Francis v. Mineta ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10-10-2007
    Francis v. Mineta
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-1293
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007
    Recommended Citation
    "Francis v. Mineta" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 312.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/312
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No: 06-1293
    ALBION FRANCIS,
    Appellant
    v.
    NORMAN Y. MINETA;
    TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION;
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
    (Civil No. 03-cv-00039)
    District Judge: Hon. Raymond L. Finch
    Argued: December 6, 2006
    Before: McKEE, BARRY and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
    (Filed; October 10, 2007)
    VINCENT A. COLIANNI, ESQ. (Argued)
    Colianni & Colianni
    1138 King Street
    Christiansted, VI 00820
    Attorneys for Appellant
    PETER D. KEISLER, ESQ.
    Assistant Attorney General
    ANTHONY J. JENKINS, ESQ.
    United States Attorney
    MARLEIGH D. DOVER, ESQ.
    MATTHEW M. COLLETTE, ESQ. (Argued)
    Attorneys, Appellate Staff
    Civil Division
    Department of Justice
    Washington, D.C. 20530
    Attorneys for Appellees
    OPINION
    McKEE, Circuit Judge.
    Albion Francis, a former federal employee, appeals the
    District Court’s dismissal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), of
    the employment discrimination claim he attempted to bring
    under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
    2000bb-2000bb-4. The District Court held that it lacked subject
    2
    matter    jurisdiction   over   Francis’s   claim   of   religious
    discrimination because any such claim must be brought under
    Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court
    also held that the action must be dismissed for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction because Francis failed to exhaust his
    administrative remedies under Title VII.        See 42 U.S.C. §
    20003-16(c).
    We disagree with the District Court’s finding that it did
    not have subject matter jurisdiction. It had federal question
    subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However,
    because we “may affirm a result reached by a District Court on
    different reasons, as long as the record supports the judgment,”
    Brumfield v. Sanders, 
    232 F.3d 376
    , 379 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000)
    (citation omitted), we will affirm as a dismissal under
    Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
    3
    relief can be granted.1
    As we explained in Robinson v. Dalton, 
    107 F.3d 1018
    , 1021-22
    (3d Cir. 1997):
    Although the district court in this case described
    its preliminary evaluation as “jurisdictional,” this
    court has previously determined that questions of
    whether a plaintiff has timely exhausted the
    administrative remedies in Title VII actions “are
    in the nature of statutes of limitation. They do not
    affect the district court's subject matter
    jurisdiction.” Moreover, in Title VII cases courts
    are permitted in certain limited circumstances to
    equitably toll filing requirements, even if there
    has been a complete failure to file, which
    necessarily precludes characterizing such
    requirements as “jurisdictional.”
    1
    “In considering a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
    12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
    accepts as true all allegations in the Plaintiff’s Complaint and all
    reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom after
    construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant.”
    Bright v. Westmoreland County, 
    380 F.3d 729
    , 735 (3d Cir.
    2004) (citation omitted). “Dismissal is not proper unless it
    clearly appears that no relief can be granted under any set of
    facts that could be proved consistently with the plaintiff’s
    allegations.” 
    Id. (citation and
    internal quotations omitted).
    4
    It follows that the . . . motion to dismiss should
    have been treated under Rule 12(b)(6).
    (citations omitted).
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    In    2001,     Congress   enacted   the   Aviation   and
    Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
    (2001), creating a federal workforce to screen passengers and
    cargo at the nation’s commercial airports. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t
    Employees v. Loy, 
    367 F.3d 932
    , 934 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
    Pursuant to the authority contained in that Act, the
    Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) assumed
    responsibility for security screening in the nation’s commercial
    airports.2
    2
    Pursuant to the Department of Homeland Security
    Reorganization Plan (Nov. 25, 2002), as required by Section
    1502 of the Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002,
    Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), TSA was
    (continued...)
    5
    In October 2002, TSA hired Albion Francis as a security
    screener at the Henry E. Rohlsen Airport in St. Croix, U.S.
    Virgin Islands.    Francis is an African-American male who
    wears his hair in dreadlocks, which he declares to be “an
    important expression of [his] sincerely held religious beliefs.”
