Muti v. Schmidt , 118 F. App'x 646 ( 2004 )

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-29-2004
Muti v. Schmidt
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-1206
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 03-1206
___________
RICHARD S. MUTI,
Appellant
v.
WILLIAM H. SCHMIDT, Individually and in
his Official Capacity as BERGEN COUNTY
PROSECUTOR; COUNTY OF BERGEN; WILLIAM P.
SCHUBER, Individually and in his Official
Capacity as BERGEN COUNTY EXECUTIVE; JOHN
AND JANE DOES 1-10, Individually and in
their Official Capacities
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-03865)
District Judge: The Honorable W illiam H. Walls
___________
ARGUED DECEMBER 14, 2004
Before: NYGAARD, ROSENN, and BECKER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed December 29, 2004)
Richard S. Muti (Argued)
66 Church Street
Ramsey, NJ 07446
Pro Se Appellant
Michael S. Stein, Esq. (Argued)
Pashman Stein
21 Main Street
Court Plaza South
Hackensack, NJ 07601-7054
Counsel for Appellees
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Richard Muti appeals from a final order of the District Court dismissing his
complaint for failure to state a claim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291and will affirm.
I.
On July 10, 1995, Acting Bergen County Prosecutor Charles Buckley hired Muti
as an Assistant Prosecutor with the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (“BCPO”).
William Schmidt became Prosecutor on March 10, 1997. At some point in June of that
year, Schmidt promoted Muti to be one of three Deputy First Assistant Prosecutors.
Despite this promotion, the two men apparently had a strained relationship, due at least in
part to a series of disagreements concerning Schmidt’s management of the BCPO.
Nonetheless, in his capacity as Deputy First Assistant, Muti: served as Chief Financial
Officer of the BCPO; had responsibility over preparation and management of the BCPO’s
budget; had authority over the disbursement of federal forfeiture funds; made regular
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staffing level recommendations to Schmidt; provided Schmidt with legal opinions and
memoranda regarding personnel decisions; and acted as the BCPO chief negotiator for
leases and the renewal of police union contracts.
In August 2000, Schmidt proposed that the county use bonds and federal forfeiture
funds to purchase a new BCPO building. In response to Schmidt’s proposal, on August
14, 2000, Muti sent a letter on BCPO letterhead to the Bergen County Executive, the
Board of Chosen Freeholders, the County Administrator, County Counsel, the County
Treasurer, and to Schmidt himself. In the letter, Muti questioned the prudence of
Schmidt’s decision to purchase the building, calling it “a significant waste of public
resources.” (App. at 69). He explained, “I have no doubt that Prosecutor Schmidt is
sincere in his belief that the BCPO needs the building, but I am convinced that we do
not.” (Id.). Muti also expressed his opinion that there existed “a palpable sense of fear
among senior staff members to voice even the slightest disagreement with our boss.”
(Id.). Schmidt received his copy of the letter that day, and promptly fired Muti.
Muti brought suit, claiming his termination violated a variety of federal and state
laws. Presently on appeal is his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, in which he asserts that he was fired in retaliation for his
exercise of the right to free speech. Pursuant to motion, the District Court dismissed that
claim on January 3, 2003.
II.
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Although we evaluate a public employee’s claim of retaliatory termination for
engaging in protected speech under a three-step test, Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d
188, 194 (3d Cir. 2001), the first is dispositive here. Under this step, Muti must establish
as a threshold that his speech regarded a matter of public concern. Id. at 195. Schmidt
concedes this threshold has been met, and indeed it has. As part of this step, we must
next balance Muti’s interest in the speech against “the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citation omitted). In
making this determination, no single factor is dispositive; each must be weighed.
Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198. On the employee’s side, the public has an “especially
powerful” interest in exposing potential wrongdoing by public officials. Id. As for the
public employer, we must consider “whether the [expression] impairs discipline by
superiors or . . . has a detrimental effect on close working relationships for which
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or . . . interferes with the regular operation
of the enterprise.” Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added). In weighing the extent of
the detrimental impact on a close working relationship, the proximity within the
organizational hierarchy between the employer and the employee is particularly
important. Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198 (citations omitted). The burden of justifying the
discharge ultimately lies with the State. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
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In the August 14th letter, Muti publicly expressed disagreement with Schmidt’s
decision to seek purchase of a new building. Muti noted that while he believed Schmidt’s
choice to be a sincere one, he questioned its prudence, characterizing it as “a significant
waste of public resources.” Furthermore, and significantly, Muti questioned Schmidt’s
receptiveness to dissenting opinions. Although Muti, as a public employee, does have an
especially powerful interest in exposing potential wrongdoing, the August 14th letter does
not particularly further that interest. Instead, the letter essentially concerns a difference of
opinion as to a policy choice: whether the BCPO should purchase a new building. Had
the letter alleged corruption or serious misconduct, Muti’s interests would weigh more
heavily; but as the letter merely expresses disagreement with a policy choice by
Schmidt— a choice he characterizes as “sincere”—it equates to little more than a public
airing of grievances and an act of insubordination.
By contrast, the detrimental impact on the working relationship between Muti and
Schmidt was somewhat significant. Although Muti portrays his role in the BCPO as that
of an outsider, serving a largely ministerial function, it appears he had a good deal of
responsibility over budgetary and staffing matters, much of which required him to report
to Schmidt. Thus, although the two were undoubtedly not close in the sense of
amicability, they were close in the sense that Schmidt had to depend on Muti’s loyalty and
confidence. At the very least, Muti’s role as an advisor to Schmidt on personnel
decisions, and as a contract negotiator for the BCPO, required Schmidt to trust and rely
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on M uti. Cf. Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 198 (“In calibrating the significance of the
disruption, the relationship between the employer and the employee is particularly
important.”). By publicly criticizing Schmidt’s policy choice and the atmosphere in the
office, Muti undermined that trust. It seems unlikely that Schmidt would be unable to
rely on his advisors if he feared that every decision he made as Prosecutor would be
publicly chided by subordinates who disagree with him. On balance, therefore, M uti’s
interest in exposing what he deemed to be an improvident use of public funds, does not
outweigh Schmidt’s interest in having trusted advisors. Accordingly, his free speech
claim must fail. 1
III.
1.
Muti also argues that his termination was based, in part, on four earlier instances of
protected speech activity, consisting primarily of memos written to Schmidt regarding
personnel and budgetary issues. To succeed on this additional claim, Muti must “show
the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory
action.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). If he can do so,
Schmidt, as employer, can rebut the claim by demonstrating he “‘would have reached the
same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct.’” Baldassare, 250 F.3d at
195 (quoting Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287). Typically, this is a fact-based inquiry not
appropriate for resolution upon a motion to dismiss. See Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 195.
Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court that we can dismiss Muti’s claim as a
matter of law because the detailed factual allegations in the complaint demonstrate that
his previous speech activity was not a substantial or motivating factor in his termination.
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As Muti has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we affirm the
order of the District Court dismissing his free speech claim.2
2.
As there are no redressable federal claims remaining, the District Court appropriately
declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Muti’s state-law claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
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