Mines v. Vaughn , 96 F. App'x 802 ( 2004 )

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-30-2004
Mines v. Vaughn
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 01-3393
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 01-3393
__________________
KEVIN S. MINES,
Appellant
v.
DONALD T. VAUGHN, ET AL.;
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF
THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
_________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 00-cv-02054)
District Judge: Honorable James McGirr Kelly
________________________________
Argued on December 18, 2003
Before: ROTH, MCKEE, AND CUDAHY*, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed March 30, 2004)
* Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit,
sitting by designation.
Thomas W. Dolgenos
Chief, Federal Litigation
Helen Kane (Argued)
Assistant District Attorney
Ronald Eisenberg
Deputy District Attorney
Law Division
Arnold H. Gordon
First Assistant District Attorney
Lynne Abraham
District Attorney
1421 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Attorney for Appellees
William T. Lawson, III (Argued)
1420 Walnut Street, Suite 1000
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Attorney for Appellant
_________________
OPINION
_________________
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Kevin S. Mines appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that his petition was time-barred. Mines contends that he has established that the
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extraordinary circumstances of his case warrant the equitable tolling of the statutory
limitations period for filing a habeas petition. We conclude that Mines has not shown
extraordinary circumstances sufficient to apply equitable tolling. Therefore, we will
affirm the District Court’s order.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts are well-known to the parties and will be only briefly summarized here.
Following a jury trial in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, Mines was convicted in 1983
of first degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of
crime. Mines was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal.
In 1990, Mines filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”). The Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
review in 1994.
In July 1995, Mines filed an action under Pennsylvania’s “Right To Know Act,”
bearing the caption and case number relating to his criminal conviction, and seeking the
production of numerous documents from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office. The
petition was denied on October 25, 1995, and Mines appealed to the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court.
While that appeal was pending, Mines filed a second PCRA petition in January
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1996. While his petition was pending, in August 1996, the Commonwealth Court
affirmed the lower court’s denial of relief in Mines’s “Right To Know” appeal. Mines
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In October 1996, the PCRA court advised
Mines of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition in light of his pending Supreme Court
appeal. Mines responded to the notice, explaining that the pending appeal was a civil
action, separate from his criminal case, and requesting that his PCRA petition be held in
abeyance pending the appeal. In the alternative, Mines requested that the dismissal of his
PCRA petition be made without prejudice and with direction that the original PCRA
filing date be preserved. On October 23, 1996, the PCRA court entered an order that the
petition was “DISMISSED AS PREMATURE (WITHOUT PREJUDICE) due to an
ongoing appeal in Supreme Court,” referencing the docket number of the “Right To
Know” appeal. Mines did not appeal this dismissal.
On January 30, 1997, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Mines’s petition for
allowance of appeal from the denial of his “Right To Know” petition. The United States
Supreme Court denied Mines’s petition for writ of certiorari.
On June 5, 1997, Mines sought to reinstate the PCRA petition that he had filed in
January 1996. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely on October 21, 1997.
At this time, Mines still had 38 days in which to file a federal habeas petition. However,
instead of making a protective federal filing, Mines elected to appeal the state court denial
of the PCRA petition. The Superior Court affirmed the denial, concluding that this third
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PCRA petition was untimely under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied allowance of appeal on January 11, 2000.
On April 21, 2000, Mines filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in
District Court. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the habeas petition be dismissed
as time-barred under section 2244(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Mines filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation. The District Court approved and adopted the report and
recommendation and dismissed the habeas petition as time-barred. Mines’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Mines timely appealed pro se and filed a request for a certificate of appealability
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). On February 6, 2003 a motions panel of this Court granted
the certificate on the question whether Mines has shown “extraordinary circumstances”
under Miller v. New Jersey State Dep’t of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998).
Counsel was appointed to represent Mines on appeal.
Because this is an appeal from a final order dismissing Mines’s habeas petition, we
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s determination regarding the statute of limitations issue.
Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 161 (2003).
