Ofc Disciplinary v. Surrick ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2003 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-1-2003
    Ofc Disciplinary v. Surrick
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 01-2783P
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    PRECEDENTIAL
    Filed August 1, 2003
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 01-2783
    IN RE:
    ROBERT B. SURRICK,
    Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 00-mc-00086)
    District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles
    Argued December 18, 2002
    Before: ROTH, FUENTES and COWEN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: August 1, 2003)
    Howard J. Bashman1 (Argued)
    Buchanan Ingersoll
    1835 Market Street
    Eleven Penn Center, 14th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Counsel for Amicus Curiae
    1. The Court appreciates the fine service performed by Howard J.
    Bashman, Esq., at the Court’s request, in presenting the brief for Amicus
    Curiae in support of affirmance.
    2
    Samuel E. Klein, Esquire
    Jeffrey G. Weil, Esquire (Argued)
    Brian Hirsch, Esquire
    Dechert, Price & Rhoads
    1717 Arch Street
    4000 Bell Atlantic Tower
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Counsel for Appellant
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ROTH, Circuit Judge:
    This appeal arises out of reciprocal attorney disciplinary
    proceedings in the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court had suspended appellant Robert Surrick
    from the practice of law for a period of five years after it
    concluded that he had violated a provision of the Rules of
    Professional Conduct by falsely accusing two lower court
    judges of “fixing” cases. Following an independent review of
    the state disciplinary proceedings, the en banc District
    Court held that reciprocal discipline was warranted but
    limited the term of Surrick’s suspension to thirty months,
    or half that imposed by the state court. On appeal, Surrick
    argues that the imposition of reciprocal discipline was
    inappropriate because the state proceedings upon which
    the District Court relied violated his rights of due process
    and free speech. Because we conclude that the District
    Court did not abuse its discretion in electing to suspend
    Surrick for a period of thirty months, we will affirm the
    judgment of the District Court.
    I. Factual Background and Procedural History
    The facts relevant to Surrick’s underlying state court
    suspension are drawn from the opinion of the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court and the Report and Recommendation
    issued by the initial District Court panel. See Office of
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 
    749 A.2d 441
    , 442-443 (Pa.
    2000) (Surrick I); In re Surrick, No. MISC. 00-086, 
    2001 WL
                 3
    120078 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2001) (Surrick II). Surrick and his
    wife were defendants in Leedom v. Spano, Case No. 89-
    12977 in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,
    a case which involved the foreclosure of a mortgage for
    which they were sureties. By stipulation of the parties, the
    issue of liability was submitted to the court. Judge Harry J.
    Bradley entered judgment against Surrick and his wife in
    July 1992.
    On appeal to the Superior Court, Surrick entered an
    appearance as co-counsel and, in August 1992, filed a
    motion for the recusal of certain judges prior to the
    designation of the appellate panel. This motion stated, in
    relevant part:
    It is believed and averred by Movant Surrick that
    Judge Bradley was “fixed” by the Delaware County
    Republican Organization as a result of a deal between
    that organization and Justice Larsen whereby Justice
    Larsen would again exert his political influence on
    behalf of Judge McEwen who was again seeking to fill
    a vacant Supreme court seat and, in return, the
    Delaware County Republican Organization, through its
    control of the Delaware county Judges, would fix this
    case.
    In litigation arising out of the termination of the
    Surrick/Levy law practice . . . Upon appeal to the
    superior court, judge Olszewski dismissed the appeal
    not on the basis of anything in the record or any issue
    raised by opposing counsel but on the basis of an
    alleged procedural defect in the record. Even the most
    cursory examination of the record will reflect that the
    alleged defect in the Record relied upon by Judge
    Olszewski does not and did not exist. It is the belief of
    Movant Surrick that the decision of Judge Olszewski
    was based upon outside intervention, as it could not
    have resulted from any rational legal analysis of the
    Record.
    749 A.2d at 443 (ellipses and emphasis in original).2
    2. Surrick has a well-documented history as an outspoken critic of the
    Pennsylvania judiciary dating back to his appointment to the Judicial
    Inquiry and Review Board in 1980. Because these facts are discussed in
    detail by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see Surrick I, 749 A.2d at
    446-49, we find it unnecessary to repeat them here.
    4
    The Office of Disciplinary Counsel investigated Surrick’s
    allegations and, as a result, filed charges against him and
    convened a Special Hearing Committee of the Disciplinary
    Board. After due deliberation, the Special Hearing
    Committee issued a Report and Recommendation
    concluding that all charges should be dismissed. The Office
    of Disciplinary Counsel objected to the Report and
    Recommendation and sought oral argument before the
    Disciplinary Board. On October 17, 1997, the Board issued
    an opinion and order rejecting the arguments asserted by
    the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and dismissing the
    charges against Surrick.
    The Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition for
    allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
    The court remanded the case to the Disciplinary Board on
    April 14, 1998, with instructions that the Board reconsider
    its prior recommendation in light of the then-recent
    decision in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous
    Attorney A, 
    714 A.2d 402
     (Pa. 1998).
    On remand, the Disciplinary Board determined that
    Surrick had violated Rule 8.4(c)3 of the Rules of
    Professional Conduct (RPC) in making his allegations
    against Judge Olszewski but found no violation in the
    allegations against Judge Bradley. The Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court then granted the parties’ cross-petitions for
    review and directed both sides to file briefs addressing the
    applicability of its more recent decision in Office of
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Price, 
    732 A.2d 599
     (Pa. 1999). After
    consideration of the parties’ arguments, a unanimous
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Surrick had violated
    RPC 8.4(c) with respect to his charges against both Judge
    Olszewski and Judge Bradley. Surrick I, 749 A.2d at 447-
    49. The court therefore suspended Surrick’s license to
    practice law in the Commonwealth for a period of five years,
    effective March 24, 2000. Id. at 449.
    Pursuant to Rule II(B)(2) of the Rules of Attorney Conduct
    3. RPC 8.4(c) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
    engage   in    conduct     involving     dishonesty,  fraud,   deceit   or
    misrepresentation.”
    5
    (RAC) for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,4 the District
    Court, in response to the decision of the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court, issued an order on May 10, 2000,
    requiring Surrick to show cause why reciprocal discipline
    should not be imposed upon him pursuant to RAC II(D). In
    his reply, Surrick asserted that reciprocal discipline was
    inappropriate because the decision of the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court lacked proof and violated his rights of
    procedural due process and free speech. On February 7,
    2001, a three judge panel of the District Court, following its
    review of the state disciplinary proceedings and the
    arguments of the parties, issued a Report and
    Recommendation concluding that no reciprocal discipline
    should be imposed on Surrick. See Surrick II, 
    2001 WL 120078
    . This recommendation was rejected by a majority of
    the non-recused active and senior judges of the Eastern
    District of Pennsylvania, and the matter was referred to a
    new three judge panel for consideration of the proper
    punishment. Following a hearing, this second panel issued
    an Amended Report and Recommendation on June 12,
    2001, concluding that Surrick should be suspended for a
    period of thirty months retroactive to April 24, 2000.
    On June 21, 2001, by a vote of seventeen to nine, the
    twenty-six non-recused active and senior district judges
    adopted the second panel’s Amended Report and
    Recommendation. See In re Surrick, No. MISC. 00-086,
    
    2001 WL 1823945
     (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2001) (Surrick III).
    Surrick’s thirty month suspension was made retroactive to
    April 24, 2000, the date of his state court suspension. The
    suspension expired on October 24, 2002.
    Surrick appealed his District Court suspension.
