Michaels v. New Jersey , 150 F.3d 257 ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1998 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-16-1998
    Michaels v. New Jersey
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 97-5701
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998
    Recommended Citation
    "Michaels v. New Jersey" (1998). 1998 Decisions. Paper 160.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/160
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    Filed July 16, 1998
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 97-5701
    MARGARET KELLY MICHAELS
    v.
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
    OFFICE; COUNTY OF ESSEX; ESSEX COUNTY
    PROSECUTOR; GEORGE L. SCHNEIDER, ESQ.;
    HERBERT TATE, ESQ.; JOHN MASTROANGELO; JOHN
    NOONAN; GLENN GOLDBERG, ESQ.; SARAH SPENCER-
    MCARDLE; EILEEN C. TREACY, M.A.; THE ESSEX
    COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; NEWARK POLICE
    DEPARTMENT; DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY
    SERVICES; LOUIS FONNELARAS; SUSAN ESQUILLAN;
    "JOHN DOES", 1 THROUGH 20 (FICTITIOUS PERSONS);
    "JOSEPH DOES", 1 THROUGH 20 (FICTITIOUS
    PERSONS); "JAMES DOES"; "JANE DOES", 1 THROUGH
    20 (FICTITIOUS PERSONS); "HARRY DOES", 1 THROUGH
    20 (FICTITIOUS PERSONS)
    COUNTY OF ESSEX,
    Appellant
    ON APPEAL FROM THE
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
    (D.C. Civ. No. 96-3557)
    Argued on: June 23, 1998
    Before: GREENBERG, ALITO, and McKEE, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: July 16, 1998)
    CATHERINE E. TAMASIK (Argued)
    Essex County Counsel
    Hall of Records, Room 530
    465 Dr. Martin Luther King
    Boulevard
    Newark, New Jersey 07102
    Attorney for Appellant
    JEFFREY MILLER (Argued)
    Mary C. Jacobson
    Assistant Attorneys General of
    Counsel
    Peter Verniero
    Attorney General of New Jersey
    R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
    CN 116
    Trenton, New Jersey 085625
    Attorney for Appellee
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ALITO, Circuit Judge:
    Essex County appeals the decision of the district court
    holding that the State of New Jersey is not obligated under
    N.J.S.A. S 59:10-1 to indemnify or defend the officers and
    employees of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office who
    were sued in this case for actions that they took in carrying
    out their law enforcement responsibilities. The district court
    held that the State's obligation to indemnify and defend is
    limited to those traditionally considered "State employees,"
    as defined by N.J.S.A. S 59:10-1 and N.J.S.A. S 59:10A-1.
    See Michaels v. State of New Jersey, 
    968 F. Supp. 230
    , 238
    (D.N.J. 1997).
    On appeal, the County of Essex contends that under
    Coleman v. Kaye, 
    87 F.3d 1491
    (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
    
    117 S. Ct. 754
    (1997), Cashen v. Spann, 
    334 A.2d 8
    (N.J.
    1975), cert. denied, 
    423 U.S. 829
    (1975), and other state
    cases, the Prosecutor's Office defendants functioned as
    agents of the State when they engaged in the actions that
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    provide the basis for plaintiff Michaels's suit and that the
    State is therefore vicariously liable under N.J.S.A. S 59:2-
    2(a). Although the County's argument is certainly
    reasonable, we agree with the district court that Coleman
    and Cashen are not controlling because they dealt with the
    issue of vicarious liability rather than indemnification and
    the provision of a defense, which are governed by a
    separate state statute. 
    See 968 F. Supp. at 236
    . For
    substantially the reasons set out in the district court's
    opinion, we predict that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
    would hold that under N.J.S.A. S 59:10A-1 the State is
    required to provide indemnification and a defense for only
    "those persons `generally' and `traditionally' considered the
    State's 
    employees." 968 F. Supp. at 237
    .
    The question presented by this appeal -- involving the
    interpretation of state statutes governing the allocation of
    certain financial responsibilities between the State and one
    of its subdivisions -- is one that seems to us to be
    particularly inappropriate for resolution by a federal court.
    Members of our court have previously expressed the view
    that it would be beneficial if New Jersey adopted a
    certification statute so that questions of this nature could
    be certified to the state supreme court. See Hakimoglu v.
    Trump Taj Majal Assocs., 
    70 F.3d 291
    , 293 n.2 (3d Cir.
    1995); 
    id. at 302-04
    (Becker, J., dissenting). As Professor
    Bradford R. Clark of George Washington University Law
    School has noted, when state law is unclear, efforts by
    federal courts to "predict" how a state's highest court would
    rule "raise judicial federalism concerns." Bradford R. Clark,
    Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
    Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1459,
    1564 (1997). As long as diversity jurisdiction is retained,
    certification provides the best way to alleviate these
    problems. See 
    id. at 1549-56.
    However, because New Jersey
    does not permit certification, we have no choice but to
    "predict" how the state supreme court would decide the
    question before us, and as we have explained, our best
    prediction is that the state supreme court would agree with
    the decision of the district court.
    For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the district
    court.
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    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
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