PA Fedr Sportsmens v. Secretary Interior ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-2-2007
    PA Fedr Sportsmens v. Secretary Interior
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 06-1780
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    PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 06-1780
    PENNSYLVANIA FEDERATION OF
    SPORTSMEN’S CLUBS, INC.;
    PENNSYLVANIA CHAPTER SIERRA CLUB;
    PENNSYLVANIA TROUT, INC.;
    TRI-STATE CITIZENS MINING NETWORK, INC.;
    MOUNTAIN WATERSHED ASSOCIATION, INC.,
    Appellants
    v.
    DIRK KEMPTHORNE,* SECRETARY,
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;
    BRENT WAHLQUIST, ACTING DIRECTOR,
    OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING
    RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT;
    BRENT WAHLQUIST, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
    *
    Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Dirk Kempthorne
    is substituted for his predecessor, Gale A. Norton, as Secretary
    of the Department of the Interior. Brent Wahlquist is substituted
    for his predecessor, Jeffrey D. Jarrett, as Acting Director, Office
    of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement.
    OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION
    AND ENFORCEMENT;
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
    DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
    Intervenor in D.C.
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 03-cv-02220)
    District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
    Argued March 26, 2007
    Before: FISHER, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: August 2, 2007 )
    Kurt J. Weist (Argued)
    PennFuture
    610 North Third Street
    Harrisburg, PA 17101
    Attorney for Appellants
    2
    Tamara N. Rountree (Argued)
    U.S. Department of Justice
    Environment & Natural Resources Division
    P.O. Box 23795
    L’Enfant Plaza Station
    Washington, DC 20026
    Attorney for Appellees, Dirk Kempthorne, et al.,
    and Brent Wahlquist, et al.
    Dennis Whitaker (Argued)
    Department of Environmental Protection
    909 Elmerton Avenue, 3rd Floor
    Harrisburg, PA 17110
    Attorney for Appellee, Pennsylvania
    Dept. of Environmental Protection
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    FISHER, Circuit Judge.
    This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment by
    the District Court sustaining two decisions of the United States
    Department of the Interior, Office of Surface Mining
    Reclamation and Enforcement. Plaintiffs challenge the agency’s
    decisions to terminate a program deficiency notice issued
    pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 732.17, and delete a required
    amendment that was codified at 30 C.F.R. § 938.16(h), both of
    which directed Pennsylvania to comply with the requirements of
    3
    30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e). For the reasons that follow, we conclude
    that the agency’s decisions were inconsistent with its own
    regulations and regulatory obligations. We will therefore
    reverse the judgment of the District Court, in part, and set aside
    both agency actions.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.
    Plaintiffs in this case are several nonprofit public interest
    organizations, corporations, and coalitions dedicated to the
    preservation of Pennsylvania’s environment and conservation of
    its natural resources. For the sake of convenience, they will be
    referred to collectively as the “Federation.” The individual
    defendants have all been sued in their official capacities as
    administration officials. In addition, the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection
    (“PADEP”), has been permitted to join as an intervenor-
    defendant. The Federation alleges that the Office of Surface
    Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (“OSM”) has taken a
    position and performed actions inconsistent with its regulatory
    obligations under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
    Act of 1977 (“SMCRA”), 30 U.S.C. § 1201, et seq. A short
    review of the origin and purpose of SMCRA is therefore in
    order.
    Congress enacted SMCRA to provide protection against
    environmental degradation from coal mining and to clean up
    areas damaged by past coal mining. See 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a)
    (“It is the purpose of this Act to . . . establish a nationwide
    4
    program to protect society and the environment from the adverse
    effects of surface coal mining operations . . . .”). Many of the
    adverse effects of surface coal mining relate to the large number
    of abandoned and unreclaimed coal mining sites strewn across
    the nation. These sites “continue, in their unreclaimed
    condition, to substantially degrade the quality of the
    environment, prevent or damage the beneficial use of land or
    water resources, or endanger the health or safety of the public .
    . . .” 30 U.S.C. § 1202(h). SMCRA aims to promote the
    complete reclamation of these abandoned mining sites and seeks
    to assure that the untreated mine discharges of abandoned sites
    are abated. See Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 
    63 F.3d 231
    , 233 (3d Cir. 1995). The statute empowers the Secretary of
    the Interior, through OSM, to promulgate regulations to realize
    these goals and oversee the regulatory program. 30 U.S.C.
    § 1211(c).
    Significantly, however, SMCRA allows a State to
    steward its own regulatory program if it can administer that
    program according to federal standards. Under this “cooperative
    federalism” approach, individual States are expected to take the
    lead in regulation while the federal government oversees their
    efforts. Once a State program is approved, the State achieves
    “primacy” over the regulation of its surface mining program
    under SMCRA. Pennsylvania attained primacy in 1982. See 47
    Fed. Reg. 33,050, 33,076 (July 30, 1982).
    When a State has primacy, operators of surface coal
    mining sites are required to file an application for a surface coal
    mining and reclamation permit with the state regulatory
    authority. 30 U.S.C. § 1252(a). To receive a mining permit,
    5
    operators are required to submit a detailed reclamation plan for
    the site in question. This plan must provide sufficient
    information to demonstrate that complete reclamation can be
    accomplished. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257(d), 1258(a). In addition, after
    the permit application has been approved, but before the permit
    is issued, applicants are required to file a performance bond with
    the regulatory authority. 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a). SMCRA’s
    bonding program is designed to provide further assurance of
    “complete reclamation of mine sites.” Cat Run Coal Co. v.
    Babbitt, 
    932 F. Supp. 772
    , 774-75 (S.D. W. Va. 1996). Under
    SMCRA, the bonds collected by States from mining operators
    must be “sufficient to assure the completion of the reclamation
    plan if the work had to be performed by the regulatory
    authority,” i.e., the State. 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a).
    A conventional bond system (“CBS”), authorized by 30
    U.S.C. § 1259(a), is sometimes referred to as a “full cost”
    system because the cost of the bond is not discounted or
    supplemented by any other source. Rather, the operator must
    pay the entire cost of the bond needed to complete reclamation
    in the event of forfeiture. 
    Id. A CBS
    bond is site specific,
    covering the permit area upon which the operator conducts
    surface coal mining. 
    Id. (“The bond
    shall cover that area of land
    within the permit area upon which the operator will initiate and
    conduct surface coal mining and reclamation operations within
    the initial term of the permit.”). As mining and reclamation
    operations within the permit area are expanded, the permit
    holder must file additional bonds to cover the additional
    operations. 
