Sunico v. Atty Gen USA , 104 F. App'x 786 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2004 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-6-2004
    Sunico v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 03-2919
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    Recommended Citation
    "Sunico v. Atty Gen USA" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 524.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/524
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 03-2919
    FAUSTINO SUNICO,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    JOHN ASHCROFT
    Attorney General of the United States,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Board No. A74-241-724)
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    July 2, 2004
    Before: AMBRO, ALDISERT and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: July 6, 2004)
    _____
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
    Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, the
    procedural history and the contentions presented, we will not recite them except as
    necessary to the discussion. Faustino Sunico, a native and citizen of the Philippines,
    petitions this court to review an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
    denying his motion to reconsider an earlier BIA determination resulting in a final removal
    order. Sunico contends that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to
    reconsider. He also argues that an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) improperly denied his
    application for suspension of deportation. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the
    petition.
    The former Immigration and Naturalization Service1 initiated deportation
    proceedings against Sunico on April 29, 1996, for having remained in the United States
    longer than he was permitted as a nonimmigrant visitor. Sunico conceded deportability
    but sought suspension of deportation under former Immigration and Nationality Act
    (“INA”) § 244(a)(1), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1254
    (a)(1) (1995). Exercising the discretion granted by
    the INA, the IJ determined that Sunico had not demonstrated that deportation would result
    in extreme hardship to himself or his United States citizen son. Thus the IJ concluded
    that suspension of deportation was not appropriate. On May 29, 1998, the IJ granted
    1
    On March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist as an independent agency within the
    Department of Justice and its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland
    Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 441, 
    116 Stat. 2135
    , 2192.
    2
    Sunico’s application for voluntary departure or, in the alternative, ordered him removed
    to the Philippines.
    On December 12, 2002, the BIA affirmed without opinion, thus making the IJ’s
    order the final agency determination. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 3.1
    (e)(4) (2002) (current version at
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
    (e)(4)). Sunico did not file a timely petition for review of the BIA’s
    order nor a timely motion to reconsider. On January 15, 2003, he filed a motion to
    reconsider with the BIA. On June 17, 2003, the BIA denied the motion to reconsider.
    The BIA noted that the motion was filed more than 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s
    underlying decision and was therefore untimely under 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (b)(2) (2003).
    Even if it had been timely, the BIA concluded, the motion had no merit and should be
    denied.
    We review the BIA’s decision to deny the motion to reconsider for abuse of
    discretion. See Nocon v. INS, 
    789 F.2d 1028
    , 1033 (3d Cir. 1986). Because Sunico did
    not timely petition this court for review of the BIA’s December 12, 2002 order, we do not
    have jurisdiction to consider his contention that the BIA violated his due process rights by
    summarily affirming the IJ and that the BIA and IJ erred in denying his application for
    suspension of deportation. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(1); Nocon, 
    789 F.2d at 1032-1033
    .
    Yet Sunico contends the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reconsider
    because, in its December 12, 2002 order affirming the IJ, the BIA failed to offer any
    analysis and reasoning and, therefore, Sunico was effectively deprived of the opportunity
    3
    to point out the BIA’s errors in his motion to reconsider.
    Sunico, however, fails to address in his brief before this court that his motion to
    reconsider was untimely. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (b)(2). The BIA issued its order
    December 12, 2002, and Sunico did not file his motion to reconsider until January 15,
    2003. Principally, the BIA denied Sunico’s motion to reconsider because the motion was
    untimely. Parenthetically, the BIA noted: “The respondent has identified no error in our
    previous decision.” (J.App. 2.)
    We do not agree with the proposition that the BIA abused its discretion in denying
    Sunico’s motion to reconsider because it was untimely filed and, secondarily, because it
    had no merit. Even if Sunico did not waive his challenge to the BIA’s timeliness
    determination by failing to raise that issue in his opening brief, see FDIC v. Deglau, 
    207 F.3d 153
    , 169 (3d Cir. 2000), the BIA did not err in its determination that Sunico’s
    motion to reconsider was not timely filed and therefore should be denied, see 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (b)(2).
    Furthermore, even if Sunico had timely filed a motion to reconsider, he did not
    meet his burden before the BIA to show errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision,
    see 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (b)(1), and the BIA was not required to give more reasoning than it
    did in its December 12, 2002, decision, see 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (b)(3); Dia v. Ashcroft, 
    353 F.3d 228
    , 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that regulations allowing the BIA to
    summarily affirm an IJ without opinion do not violate due process).
    4
    We have considered all of the contentions raised by the parties and conclude that
    no further discussion is necessary.
    The petition for review will be denied.
    5