuous physical presence in the United States of not less than 10
    2
    However, in his opening brief, Marroquin does not challenge the BIA’s decision in
    any way. Instead, he simply notes that he is “waiting on the Judges [sic] decision” in a
    post-conviction proceeding that he apparently filed in New Jersey earlier this year. But
    the pendency of a collateral challenge to a conviction does not affect the finality of the
    conviction for immigration purposes. See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 
    528 F.3d 196
    , 198-99
    (3d Cir. 2008).
    Because Marroquin has failed to raise any other issues in his opening brief, he has
    waived those issues on petition for review. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 
    381 F.3d 221
    , 235 (3d
    Cir. 2004). Marroquin’s pro se reply brief, without making any argument on the issue,
    asks us to consider whether his time in pretrial detention counts as time confined “as a
    result of a conviction,” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7). 3 But raising an issue for
    the first time in a reply brief does not suffice to bring it before us for review. See
    Gambino v. Morris, 
    134 F.3d 156
    , 161 n.10 (3d Cir. 1998).
    For the foregoing, we will deny the petition for review.
    years; good moral character; an absence of certain disqualifying criminal convictions;
    and exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative who is a United
    States citizen or lawful permanent resident as a result of his removal. See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229b(b)(1); see also Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 
    615 F.3d 180
    , 185 (3d Cir. 2010)
    (explaining that someone who has conceded removability and seeks cancellation of
    removal has the burden of showing eligibility for cancellation).
    3
    Notably, in our order granting Marroquin’s stay motion, we explicitly ordered the
    parties to address this issue in their briefs. Marroquin failed to do so.
    3