    Id. (“As succeeding
    increments of surface coal
    mining and reclamation operations are to be initiated and
    conducted within the permit area, the permittee shall file with
    6
    the regulatory authority an additional bond or bonds to cover
    such increments . . . .”).
    An alternative bond system (“ABS”), authorized by 30
    U.S.C. § 1259(c), is a collective risk-spreading system that
    draws in part on a bond pool to cover the reclamation liabilities
    of each individual mining site. An ABS allows a State to
    discount the amount of the required site-specific bond to an
    amount that is less than the full cost needed to complete
    reclamation of the site in the event of forfeiture. Individual
    mine operators contribute to the bond pool, thereby sharing the
    liability of reclamation and compensating for the discounted
    site-specific bonds.
    B.
    Pennsylvania’s past and present efforts to comply with its
    obligation to maintain a solvent bond system form the backdrop
    for this appeal. Pennsylvania first instituted an ABS to cover
    surface coal mines in 1981, even before it obtained primacy over
    mining activities in the Commonwealth. See 11 Pa. Bull. 2680
    (August 1, 1981) (final rule implementing ABS). As previously
    noted, OSM approved Pennsylvania’s surface coal mining
    regulatory program in 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,050 (July 30,
    1982); see generally Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
    Reclamation Ass’n, 
    452 U.S. 264
    , 268-72 (1981) (describing
    state program approval process). Under the approved program,
    Pennsylvania had the authority to implement either an ABS or
    CBS.
    7
    From 1982 until 2001, Pennsylvania opted for a
    bifurcated bond system, with surface coal mines, as well as coal
    refuse reprocessing operations and coal preparation plants,
    covered by an ABS, and underground coal mines and coal refuse
    disposal operations covered by a CBS. The ABS that
    Pennsylvania used for its surface coal mines consisted, in part,
    of site-specific bonds set below the cost of reclamation. These
    discounted site-specific bonds were supplemented by a
    statewide bond pool called the “Surface Mining Conservation
    and Reclamation Fund” (“PA SMCRA Fund”), 52 Pa. Stat. Ann.
    § 1396.18. The PA SMCRA Fund receives revenue from
    several sources, including the collection of a one-time, non-
    refundable, per-acre reclamation fee paid by individual
    operators of surface coal mines. That fee was originally $50 per
    acre, but was raised to $100 per acre in 1993. See 25 Pa. Code
    § 86.17(e).
    On January 10, 1991, OSM’s director notified PADEP
    that Pennsylvania’s “alternative bonding system must be
    modified to provide the resources needed to reclaim existing
    permanent forfeiture sites within a reasonable timeframe and to
    ensure that future forfeiture sites will be reclaimed in a timely
    manner. These resources must be sufficient to complete the
    reclamation plan approved in the permit.” On May 31, 1991, in
    a final rule conditionally approving a proposed state program
    amendment, OSM codified a “required regulatory program
    amendment,” 30 C.F.R. § 938.16(h), directing Pennsylvania to
    submit information by November 1, 1991, indicating that the PA
    SMCRA Fund was solvent. Specifically, the rule required
    Pennsylvania to either “submit information, sufficient to
    demonstrate that the [ABS] can be operated in a manner that
    8
    will meet the requirements of 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e),” or to
    amend its rules or otherwise amend its program by November 1,
    1991, to be compliant with Federal standards. 56 Fed. Reg.
    24,687, 24,719-21 (May 31, 1991). This “required amendment”
    was published in the Federal Register on May 31, 1991, as a
    final rule, following public notice as a proposed rule in the
    February 26, 1990 Federal Register and a period of public
    comment. 
    Id. In addition,
    on October 1, 1991, OSM sent Pennsylvania
    a letter pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 732 (“Part 732 Notice”). Part
    732 of the Code sets out the procedural requirements for
    submission, review and approval of state programs, 
    id. §§ 732.11-732.16,
    along with the requirements for submission
    and approval of state program amendments. 
    Id. § 732.17.
    As
    described by the District Court, a Part 732 Notice “is a
    document in which [OSM] notifies the State that its regulatory
    program must be amended to be in accordance with SMCRA
    and consistent with the Federal regulations . . . . Such
    notification may be necessary as a result of Federal regulation
    changes, State or Federal court decisions, or problems identified
    during oversight or other program review processes.”
    Pennsylvania Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs v. Norton, 413 F.
    Supp. 2d 358, 364 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
    The Part 732 Notice in this case indicated that
    Pennsylvania’s regulatory program was no longer in compliance
    9
    with SMCRA and related federal regulations.1 Specifically,
    1
    The Part 732 Notice states, in part:
    The specific event leading to this determination is
    an OSM Field Office evaluation of the adequacy
    of the Commonwealth’s alternative bonding
    system (ABS).        This evaluation identified
    unfunded reclamation liabilities (for backfilling,
    grading, and revegetation) in excess of eight
    million dollars for current bond forfeiture sites
    alone. The review also found that the ABS is
    financially incapable of abating or permanently
    treating pollutional discharges from bond
    forfeitures. Even if no such discharges are
    created in the future, annual treatment costs for
    existing discharges are currently estimated at 1.3
    million dollars.
    Section 509(c) of SMCRA authorizes the
    Secretary to approve an ABS if it will achieve the
    objectives and purposes of the otherwise
    mandatory conventional bonding program. As set
    forth in 30 CFR 800.11(e), this provision means
    that the ABS must (1) assure that sufficient funds
    are available to complete the reclamation plans
    for any areas in default at any time, and
    (2) provide a substantial economic incentive for
    the operator to comply with all reclamation
    requirements. As discussed in the preceding
    paragraph, these conditions no longer exist in
    Pennsylvania.
    10
    OSM explained that a field office evaluation had determined
    that Pennsylvania’s ABS system was “financially incapable of
    abating or permanently treating pollutional discharges from
    bond forfeiture sites . . . ,” and that the default reclamation
    requirements of 30 C.F.R § 800.11(e) were no longer satisfied.
    OSM acknowledged that Pennsylvania had already initiated the
    legislative process to increase the per-acre reclamation fee for
    the PA SMCRA fund (which would eventually lead to the $50
    to $100 increase in 1993), but concluded that a more
    comprehensive analysis had to be conducted to determine if the
    revised ABS could reasonably be expected to generate sufficient
    funds. OSM required that Pennsylvania submit within sixty
    days “either proposed amendments or a description of
    amendments to be proposed to remedy the deficiency.” In
    response to this demand, PADEP sent a letter on December 6,
    1991, which briefly outlined its plan to address the bonding
    concerns. The letter described PADEP’s efforts to initiate an
    actuarial review of its ABS and proposed a site-specific and
    umbrella “trust fund” approach to meeting its obligations under
    SMCRA. On March 3, 1992, OSM responded that PADEP’s
    plan was still insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Part
    732 Notice.
    On July 6, 1993, OSM approved Pennsylvania’s per-acre
    reclamation fee increase from $50 to $100. 58 Fed. Reg.