    All new TSA employees are required to undergo forty
    hours of classroom training and sixty hours of on-the-job
    training.   On October 20, 2002, TSA’s new transportation
    screeners in the Virgin Islands, including Francis, began their
    training at the Rohlsen Airport. Prior to administering the oath
    of employment to the screeners, Deputy Federal Security
    Director Lawrence Londer told the new screeners that they were
    part of a uniformed service and were therefore subject to the
    2
    (...continued)
    transferred from the Department of Transportation to the
    Department of Homeland Security, effective March 1, 2003.
    6
    mandatory grooming policy that TSA had established for its
    uniformed employees.        Londer stated that if this policy
    presented a problem to anyone, he/she should not take the oath
    of employment. He then administered the oath of employment
    to those present, including Francis.
    At an orientation session approximately one week later,
    TSA screening manager Steven Betz noticed that three
    screeners, including Francis, had hairstyles that did not conform
    to the agency’s grooming policy, and he informed them that they
    had to conform to that policy.
    Francis alleges that he informed Betz that he would not
    cut his dreadlocks, and told him that the refusal to cut his
    dreadlocks was based on his religious beliefs. Francis further
    alleges that Betz then ordered him to sign a separation
    agreement, terminating his employment. Thereafter, Francis
    filed the instant suit in the District Court.
    7
    II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
    Francis asserts a cause of action for religious
    discrimination under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
    (“RFRA”),3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4. He named as
    defendants: Norman Y. Mineta, the then - Secretary of
    Transportation; the Department of Transportation; the TSA;
    and the United States. The one-count complaint alleges that
    TSA fired him because he refused to comply with TSA’s
    grooming policy. It also alleges that the grooming policy, as
    applied to him, violates RFRA because it substantially burdens
    his sincerely held religious beliefs without furthering any
    3
    The RFRA applies only to the federal government. In City
    of Boerne v. Flores, 
    521 U.S. 507
    (1997), the Supreme Court
    held that the Act was unconstitutional, as applied to the states,
    under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    8
    compelling governmental interest.4
    The Government moved to dismiss based on lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The
    Government argued that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
    1964 is the exclusive remedy for asserting claims of federal
    employment discrimination. The Government also argued that
    the suit should be dismissed because Francis had not exhausted
    his administrative remedies.
    In granting the Government’s motion to dismiss, the
    District Court held that the comprehensive and exclusive
    remedial scheme of Title VII precludes Francis’s attempt to
    obtain redress under RFRA. The District Court also agreed that
    Francis was required to administratively exhaust his claim as
    4
    Francis sought compensatory damages, reinstatement and
    injunctive relief against the enforcement of the grooming policy,
    as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
    9
    provided in Title VII. This appeal followed.
    III. DISCUSSION
    As noted above, Francis claims that his dreadlocks have
    religious significance and that TSA’s grooming policy
    substantially burdens his free exercise of religion because it
    forces him to remove the dreadlocks despite their religious
    significance. Francis argues that the policy can not be applied
    to him under RFRA unless the Government can demonstrate that
    it furthers a compelling governmental interest. He relies upon
    the following provisions of RFRA:
    § 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected
    (a) In general
    Government shall not substantially burden a
    person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
    results from a rule of general applicability, except
    as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
    (b) Exception
    10
    Government may substantially burden a person’s
    exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
    application of the burden to the person --
    (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
    interest; and
    (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
    compelling governmental interest.
    42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b).
    Francis also claims that the plain text of RFRA “clearly
    gives [him] and other federal employees a right to sue under the
    statute.” He points to two subsections to support his claim: (1)
    § 2000bb(b)(2) (stating that one of the purposes of RFRA is “to
    provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise
    is substantially burdened by government.”); and (2) § 2000bb-
    1(c) (“A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
    violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or
    defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief
    against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense
    11
    under this section shall be governed by the general rules of
    standing under article III of the Constitution.”).
