United States v. Kelly ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2001 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    12-5-2001
    USA v. Kelly
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 00-2705
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001
    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Kelly" (2001). 2001 Decisions. Paper 283.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/283
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
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    Filed December 5, 2001
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    Nos. 00-2705, 00-2849 & 00-3688
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    COREY KELLY, a/k/a "Tre," Appellant at No. 00-2705;
    ROBERT DAVID, Appellant at No. 00-2849; and
    BERNARD WINSTON, Appellant at No. 00-3688.
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Nos. 99-cr-00672-1, 99-cr-00672-7 & 99-cr-00672-8)
    District Judge: Hon. Jerome B. Simandle
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    September 11, 2001
    Before: MANSMANN, RENDELL and ALDISERT,
    Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: December 5, 2001)
    STEPHEN A. FELDMAN, ESQUIRE
    Feldman and Feldman
    300 Rabro Drive
    Hauppauge, NY 11788
    ATTORNEY FOR COREY KELLY
    DAVID L. RHOADS, ESQUIRE
    311 Whitehorse Ave. -- Suite A
    Trenton, N.J. 08610
    ATTORNEY FOR ROBERT DAVID
    MARK W. CATANZARO, ESQUIRE
    Blason IV -- Suite 208
    513 South Lenola Road
    Moorestown, N.J. 08057
    ATTORNEY FOR BERNARD
    WINSTON
    ROBERT J CLEARY, ESQUIRE,
    United States Attorney
    GEORGE S. LEONE, ESQUIRE,
    Chief Appeals Division
    NORMAN GROSS, ESQUIRE,
    Assistant United States Attorney,
    United States Attorney's Office
    Camden Federal Building and
    United States Courthouse
    P.O. Box 2098
    Camden, N.J. 08101-2098
    ATTORNEYS FOR UNITED STATES
    OF AMERICA
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    PER CURIAM:
    We affirmed the judgment of the district court in all
    respects in a Not for Publication Memorandum Opinion
    filed October 26, 2001. We rejected, inter alia, Appellants'
    contention that in light of the holding in Apprendi v. New
    Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000), the provisions of 21 U.S.C.
    S 841 are facially unconstitutional and thus conspiracy
    convictions thereunder are invalid. Thereafter, the United
    States Attorney filed a motion asking that the portion of our
    opinion addressing this issue be published, noting that the
    constitutionality of the statute has been challenged in a
    number of pending cases in this court and in various
    district courts in our judicial circuit.1 We have decided to
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. See e.g., Wasang Thomas Mock v. Bernie D. Ellis, No. 01-2013; United
    States v. Richard Marshall, No. 01-1825; United States v. Joseph Criniti,
    2
    accommodate this request and set forth this brief statement
    of our reasons for rejecting Appellants' argument.
    Because this is a question of law only, we need not set
    forth the facts other than to state that in these consolidated
    cases, Corey Kelly, Robert David and Bernard Winston
    appeal their respective judgments of conviction and
    sentencing in drug cases. Count one of the indictment
    charged Kelly, David, Winston and three other co-
    defendants with conspiracy to distribute and possess with
    the intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine
    base. Count four charged Kelly and another with the
    substantive offense of distribution, and possession with
    intent to distribute 4.1 grams of cocaine base. Count five
    charged Kelly, David, Winston and others with a drug
    trafficking count involving 23.5 grams. The jury convicted
    Kelly on the conspiracy count and the substantive counts
    four and five. The jurors also convicted both David and
    Winston on the conspiracy count, but acquitted them on
    count five.
    Section 841(a), captioned "Unlawful acts," provides:
    Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be
    unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally--
    (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess
    with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
    controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or
    dispense, or possess with intent to distribute, or
    dispense, a counterfeit substance.
    21 U.S.C. S 841(a) (1994).
    Section 841(b), captioned "Penalties," states that "any
    person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be
    _________________________________________________________________
    No. 01-1673; United States v. Eugene Williams , No. 01-1479. The issue
    has also been raised in criminal and civil proceedings in our district
    courts. See e.g., Gary Nero v. United States, D.N.J. Civ. No. 01-1927;
    United States v. Wayman Brown, D.N.J. Crim. No. 01-477; United States
    v. Louis Santaguida et al., D.N.J. Crim. No. 00-247; Anderson Delgado v.
    Olson, D.N.J. Civ. No. 01-2538; Glendon Henry v. United States, D. Del.
    No. 00-43, Civ. No. 01-619; Jorge Luis Orendain v. Warden, FCI McKean,
    W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 01-310E; United States v. Hamlin, W.D. Pa. Crim. No.
    98-43; United States v. Hurley, W.D. Pa. Crim. No. 88-219.
    3
    sentenced as follows . . ." It then proceeds to lay out the
    minimum and maximum penalties for possession of various
    types and quantities of drugs, with adjustments depending
    on whether the defendant has prior drug-related
    convictions or whether the activities caused death or
    serious injury.
    In a recent en banc decision, this court made the
    following determination in an Apprendi context:
    We indicated in United States v. Williams, 
    235 F.3d 858
           (3d Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, 
    69 U.S.L.W. 3763
           (U.S. 2001), and we hold here, that an Apprendi
    violation only occurs if the drug quantity is not found
    by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and the
    defendant's sentence under S 841 exceeds 20 years.
    United States v. Vazquez, ___ F.3d ___, ___; 
    2001 WL 1188250
    *3 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
    In light of the Apprendi holding, Appellants contend that
    21 U.S.C. S 841 is facially unconstitutional, because
    sentencing factors must now be treated as elements of the
    offense and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Kelly Brief
    at 31. Because none of the Appellants challenged the facial
    constitutionality of S 841(a) in the district court, this
    contention is reviewed for plain error.
    We conclude that Appellants may not prevail, because
    the district court committed no "clear" or"obvious" error by
    declining to declare all convictions under S 841(a) to be
    facially unconstitutional. Every appellate court that has
    considered the issue has upheld its constitutionality.2 One
    court that has addressed facial constitutional challenges to
    S 841 under Apprendi has concluded that such claims are
    not only meritless, but "confused." United States v. Brough,
    