    36,139, 36,141.         However, it emphasized the mutual
    understanding between OSM and Pennsylvania that this fee
    increase was a “stop-gap” measure, “an intermediate step to
    keep the shortage in the [PA SMCRA] Fund from further
    deteriorating,” 
    id. at 36,140,
    rather than a long term solution to
    the insolvency problem of the PA SMCRA Fund. The
    11
    Pennsylvania Environmental Quality Board agreed that “[t]o
    allow the [PA SMCRA] Fund to remain insolvent is not an
    acceptable bond program under Pennsylvania SMCRA or the
    Federal SMCRA.”
    Nearly two years later, on May 31, 1995, OSM sent the
    Secretary of PADEP a letter the Federation describes as a
    dunning letter reminding the Secretary of PADEP’s outstanding
    obligations under OSM’s Part 732 Notice to amend its program
    to address the PA SMCRA insolvency problem. The letter
    acknowledged an earlier October 1993 PADEP proposal to
    enhance its bonding system through a master trust fund, but
    observed that no action had been taken to implement this
    proposal. It directed PADEP to take immediate action to
    finalize these or other proposals.
    A letter dated September 28, 1998, from PADEP to the
    Pennsylvania Coal Association’s Director of Regulatory Affairs,
    underscored the magnitude of Pennsylvania’s bonding program
    deficiencies:
    [PA]DEP is currently holding about $89 million
    in reclamation bonds, involving 178 coal
    operators and 102 financial institutions on 331
    permits that have long been reclaimed, but have
    one or more discharges. Pennsylvania law
    prohibits the release of these bonds unless other
    financial assurances for the long-term treatment
    of water are provided. In addition, the bonds do
    not represent anywhere near the amount of money
    12
    required to provide for the long-term treatment of
    discharges in case of default by an operator.
    This letter set forth various proposals for ameliorating the
    problem and concluded that “[t]he risk, and I believe certain
    consequence, of not dealing with this problem now and in
    earnest is the real possibility that some court will eventually
    decide the issues for us. The dog is no longer sleeping.”
    Less than a year later, on June 3, 1999, the Citizens for
    Pennsylvania’s Future (“PennFuture”), on behalf of various
    parties, filed the advance notice required for a citizen’s suit.
    This notice alleged, inter alia, that Pennsylvania’s bonding
    system had been insolvent for over a decade, and that “[t]he
    amount of bond money posted for those sites [] is grossly
    insufficient for providing long term treatment.” In the midst of
    settlement negotiations between PennFuture and PADEP,
    PADEP issued an October 6, 1999 news release announcing its
    decision to adopt a full-cost CBS that would “fully reflect the
    department’s estimated cost for reclamation . . . .” 2
    OSM’s initial position on this proposed solution to the
    insolvency of the PA SMCRA Fund was expressed at a
    2
    On October 13, 1999, the Federation filed a related
    action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking to compel
    Federal and State officials to comply with various provisions of
    SMCRA. Pennsylvania Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v.
    Kathleen A. McGinty, No. 99-CV-1791. That action is stayed
    pending disposition of this matter.
    13
    November 18, 1999, meeting with PADEP representatives. The
    OSM concluded that “conversion to FCB [full cost bonding] for
    all current and future permits, as outlined by PADEP, would not
    resolve the outstanding [1991] Part 732 Notification” because
    it failed to address “current liability that has accrued against the
    ABS” and that PADEP could not dissolve the ABS without first
    addressing those existing liabilities. OSM explained that “the
    liability of a bond pool for the reclamation costs on a given
    forfeited site is not limited to any assigned amount. Rather its
    obligation, as stated in 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e)(1), is to ‘have
    sufficient money available to complete the reclamation plan for
    any areas which may be in default at any time.’” Consequently,
    OSM concluded that “PADEP’s proposal cannot be approved in
    its entirety.”
    OSM clarified this position in a document sent to PADEP
    in a June 2000 memorandum in response to PADEP’s request
    for guidance, explaining that “[f]ederal regulations do not
    authorize partial or full ‘write off’ of liability through ABS
    modification, and Pennsylvania must administer the program so
    that all liabilities accrued against the ABS are accounted for
    . . . .” Three months later, in a letter to the Secretary of PADEP
    dated October 11, 2000, OSM’s Regional Director restated the
    position that “[a]ddressing forfeiture sites remains a critical
    aspect of OSM’s 1991 notice on ABS insolvency and requires
    corrective action.” The Regional Director explained that OSM
    had consistently interpreted the provisions of 30 C.F.R.
    § 800.11(e)(1) as “requiring that (1) a state is responsible to
    administer its ABS in a manner that provides sufficient funds,
    including funds for treatment of AMD [acid mine drainage]
    emanating from forfeiture primacy permits; and (2) an ABS can
    14
    only be terminated when all sites bonded under the system are
    successfully reclaimed or adequate replacement bonds are
    provided.”
    C.
    On August 4, 2001 PADEP formally announced the
    termination of its ABS and conversion to a CBS for surface
    mines, coal refuse reprocessing and coal preparation plants. In
    an attempt to resolve concerns regarding OSM’s May 1991
    Codified Required Amendment and Part 732 Notice, PADEP
    and OSM exchanged drafts of what would become the jointly
    authored “Pennsylvania Bonding Systems Program
    Enhancements” (“Program Enhancements Document”). The
    Program Enhancements Document was officially submitted to
    OSM on June 5, 2003, and provides descriptions of various
    aspects of Pennsylvania’s bonding program, including
    summaries of actions taken and plans for future actions.
    The Program Enhancements Document outlines
    Pennsylvania’s August 2001 termination of the ABS and
    conversion to a CBS as well as revisions made and proposed to
    the CBS system subsequent to the conversion. Specifically, it
    explains that, after the conversion, Pennsylvania’s existing and
    future mine operators could no longer rely on the
    Commonwealth’s existing ABS to meet performance bond
    requirements. Existing operators originally permitted and
    bonded under the ABS fund were required to obtain new CBS
    bonds. New operators were also required to be permitted and
    bonded under a CBS bond and, consequently, were required to
    pay the full cost of bond coverage.