    II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    The District Court has the inherent authority to set
    4. The Rules of Attorney Conduct (RAC) are codified in Rule 83.6 of the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Local Rules of Civil Procedure. For
    ease of reference, Pennsylvania’s Rules of Professional Conduct will be
    referred to throughout this Opinion as “RPC”, and the Rules of Attorney
    Conduct contained in Local Rule 83.6 will be referred to as “RAC”.
    6
    requirements for admission to its bar and to discipline
    attorneys who appear before it. See In re Mitchell, 
    901 F.2d 1179
    , 1183 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Abrams, 
    521 F.2d 1094
    ,
    1099 (3d Cir. 1975). We have jurisdiction to review the final
    order of the District Court pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    We review district courts’ decisions regarding the regulation
    of attorneys who appear before them for abuse of
    discretion. Richardson v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 
    469 F.2d 1382
    , 1386 (3d Cir. 1972). Our review of the District
    Court’s interpretation of legal precepts is plenary. Epstein
    Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 
    13 F.3d 762
    , 765-66 (3d
    Cir. 1994).
    III. Discussion
    A. Mootness
    Because “ ‘[t]he existence of a case or controversy is a
    prerequisite to all federal actions,’ ” Philadelphia Fed’n of
    Teachers v. Ridge, 
    150 F.3d 319
    , 322-23 (3d Cir. 1998)
    (quoting Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church
    v. Florio, 
    40 F.3d 1454
    , 1462 (3d Cir. 1994)), we must begin
    by examining our jurisdiction to consider the matter before
    us. Although it is well-established that “bar admissions, bar
    disciplinary actions, and disbarments are essentially
    judicial in nature and thus present a case or controversy
    under Article III,” In re Calvo, 
    88 F.3d 962
    , 965 (11th Cir.
    1996), we must determine whether Surrick’s appeal was
    mooted when the term of his District Court suspension
    expired on October 24, 2002.
    As we have previously held, “[a] case will be considered
    moot, and therefore nonjusticiable as involving no case or
    controversy, if the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or
    the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
    outcome.” In re Kulp Foundry, Inc., 
    691 F.2d 1125
    , 1128
    (3d Cir. 1982) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Our
    analysis of whether a case is moot “traditionally begins with
    ‘the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under
    which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the
    existence of a case or controversy.’ ” International Bhd. of
    Boilermakers v. Kelly, 
    815 F.2d 912
    , 914 (3d Cir. 1987)
    (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 
    404 U.S. 244
    , 246 (1971)).
    7
    The existence of a case or controversy, in turn, requires
    “ ‘(1) a legal controversy that is real and not hypothetical,
    (2) a legal controversy that affects an individual in a
    concrete manner so as to provide the factual predicate for
    reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal controversy with
    sufficiently adverse parties so as to sharpen the issues for
    judicial resolution.’ ” Id. at 915 (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v.
    United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 
    605 F.2d 673
    , 678
    (3d Cir. 1979)).
    Furthermore, “[i]n addition to its threshold constitutional
    dimension, mootness doctrine incorporates prudential
    considerations as well.” International Bhd. of Boilermakers,
    
    815 F.2d at 915
    . “Thus, in applying the mootness doctrine,
    courts, in addition to satisfying the requirements of Article
    III, ‘must answer the more policy-oriented question whether
    the parties before it have, at the time for decision sufficient
    functional adversity to sharpen the issues for judicial
    resolution.’ ” 
    Id.
     (quoting Dow Chem., 
    605 F.2d at 677-78
    ).
    Accordingly, “ ‘the central question of all mootness
    problems is whether changes in circumstances that
    prevailed at the beginning of the litigation have forestalled
    any occasion for meaningful relief.’ ” 
    Id.
     (quoting Jersey
    Cent. Power & Light Co. v. State of N.J., 
    772 F.2d 35
    , 39 (3d
    Cir. 1985)).
    In addressing such questions, we have recognized three
    exceptions that should be considered prior to any
    determination of mootness:
    (1) whether the appellant has expeditiously taken all
    steps necessary to perfect the appeal and to preserve
    the status quo before the dispute becomes moot, (2)
    whether the trial court’s order will have possible
    collateral consequences, and (3) whether the dispute is
    of such a nature that it is capable of repetition yet
    evading review.
    Kulp Foundry, 
    691 F.2d at 1129
    .
    We need not address the applicability of first and third
    exceptions noted above, as the continuing stigma resulting
    from his suspension places Surrick’s appeal squarely
    within the second. See Dailey v. Vought Aircraft Co., 
    141 F.3d 224
    , 228 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that the appeal of an
    8
    attorney who was disbarred and then reinstated was not
    moot because even temporary disbarment is harmful to a
    lawyer’s reputation, and “the mere possibility of adverse
    collateral consequences is sufficient to preclude a finding of
    mootness”) (citation and internal quotation omitted); see
    also In re Hancock, 
    192 F.3d 1083
    , 1084 (7th Cir. 1999)
    (citing Dailey for the proposition that a suspended
    attorney’s appeal was not mooted by his payment of the
    imposed sanction and subsequent reinstatement); Kirkland
    v. National Mortgage Network, Inc., 
    884 F.2d 1367
    , 1370
    (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that attorney’s appeal of the
    revocation of his pro hac vice status was not moot following
    dismissal of the underlying case because “the ‘brand of
    disqualification’ on grounds of dishonesty and bad faith
    could well hang over his name and career for years to
    come”); Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 
    751 F.2d 1193
    , 1200 n.14 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that “the brand of
    disqualification was not lifted at the close of the
    proceedings. The disciplinary action and consequent
    disqualification may expose counsel to further sanctions by
    the bar and portends adverse effects upon counsel’s careers
    and public image. The effects of disqualification will linger
    long after the closing of the case. The controversy thus
    remains live and demands consideration.”). Further,
    Surrick’s suspension has a continuing effect on his ability
    to practice before the District Court, as RAC VII(A) provides
    that attorneys suspended for more than three months must
    apply for reinstatement.5 Thus, we conclude that Surrick’s
    claim satisfies the collateral consequences exception to the
    doctrine of mootness and that we have jurisdiction to
    consider the merits of his appeal.
    B. Reciprocal Disciplinary Proceedings
    The starting point for our review of federal district court
    disciplinary proceedings is the recognition that individual
    district courts, “like all federal courts, ha[ve] the power both
    to prescribe requirements for admission to practice before
    that court and to discipline attorneys” who appear before
    5. Surrick is presently living in Florida and not practicing law, but, as
    his attorney stated at oral argument, he may some day decide to return
    to Pennsylvania and to resume his law practice.
    9
    them. Abrams, 
    521 F.2d at 1099
    ; see also In re Kramer,
    
    193 F.3d 1131
    , 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing cases for the
    proposition that “[t]here is little question but that district
    courts have the authority to supervise and discipline the
    conduct of attorneys who appear before them.”). “This
    includes the inherent authority to suspend or disbar
    lawyers,” provided such power is “exercised within the
    parameters of due process.” Kramer, 
    193 F.3d at 1132
    (citations and internal quotations omitted).
    A reciprocal disciplinary proceeding such as the one at
    issue here, in which a federal court initiates action against
    a member of its bar based on the outcome of a state
    disciplinary proceeding against that attorney, requires
    federal courts to conduct an independent review of the state
    disciplinary proceeding prior to imposing punishment.
    Indeed, it is well-settled that, although state bar
    membership is required of those seeking admission to
    practice before the federal district courts of a given state,
    “disbarment by the [s]tate does not result in automatic
    disbarment by the federal court.” In re Ruffalo, 
    390 U.S. 544
    , 547 (1968). Rather, although the decisions of state
    courts in such matters are “entitled to respect,” they are
    “not conclusively binding on the federal courts.” 
