Thomas v. Rosemeyer , 199 F. App'x 195 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10-12-2006
    Thomas v. Rosemeyer
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-1940
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    Recommended Citation
    "Thomas v. Rosemeyer" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 333.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/333
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    DPS-362                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NO. 06-1940
    ________________
    VINCENT THOMAS,
    Appellant
    v.
    FREDERIC A. ROSEMEYER, Superintendent in his
    individual and official capacity as Superintendent
    of Laurel Highlands; MARDI HUNSBERGER, Deputy, in her
    individual and official capacity as Deputy of Laurel
    Highlands; STEVEN M. GATES, In his individual and official
    capacity as Deputy of Laurel Highlands; RONALD CHERO,
    In his individual and official capacity as Captain of
    Security of Laurel Highlands; MICHAEL TURNER, In his
    individual and official capacity as Lieutenant of Security
    of Laurel Highlands; JOANN CROSS, In her individual and
    official capacity as Educational Guidance Counsel for
    Laurel Highlands; RAYMOND SOBINA, In his individual and
    official capacity as Superintendent of Somerset; GERALD
    ROZUM, In his individual and official capacity as Deputy
    of Somerset; M. LARRY AMENTI, In his individual and official
    capacity as Program Manager for Somerset; GEHLMANN, Lt.,
    In his individual and official capacity Major of Somerset; ROBERT BITNER,
    In his individual and official capacity as Chief
    Hearing Examiner for Misconducts for the Department of Corrections
    of Pennsylvania; BEN E. ANSELL, In his individual and official
    capacity as Hearing Examiner for Misconducts for the Department
    of Corrections of Pennsylvania
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00032)
    District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
    _______________________________________
    Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
    September 28, 2006
    Before: FUENTES, VANANTWERPEN AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: October 12, 2006)
    _______________________
    OPINION
    _______________________
    PER CURIAM
    Vincent Thomas appeals the order of the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights action.
    While Thomas was incarcerated in SCI-Laurel Highlands in 2003, he was
    suspected of sending a threatening letter to defendant Joann Cross, who is a guidance
    counselor at the institution. Thomas was then transferred to SCI-Somerset and placed
    into the restricted housing unit (RHU). On November 26, 2003, a misconduct hearing
    was conducted relating to the threatening letter. At the conclusion of the hearing,
    defendant Ben Ansell found Thomas guilty of three charges, and imposed a sanction of
    90 days’ confinement on each charge for a total disciplinary time of 270 days.
    Thomas filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that: (1) his
    Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated when he was denied
    access to witnesses and evidence at his misconduct hearing, and (2) defendants violated
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    his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Thomas
    sought damages and expungement of his record. The magistrate judge recommended that
    Thomas’s complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state
    a claim upon which relief may be granted. The District Court adopted the
    recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissed Thomas’s complaint.
    Thomas timely filed a notice of appeal. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291. Having granted Thomas leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal,
    we must now determine whether his appeal should be dismissed pursuant to
    § 1915(e)(2)(B). An appeal may be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it has no arguable
    basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325 (1989).
    Thomas alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process
    was violated when he was transferred to SCI-Somerset and placed in the RHU, and when
    he received 270 days of disciplinary confinement without being permitted to see the
    evidence against him or call any witnesses. In analyzing a due process claim, the
    threshold question is whether the complaining party has been deprived of a protected
    liberty or property interest. See Shoats v. Horn, 
    213 F.3d 140
    , 143 (3d Cir. 2000). In a
    prison context, due process protection is limited to those situations where the deprivation
    rises to the level of an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
    ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 484 (1995). Thomas
    concedes that he has no liberty interest in being confined at any particular prison. See
    Olim v. Wakinekona, 
    461 U.S. 238
    , 245 46 (1983). Thomas’s confinement in the RHU
    3
    for a period of 270 days is not an atypical or significant hardship. See Griffin v. Vaughn,
    
    112 F.3d 703
    , 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (placement of a prisoner in administrative custody for
    15 months did not involve an atypical, significant deprivation). He thus does not assert a
    liberty interest for which he is entitled to due process protection. To the extent Thomas
    asserts that the prison’s failure to comply with state procedures deprived him of due
    process, state procedures, in themselves, do not confer a liberty interest protected by the
    due process clause. See Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 
    214 F.3d 328
    , 339 (2d Cir. 2000) (the
    fact that a state has established procedures to be followed does not mean that it has
    created a protected liberty interest). Accordingly, Thomas’s claims under the Fourteenth
    Amendment fail.
    Thomas also alleges that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in
    violation of the Eighth Amendment. The relevant Eighth Amendment inquiry is whether
    the prisoner has been deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”
    Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 834 (1994). This requires an allegation that the
    prisoner has been denied “basic human needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,
    medical care and personal safety” from physical assault. 
    Griffin, 112 F.3d at 709
    . As the
    District Court explained, Thomas presented no evidence that he was denied basic human
    needs such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or personal safety.
    Thomas’s claim that his placement in the RHU violated the Eighth Amendment lacks
    merit. See 
    Griffin, 112 F.3d at 709
    (placement of a prisoner in administrative custody for
    15 months did not involve the deprivation of any basic human need under the Eighth
    4
    Amendment).
    For the foregoing reasons, Thomas’s appeal will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(B) for lack of legal merit. Because Thomas’s appeal lacks legal merit, his
    motion for appointment of counsel is denied. See Tabron v. Grace, 
    6 F.3d 147
    , 155-56
    (3d Cir. 1993).
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