Claudio v. Snyder ( 1995 )

Opinions of the United
1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-8-1995
Claudio v Snyder
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 94-7591
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Recommended Citation
"Claudio v Snyder" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 287.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/287
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1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 94-7591
CARMELO CLAUDIO;
ENRIQUE MAYMI,
Appellants
v.
*ROBERT SNYDER, Warden,
Delaware Correctional Center;
*M. JANE BRADY, Attorney
General of the State of Delaware
*(Amended as per the Clerk's 4/17/95 Order)
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 91-cv--00203)
Argued October 16, 1995
Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges
and SHADUR1, District Judge
(Opinion Filed November 8, 1995)
Stephen M. Latimer, Esq. (Argued)
Loughlin & Latimer
58-60 Main Street
Hackensack, NJ 07602
1
Milton I. Shadur, United States District Court Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2
Attorney for Appellants
Loren C. Meyers (Argued)
Deputy Attorney General
Delaware Department of Justice
820 N. French Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
Attorney for Appellees
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Carmelo Claudio and Enrique Maymi appeal the district
court's denial of their consolidated petition for habeas corpus
relief. Appellants were convicted in Delaware Superior Court of
first degree robbery, four counts of possession of a deadly
weapon during the commission of a felony, two counts of first
degree conspiracy, and one count each of first degree murder and
first degree attempted murder. Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278,
1279 (Del. Supr. 1991). Appellants claim that the state trial
court erred by: (1) substituting an alternate juror for an ill
juror without instructing the jury to discard previous
deliberations and begin anew, (2) failing to issue a curative
instruction despite allegedly inflammatory remarks by the
prosecutor after physical evidence was excluded, and (3)
instructing the jury on accomplice liability in a manner that
3
could lead a reasonable juror to believe that petitioners bore
the burden of proof on that issue.
Jurisdiction in the district court was invoked pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) after appellants exhausted their state
court remedies. Claudio v. Redman, Nos. 91-203-LON, 91-209-LON,
slip op. at 2 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 1994) (consolidated petitions of
Claudio and Maymi). This appeal is properly before us on a
certificate of probable cause issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253.
We will affirm the district court's denial of habeas
corpus relief on all three grounds, the second and third
requiring no further discussion. Because the Delaware trial
court's substitution of an alternate juror after jury
deliberations had already begun presents a question of first
impression in this circuit, we further elaborate our holding on
this issue.
I
At the conclusion of appellants' state trial, the trial
judge read his instructions to the jury and three alternate
jurors. Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d at 1283. The jury began its
deliberations on December 1, 1987, at approximately 10:30 a.m.
and deliberated until approximately 5:00 p.m. During this first
day of deliberations, the jury requested to view the defendant,
Claudio. The trial judge agreed, and the twelve jurors and three
alternates were brought back into the courtroom to view Claudio.
The jury failed to reach a verdict during the first day of
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deliberation and was sequestered for the night. The alternate
jurors were separately sequestered.2 Id.During the night, one of the regular jurors became ill.
The next morning, the trial judge excused the ill juror and
replaced that juror with one of the alternates. The judge asked
the three alternates if they had discussed the case amongst
themselves during their sequestration and inquired whether they
had read anything about the case. Id. at 1283 n.8. All three
jurors responded in the negative. The trial judge then impaneled
the first alternate. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but
that motion was denied. Id. at 1283.
After impaneling the new juror, the trial judge gave
special instructions to the reconstituted jury and to the
alternate juror. The court instructed the original eleven jurors
to "take whatever time is necessary, even though it may be
repetitious and time consuming, to completely update [the
alternate juror] as to the stage of deliberations you as a group
have reached." Id. at 1284 n.9. The court then specifically
directed the alternate juror to take as much time as necessary to
familiarize herself with the evidence and with the thinking of
the other jurors and to move forward only when she felt that she
2
The alternate jurors were not released at the conclusion of
trial because, in the event that the jury returned a guilty
verdict, the defendants were subject to a post-verdict hearing to
determine the issue of capital punishment. Claudio v. State, 585
A.2d at 1283 n.7 (citing Del.C. § 4209(b)).