    We can best respond to Francis’s reliance on RFRA by
    reiterating the background of that statute. In Adams v. Comm’r
    of Internal Revenue, we explained: “[i]n enacting RFRA,
    Congress specifically announced its intent to ‘restore’ the
    ‘compelling interest’ test set forth in Sherbert v.Verner and
    Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and ‘to guarantee its application in all
    cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
    burdened[.]’” 
    170 F.3d 173
    , 176 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 42
    U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)).
    Under the compelling interest test, the Supreme Court
    had traditionally held that laws that substantially burden the free
    exercise of religion must be supported by a compelling interest
    to survive scrutiny under the First Amendment. However, in
    1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Div., Dep’t of
    12
    Human Res. v. Smith, 
    494 U.S. 872
    (1990). There, the Supreme
    Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require Oregon
    to exempt the sacramental ingestion of peyote by members of
    the Native American Church from Oregon’s criminal drug laws.
    
    Id. at 877-82.
       The Court concluded that such generally
    applicable laws may be applied to religious exercise even in the
    absence of a compelling governmental interest. 
    Id. at 884-89.
    Congress responded by enacting RFRA.
    Enacted in 1993, RFRA applies to “all Federal law” and
    the implementation of that law, “whether statutory or
    otherwise,” adopted both before and after the passage of RFRA.
    42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a). Despite the apparent limitless scope
    of RFRA, Congress was careful to circumscribe its reach.
    Accordingly, in a section captioned “Other Areas of Law are
    Unaffected,” the Senate Report on RFRA states: “[a]lthough the
    purpose of this act is only to overturn the Supreme Court’s
    13
    decision in Smith, concerns have been raised that the act could
    have unintended consequences and unsettle other areas of law.”
    S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 12 (1993), as reprinted in 1993
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 1879, 1902. The Report then discusses a number
    of areas that are not affected by RFRA, including Title VII. It
    explains: “[n]othing in this act shall be construed as affecting
    religious accommodation under title VII of the Civil Rights Act
    of 1964.” 
    Id. at 13,
    as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1903.
    The House Report on RFRA contains nearly identical language.
    See H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993).
    It is not surprising that nothing in RFRA alters the
    exclusive nature of Title VII with regard to employees’ claims
    of religion-based employment discrimination. Nothing in pre-
    Smith case law permitted an employee alleging employment
    discrimination based on religion to bypass Title VII’s exclusive
    and comprehensive scheme. Accordingly, since RFRA was only
    14
    enacted to overturn Smith and restore pre-Smith case law, the
    Senate Report merely clarifies that Congress did not intend
    RFRA to subsume other statutory schemes.
    Francis claims the District Court erred in considering this
    legislative history and disregarding the plain language of RFRA.
    However, as we shall discuss, the plain text of RFRA does not
    necessarily advance our inquiry because, according to Francis,
    RFRA subsumes the prohibition on employment discrimination
    that is the hallmark of Title VII. Thus, to the extent that there is
    any ambiguity about RFRA’s impact on Title VII, legislative
    history becomes a useful and appropriate tool for our inquiry
    into congressional intent. See In re Mehta, 
    310 F.3d 308
    (3d Cir.
    2002). Even a cursory examination of the text of Title VII
    reveals that RFRA’s legislative history can guide that inquiry.
    Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an
    unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge
    15
    any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
    individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
    or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . .
    religion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 2000e(j) of
    Title 42 defines “religion” to include “all aspects of religious
    observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
    demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
    employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or
    practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
    employer’s business.”    In enacting this provision, Congress
    clearly intended to make it unlawful “for an employer not to
    make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for
    the religious practices of his employees and prospective
    employees.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 
    432 U.S. 63
    , 74 (1977).
    In 1972, Congress extended Title VII’s protection to
    16
    federal employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 provides that “[a]ll
    personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
    employment” in military departments, executive agencies, and
    several specified governmental entities “shall be made free from
    any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national
    origin.” Thereafter, the Supreme Court held that Title VII is the
    “exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for
    the redress of federal employment discrimination.” Brown v.
    GSA, 
    425 U.S. 820
    , 829 (1976).5 Title VII thus sweeps within
    its reach all claims of employment discrimination whether they
    are based on religion or another enumerated form of
    discrimination that may impact a constitutionally protected right.