    Id.
    However, “[i]n striking the appropriate balance . . .
    district courts must not operate in a vacuum. If the
    disciplinary proceedings derive from state court action,
    federal courts are not totally free to ignore the original state
    proceedings.” Abrams, 
    521 F.2d at
    1099-1100 (citing
    Theard v. United States, 
    354 U.S. 278
     (1957)). Instead, they
    must “examine the state proceeding for consistency with
    the requirements of due process, adequacy of proof and
    absence of any indication that imposing discipline would
    result in grave injustice.” In re Jacobs, 
    44 F.3d 84
    , 88 (2d
    Cir. 1994) (citing Selling v. Radford, 
    243 U.S. 46
    , 51
    (1917)). More specifically, as the Supreme Court has held,
    federal courts should impose reciprocal discipline unless
    “an intrinsic consideration of the state record” indicates one
    of the following infirmities:
    1. That the state procedure, from want of notice or
    opportunity to be heard, was wanting in due process;
    2, that there was such an infirmity of proof as to facts
    10
    found to have established the want of fair private and
    professional character as to give rise to a clear
    conviction on [the part of the federal court] that [it]
    could not, consistent[ ] with [its] duty, accept as final
    the conclusion on that subject; or 3, that some other
    grave reason exist[s] which should convince [the federal
    court] that to allow the natural consequences of the
    judgment to have their effect would conflict with the
    duty which rests upon [the court] not to disbar except
    upon the conviction that, under the principles of right
    and justice, [it is] constrained so to do.
    Selling, 
    243 U.S. at 51
    ; see also Theard, 
    354 U.S. at 282
    .
    RAC II(D), which governed the proceedings below, was
    enacted on the basis of this ruling. See In re Pawlak, No.
    94-211, 
    1995 WL 723177
     at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1995).6
    Moreover, attorneys subject to reciprocal discipline in
    federal court bear the burden of demonstrating, “by clear
    and convincing evidence, that one of the Selling elements
    6. RAC II(D) provides as follows:
    D. Upon the expiration of 30 days from service of the notice issued
    pursuant to the provisions of (B) above and after an opportunity for
    any attorney contesting the imposition of the identical discipline or
    prohibition to be heard by one or more judges designated by the
    Chief Judge, this court shall impose the identical discipline unless
    the respondent-attorney demonstrates, or this court finds, that
    upon the face of the record upon which the discipline or prohibition
    in another jurisdiction is predicated it clearly appears:
    1. that the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to
    be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
    2. that there was such an infirmity of proof as to give rise to the
    clear conviction that this court could not, consistent with its duty,
    accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
    3. that the imposition of the same discipline or prohibition by
    this court would result in grave injustice; or
    4. that the misconduct or other basis established for the
    discipline or prohibition is deemed by this court to warrant
    substantially different action.
    Where this court determines that any of said elements exist, it shall
    enter such other order as it deems appropriate.
    11
    precludes reciprocal discipline.” In re Kramer, 
    282 F.3d 721
    , 724-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing cases). Thus, there is no
    entitlement to a de novo trial before the District Court. See
    In re Alker, 
    307 F.2d 880
    , 881 (3d Cir. 1962); see also
    Calvo, 
    88 F.3d at 967
    . Rather, the District Court need only
    “determine whether the record underlying the predicate
    state disbarment reveals the kind of infirmities identified in
    Selling.” Calvo, 
    88 F.3d at 967
     (citation and internal
    quotations omitted).
    Finally, as we noted in Abrams, “we perceive our role in
    reviewing the district court’s action to be extremely limited.”
    
    521 F.2d at 1101
    . In particular, it consists of the following:
    (1) To recognize and reinforce an absolute and
    unfettered power of the district court to admit and to
    discipline members of its bar independently of and
    separately from admission and disciplinary procedures
    of (a) the state courts and (b) this court.
    *    *   *
    (3) To recognize that an absolute and unfettered power
    of the district court to discipline lawyers may be
    circumscribed to the extent the district court, in
    imposing its disciplinary sanctions, relies upon a
    state’s legal or factual determinations. Stated
    otherwise, the district court’s action may be
    circumscribed to the extent it depends in whole or in
    part on a state’s actions, either for the commencement
    of the disciplinary proceedings or for a stated basis in
    the determination of the sanction imposed.
    
    Id.
     It is against this backdrop that we consider the
    proceedings at issue here.
    C. Surrick’s Due Process and First Amendment
    Arguments
    The issue before us on this appeal is whether the en banc
    District Court abused its discretion in relying on the state
    court proceedings as the basis for its decision to impose
    reciprocal discipline upon Surrick. In rejecting the
    conclusion of the initial panel and adopting the Amended
    Report and Recommendation, the District Court noted that
    12
    it was required to impose reciprocal discipline “unless it
    ‘clearly’ appeared to the court” that at least one of the four
    elements of RAC II(D) was satisfied. Surrick III, 
    2001 WL 1823945
     at *1.
    Following its review of the state disciplinary proceedings,
    the District Court determined that none of the RAC II(D)
    conditions were met in this case. In support of this
    conclusion, the District Court noted that (1) not even the
    first District Court panel, which opposed the imposition of
    reciprocal discipline, concluded that the state disciplinary
    proceedings violated Surrick’s right to due process; (2) there
    was no infirmity of proof, particularly in view of the fact
    that Surrick admitted during the state disciplinary
    proceedings “that he had no objective factual basis for the
    accusations he made in his sworn affidavit to the state
    court about purportedly corrupt conduct by a state judge”;
    and (3) the Amended Report and Recommendation, issued
    by the second District Court panel, took into account the
    fact that the five year suspension meted out by the state
    court exceeded that of other comparable cases, and
    therefore recommended a suspension of only half that
    duration. Surrick III, 
    2001 WL 1823945
     at *1.
    In asserting that the District Court abused its discretion
    by so concluding, Surrick contends first that the District
    Court erred in failing to find a due process violation in the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s retroactive application of
    Anonymous Attorney A and of Price to his case. He next
    argues that the District Court’s conclusion that a second
    evidentiary hearing would be futile was based on an
    improper reading of the initial panel’s Report and
    Recommendation. Finally, Surrick asserts that the
    imposition of reciprocal discipline violates his First
    Amendment rights and therefore constitutes a grave
    injustice. We address each argument in turn.
    In considering Surrick’s due process argument, we begin
    by reiterating our prior observation that, although attorney
    disciplinary proceedings “ha[ve] consequences which
    remove [them] from the ordinary run of civil case[s],” they
    are “not criminal in nature.” Abrams, 
    521 F.2d at 1099
    . It
    therefore follows that the protections normally afforded
    criminal defendants are not required here. See In re
    13
    Palmisano, 
    70 F.3d 483
    , 486 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
    the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruffalo “does not require
    courts to employ the procedures of the criminal law in
    disbarment matters”); In re Cordova-Gonzalez, 
    996 F.2d 1334
    , 1336 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that, “[a]lthough
    attorney discipline proceedings have been called ‘quasi-
    criminal,’ In re Ruffalo, 
    390 U.S. 544
    , 550, 
    88 S.Ct. 1222
    ,
    1226, 
    20 L.Ed. 2d 117
     (1968), the due process rights of an
    attorney in a disciplinary proceeding ‘do not extend so far
    as to guarantee the full panoply of rights afforded to an
    accused in a criminal case.’ ”) (quoting Razatos v. Colorado
    Supreme Court, 
    746 F.2d 1429
    , 1435 (10th Cir. 1984));
    Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Cal., 
    910 F.2d 561
    , 564 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that “[a] lawyer
    disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal proceeding. As a
    result, normal protections afforded a criminal defendant do
    not apply.”) (citations omitted).