    15
    In addition, the Program Enhancements Document
    discusses revisions and proposed revisions to the CBS, including
    measures directed to OSM’s original concerns regarding
    Pennsylvania’s compliance with 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e). For
    land reclamation on bond forfeiture sites, the Program
    Enhancements Document indicates that PADEP requested and
    the Pennsylvania General Assembly appropriated $5.5 million
    to address the deficit in the PA SMCRA Fund. Additionally, in
    the course of the ABS to CBS conversion, the Program
    Enhancements Document indicates that PADEP would continue
    to collect the $100 per-acre reclamation fee from mine operators
    filing for new permits for the PA SMCRA Fund “to cover
    forfeitures that occurred during the conversion.”
    Finally, the Program Enhancements Document includes
    a “Workplan” that prioritizes and allocates resources, purporting
    to “adequately provide for abatement or treatment of pollutional
    discharges on primary forfeiture sites.” The document asserts
    that this Workplan “addresses more discharges than is required
    by federal SMCRA.” Attached as an appendix to the Program
    Enhancements Document, the Workplan’s full title is the
    “Alternate Bonding System Primacy Discharge Abatement
    Workplan.” It explains that PADEP and OSM had completed
    an initial inventory of discharges on sites forfeited under the
    State’s ABS. Briefly summarized, the Workplan describes
    PADEP’s intent to clean up those discharges through a
    16
    “watershed approach” that utilizes various financial and
    programmatic resources.3
    OSM’s regional director sent a letter to PADEP on
    June 12, 2003, one week after submission of the Program
    Enhancements Document, stating that PADEP’s “transition of
    existing active and inactive permits covered by the ABS
    conventional bonds . . . is now complete.” The letter concurred
    with PADEP’s conclusions that the measures taken by PADEP,
    as described in the Program Enhancements Document, were
    sufficient to remedy the deficiencies set forth in OSM’s
    October 1, 1991 Part 732 Notice.            OSM noted that
    Pennsylvania’s CBS had been “revised and improved” and
    concluded that the actions taken by PADEP warranted
    termination of the Part 732 Notice.
    In addition, two weeks later on June 26, 2003, OSM
    issued a proposed rule to remove the required amendment at 30
    C.F.R. § 938.16(h). 68 Fed. Reg. 37,987. In that proposed rule,
    OSM asserted that the strategy outlined in the Program
    3
    Those resources are: (1) Remining; (2) Reclamation-in-
    lieu of civil penalty agreements with active operators; (3) Surety
    reclamation/abatement of forfeited sites; (4) Bonds forfeited and
    collected from the site; (5) Excess funds from the ABS; (6) Title
    IV AML funding for insolvent surety companies; (7) Title IV
    10% set-aside funding for insolvent sites in Qualified
    Hydrologic Units; (8) Additional Pennsylvania funding, such as
    Growing Greener; (9) Other funds or approaches that become
    available.
    17
    Enhancements Document would “satisfy [OSM’s] concerns as
    to whether the [PA SMCRA] Fund can be operated in a manner
    that will meet the requirements of 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e).” 
    Id. at 37,988.
    OSM also stated “[s]ince we are now satisfied that
    [Pennsylvania’s] bonding program enhancements adequately
    address[ed] our concerns about the ability of the bonding
    program to ensure the completion of the reclamation plan . . .,
    we are proposing the removal of the first portion of 30 C.F.R.
    938.16(h).” 
    Id. OSM invited
    public comments on whether it
    should consider the information submitted by Pennsylvania
    sufficient to remove the required amendment. 
    Id. However, it
    stated that “[b]ecause we decided on June 12, 2003, that
    PADEP’s bonding program enhancements satisfy the concerns
    expressed in our October 1, 1991, Part 732 Notification Letter,
    we are not seeking comments on the adequacy of those bonding
    program enhancements.” 
    Id. at 37,988-37,989.
    The Federation submitted extensive comments on the
    proposed rule, as well as on OSM’s decision to terminate the
    Part 732 Notice, in a 40-page memorandum to OSM’s Regional
    Director on July 25, 2003. It asked the Regional Director to
    “reconsider and rescind [the termination of the 732 Notice], and
    . . . similarly reconsider and decline to adopt the proposed rule
    . . . .” The Federation characterized OSM’s actions as a “Retreat
    from Responsibility,” and a “flip-flop,” and argued that
    Pennsylvania’s new program failed to cover the costs of mine
    drainage treatment, and thus the full cost of reclamation, at
    many sites with post-mining discharges. The Federation
    complained that Pennsylvania was “writing off” ABS
    reclamation liabilities by leaving discharges from ABS
    forfeiture sites untreated and by transferring those liabilities to
    18
    other programs and sources of funding identified in the
    Workplan. In addition, the Federation observed that the
    Workplan lacked any meaningful and enforceable commitments
    to funding levels or implementation deadlines. To this end, the
    Federation argued that “[a] ‘Workplan’ is no substitute for [the]
    guarantee” of treatment required by SMCRA. Consequently, the
    Federation argued that the required amendment at 30 C.F.R.
    § 938.16(h) should not be removed.
    On October 3, 2003, OSM declined the Federation’s
    request that it rescind its June 12, 2003 letter terminating the
    Part 732 Notice, and stated that the Federation’s request that
    OSM retain 30 C.F.R. § 938.16(h) “will be separately addressed
    in a FR [final rule] notice to be published in the near future.”
    On October 7, 2003, OSM published a final rule in the Federal
    Register, announcing its removal of the required amendment at
    30 C.F.R. § 938.16(h). 68 Fed. Reg. 57805. The final rule
    responded to the Federation’s objections by explaining that
    “Pennsylvania’s conversion from the ABS to full cost bonding,
    renders moot that portion of the required amendment concerned
    with the solvency of the Fund.” 
    Id. at 57806.
    On December 8, 2003, the Federation commenced the
    underlying action in the District Court by filing a three-count
    complaint. The parties presented their cases, as is customary in
    agency review proceedings, in cross motions for summary
    judgment. The District Court denied the Federation’s motion
    and granted OSM’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint on all
    19
    three counts in a Memorandum and Order issued February 1,
    2006.4 This timely appeal followed.
    II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
    this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1).
    We have jurisdiction over the appeal from a final judgment of
    the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the
    District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary, applying
    the same standard the District Court was required to apply.
    Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 
    423 F.3d 184
    , 201 (3d Cir. 2005).
    A grant of summary judgment is proper where, viewing the facts
    in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving
    party has established that “there is no genuine dispute of
    material fact” and it “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    Judicial review of agency actions under SMCRA is
    conducted according to the deferential standard applied to
    administrative actions. SMCRA provides that “any action
    subject to judicial review under this subsection shall be affirmed
    unless the court concludes that such action is arbitrary,
    capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law.” 30 U.S.C.