    As we explained in Owens v. United States, “[i]nterpretation of
    5
    Because Title VII’s protections were extended to federal
    employees, federal employees complaining of employment
    discrimination became subject to Title VII’s administrative
    exhaustion requirements. Brown, 425 U.S. at, 833.
    17
    Title VII has shown that Title VII . . . ‘precludes actions against
    federal officials for alleged constitutional violations as well as
    actions under other federal legislation.’” 
    822 F.2d 408
    , 410 (3d
    Cir. 1987) (quoting Kizas v. Webster, 
    707 F.2d 524
    , 542 (D.C.
    Cir. 1983)).
    Francis’s complaint alleges, inter alia, that in firing him
    for not cutting his dreadlocks, the TSA violated his right to
    freely exercise his religion. He claims that he was terminated
    because his religious practice (wearing dreadlocks) was
    inconsistent with TSA’s grooming policy. He is suing because
    that policy failed to accommodate his religiously-based conduct.
    But that is an attempt to use RFRA to force the TSA to
    accommodate wearing dreadlocks because they have religious
    significance. The legislative history that we have discussed
    demonstrates that Congress did not intend RFRA to create a
    vehicle for allowing religious accommodation claims in the
    18
    context of federal employment to do an end run around the
    legislative scheme of Title VII.6 The Supreme Court framed the
    issue before it in Brown, as follows: “[i]s . . . the Civil Rights
    Act of 1964, . . . [as amended,] the exclusive individual remedy
    available to a federal employee complaining of job-related racial
    
    discrimination?” 425 U.S. at 824-25
    . It is equally clear that
    Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for job-related claims
    of federal religious discrimination, despite Francis’s attempt to
    rely upon the provisions of RFRA.
    III.
    One matter remains. Because the District Court found
    that Title VII precludes Francis’s RFRA claim, it also held that
    Francis was required to exhaust administrative remedies under
    Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 20003-16(c); 
    Brown, 425 U.S. at 6
         The Government concedes that the conduct alleged by
    Francis clearly falls within the purview of Title VII.
    19
    832-33. Since Francis did not exhaust his remedies, the District
    Court dismissed his claim. Francis claims that was error and
    insists that his “RFRA claim” is not subject to the exhaustion
    requirements of Title VII. However, as we have explained, his
    claim is not a RFRA claim; rather, it is a Title VII claim and
    Title VII requires exhaustion.
    IV.
    Accordingly, the order of the District Court dismissing
    Francis’s complaint will be affirmed.7
    7
    Judge Stapleton concurs, but writes separately to discuss this
    claim of employment discrimination based on religion. We do
    not disagree with his discussion.
    20
    STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring.
    In my view, resolution of the issue before us requires only a
    straightforward application of Supreme Court precedent.
    Francis’s argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
    ruling in Brown v. General Services Administration, 
    425 U.S. 820
    (1976). By its terms, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) would
    seem to provide Mr. Francis with a cause of action. That
    statute, however, is in tension with § 717 of Title VII, 42
    U.S.C. § 2000e-16, which imposes several procedural
    requirements on a federal employee raising claims of
    employment discrimination that must be met before the
    employee can sue in federal district court. In 
    Brown, 425 U.S. at 829
    , the Supreme Court held that Title VII provides “the
    exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for
    the redress of federal employment discrimination,” and,
    accordingly, Brown (the plaintiff in that case) could not
    enforce his right under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to be free from racial
    employment discrimination without resort to that exclusive
    administrative and judicial scheme.
    The Court gave two reasons for its holding in Brown. First,
    given the detail and comprehensiveness of the remedial
    scheme in § 717 of Title VII, the Court held that § 717 should
    supersede more general statutes under the canon of statutory
    interpretation that resolves tension between specific statutes
    and general statutes in favor of specific statutes. 
