United States v. Sabarese ( 1995 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1995 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    11-28-1995
    United States of America v. Sabarese
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 95-5160
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995
    Recommended Citation
    "United States of America v. Sabarese" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 299.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/299
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    1
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 95-5160
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    THEODORE M. SABARESE,
    Appellant.
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Criminal Action No. 93-cr-00389-1)
    Argued October 19, 1995
    Before: SCIRICA, COWEN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed November 28, 1995)
    Faith S. Hochberg
    United States Attorney
    Allan Tananbaum (Argued)
    Assistant United States Attorney
    Kevin McNulty
    Assistant United States Attorney
    Office of the United States Attorney
    970 Broad Street
    Newark, NJ 07102
    Attorneys for Appellee
    2
    Nicholas J. Nastasi, Esq. (Argued)
    241 South 7th Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Richard L., Scheff, Esq.
    Gerard M. McCabe, Esq.
    Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads
    Three Parkway - 20th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19102
    Attorneys for Appellant
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ROTH, Circuit Judge:
    Theodore Sabarese was sentenced to a term of
    imprisonment by the United States District Court for the District
    of New Jersey after being sentenced to a term of probation by the
    United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania.   He now challenges the New Jersey prison sentence
    claiming that, pursuant to the United States Sentencing
    Guidelines, a subsequent sentence for a related offense must be
    imposed concurrently.   He argues that the New Jersey district
    court was constrained by § 5G1.3 of the Guidelines, read in
    conjunction with 
    18 U.S.C. § 3564
    (b), to impose either a
    probationary term or a prison sentence of no longer than 30 days.
    3
    Finding no merit in Sabarese's challenge, we will affirm the New
    Jersey district court's sentence.1
    I.
    Sabarese played a key role in a scheme to defraud
    financial institutions by obtaining loans that exceeded the
    market value of the boats and airplanes financed.    Sabarese was
    convicted after a trial in Pennsylvania on a two-count indictment
    charging him with making false statements on loan applications in
    order to obtain financing for non-existent yachts.    After his
    conviction in Pennsylvania, Sabarese entered a guilty plea on a
    one-count indictment returned against him in Connecticut.     The
    Connecticut case was transferred to the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania where the judge sentenced Sabarese on the two
    Pennsylvania counts and the one Connecticut count.
    Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Sabarese could have
    been sentenced by the Pennsylvania court to a prison term of 24
    to 30 months.   The presentence investigation report ("PSI") noted
    Sabarese's involvement in the "related" New Jersey scheme.    The
    district court in Pennsylvania agreed that the conduct in New
    Jersey was related, which allowed the judge to elevate the
    offense conduct level by two points.   Upon motion of the
    1
    When statutory construction or construction of the
    Sentencing Guidelines is required on appeal, the standard of
    review is plenary. United States v. Holifield, 
    53 F.3d 11
    , 12-13
    (3d Cir. 1995); Moody v. Sec. Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 
    971 F.2d 1056
    , 1063 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Nottingham, 
    898 F.2d 390
    , 392 (3d Cir. 1990). This court has appellate
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     (1988) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a) (1988).
    3
    Government, however, the judge granted a substantial downward
    departure and sentenced Sabarese to concurrent five-year
    probationary terms, conditioned on three months house arrest and
    a payment of restitution in the amount of $1,170,511.
    After he was convicted and sentenced in Pennsylvania,
    Sabarese pled guilty to the charges brought against him in New
    Jersey.   The New Jersey indictment charged Sabarese with a total
    of thirty counts:    one count of conspiracy, six counts of bank
    fraud, and twenty-three counts of wire fraud.     These counts
    stemmed from a conspiracy to obtain financing for airplanes.
    The New Jersey judge concluded that the airplane fraud was not
    related to the boat fraud in Pennsylvania.
    Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Sabarese could have
    been sentenced to prison for a term of 24 to 30 months for the
    New Jersey convictions.    However, because of Sabarese's
    substantial assistance, the Government again moved for a downward
    departure.    The New Jersey district court granted the
    Government's motion, sentencing Sabarese to sixteen months
    imprisonment, three years supervised release, and restitution
    totalling $439,000.
    II.
    Sabarese's principal argument is that the language of
    §5G1.3 of the Guidelines required the district court in New
    Jersey to impose a sentence that would run concurrently with the
    sentence imposed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.    The
    parties agree that the 1988 version of the Guidelines applies in
    this case.    In 1988, § 5G1.3 provided:
    4
    If at the time of sentencing, the defendant
    is already serving one or more unexpired
    sentences, then the sentences for the instant
    offense(s) shall run consecutively to such
    unexpired sentences, unless one or more of
    the instant offense(s) arose out of the same
    transactions or occurrences as the unexpired
    sentences. In the latter case, such instant
    sentences and the unexpired sentences shall
    run concurrently, except to the extent
    otherwise required by law.