    With this background in mind, we consider Surrick’s due
    process argument. In Anonymous Attorney A, the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, although it had not
    expressly decided the issue of the mental state necessary to
    establish culpability for misstatements made in violation of
    RPC 8.4(c), it would follow the lead of other states with
    identical versions of the rule that had rejected a
    requirement of actual knowledge. 714 A.2d at 406-07.
    Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in accordance with
    existing decisions in other jurisdictions, held that “a
    culpable mental state greater than negligence is necessary
    to establish a prima facie violation of [RPC] 8.4(c),” and that
    “[t]his requirement is met where the misrepresentation is
    knowingly made, or where it is made with reckless
    ignorance of the truth or falsity thereof.” Id. at 407. Surrick
    now asserts that the District Court erred in failing to
    conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s retroactive
    application of this ruling to his case was a violation of due
    process that precluded the imposition of reciprocal
    discipline.
    We disagree. It is well-settled “that a judicial alteration of
    a common law doctrine of criminal law violates the
    principle of fair warning, and hence must not be given
    retroactive effect, only where it is ‘unexpected and
    14
    indefensible by reference to the law which had been
    expressed prior to the conduct in issue.’ ” Rogers v.
    Tennessee, 
    532 U.S. 451
    , 462 (2001) (quoting Bouie v. City
    of Columbia, 
    378 U.S. 347
    , 354 (1964)).7 Although Surrick
    contends that “no one could reasonably have anticipated”
    the legal standards applied to his case by the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court, even a cursory review of the state of the
    law at the time of the conduct in question reveals
    otherwise. Indeed, while it is true that the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court had not formally addressed the issue prior
    to its decision in Anonymous Attorney A, it was nevertheless
    well-settled at the time of Surrick’s conduct that liability
    under the standards of DR 1-102(A)(4), the predecessor to
    RPC 8.4(c), extended to reckless misstatements. See ABA
    Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
    Op. 346 (Revised) (1982); see also People v. Rader, 
    822 P.2d 950
    , 953 (Colo. 1992); Committee on Legal Ethics of the
    W.V. State Bar v. Farber, 
    408 S.E.2d 274
    , 284-85 (W. Va.
    1991); Dowling v. Alabama State Bar, 
    539 So.2d 149
    , 152
    (Ala. 1989); In re Silverman, 
    549 A.2d 1225
    , 1238 (N.J.
    1988); In re Zang, 
    741 P.2d 267
    , 280 (Ariz. 1987);
    Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa
    State Bar Ass’n v. Hurd, 
    360 N.W.2d 96
    , 104 (Iowa 1985).
    Further, it was well-established in Pennsylvania at that
    time that the term “misrepresentation” — one of the types
    of misconduct prohibited by RPC 8.4(c) — included
    statements made with reckless disregard for the truth. See,
    e.g., Berda v. CBS Inc., 
    881 F.2d 20
    , 27 (3d Cir. 1989)
    (noting that reckless statements are sufficient to maintain
    a claim for misrepresentation under Pennsylvania law);
    Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffmann Co., 
    155 A.2d 363
    ,
    366 (Pa. 1959) (holding that “[a] material misrepresentation
    may be found whether [Defendant] actually knew the truth
    7. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Rogers, by its terms, applies only to
    criminal proceedings. However, we see no basis for refusing to apply the
    same rationale here. As we noted, supra, the full panoply of rights
    provided in criminal proceedings are not required in attorney disciplinary
    proceedings. Thus, it necessarily follows that attorneys involved in
    disciplinary proceedings are not entitled to any greater protection from
    the retroactive application of judicial rulings than that afforded to
    criminal defendants.
    15
    or not, especially where, as here, it was bound to ascertain
    the truth before making the representation.”).
    We therefore reject Surrick’s contention that prior to
    Anonymous Attorney A, nothing in the history of RPC 8.4(c)
    had stated or even foreshadowed that reckless conduct
    could violate it. Indeed, in view of the foregoing, the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Anonymous
    Attorney A was neither “unexpected” nor “indefensible by
    reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the
    conduct in issue.” Rogers, 
    532 U.S. at 462
    . This is perhaps
    best illustrated by the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court remanded Attorney A’s case for application of the
    purportedly new standard despite the fact that, as here, the
    conduct at issue plainly occurred prior to its ruling in that
    case. See Anonymous Attorney A, 714 A.2d at 407. Thus,
    we hold that the District Court did not err in concluding
    that the application of the ruling in Anonymous Attorney A
    to Surrick’s case was consistent with the requirements of
    due process.
    Similarly, we conclude that the District Court did not err
    in rejecting Surrick’s due process argument regarding the
    application to his case of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
    decision in Price. Surrick contends that the decision in Price
    established a new burden of proof that is unconstitutional
    both in design — because it purportedly violates the
    presumption of innocence to which he is entitled — and as
    retroactively applied to his case. However, the Price court
    was careful to note that the burden of proving misconduct
    by a preponderance of the evidence rests, as it always has,
    with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. See Price, 732 A.2d
    at 603. The ruling in Price simply made clear the fact that,
    once a prima facie case of false allegations in a court
    pleading has been established, the burden shifts to the
    respondent to demonstrate “that the allegations are true or
    that he had an objective reasonable belief that the
    allegations were true, based upon a reasonably diligent
    inquiry.” Id. at 604.
    This holding in Price was in no way “unexpected” or
    “indefensible by reference to the law which had been
    expressed prior to the conduct in issue,” Rogers, 
    532 U.S. at 462
    , as it was already “well-established” prior to the
    16
    decision in Price “that every court pleading containing an
    averment of fact not of record is required to state that the
    assertion is true based upon the pleader’s personal
    knowledge, information or belief,” and that such averments
    must “be supported by oath or affirmation or made subject”
    to certain penalties. Price, 732 A.2d at 603. Thus, at the
    time Surrick made the allegations contained in the recusal
    motion, Pennsylvania law already required attorneys to
    “bear[ ] the burden of establishing a factual basis” for
    allegations contained in pleadings submitted to the courts
    of the Commonwealth. Id.
    Indeed, although the justices differed as to the
    appropriate punishment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    was unanimous in its application of the purportedly new
    ruling to Price himself despite the fact that, as in this case,
    the record in Price had been developed prior to the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s express articulation of this
    burden of production. See id. at 604-05.8
    Surrick’s next argument — that the District Court
    abused its discretion in concluding that a second
    evidentiary hearing would be futile — is closely related.
    Specifically, he asserts that, in view of the purported
    changes in the requisite mental state and burden of proof
    that resulted from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
    decisions in Anonymous Attorney A and Price, he should
    have been provided a second evidentiary hearing at which
    he could have addressed the issues raised by these
    decisions. However, despite having advance notice that the
    ruling in Price might be applied to his case, Surrick never
    requested either an evidentiary hearing or the reopening of
    the record during the state proceedings. Thus, any due
    process violation that might have resulted from the failure
    to hold a second hearing was waived. See United States v.
    Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731 (1993) (holding that “ ‘[n]o
    8. To the extent that Surrick asserts that the decision in Price, which
    involved RPC 3.3(a)(1) and RPC 8.2(b), may not be applied to his
    violation of RPC 8.4(c), we reject this argument. Not even the first
    District Court panel found any basis for this claim. See Surrick II, 
    2001 WL 120078
     at *14 (holding that “[w]e see no ground for questioning the
    [Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s] judgment that the Price procedural
    regime was properly transferable to RPC 8.4(c) proceedings.”).