    Id. at 834-
     35. (“The balance, completeness, and structural integrity of
    § 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner’s contention that §
    717(c) was designed merely to supplement other putative
    judicial relief.”). Second, the Court explained that as a
    practical matter the entire Title VII remedial scheme for
    21
    federal employees would be undermined if a plaintiff could
    circumvent its procedural requirements by “the simple
    expedient of putting a different label on the pleadings.” 
    Id. at 833.
    Twice this term, the Supreme Court has cited Brown for
    both of the general principles explained therein. See Hinck v.
    United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2011
    , 2015 (2007); EC Term of
    Years Trust v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 1763
    , 1767 (2007).
    Both principles applied in Brown are equally applicable here,
    and they compel us to hold that Francis can enforce his
    religious discrimination claim only through resort to the
    administrative and judicial scheme created by Title VII..
    First, RFRA’s remedial statute is general, while Title VII’s is
    comprehensive and specific. Although it does not appear that
    any court of appeals has yet addressed the effect of Title VII
    on RFRA, our court and others have applied Brown in other
    similar contexts, holding that Title VII requires compliance
    with its remedial scheme whenever a government employee
    seeks to enforce a right created by another statute that is
    secured by Title VII as well. See, e.g., Ford v. West, 
    222 F.3d 767
    , 772-73 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Plaintiff’s [42 U.S.C.] §
    1985(3) Fifth Amendment equal protection claim fails,
    however, because the Supreme Court has clearly held that
    Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for
    discrimination claims in federal employment”); Rivera-
    Rosario v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
    151 F.3d 34
    , 38 (1st Cir.
    1998) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim under the Back Pay Act
    because “The Supreme Court has indicated that where the
    gravamen of the claim is Title VII discrimination, the only
    remedy available is under Title VII.”); Owens v. United
    States, 
    822 F.2d 408
    , 410 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Interpretation of
    22
    Title VII has shown that Title VII provides federal employees
    a remedy that “precludes actions against federal officials for
    alleged constitutional violations as well as actions under other
    federal legislation.”); Gissen v. Tackman, 
    537 F.2d 784
    , 786
    (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (applying Brown to foreclose a
    plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985).8 Second, as was
    the case in Brown, if we allow Francis’s claim to go forward,
    it would undermine the Title VII administrative and judicial
    scheme for federal employees claiming religious
    discrimination. Federal employees like Francis, who allege
    religious discrimination, would have no need to exhaust their
    administrative remedies under Title VII if they could go
    directly to federal court with identical claims framed as RFRA
    claims. 
    Brown, 425 U.S. at 833
    (“Under the petitioners
    theory, by perverse operation of a type of Gresham's law,
    § 717, with its rigorous administrative exhaustion
    requirements and time limitations, would be driven out of
    currency were immediate access to the courts under other, less
    demanding statutes permissible.”).
    8
    As the Supreme Court noted in Brown, the canon of
    statutory interpretation that favors specific statutes over general
    statutes when the two are in tension applies regardless of the
    order of enactment of the statutes. 
    Brown, 425 U.S. at 834-35
    (citing cases). In Owens, we applied Brown to hold that Title
    VII foreclosed remedies otherwise available under § 1983,
    which was enacted after Title VII. It is therefore of no
    consequence that RFRA was enacted in 1993, while § 717 of
    Title VII was enacted in 1972.
    23
    The language in RFRA providing that it applies to “all
    Federal law” and the implementation of that law, “whether
    statutory or otherwise,” adopted before or after the passage of
    RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a), is not inconsistent with this
    conclusion. While “all Federal law” must include Title VII,
    to say that RFRA “applies” to Title VII does not mean that
    RFRA must be interpreted to create an exception to the
    procedural requirements of Title VII, such that it would
    effectively supplant § 717 of Title VII whenever a federal
    employee alleges religious discrimination and could otherwise
    proceed under Title VII. Precisely how RFRA may “apply” to
    Title VII is not now before us, and it is enough to hold that it
    does not absolve Francis from complying with the
    requirements of Title VII’s “exclusive, preemptive
    administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal
    employment discrimination.” 
    Brown, 425 U.S. at 829
    .
    Following Brown, I would hold, as the majority does, that
    Francis’s claim was properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6).
    24