4
was at no relative disadvantage with regard to her understanding
of the case.3
The reconstituted jury deliberated from approximately
10:01 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on December 2. At 11:17 a.m. the jurors
sent out a note asking if the surviving victim had been visited
in the hospital by a Mrs. Guzman. The note was answered an hour
later. On December 3 the jury reconvened at approximately 10:00
a.m. After a break for lunch at noon, the jury reached a verdict
on all charges at approximately 2:00 p.m. on December 3. Thus
the original jury deliberated for about six and one-half hours,
and the reconstituted jury deliberated for approximately nine and
3
The Delaware Supreme court quoted the trial judge's
instructions to the replacement juror in part as follows:
You find yourself [sic] somewhat of a
disadvantage. Fortunately, however, with
your diligence and the cooperation of your
fellow jurors, you will be able to
familiarize yourself with the deliberations
concluded thus far, so that you are not at
any disadvantage with regard to understanding
all of the evidence and the views of your
fellow jurors. It is essential and critical
that you take whatever time is necessary to
familiarize yourself with the evidence and
the thinking and views of the jurors.
You must guard against the natural
feelings to rush or hasten in order to keep
up with the majority or the other 11. I
instruct you to be conscious, and forthright
in telling the others if you feel any
disadvantage with regard to the level of your
understanding.
When and only when you feel
yourself adequately and reasonably equipped
to understand what has transpired thus far in
the deliberations, should you signal to your
fellow jurors your desire to move forward.
Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d at 1284 n.9.
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one-half hours. Id. at 1284. The jury returned the guilty
verdicts noted above. Appellants were sentenced to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for first degree
murder, life imprisonment with possibility of parole for
attempted murder, and an additional forty-five years for other
offenses.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled
that the trial court violated Delaware Superior Court Criminal
Rule 24(c), which permits the replacement of regular jurors by
alternates prior to deliberation only.4 Id. at 1284-85. It also
concluded that the substitution of the alternate juror violated
the United States and Delaware constitutions. Id. at 1289, 1301.
The court held, however, that these were harmless errors. Id. at
1289, 1304. The district court properly declined to review the
state law issues involving Rule 24(c) and the Delaware
Constitution, Claudio v. Redman, slip op. at 9 (citing Helton v.
Fauver, 930 F.2d 1040, 1044 (3rd Cir. 1991)), and our review is
confined to the federal constitutional challenge.
II
Appellants claim that the trial court's decision to
substitute an alternate juror after jury deliberations had
already begun violated their right to a trial by jury under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
4
A stipulation by the parties that they would accept the
unanimous verdict of eleven jurors pursuant to Delaware Superior
Court Rule 23(b) would have resolved the situation. The Delaware
Supreme Court noted that the trial court never put this question
to the parties, Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d at 1305 n.73, and the
record indicates that this option was not considered at the time.
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Constitution. The Supreme Court has summarized the essential
feature of a jury trial:
"Providing an accused with the right to be
tried by a jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Given
this purpose, the essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the interposition between
the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,
and in the community participation and shared
responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). Appellants contend that
the introduction of an alternate juror after deliberations had
begun vitiated the essential purpose of the jury by disrupting
the community participation and shared responsibility that the
Supreme Court deemed essential. Appellants' Brief at 15 (quoting
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100). The introduction of an alternate
juror after the commencement of deliberations violates the
"sanctity of the deliberative process" in a manner that renders
the trial fundamentally unfair, according to appellants. Id. at
15, 16 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 100); Appellants' Reply
Brief at 5.
The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the
constitutionality of substituting an alternate juror after jury
deliberations have begun. Most of the federal courts that have
addressed the issue, however, have held that when circumstances
require, substitution of an alternate juror in place of a regular
juror after deliberations have begun does not violate the
7
Constitution, so long as the judge instructs the reconstituted
jury to begin its deliberations anew and the defendant is not
prejudiced by the substitution. See, e.g., United States v.
Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 1987); Peek v. Kemp, 784
F.2d 1479, 1484-85 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 939 (1986); Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986), and cert. denied sub
nom., Freeman v. Stagner, 475 U.S. 1049 (1986); United States v.
Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub
nom., Soteras v. U.S., 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v.
Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1056-57 (2nd Cir. 1983); United States v.
Evans, 635 F.2d 1124, 1128 (4th Cir. 1980). But see United
States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc)
(finding impermissible coercion of juror when original jury
required four hours to render verdict but reconstituted jury
required only twenty-nine minutes).