    17
    procedural principle is more familiar . . . than that a
    constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may be
    forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to
    make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having
    jurisdiction to determine it.’ ”) (quoting Yakus v. United
    States, 
    321 U.S. 414
    , 444 (1944)).
    Further, even if this claim had not been waived, Surrick
    has failed to identify any evidence not presented in the first
    hearing that would have led to a conclusion that he had an
    objectively reasonable basis for the allegations contained in
    his recusal motion. Indeed, despite his claim that he bore
    no burden of production prior to the ruling in Price, Surrick
    voluntarily offered extensive testimony during the three-day
    proceedings regarding his purported bases for the
    statements contained in the recusal motion. In light of this,
    it is difficult to imagine that he could or would have come
    forward with any additional information if provided the
    opportunity to do so in a second hearing. In addition, both
    the Disciplinary Board and the District Court found, based
    on the testimony and evidence already in the record, that
    Surrick’s statements were unsupported. See Surrick III,
    
    2001 WL 1823945
     at *1 (“Mr. Surrick admitted at state
    disciplinary proceedings that he had no objective factual
    basis for the accusations he made in his sworn affidavit to
    the state court about purportedly corrupt conduct by a
    state judge.”); Report and Recommendations of the
    Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at
    29-30 (noting Surrick’s admission that the charges leveled
    against Judge Olszewski were based on conjecture and
    theory). In view of the foregoing, we simply cannot conclude
    that the District Court abused its discretion in electing to
    impose reciprocal discipline despite the absence of a second
    state court hearing, particularly when such a hearing was
    never requested by Surrick in the first instance.
    Moreover, we note with respect to each of Surrick’s first
    two arguments that no member of the District Court —
    including the original three member panel which
    recommended that no reciprocal discipline be imposed —
    concluded that the state disciplinary proceedings failed to
    satisfy minimal due process requirements. See Surrick III,
    
    2001 WL 1823945
     at *1 (“The court determined that there
    18
    was no clear deprivation of due process of law.
    Significantly, while critical of the approach of the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court, even Judge Pollak, the
    author of the panel report of February 7, 2001,
    acknowledged that the report had not concluded that Mr.
    Surrick was deprived of his federal constitutional right to
    due process.”).
    We further note that Surrick’s reliance upon Ruffalo is
    misplaced. In Ruffalo, an additional charge of misconduct
    was brought against the attorney in question following the
    completion of his testimony in the state disciplinary
    proceedings. See 
    390 U.S. at 546-47
    . That new charge
    served as the sole basis for the Sixth Circuit Court of
    Appeals’ decision to impose reciprocal discipline. 
    Id.
     The
    Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of
    appeals, concluding that the addition of a new charge at
    that stage of the state court proceedings violated Ruffalo’s
    right of due process, thereby making the imposition of
    reciprocal discipline inappropriate. 
    Id. at 550-551
    .
    Contrary to Surrick’s contention, we conclude that the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of its rulings in
    Anonymous Attorney A and Price did not amount to a new
    charge, and therefore is not functionally equivalent to the
    actions held violative of due process in Ruffalo. Cf.
    Committee on Prof ’l Ethics and Grievances of the Virgin
    Islands Bar Ass’n v. Johnson, 
    447 F.2d 169
    , 172-74 (3d
    Cir. 1971) (applying Ruffalo to situation in which
    disciplinary charges were amended based on the testimony
    of the attorney in question); see also In re Slattery, 
    767 A.2d 203
    , 210-11 (D.C. 2001) (noting that “we understood
    Ruffalo as holding that due process was violated because
    the bar association failed to give Ruffalo prior notice that
    his conduct would amount to, in the words of the Supreme
    Court, a ‘disbarment offense,’ with the consequence that
    Ruffalo was trapped into admitting that he had committed
    a disciplinary violation . . . . Ruffalo rests on the premise
    that the amendment of charges created an impermissible
    trap since, at the time of the proceedings, the attorney
    could not have known that the defense he asserted would
    subject him to disbarment”) (citations and internal
    quotations omitted).
    19
    Thus, we hold that the District Court did not err in
    concluding that the state disciplinary proceedings complied
    with minimal due process requirements. As a consequence,
    it did not abuse its discretion in imposing reciprocal
    discipline as required by its local rules in the absence of a
    due process violation. See RAC II(D).
    We need not address the merits of Surrick’s third and
    final argument — that the state court’s ruling violates his
    First Amendment rights and therefore constitutes a grave
    injustice pursuant to RAC II(D) — as he failed to adequately
    raise it before the District Court. See Brenner v. Local 514,
    United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 
    927 F.2d 1283
    , 1298 (3d Cir. 1991). Further, to the extent that
    Surrick’s reply brief may be read to challenge the District
    Court’s finding of waiver with respect to the First
    Amendment argument that was asserted below, we
    conclude that his failure to identify or argue this issue in
    his opening brief constitutes waiver of this argument on
    appeal. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 
    1 F.3d 176
    , 182 (3d Cir.
    1993). Moreover, even if Surrick’s objection to the District
    Court’s finding of waiver had been properly presented in his
    opening brief, we have reviewed the record and find no
    abuse of discretion.
    Finally, we note that the question whether the imposition
    of either state or reciprocal federal discipline was
    appropriate under the circumstances of this case is clearly
    one over which reasonable jurists may disagree. However,
    even conceding that we would view some of Surrick’s
    arguments as presenting close issues if called upon to
    examine them in the first instance, we have no difficulty in
    concluding that the District Court en banc did not abuse its
    discretion in imposing reciprocal discipline.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above we will affirm the judgment
    of the District Court.
    20
    COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
    I agree with the majority’s framing of the question
    presented on this appeal: whether the District Court
    abused its discretion by relying on the decision of the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court to impose reciprocal
    discipline. I further agree that we have jurisdiction to
    consider this appeal, and concur with the majority’s review
    of Surrick’s belated First Amendment challenge. However, I
    part company with the majority’s analysis of the Due
    Process concerns raised by the District Court’s
    countenance of the mental standard and burden of proof
    ultimately applied to Surrick’s Commonwealth disciplinary
    charge. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s expansion of the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct to prohibit
    reckless misstatements was unexpected under the clearly
    expressed law of the Commonwealth. Likewise, the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s changes to the proof
    sufficient   to   establish    attorney    misrepresentations
    materially altered the evidentiary burdens used at Surrick’s
    hearing. The retroactive application of both newly crafted
    standards impinged the guarantees of Due Process
    applicable to Surrick’s hearing, and presented a grave
    reason to reject the Commonwealth’s decision. Given these
    flaws, the use of the Commonwealth’s discipline as the
    basis for reciprocal federal discipline was unwarranted, and
    an abuse of the District Court’s discretion. Accordingly, I
    respectfully dissent from the majority’s reasoning and its
    decision.
    I.
    Like the majority, I begin by noting this Court’s extremely
    limited role in reviewing the disciplinary decisions of the
    District Court. In re Abrams, 
    521 F.2d 1094
    , 1101 (3d Cir.
    1975). The District Court, like all federal courts, enjoys a
    broad power to regulate and discipline admitted attorneys.
    In re Snyder, 
    472 U.S. 634
    , 643 (1985). However, the
    District Court’s “absolute and unfettered” disciplinary
    authority “may be circumscribed to the extent the district
    court, in imposing its disciplinary sanctions, relied upon a
    state’s legal or factual determinations.” In re Abrams, 
    521 F.2d at 1101
    . This limitation recognizes that “[w]hile a
    21
    lawyer is admitted into a federal court by way of a state
    court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal court
    by the same route.” Theard v. United States, 
    354 U.S. 278
    ,
    281 (1957). Thus, while a state disciplinary decision “is
    entitled to respect, it is not conclusively binding on the
    federal courts.” In re Ruffalo, 
    390 U.S. 544
    , 547 (1968);
    Theard, 
    354 U.S. at 282
    ; In re Abrams, 
    521 F.2d at
    1099-
    1100.