    U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (Oct. 1987).   Sabarese claims that the district
    court in New Jersey was bound by the finding in the Eastern
    District of Pennsylvania that the fraud schemes were "relevant
    and related."   He argues that the term "relevant and related" is
    defined in § 1B1.3 of the Guidelines and should be construed as
    being synonymous with the phrase "a[rising] out of the same
    transactions or occurrences" of § 5G1.3.     He then contends that
    the "relevant and related" finding in the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania, taken together with the language of § 5G1.3,
    mandates a sentence that would run concurrently with Sabarese's
    unexpired Pennsylvania probationary term.2
    Sabarese next turns to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3564
    (b) and argues
    that the only type of sentence which can run currently with a
    sentence of probation is a sentence of imprisonment for less than
    thirty days or a sentence of probation.    Section 3564(b) provides
    in pertinent part:   "A term of probation does not run while the
    2
    Sabarese also argues that the doctrine of collateral
    estoppel should bar the Government from arguing in a subsequent
    trial that the New Jersey transactions were not relevant and
    related to the Pennsylvania transactions because a prior court
    positively concluded that the transactions were in fact relevant
    and related. Because our holding relies solely on the
    construction of § 3564(b) and Guideline § 5G1.3, we need not
    reach this issue.
    5
    defendant is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a
    Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a
    period of less than thirty consecutive days."   18 U.S.C. 3564(b).
    Combining this language with his § 5G1.3 argument, Sabarese
    concludes that the district judge was constrained by the
    Guidelines and § 3564(b) to impose a sentence of imprisonment of
    less than thirty days imprisonment or a sentence of a concurrent
    probationary term.   We disagree.
    We hold that the district judge in New Jersey was not
    so confined in imposing sentence by the provisions of § 3564(b).
    This section merely clarifies that a term of probation will run
    only during a concurrent term of probation or during a sentence
    of imprisonment of less that 30 consecutive days.    Section
    3564(b) does not require that a subsequently imposed sentence be
    of any certain term or of any particular type, such as a sentence
    of incarceration, of a fine, of community confinement, or of
    probation.   There is no reason to believe that either Congress or
    the Sentencing Commission intended § 5G1.3 and § 3564(b) to be
    read in a conjunctive or restrictive manner.    Moreover, the use
    of the term "sentence" in § 5G1.3 clearly refers to a sentence of
    imprisonment.   Otherwise, the language of § 5G1.3 would make no
    sense.   A sentence imposing a fine cannot run concurrently or
    consecutively with a sentence of 12 months imprisonment.
    Moreover, even if the Pennsylvania and the New Jersey
    offenses were considered to arise from the same transaction or
    occurrence, the Guidelines provision in § 5G1.3 could not trump
    the statutory provision of § 3564(b).   See United States v.
    6
    Nottingham, 
    898 F.2d 390
    , 393 (3d Cir. 1990).    Indeed, even if
    the offenses did arise from the same transaction or occurrence,
    the "except to the extent otherwise required by law" language of
    § 5G1.3 would incorporate by reference into § 5G1.3 the provision
    of § 3564(b) that a term of probation may not run concurrently
    with a sentence of imprisonment (unless that sentence of
    imprisonment is for less that 30 consecutive days).    If the term
    of imprisonment cannot run concurrently with the sentence of
    probation, the terms of imprisonment and of probation will have
    to run consecutively.    It is distorted logic to interpret
    §3564(b) to permit a sentence, imposed pursuant to a two-count
    indictment, to limit a sentence, imposed on the basis of a
    thirty-count indictment, simply because the two-count indictment
    was tried first.   We reach this conclusion whether the offenses
    are "related" or not.3
    We conclude, therefore, that the sentence of the
    sixteen month term of imprisonment was properly imposed by the
    district court in New Jersey and that Sabarese must serve that
    term; his sentence to three-years of supervised release will then
    run concurrently with the five-year probationary term imposed in
    the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
    3
    Because we find that the provisions of § 3564(b) do not
    place a 30 day limit on the term of imprisonment which can be
    imposed on a defendant who has been sentenced to a prior term of
    probation on a "related" offense, we do not need to go on to
    determine whether "related" as defined in § 1B1.3 of the
    Guidelines is synonymous with the phrase "arose out of the same
    transaction or occurrences" of § 5G1.3. Nor are we required to
    determine if the New Jersey district court was bound by the
    "relatedness" finding of the Pennsylvania court.
    7
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of sentence
    imposed on Sabarese by the New Jersey district court will be
    affirmed.4
    4
    Because we will affirm Sabarese's New Jersey sentence,
    we will not consider Sabarese's request to assign the case to a
    different judge for resentencing. We note, however, that it is
    the standard practice in this circuit to assign a case on remand
    to the judge who originally heard it. See United States v.
    Baylin, 
    696 F.2d 1030
    , 1042 n.30 (3d Cir. 1982).
    8