II. DISCUSSION
AEDPA’s section 2244(d)(1) imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing
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federal habeas petitions. Because Mines’s conviction became final well before the
effective date of AEDPA, he had a one-year grace period from AEDPA’s effective date,
April 24, 1996, in which to file a timely section 2254 petition. See Burns v. Morton,
134 F.3d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1998). However, a “properly filed” PCRA petition tolls
the limitations period while it is pending in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In
this case, Mines’s January 1996 PCRA petition was dismissed on October 30, 1996; the
limitations period was tolled until November 29, 1996, when the time for appealing the
PCRA court’s dismissal expired. Mines then had one year from that date to file a federal
habeas petition. Mines’s third PCRA petition, filed in June 1997 and dismissed by the
state courts as untimely under state law, is not a “properly filed” PCRA petition that
tolled the limitations period. Merritt, 326 F.3d at 165-66.
Mines’s federal habeas petition, filed in April 2000, thus was filed several years
too late. However, because AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is not a
jurisdictional rule, Mines may avoid dismissal of his habeas petition as untimely if he can
establish “extraordinary circumstances” to warrant equitable tolling of the limitations
period. Equitable tolling is available only when the rigid application of the limitations
period would be unfair. Miller, 145 F.3d at 618. Typically, such unfairness occurs
“when a petitioner has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting” his
rights. Id. A petitioner must demonstrate that he “exercised reasonable diligence in
investigating and bringing” his claims. Id.6
Mines attempts to show extraordinary circumstances arising from the state courts’
errors in handing and in disposing of his various petitions. Essentially, he argues that the
state courts gave him the “run around,” stemming in part from the state court’s failure to
open a new civil case number for his “Right To Know” action. Because the matter was
instead reviewed in conjunction with his criminal case, he argues that the dismissal of his
January 1996 PCRA petition as “premature” was erroneous. In addition, Mines maintains
that the dismissal of his January 1996 PCRA petition “without prejudice” clearly
indicated that the state courts contemplated further PCRA proceedings after his “Right To
Know” action concluded, and he was entitled to rely on the presumption that his January
1996 PCRA petition would be reinstated. Mines asserts that the state courts’ errors
compounded when they treated his petition to reinstate the PCRA petition as a new,
untimely third PCRA petition and dismissed it. Thus, Mines contends that the
circumstances dictate that equitable tolling be applied in his case through the conclusion
of the proceedings on his third PCRA petition, rendering his federal habeas petition
timely filed under AEDPA.
As the Commonwealth points out, it does not appear that Mines’s situation is
entirely of the state courts’ making. Although Mines argues that the series of missteps in
state court began with the failure to docket his “Right To Know” action as a separate civil
case, M ines himself submitted his action bearing the caption and case number of his
criminal matter. Also, Mines faults the improper dismissal of his January 1996 petition,
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yet he did not appeal that dismissal and instead pursued his “Right To Know” action to its
conclusion. In the absence of a state court order holding the second PCRA petition in
abeyance pending the “Right To Know” appeal, or otherwise preserving the filing date of
the second PCRA petition, we do not agree that Mines was entitled to rely on his
assumption that a third PCRA petition would be entertained in state court merely because
his 1996 PCRA petition had been dismissed without prejudice. See Hull v. Kyler, 190
F.3d 88, 103-04 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[t]ypically, when a complaint (or habeas petition) is
dismissed without prejudice, that complaint or petition is treated as if it never existed.”)
See also Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting proposition that the
filing date of a third habeas petition should have “related back” to the filing date of an
earlier petition dismissed without prejudice). Moreover, Mines’s complaints regarding
the state courts’ actions in disposing of his January 1996 PCRA petition in no way
explain why he chose to pursue his “Right To Know” matter on appeal and to appeal the
dismissal of his third PCRA petition as untimely, rather than to file a timely federal
habeas petition.
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude that Mines has not shown extraordinary circumstances warranting the
equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations period. Therefore, we will affirm the District
Court’s order dismissing Mines’s habeas petition.
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