In both Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d at 1484-85, and Miller
v. Stagner, 757 F.2d at 995, federal courts declined to grant
habeas corpus relief to petitioners convicted in state
proceedings by juries including one or more alternates
substituted after jury deliberations had begun. In Miller, two
jurors were dismissed on the fifth day of jury deliberations and
replaced with alternates over the objections of defense counsel.
Miller, 757 F.2d at 995. The Ninth Circuit held that the
substitution of the alternate jurors did not violate appellants'
federal constitutional rights because the procedure followed by
the trial court "preserved the 'essential feature' of the jury
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required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. (citing
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100).
Unlike the California penal code at issue in Miller,
however, Delaware's Superior Court Criminal Code permits
replacement of regular jurors by alternate jurors only prior to
deliberations. Compare Miller, 757 F.2d at 995 n.3 with Claudio
v. State, 585 A.2d at 1284 n.11, 1285. By substituting an
alternate juror after deliberations had begun, the Delaware trial
court violated Rule 24(c) of the Delaware Criminal Code. The
relevant question for us, though, is whether the state court
violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
constitution, not whether it violated a state rule of criminal
procedure.
Analogous federal cases make clear that a violation of
the established criminal procedure is not sufficient in itself to
create a constitutional violation. Several courts have held that
the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations have
begun in a federal criminal trial violates Rule 24(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. But despite the
characterization of Rule 24(c) as "a mandatory requirement that
should be scrupulously followed," federal courts have generally
ruled that the substitution of a juror after deliberations have
begun does not violate the United States Constitution, provided
that defendants suffered no prejudice as a result. United States
v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 994-95 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982), and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906(1982) (citing cases); see also Guevara, 823 F.2d at 448;
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Josefik, 753 F.2d at 587; Hillard, 701 F.2d at 1056-57. In
Hillard, for example, a juror became ill after two and one-half
days of deliberations and a three-day holiday recess. Hillard,
701 F.2d at 1055. The district court excused the ill juror and
impaneled an alternate juror, and the jury returned several
verdicts over the following two days. The Second Circuit upheld
these verdicts against a constitutional challenge despite the
violation of Rule 24(c) because the "essential feature" of the
jury was preserved:
The alternates were chosen along with the
regular jurors and by the same procedures.
They heard all the evidence and the
instructions on the law with the regular
jurors. Moreover, the alternate chosen to
replace the ill juror reaffirmed his ability
to consider the evidence and deliberate
fairly and fully . . .. The trial judge
instructed all the jurors to begin their
deliberations anew . . ..
Id. at 1056-57. Thus, even though the pertinent rule of criminal
procedure was violated, the court found no constitutional
violation absent evidence that the defendant suffered prejudice
as a result.
Like the petitioners in Hillard, appellants in this
case cite no prejudice that would elevate a violation of a rule
of criminal procedure to a violation of the United States
Constitution. The alternates in this case were chosen along with
the regular jurors, and they heard all of the same evidence and
legal instructions simultaneously with the regular jurors. The
replacement juror reaffirmed that she had not discussed the case
10
and that she had not been exposed to media reports. Whereas the
reconstituted jury in Hillard deliberated for slightly less time
than the original jury before rendering its verdict, the
reconstituted jury in this case continued its deliberations for a
slightly longer time than the originally impaneled jury.
The fact that the Delaware trial court did not
specifically instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew is
not dispositive. The trial court instructed the original jurors
to "take whatever time is necessary" to completely inform the
replacement juror of all previous deliberations and of each
juror's individual point of view. It also instructed the
replacement juror to guard against the inclination to proceed
before she was thoroughly familiar with the evidence and the
views of the other jurors. See supra note 2. Although the trial
judge never specifically directed the jury to "begin anew," we
agree with the district court that the trial court's instructions
were the functional equivalent of such an instruction. The
instructions were designed to eliminate any disadvantage that the
alternate juror may have felt as a result of her late
introduction into the deliberations and to ensure her full,
effective, and uncoerced participation in all aspects of the
deliberations. The words "begin anew" carry no talismanic power,
and we would exalt form over substance were we to ignore the
salutary effect of the trial court's instructions in this case.
Because the trial court's instructions were the
functional equivalent of an instruction to "begin anew," we find
no evidence that the substitution of the alternate juror
11
compromised the "essential feature" of a trial by jury. We will
therefore affirm the district court's denial of appellants'
request for habeas corpus relief.
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