    The Supreme Court has outlined three areas of
    constitutional concern where a federal court should not
    give controlling weight to a state disciplinary decision: 1)
    where the state procedure, “from want of notice or
    opportunity to be heard, was wanting in due process”; 2)
    where there was such an infirmity of proof “as to give rise
    to a clear conviction” that the state’s judgment cannot be
    accepted as final; or 3) where some other grave reason
    exists to reject the decision of the state court. Selling v.
    Radford, 
    243 U.S. 46
    , 51 (1917); see also R. of Attorney
    Conduct II.D (codified at R. of Civ. P.for the E.D. Pa. 83.6).
    This Court must examine the Commonwealth disciplinary
    proceedings     to   determine      whether     Surrick   has
    demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of
    these factors warranted a departure from the presumptive
    imposition of federal discipline. In re Kramer, 
    282 F.3d 721
    ,
    724-25 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Jacobs, 
    44 F.3d 84
    , 88 (2d
    Cir. 1994); In re Rosenthal, 
    854 F.2d 1187
    , 1188 (9th Cir.
    1988).
    II.
    Like the majority, I also apply Rogers v. Tennessee, 
    532 U.S. 451
     (2001) in evaluating whether the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court’s retroactive decisions satisfied federal Due
    Process. Attorney disciplinary hearings “are adversary
    proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.” In re Ruffalo, 
    390 U.S. at 551
    ; In re Abrams, 
    521 F.2d at 1099
    . Although
    attorneys are not entitled to the full panoply of protections
    afforded to criminal defendants, they are “entitled to
    procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the
    charge.” In re Ruffalo, 
    390 U.S. at 550
    ; Comm. on Prof ’l
    Ethics and Grievances of V.I. Bar Ass’n v. Johnson, 
    447 F.2d 169
    , 173 (3d Cir. 1971). These procedural safeguards
    22
    ensure that the nature of the state’s allegation is known
    before the commencement of a disciplinary hearing so that
    the accused attorney might meet the charges of
    misconduct. In re Ruffalo, 
    390 U.S. at 551
    .
    These same concerns are reflected in the Supreme
    Court’s decision in Rogers v. Tennessee, which limited the
    retroactive application of judicial alterations of common law
    criminal doctrines. Rogers holds that while courts have
    substantial interpretive leeway, the Due Process clause
    limits “unjustified and unpredictable breaks with prior law”
    to protect against “vindictive or arbitrary judicial
    lawmaking.” 
    Id.
     
    532 U.S. at 462
    . These concerns are
    heightened in the highly charged context of attorney
    disciplinary     hearings,    where      “sensitive   personal,
    institutional and societal interests” converge into a “jural
    environment that is fraught with tension and devoid of
    decisional and precedential guideposts.” In re Abrams, 
    521 F.2d at 1100
    . Therefore, judicial alteration of a state rule of
    professional conduct may not be applied retroactively
    “where it is ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the
    law which had been expressed prior to the conduct at
    issue.’ ” Rogers, 
    532 U.S. at 462
     (quoting Bouie v. City of
    Columbia, 
    378 U.S. 347
    , 354 (1964)).
    III.
    Against this background, I consider the retroactive
    application of the recklessness standard to Surrick’s
    misstatements. Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct
    8.4(c) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a
    lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
    deceit or misrepresentation.” The plain language of RPC
    8.4(c) does not specify a relevant state of mind, and the
    comments accompanying the rule are similarly silent.1 At
    the time of Surrick’s action in 1992, no decision of the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted the mental
    state required for sanctions under the rule. Office of
    1. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4), the precursor to RPC 8.4(c), also lacked
    a mental standard. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney
    A, 
    714 A.2d 402
    , 404-05 & n.7 (Pa. 1998).
    23
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A, 
    714 A.2d 402
    , 405-06 (Pa. 1998).
    Citing the text of RPC 8.4(c) and the absence of any
    interpretive authorities, the Special Hearing Committee of
    the Disciplinary Board in this case concluded that only
    knowingly false statements violate the rule. App. at 160.
    The Special Committee explained that Pennsylvania “did
    not adopt the language of the Model Rules which contained
    a more objective ‘knew or should have known’ standard.”
    App. at 160. Given this distinction, the use of an objective
    recklessness standard would “disregard[ ] the plain
    language of the Rule as promulgated in this
    Commonwealth.” App. at 162. The Special Committee
    concluded that because there was “no evidence whatsoever
    presented that Mr. Surrick knew that the accusations made
    were false,” no violation of RPC 8.4(c) was established.2
    App. at 162-63.
    The Disciplinary Board adopted these conclusions. The
    Board explained that “negligent or careless conduct was not
    sufficient to constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(c).” App. at
    183. Significantly, the Board based this holding on its then
    recent decision in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Rebert,
    No. 28 D.B. 95 (April 23, 1997) which also found no
    misconduct for merely mistaken, rather than intentional,
    misrepresentations.3 The Disciplinary Board’s reliance on
    Rebert is significant because that decision, recaptioned as
    Anonymous Attorney A, was reversed by the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court while Surrick’s case was on appeal. As I
    shall discuss, the Disciplinary Board’s reliance on Rebert to
    exonerate Surrick reveals that the Commonwealth’s
    designated disciplinary authority did not anticipate the
    2. Despite this ruling, the Special Committee went on to opine that the
    evidence failed to show Surrick was unreasonable in his allegations.
    App. at 163. Although the Special Committee’s statement that “we
    cannot conclude that he . . . did not have a reasonable basis [ ] to make
    the assertions that he did” was unnecessary given its interpretation of
    RPC 8.4(c), its analysis of the evidence at the hearing is nonetheless
    notable.
    3. The unpublished decision of the Disciplinary Board in Rebert is
    available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/disciplinaryboard/
    dboardopinions/28DB95.OP.pdf.
    24
    standard that would be announced in Anonymous Attorney
    A. I thus turn to the facts, reasoning, and holding of that
    decision.
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its opinion in
    Anonymous Attorney A by noting that no prior decision of
    either the Supreme Court or the Disciplinary Board had
    examined the requirement of intent under RPC 8.4(c). The
    Court explained that while an earlier case did address
    attorney misrepresentations under DR 1-102(A)(4) (the
    predecessor rule to RPC 8.4(c)), the case did not “address
    the mental culpability standard for an attorney’s alleged
    misrepresentations which Petitioner must meet in order to
    establish a violation . . . .” Anonymous Attorney A, 714 A.2d
    at 405 (discussing Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Geisler,
    
    614 A.2d 1134
     (Pa. 1992)). The Court concluded that
    because “Geisler focused on the discipline to be imposed
    . . . rather than . . . mental culpability, that opinion is of
    limited value in resolving the question presently before us.”
    
    Id.
    The Court then turned to In re Anonymous, 126 D.B. 92,
    
    26 Pa. D. & C. 4th 427
     (1995), “[t]he sole Disciplinary
    Board decision addressing a mental culpability standard”
    under RPC 8.4(c) or DR 1-102(A)(4). 
    Id.
     In re Anonymous
    involved a disciplinary charge arising out of an attorney’s
    failure to abide by the terms of an informal admonition. In
    exchange for an informal sanction, the attorney twice
    agreed to return a client’s file. Despite these
    representations to the Disciplinary Board, the attorney
    failed to return the materials, leading to an additional
    disciplinary charge for his false statement. The Disciplinary
    Board held that while RPC 8.4(c) “does not attach an
    independent state of mind requirement,” the common
    meaning of “misrepresentation” includes “an assertion not
    in accordance with the facts.” In re Anonymous, 26 Pa. D.