    243 F.3d 1078
    , 1079 (7th Cir. 2001).3
    _________________________________________________________________
    2. A split panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
    otherwise, but its opinion has been vacated. United States v. Buckland,
    
    259 F.3d 1157
    (9th Cir. 2001), opinion vacated and en banc
    consideration granted, 
    2001 WL 1091167
    (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2001).
    3. At least five other courts of appeals have considered the issue and
    have essentially agreed with the Brough formulation. See United States v.
    4
    We agree with and adopt the reasoning of Brough:
    Apprendi . . . [does] not establish that anything in
    S 841 is unconstitutional or require[s] its severance. If
    Congress had specified that only judges may make the
    findings required by S 841(b), or that these findings
    must be made by a preponderance of the evidence,
    then S 841 would create a constitutional problem. But
    the statute does not say who makes the findings or
    which party bears what burden of persuasion. Instead
    the law attaches effects to facts, leaving it to the
    judiciary to sort out who determines the facts, under
    what burden. It makes no constitutional difference
    whether a single subsection covers both elements and
    penalties, whether these are divided across multiple
    subsections (as S 841 does), or even whether they are
    scattered across multiple statutes (see 18 U.S.C.
    SS 924(a), 1963). Apprendi holds that the due process
    clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments make
    the jury the right decision maker (unless the defendant
    elects a bench trial), and the reasonable-doubt
    standard the proper burden, when a fact raises the
    maximum lawful punishment. How statutes are
    drafted, or implemented, to fulfil that requirement is a
    subject to which the Constitution does not speak.
    
    Brough, 243 F.3d at 1079
    .
    _________________________________________________________________
    Candelario, 
    240 F.3d 1300
    , 1311 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding a facial
    challenge to drug statutes to be "without merit"); United States v.
    Slaughter, 
    238 F.3d 580
    , 582 (5th Cir. 2000) ("We see nothing in the
    Supreme Court decision in Apprendi which would permit us to conclude
    that 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a) and (b), 846, and 860(a) are unconstitutional on
    their face"); United States v. Meyst, 
    2001 WL 1126642
    at *1 (4th Cir.
    Sept. 25, 2001) ("On appeal, Meyst argues that the rule announced in
    Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000), renders 21 U.S.C.A S 841
    . . . unconstitutional on its face. We reject this argument and affirm his
    conviction and sentence"); United States v. Cernobyl, 
    255 F.3d 1215
    ,
    1219 (10th Cir. 2001) ("We now join [other] courts in holding that S 841
    remains constitutionally enforceable notwithstanding Apprendi"); United
    States v. Martinez, 
    253 F.3d 251
    , 256 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001) ("We decline
    Appellants' invitation to find that 21 U.S.C. S 841 is unconstitutional in
    light of the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi").
    5
    Notably, the Supreme Court did not find the New Jersey
    statute at issue in Apprendi to be facially unconstitutional
    and unenforceable, but struck down only the procedure
    employed to increase petitioner's sentence. See 
    Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497
    ("[t]he New Jersey procedure challenged in
    this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury
    tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal
    justice system") (emphasis added).
    Accordingly, we reject the contention that S 841 is facially
    unconstitutional in light of Apprendi.
    The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6