    § 1276(a)(1).         This standard is consistent with the
    4
    Dismissal of the first count, alleging that OSM had
    failed to follow administrative procedures required by law in
    rescinding the final rule and required amendment, is not
    appealed by the Federation.
    20
    Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement that an agency’s
    action be set aside if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
    § 706(2)(A); see also Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v.
    Kempthorne, 
    473 F.3d 94
    (4th Cir. 2006) (comparing SMCRA
    standard to APA standard). The scope of review under this
    standard “is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment
    for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
    Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983).
    However, courts are “not obliged to stand aside and
    rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that
    they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate
    the congressional policy underlying a statute.” NLRB v. Brown,
    
    380 U.S. 278
    , 291 (1965); see also Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v.
    Thompson, 
    380 F.3d 142
    , 151 (3d Cir. 2004) (a reviewing court
    must ensure that an agency’s ruling is not “inconsistent with
    applicable regulations”). The arbitrary and capricious standard
    of review applies equally to an agency’s decision to pass a rule
    or rescind a rule. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
    Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 42-43
    .
    Moreover, “an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule
    is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond
    that which may be required when an agency does not act in the
    first instance.” 
    Id. at 42.
    In determining whether an agency’s actions were
    arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
    inconsistent with law we look to the statute delegating authority
    to the agency to make and enforce rules pursuant to the statute.
    See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842 (1984). In this case, the statute is SMCRA, which
    21
    delegated rulemaking power to the Department of Interior (and
    consequently OSM, which is within the Interior Department).
    30 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (authorizing permanent program
    regulations). Under the familiar two-step Chevron analysis, a
    court first looks to the statute to determine “whether Congress
    has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 
    Id. at 842.
    If the statute is silent or ambiguous, we move to step two of the
    inquiry. At step two, “the question for the court is whether the
    agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
    statute.” 
    Id. at 843.
    The Supreme Court has described the
    standard of review at step two as “arbitrary and capricious”
    review. See United States v. Mead Corp., 
    533 U.S. 218
    , 227
    (2001); see also National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand
    X Internet Servs., 
    545 U.S. 967
    , 986 (2005) (“[W]e defer at step
    two to the agency’s interpretation so long as the construction is
    a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.” (internal
    quotes omitted)). We therefore approach agency regulations
    with great deference when reviewing them under Chevron’s
    second step.
    III. DISCUSSION
    A.
    The OSM actions under review in this appeal are the
    agency’s termination of the Part 732 Notice and removal of the
    codified required amendment at 30 C.F.R. § 938.16(h). Our
    review of these actions requires us to consider the applicability
    of 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e) because OSM argues, and the District
    Court agreed, that Pennsylvania’s conversion from an ABS to a
    CBS rendered § 800.11(e) inapplicable and mooted the issue of
    22
    compliance with the provision.       Pennsylvania Fed’n of
    Sportsmen’s 
    Clubs, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 377
    (“[A] conversion to
    the CBS amounts to a conversion of applicable statutory
    provisions and regulations [and as a result] any ongoing
    obligations from 30 C.F.R. 800.11(e) cease to apply.”). As a
    threshold matter, however, we must determine whether
    Pennsylvania’s ABS system was actually terminated by
    Pennsylvania’s August 4, 2001 announcement, and, if so,
    whether OSM’s actions in approving this purported termination
    of the ABS and conversion to a new bonding system were
    inconsistent with the applicable regulations and therefore an
    abuse of discretion.
    The Federation argues that because Pennsylvania’s ABS
    is part of the approved Pennsylvania regulatory program, it may
    be dissolved only through PADEP’s submission and OSM’s
    approval of a State program amendment deleting the
    authorization for an ABS from the program.5 See 30 C.F.R.
    § 732.17(g) (“Whenever changes to laws or regulations that
    make up the approved State program are proposed by the State,
    the State shall immediately submit the proposed changes to the
    5
    OSM argues that the Federation has waived the
    argument that “Pennsylvania’s ABS could be terminated only
    through a program amendment,” Br. of Appellee OSM 39 n.9,
    by failing to raise it below. However, we believe this argument
    is preserved as a component of a larger issue argued by the
    Federation in the District Court, namely that “the ABS continues
    to exist as an approved part of the Pennsylvania program.”
    Plaintiffs’ Surreply Br., Doc. 55 at 6 n.6.
    23
    Director as an amendment. No such change to laws or
    regulations shall take effect for purposes of a State program
    until approved as an amendment.”). However, Pennsylvania’s
    program, as originally approved in 1982, provides for the option
    to implement either a CBS or an ABS. PA SMCRA states in
    relevant part that:
    The amount of the bond required shall be in an
    amount determined by the department based upon
    the total estimated cost to the Commonwealth of
    completing the approved reclamation plan, or in
    such other amount and form as may be established
    by the department pursuant to regulations for an
    alternate coal bonding program which shall
    achieve the objectives and purposes of the
    bonding program.
    52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1396.4. OSM approved this bonding
    portion of PA SMCRA without condition. See 47 Fed. Reg.
    33,079-80 (setting forth Ҥ 938.11 Conditions of state regulatory
    program approval.”). As such, it is unnecessary for PADEP to
    codify a new regulation or amend its existing regulation. Under
    the current regulations, both state (52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
    § 1396.4) and federal (47 Fed. Reg. at 33,079-80), Pennsylvania
    is already authorized to pursue any bonding scheme it desires so
    long as that scheme achieves the ultimate objective of the
    bonding program, which is to guarantee sufficient funds for
    reclamation. The conversion from an ABS to a CBS is therefore
    not a “change[] to laws or regulations that make up the approved
    State program,” 30 C.F.R. § 732.17(g), that triggers the SMCRA
    program amendment process. It is merely an exercise of
    24
    authority already granted to Pennsylvania in the existing
    regulations. OSM’s actions in approving this conversion were
    therefore not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
    otherwise inconsistent with law.
    The Federation alights on the fact that Pennsylvania
    continues to collect the OSM-approved reclamation fee, which
    continues to supply the PA SMCRA Fund (or “ABS fund,” App.