    & C. 4th at 436 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 903 (5th
    ed. 1979)). Based on this definition, the Disciplinary Board
    concluded that the attorney’s negligent misrepresentation
    to the Board was “an assertion not in accordance with the
    facts,” and a violation of RPC 8.4(c). Id. The Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court viewed “the egregiousness of the facts in In
    re Anonymous” as the basis for the discipline. Anonymous
    25
    Attorney A, 714 A.2d at 405. Given the severity of the facts,
    the Court concluded “that this decision is of no
    precedential value regarding the issue sub judice.” Id. at
    405-06.
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus found no
    authorities explaining the mental state required under RPC
    8.4(c), and “given the absence of precedent in Pennsylvania
    on the issue,” proceeded to canvass the case law from other
    jurisdictions. Id. at 406. After reviewing the decisions of
    four other states, the Supreme Court adopted the
    interpretation of Colorado’s analogous disciplinary rule and
    held that “no actual knowledge or intent to deceive” is
    necessary to prove a violation of RPC 8.4(c). Id. at 407.
    Instead, misconduct is established by recklessness, “the
    deliberate closing of one’s eyes to facts that one had a duty
    to see or state as fact things of which one was ignorant.” Id.
    The Court concluded that this holding “clarifies” the finding
    in Geisler. Id.
    Anonymous Attorney A reveals three facts regarding the
    state of Pennsylvania law prior to 1998: 1) the text of RPC
    8.4(c) does not contain a state of mind requirement; 2) the
    prior decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Geisler
    —the only Supreme Court decision to even consider
    attorney misrepresentations under DR 1-102(A)(4) or RPC
    8.4(c)—did not impose a state of mind requirement; and 3)
    the prior decision of the Disciplinary Board in In re
    Anonymous had “no precedential value” regarding the state
    of mind requirement. These facts reveal a complete lack of
    Pennsylvania authority on the meaning of RPC 8.4(c), and
    explain the Supreme Court’s examination of cases outside
    the Commonwealth.
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Office of
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 
    749 A.2d 441
     (Pa. 2000)
    essentially accepts these conclusions, and acknowledges
    that no case addressed the mental standard of RPC 8.4(c)
    before Anonymous Attorney A. 
    Id. at 444
    . Nonetheless, the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed the glass as half-
    empty, reasoning that because “[n]o precedent had declared
    only intentional conduct would violate” the rule, attorneys
    must have assumed that some lesser degree of conduct
    might be actionable. 
    Id. at 445
    . To support this conclusion
    26
    the Supreme Court pointed to the outcome in Geisler, the
    case that it previously characterized as offering “limited
    value” to this issue, and requiring the “guidance” offered by
    Colorado law. 
    Id. at 444
    . Thus, with no more than a
    citation to Geisler and the unsupported statement that the
    recklessness standard was not unforeseeable, the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that Anonymous
    Attorney A governed Surrick’s conduct some eight years
    before the decision. Given this thin reasoning, the original
    District    Court    panel   to    review    Surrick’s   case
    understandably found it “hard to escape the conclusion”
    that Anonymous Attorney A decided an issue of first
    impression. App. at 82.
    The majority labors to bolster the Supreme Court’s scant
    analysis in an attempt to argue that given “the state of the
    law” in 1992, Surrick should reasonably have anticipated
    the decision in Anonymous Attorney A. First, the majority
    finds it “well-settled” that reckless conduct satisfied DR 1-
    102(A)(4), the predecessor to RPC 8.4(c). This assertion,
    however, lacks any citation to Pennsylvania law. Nor could
    any citation be included, given “the absence of precedent in
    Pennsylvania on the issue.” Anonymous Attorney A, 714
    A.2d at 406. Instead, the majority cites to an opinion of the
    American Bar Association interpreting Model DR 1-
    102(A)(4). But as stated by the Special Committee,
    Pennsylvania did not adopt the language of the ABA Model
    Rule in promulgating RPC 8.4(c), and looking to the ABA’s
    interpretations of a objective standard would “disregard[ ]
    the plain language of the Rule as promulgated in this
    Commonwealth.” App. at 162.
    The majority then offers six state court opinions
    interpreting the disciplinary rules of their individual
    jurisdictions to extend to reckless misstatements. That fact
    seems to prove only that forty-four states, or more than
    three-quarters of the nation, had not extended their rules
    to include reckless conduct. Thus, while this survey might
    indeed prove some “general state of the law,” it does not
    support the majority’s conclusion that recklessness was a
    well-settled standard. More importantly, the majority does
    not accompany these citations with any principle of law
    that requires attorneys to conform their behavior not only
    27
    to the rules of their jurisdiction, but to those promulgated
    in all others.
    Next, the majority offers several decisions holding that
    misrepresentations are actionable as torts in Pennsylvania
    if made with a reckless disregard for the truth. See, e.g.,
    Berda v. CBS, Inc., 
    881 F.2d 20
    , 27 (3d Cir. 1989)
    (discussing tort claims for fraud and negligent
    misrepresentation). But as the majority agrees, this Court
    has already held that a disciplinary proceeding “has
    consequences which remove it from the ordinary run of civil
    case.” In re Abrams, 
    521 F.2d at 1099
    . Using a common
    law doctrine to expand the meaning of a criminal statute is
    generally prohibited in Pennsylvania. 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
    § 1928(b)(1) (West 2003) (stating that penal provisions shall
    be strictly construed). Strict construction is also required
    for the interpretation of retroactive laws. Id. § 1928(b)(2).
    The civil laws cited by the majority to justify the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s retroactive application of a
    new disciplinary ruling have little, if any, application to
    such a quasi-criminal proceeding.
    Finally, the majority views the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court’s decision to remand the case in Anonymous Attorney
    A as evidence that the recklessness standard was not new
    law. The correctness of the Supreme Court’s decision to
    remand that case, in light of the Disciplinary Board’s
    understanding that only intentional misrepresentations
    satisfied RPC 8.4(c) and the requirements of 1 Pa. Cons.
    Stat. Ann. § 1928(b)(2), is not before this Court. As
    succinctly stated by the District Court panel, the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Anonymous
    Attorney A, as in Surrick, “settles the issue as a matter of
    Pennsylvania law.” App. at 82.
    But it does not settle for this court the federal due
    process question whether it was fundamentally unfair
    for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, through its
    highest court, in 2000, to suspend Mr. Surrick from
    the practice of law for five years because of actions
    taken at a time—nearly eight years before the court’s
    decision—when there was an ‘absence of precedent in
    Pennsylvania’ that his actions were sanctionable.
    28
    App. at 82. Our focus on this appeal is whether the
    application of Anonymous Attorney A was unexpected or
    indefensible by reference to prior law. The Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court’s interpretation of Commonwealth law does
    not, therefore, substitute for our own independent Due
    Process analysis.
    The majority’s reasoning does not support the conclusion
    that the recklessness standard of Anonymous Attorney A
    was foreseeable. More fundamentally, however, it is
    unhelpful to examine the general “state of the law” in other
    jurisdictions, or in other substantive areas, instead of the
    law of Pennsylvania regarding attorney misrepresentations.