    265). This fund, the Federation observes, may only be used to
    reclaim mining sites that had obtained bond coverage under the
    former ABS by paying the ABS reclamation fee. 25 Pa. Code
    §§ 86.17(e), 86.187(a)(1). This continued use of an ABS fund
    fed by an ABS reclamation fee, the Federation argues, confirms
    the continued existence of an ABS.6 However, while it is true
    that the “ABS Fund” continues to exist in name, it no longer
    operates as an ABS, that is, as a bond pool to provide liability
    coverage for new and existing mining sites. Under the new
    terms of PADEP’s Program Enhancements Document, existing
    and future operators can no longer rely on the PA SMCRA Fund
    for their bond coverage. Existing operators that were originally
    bonded under the ABS, and relied on the supplemental revenue
    in the Fund, were required to obtain new, CBS bonds. New
    6
    OSM proposed a rule including a proposed amendment
    to 25 Pa. Code § 86.17(e) that would “discontinue the collection
    of [Pennsylvania’s] Alternative Bonding System (ABS) $100
    per acre reclamation fee.” 71 Fed. Reg. 50868, 50869 (col. 1)
    (August 28, 2006). However, in its final rule, OSM has deferred
    its decision on the proposed change until final disposition of this
    appeal. 72 Fed. Reg. 19117, 19120 (col. 1) (February 23, 2007).
    25
    operators were and are required to be permitted and bonded
    under a CBS bond and, consequently, were and are required to
    pay for the full cost of their bond coverage. Thus, while there
    still is a legacy alternative bond fund that is being paid into and
    drawn on “to cover for forfeitures that occurred during the
    conversion,” there is no longer a current or prospective ABS in
    Pennsylvania.
    B.
    Although we have determined that Pennsylvania has
    effectively converted to a CBS and OSM did not abuse its
    discretion in approving that conversion, neither we nor OSM are
    yet out of the woods, so to speak. That is because we are still
    faced with the question of what obligations, if any, Pennsylvania
    has to ensure reclamation of sites forfeited before the conversion
    to a CBS began, plus any additional sites whose reclamation
    costs are still not fully covered by CBS bonds. To clarify, it is
    important we distinguish between the ABS as a bonding
    program, which no longer exists in Pennsylvania, and the
    particular mine sites bonded under that now defunct program.
    This distinction is a critical one as the conclusion that it is
    permissible under SMCRA for a State to dissolve its ABS
    program, in the manner Pennsylvania has, does not lead
    ineluctably to the conclusion that all liabilities accrued under
    that program are also automatically dissolved. In other words,
    there are still mining sites in Pennsylvania that were originally
    bonded under the ABS and forfeited prior to the CBS
    conversion. The question remains as to what obligations
    Pennsylvania has to provide for complete reclamation and
    treatment of these mining sites and their pollutional discharges.
    26
    OSM argues, and the District Court agreed, that whatever
    obligations Pennsylvania has, those obligations are not the ones
    set forth in 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e). That provision, OSM
    maintains, simply ceased to apply once the prospective
    conversion to a CBS was announced and approved. OSM’s
    position, simply stated, is that, because there is no longer an
    ABS in Pennsylvania, § 800.11(e) is no longer applicable and
    any obligations set forth in that provision are no longer binding.
    To reiterate, the District Court “agree[d] that a conversion to the
    CBS amounts to a conversion of applicable statutory provisions
    and regulations.” Pennsylvania Fed’n of Sportsmen’s 
    Clubs, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 377
    . We do not agree with this conclusion
    entirely. We agree that the conversion to a CBS amounts to a
    change in statutory provisions going forward for those mining
    sites where complete reclamation costs are now fully covered by
    CBS bonds. However, we do not agree that sites forfeited
    before the conversion began are no longer subject to regulation
    under § 800.11(e).
    To start, like the Federation, we find OSM’s apparent
    “about face” on the issue of the applicability of 30 C.F.R.
    § 800.11(e)(1), and more generally Pennsylvania’s outstanding
    and future reclamation liabilities, striking.7 However, an agency
    7
    OSM examined § 800.11(e)(1) in a 1991 final rule
    concerning the ABS of Missouri. 56 Fed. Reg. 21281 (May 8,
    1991). In an effort to address an “unexpectedly large default”
    leaving substantial acreage unreclaimed at mines forfeited
    before September 1988, 
    id. at 21283
    (col. 1), 21286 (col. 2),
    Missouri submitted a program amendment to OSM that would
    27
    have modified the state’s ABS “to provide money to cover only
    part of the cost of reclaiming sites that were in bond forfeiture
    prior to September 1, 1998.” 
    Id. at 21283
    (col. 1). Rejecting
    that proposal, the agency explained:
    Reclamation liability under a bond pool must be
    continuous. The liability and obligation of an
    ABS does not disappear if the bond pool finds
    itself unable to meet its obligations as they
    mature, or its existing capital structure is impaired
    or its ability to perform any of its obligations is
    impaired. Additionally, existing liabilities of an
    impaired pool cannot be erased simply because
    proposed modifications to the pool will assure
    partial satisfaction of existing reclamation
    liabilities. Stated differently, if a bond pool
    comes up short of cash, the regulatory authority
    cannot and should not be able to simply “write
    off” any existing reclamation liabilities and then
    resume business as usual by proposed
    modifications to the previous ABS. This would be
    directly in conflict with the language of 30 CFR
    800.11(e) and the purposes and objectives of
    section 509 of SMCRA, which provide that an
    ABS, must have available sufficient money to
    complete reclamation for any areas which may be
    in default at any time.
    56 Fed. Reg. at 21286 (col. 2-3).
    28
    In the same rule, OSM rejected a proposal by Missouri to
    supplement its ABS with a CBS. Missouri proposed to allow
    new operations to “opt-out” of the ABS by posting a full cost
    conventional bond, 56 Fed. Reg. at 21287 (col. 1-2, Finding
    B.5(a)), and existing permittees to “buy out” of the ABS by
    posting such a bond and paying a one-time assessment into the
    State’s ABS bond pool fund. 
    Id. at 21287
    (col. 2-3, Finding
    B.5(c)). OSM explained that the Missouri ABS fund had
    “continuing liability to reclaim sites forfeited in the past,” 
    id. at 21287
    (col. 3), and rejected these CBS proposals because
    Missouri had provided “no assurances that past bond forfeiture
    liabilities [of the ABS] will be met.” 
    Id. at 21287
    (col. 1-3).
    OSM reasoned that Missouri was relying on the ABS at the time
    of the bond forfeitures, which, coupled with the language of 30
    C.F.R. § 800.11(e)(1), gave the Missouri ABS a “continuing
    liability to reclaim sites forfeited in the past.” 56 Fed. Reg. at
    21287 (col. 3).
    Similarly, in a final rule involving West Virginia’s ABS,
    OSM required the State “to eliminate the deficit in the State’s
    alternative bonding system and to ensure that sufficient money
    will be available to complete reclamation, including the
    treatment of polluted water, at all existing and future bond
    forfeiture sites.” 60 Fed. Reg. 51900, 51918 (col. 2) (October 4,
    1995).
    As 
    described supra
    , Part I.B, in various communications
    with PADEP, OSM previously took a similar position with
    respect to Pennsylvania’s ABS. OSM emphasized that “Federal
    regulations do not authorize partial or full ‘write off’ of liability
    through ABS modification, and Pennsylvania must administer
    29
    is not estopped from “changing a view [it] believes to have been
    grounded upon a mistaken legal interpretation [and] . . . an
    administrative agency is not disqualified from changing its mind
    . . . .” Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 
    508 U.S. 402
    , 417
    (1993) (citations omitted). Indeed, Chevron itself involved an
    agency reversal on a significant question of statutory
    construction. See 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-58
    . On the other
    hand, “[a]s a general matter, of course, the case for judicial
    deference is less compelling with respect to agency positions
    that are inconsistent with previously held views.” Pauley v.
    BethEnergy Mines, 
    501 U.S. 680
    , 698 (1991); see also INS v.
    Cardoza-Fonseca, 
    480 U.S. 421
    , 447 n.30 (1987) (“An agency
    interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the
    agency’s earlier interpretation is entitled to considerably less
    deference than a consistently held agency view.”). When an
    agency “sharply change[s] its substantive policy, then, judicial
    review of its action, while deferential, will involve a scrutiny of
    the reasons given by the agency for the change.” Natural Res.
    Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 
    683 F.2d 752
    , 760 (3d Cir. 1982).
    the program so that all liabilities accrued against the ABS are
    accounted for . . . .” OSM “insist[ed] that PADEP must deal
    with the current liability that has accrued against the ABS
    [through past bond forfeitures] as well as any future liability
    from the forfeiture or existing permits under the ABS that are
    unwilling or unable to convert to FCB.” OSM made clear its
    conviction that this position was “mandated by the Federal
    regulations at 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e)(1) . . . ,” and “consistent
    with decisions it ha[d] issued with respect to ABS program
    amendments from Missouri and West Virginia.”
    30
    Under these circumstances, OSM bears the burden of rationally
    explaining its departure from its previous position. See Motor
    Vehicle Mfrs. 
    Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 41-44
    (1983).
    With respect to the step one of the Chevron inquiry –
    whether Congress has spoken directly to the question at hand –
    we agree with the District Court that “[t]he language of SMCRA
    itself does not address dissolution of an ABS one way or the
    other.” Pennsylvania Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, 
    413 F. Supp. 2d
    at 377. To state the issue more precisely, Congress has not
    set forth any requirements under SMCRA or any of its
    regulations dictating how a conversion from an ABS to a CBS
    is to be executed and how any remaining liabilities from an
    insolvent ABS are to be discharged. As SMCRA and its
    regulations are silent on the issue of dissolution of an ABS, we
    proceed to step two of the Chevron analysis where “the question
    for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
    permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., 
    Inc., 467 U.S. at 483
    . The basic tenets of statutory construction apply
    to construction of regulations and “[our] starting point on any
    question concerning the application of a regulation is its
    particular written text.” Wilson v. United States Parole
    Comm’n, 
    193 F.3d 195
    , 197 (3d Cir. 1999). The regulation at
    issue provides:
    OSM may approve, as part of a State or Federal
    program, an alternative bonding system, if it will
    achieve the following objectives and purposes of
    the bonding program:
    31
    (1) The alternative must assure that the regulatory
    authority will have available sufficient money to
    complete the reclamation plan for any areas which
    may be in default at any time.
    30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e)(1).
    OSM fixes on the words “may approve” and argues that
    the terms of the provision therefore refer only to the conditions
    for approval of ABS programs. 8 However, this suggested
    narrow construction is contradicted by the more expansive
    language in § 800.11(e)(1), which requires that “the regulatory
    authority [] have available sufficient money to complete the
    reclamation plan for any areas which may be in default at any
    time . . . .” “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive
    meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever
    kind.’” United States v. Gonzales, 
    520 U.S. 1
    , 5 (1997) (quoting
    Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)).
    OSM’s argument that the “‘at any time component’ . . . applies
    to the ABS that is the subject of the proposal and approval,” Br.
    of Appellees at 40, is unavailing given that the words “at any
    8
    In addition, PADEP points out that the section heading
    of § 800.11 is entitled “Requirement to file a bond” (emphasis
    added), and argues that the provision only sets forth those initial
    requirements for filing. However, it is a “well-settled rule of
    statutory interpretation that titles and section headings cannot
    limit the plain meaning of statutory text where that text is clear.”
    M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 
    344 F.3d 335
    , 348
    (3d Cir. 2003).
    32
    time” are immediately preceded by the words “any areas which
    may be in default.” The context makes clear that the words “at
    any time” apply not to the ABS program in general, but to
    specific “areas”, i.e., mining sites bonded under the ABS. See
    Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div. v. Automobile
    Workers, 
    523 U.S. 653
    , 657 (1998) (“[I]t is a fundamental
    principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language
    itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in
    isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is
    used.” (citation and quotations marks omitted)). Thus, a plain
    reading of the words “any areas which may be in default at any
    time” indicate that the obligations prescribed by § 800.11(e) are
    not restricted to the immediate circumstances surrounding the
    approval of an ABS, but are instead ongoing in nature and apply
    at any time, so long as those mining areas originally bonded
    under the ABS, and not yet converted to CBS bonds, still exist.
    Furthermore, keeping in mind the distinction between
    sites bonded under the ABS and the ABS itself, we see no
    reasonable basis for OSM’s assertion that a purely prospective
    process – the transition to a CBS initiated on August 4, 2001 –
    should have retroactive effects on obligations that already
    accrued and guarantees that were already made under the ABS
    while the ABS was still active. This assertion is inconsistent
    with the expansive language of § 800.11(e) insofar as it adds to
    the phrase “any areas which may be in default at any time” an
    implicit limitation – “until a new bonding system is in place for
    new or ongoing mine operations.” Furthermore, it would allow
    the regulatory authority to disclaim or “write off” existing
    33
    reclamation liabilities,9 a result which would be contrary to the
    fundamental purpose of SMCRA’s bonding requirement, which
    is to ensure complete reclamation of mining sites in the case of
    forfeiture. See Cat Run Coal 
    Co., 932 F. Supp. at 774
    ; 30
    U.S.C. § 1259(a). Consequently, even under the deferential
    standard applicable to agency interpretations, OSM’s
    construction of 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e) is impermissible. Mercy
    Catholic Med. 