    It is clear from Anonymous Attorney A that no prior law
    explained the application of RPC 8.4(c). It is clear from the
    record that the Special Hearing Committee and the full
    Disciplinary Board both believed that RPC 8.4(c) did not
    embrace objectively reckless misstatements. And it is clear
    from the Disciplinary Board’s citation to Rebert, the very
    case that would later announce the recklessness standard,
    that the Board did not anticipate the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court’s decision. Given the text of RPC 8.4(c), and
    the absence of any interpretive authority, it is not
    surprising that even the professional experience and
    institutional learning of Pennsylvania’s highest disciplinary
    authority was insufficient to predict the Supreme Court’s
    decision.
    For these reasons, I am left with the same conclusion as
    the District Court panel: Anonymous Attorney A announced
    a new standard for attorney misconduct, one that was not
    obvious from the text of RPC 8.4(c), foreshadowed by prior
    decisions, or even suggested by the state of Pennsylvania
    disciplinary law. The better reading of that decision is the
    one offered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself: a
    new professional standard drawn from a Colorado Supreme
    Court decision. The decision to alter RPC 8.4(c) is, without
    question, entrusted to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It
    is not ours to dispute that decision, or its retroactive
    application to Surrick’s misstatements. It is, however, the
    role of this Court to determine whether some grave reason
    exists to reject the District Court’s reliance on those
    judgments. The recklessness standard of Anonymous
    29
    Attorney A was unexpected and indefensible under the law
    prior to Surrick’s conduct. Relying on the retroactive
    application of that holding to impose reciprocal federal
    discipline was clearly erroneous.
    IV.
    Similar concerns support my conclusion that the
    retroactive application of the burden-shifting framework
    announced in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Price, 
    732 A.2d 599
     (Pa. 1999) constitutes a grave reason to depart
    from the Commonwealth’s sanctions. I begin by outlining
    the elements of RPC 8.4(c) and the burden of proof applied
    by the Disciplinary Board at Surrick’s hearing. As explained
    by the Special Hearing Committee, RPC 8.4(c) required the
    Office of Disciplinary Counsel to prove that Surrick knew
    his allegations were false. App. at 163 (“The focus of the
    inquiry, in this case, was to Mr. Surrick’s state of mind in
    making these allegations and not to the ultimate truth or
    falsity of the allegations.”). The Disciplinary Board further
    explained that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel must
    prove Surrick’s actual subjective knowledge by clear and
    satisfactory evidence. App. at 178. Anonymous Attorney A
    changed the first of these requirements by adding an
    objective recklessness standard. Thus, under the new
    formulation, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel could prove
    Surrick actually knew his statements were false, or that he
    made the statements with reckless ignorance of the facts.
    Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Price then changed the
    second requirement. In Price, the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court affirmed that “the burden of proving misconduct lies
    with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,” that misconduct
    must be shown “by a preponderance of the evidence,” and
    that proof of the misconduct must be clear and satisfactory.
    Price, 732 A.2d at 603. The Supreme Court then noted that
    every fact asserted in a court pleading must be based on
    either the pleader’s personal knowledge, or the results of a
    reasonably diligent inquiry. Id. Synthesizing these
    requirements, Price held that the Office of Disciplinary
    Counsel may satisfy its burden to prove the alleged
    misconduct simply by demonstrating that the statements at
    issue were false. Id. at 604. After this initial showing, “[t]he
    30
    burden then shifts to the respondent to establish that the
    allegations are true or that he had an objective reasonable
    belief that the allegations were true, based upon a
    reasonably diligent inquiry.” Id.
    The    majority    views   this  second     alteration  as
    unexceptional given that the burden of proof remains on
    the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and that the relevant
    quantum of evidence remains clear and satisfactory. This
    explanation, however, does not consider that what the
    Office must prove is no longer the attorney’s subjective
    knowledge, or the objective unreasonableness of the
    attorney’s belief. Instead, the Office need only prove the
    objective falsity of the statement, after which the attorney
    carries the burden to either prove the statement true, or to
    prove a reasonably diligent inquiry supported the erroneous
    belief. By formulating the burdens in this manner, the
    Office of Disciplinary Counsel is no longer required to prove
    (by any measure of evidence) that the attorney actually
    knew the statements were false, as was the practice before
    Anonymous Attorney A. And the Office need not even prove
    that the attorney failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry, as
    seemed to be the requirement after Anonymous Attorney A.
    Under Price, therefore, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel is
    relieved of proving the state of mind requirement added to
    RPC 8.4(c), and permitted to rest its case solely on the
    falsity of the statements at issue.
    It bears repeating that as with the new recklessness
    standard, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
    Price is relevant only to this Court’s consideration of
    whether to afford Surrick’s Commonwealth discipline
    presumptive force. That question turns, as before, on
    whether the change in Price was unexpected or
    indefensible. The majority contends that it was not, quoting
    the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s view that “the pleader in
    a court proceeding bears the burden of establishing a
    factual basis upon which his allegations are based.” Price,
    732 A.2d at 603. However, Price itself does not cite any
    authority for this claim, making its presumptive force
    suspect. Moreover, the relevant issue is not whether
    Surrick had a duty to verify the contents of his pleading.
    That duty is unquestionably established by Pa. R. Civ. P.
    31
    10234 and 1024, and Pennsylvania courts are authorized to
    impose appropriate sanctions for bad faith violations.
    Surrick’s misstatements might have been the basis for
    penalties before the Superior Court.
    Price goes a step further, allowing an attorney’s duty of
    verification under the civil rules to automatically satisfy the
    Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s case under RPC 8.4(c), if
    the attorney’s statements are false. Whether that is a
    desirable rule is of no moment. That it was an unexpected
    departure from prior practice is acknowledged by the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s explanation that Price “set
    forth an objective standard” based on a newly crafted
    shifting burden of production. Surrick, 749 A.2d at 445.5
    The process required during disciplinary proceedings
    includes, at a minimum, fair notice of the misconduct
    alleged. In re Ruffalo, 
    390 U.S. at 550
    ; Johnson, 
    447 F.2d at 173
    . Knowledge of the violation charged, and hence the
    accompanying elements and burdens, is critical to
    mounting a proper defense. More importantly, adequate
    notice protects attorneys from the specter of vindictive and
    arbitrary discipline. Rogers, 
    532 U.S. at 462
    . Like the
    District Court panel, I do not find it necessary to determine
    whether the retroactive application of Price to Surrick’s
    conduct violated federal Due Process. Instead, I would hold
    that the Due Process concerns implicit in the retroactive
    application of a new burden of proof provide a grave reason
    to reject the District Court’s reliance on the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court’s decision. Price was unexpected and
    indefensible under prior law, and the retroactive application
    of its framework “should not be accepted as adequate for
    the purposes of disbarment from a federal court.” In re
    4. Rule 1023 was rescinded effective July 1, 2002. New Rules 1023.1-
    1023.4 continue the requirements of the old rule, and provide additional
    instruction on remedies for violations.
    5. The majority also views the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to
    apply this new framework to the conduct at issue in Price as evidence
    that the burden allocation was not new law. I find this reasoning
    irrelevant for the same reasons I disagree with majority’s reliance on the
    Supreme Court’s decision to remand Anonymous Attorney A.
    32
    Ruffalo, 
    390 U.S. at 552
     (Harlan, J., concurring). So viewed,
    the District Court’s decision was clearly erroneous.6
    V.
    I note finally that my disagreement with the majority’s
    analysis implies no view on the substance of Surrick’s
    allegations. With that observation, and for the foregoing
    reasons, I must dissent from the majority’s decision.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6. Because I would hold that the retroactive application of Price is a
    sufficiently grave reason to reject the Commonwealth’s decision, I need
    not address Surrick’s additional Due Process arguments, or the
    majority’s analysis of those issues.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-2783P

Filed Date: 8/1/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

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