    Ctr., 380 F.3d at 151
    . We conclude that
    § 800.11(e) continues to apply to sites forfeited prior to the CBS
    conversion and that § 800.11(e) requires that Pennsylvania
    fulfill the obligations it voluntarily assumed to ensure that these
    sites are fully reclaimed.
    C.
    Finally, we turn to Pennsylvania’s Program
    Enhancements Document.         This document provided the
    justification for Pennsylvania’s claim that the deficiencies
    identified in OSM’s 732 Notice and 30 C.F.R. § 938.16(h)
    amendment had been remedied. OSM is careful to emphasize
    that, for purposes of its review, it did not view the Program
    9
    At oral argument, counsel for the Federation analogized
    OSM’s argument to that of a credit cardholder who cancels the
    card and then claims that his or her outstanding balance should
    be limited to the cash he has on hand. While we recognize that
    the analogy is imperfect, as Pennsylvania is not in the position
    of a debtor, we believe it illustrates the principle that accrued
    liabilities under a particular financial regimen do not simply
    disappear when an individual or entity abandons that regimen.
    34
    Enhancements Document as a means of complying with
    § 800.11(e) because it believed that Pennsylvania’s bond
    conversion mooted the issue of compliance with that provision.
    As the District Court correctly observed, however, “the decision
    to terminate the Part 732 Notice was made after consideration of
    the actions taken over the years – actions that were described in
    the program enhancements document.” Pennsylvania Fed’n of
    Sportsmen’s 
    Clubs, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 377
    . In light of our
    conclusion that § 800.11(e) continues to apply to sites forfeited
    prior to the conversion, the Program Enhancements Document
    takes on special significance. If, in fact, the Program
    Enhancements Document does not ensure compliance with
    § 800.11(e), then it is an inadequate response to OSM’s 732
    Notice and 30 C.F.R. § 938.16(h) amendment, both of which
    emphatically called for Pennsylvania to take measures to comply
    with its obligations pursuant to § 800.11(e).
    As 
    described supra
    , the Program Enhancements
    Document presents an elaborate array of proposals for discharge
    abatement. The Federation argues that many of these proposals
    are inadequate, but we need not reach that argument because we
    believe the Program Enhancements Document is inadequate for
    a more basic reason: none of the proposals described in it
    represent enforceable commitments. OSM and PADEP describe
    these proposals in the language of a guarantee, see, e.g., Br. of
    Appellee PADEP at 31 (describing the Workplan as a
    “commitment, acknowledged by OSM [that] became a
    programmatic obligation”), but Pennsylvania is only obligated
    under the regulations to enforce the provisions of its approved
    State program. 30 C.F.R. § 733.11. In turn, OSM may only
    take oversight action against Pennsylvania for failure to
    35
    implement those OSM-approved provisions.           30 C.F.R.
    § 733.12. Because the Program Enhancements Document is not
    part of an approved program amendment, it is not part of the
    Commonwealth’s approved State program, and Pennsylvania is
    therefore under no obligation to implement its “programmatic
    commitments.” While we would not go as far as the Federation
    in describing the use of language such as “programmatic
    commitments” and “programmatic accountability” as
    bureaucratic obfuscation, we do agree that such references do
    not obscure the simple fact that the Program Enhancements
    Document sets forth policy aspirations, not enforceable
    obligations.
    Even if we were to concede that PADEP is unlikely to
    disregard the goals described in the Program Enhancements
    Document, given the time and effort put into drafting it,
    SMCRA demands that “sufficient money” will be available “at
    any time” a discharge from an ABS bond forfeiture site must be
    treated. 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e)(1). The plain language of this
    provision requires that Pennsylvania demonstrate adequate
    funding for mine discharge abatement and treatment at all ABS
    forfeiture sites. While the Program Enhancements Document
    appears to be a good faith effort by OSM and PADEP to allocate
    scarce resources, SMCRA requires that reclamation and
    treatment of all post-SMCRA mining areas be guaranteed. 30
    U.S.C. § 1259; 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e)(1). The Program
    Enhancements Document is a policy directive, not an
    36
    enforceable guarantee.10 Accordingly, OSM’s actions in
    rescinding the October 1, 1991 Part 732 Notice and deleting the
    30 C.F.R. § 938.16(h) amendment were inconsistent with
    SMCRA and OSM’s own regulation, 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e)(1),
    and therefore an abuse of discretion.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Close to thirty years ago, through SMCRA, Congress
    dealt with the reclamation problem that then faced this country
    as a result of decades of coal mining that provided needed
    supplies of energy, but left many States and communities with
    land that was badly scarred, no responsible party to reclaim the
    land, and no taxpayer funds that would allow the federal or state
    government to do the work. Pennsylvania was one of those
    States with such a problem. At the same time, Pennsylvania had
    an abundance of coal, communities whose economies benefitted
    from coal mining, and a coal mining industry interested in doing
    the work. To provide for reclamation and at the same time
    allow States such as Pennsylvania to continue mining, SMCRA
    10
    The parties confirmed at oral argument that the
    administrative process has been initiated to codify the
    substantive proposals of the Program Enhancements document
    as a formal amendment to Pennsylvania’s approved regulatory
    program. We do not reach the question of whether a formal
    amendment incorporating the substantive proposals of the
    Program Enhancements Document would adequately address the
    concerns raised in OSM’s 732 Notice and required program
    amendment.
    37
    established new stringent rules for permitting, bonding, mining
    and reclamation. Notably, it was also one of the first laws
    passed by Congress employing a new form of federalism,
    whereby States could assume primary responsibility for
    implementing the law with a limited amount of federal
    supervision. Pennsylvania’s approved program provided an
    ABS as an alternative to full cost bonding, which allowed the
    cost and burden of bonding to be shared across the
    Commonwealth and the industry. Over the period in which the
    ABS was in place, significant mining operations took place by
    responsible operators who met their commitments fully, and
    produced needed coal while employing thousands of
    Pennsylvanians in well paying jobs.
    However, as well intentioned as the ABS program may
    have been, within the first ten years of its operation, it became
    clear that the ABS left the Commonwealth with now
    unreclaimed land, unabated mine discharges, and a reclamation
    fund insufficient to meet the new obligations. In 2001, PADEP
    scrapped the ABS for existing and future mining operations, and
    converted to the full cost CBS. Since SMCRA was enacted
    thirty years ago, we are faced in this case, for the first time, with
    the question of what continued level of supervision OSM should
    maintain over a State’s program where an ABS is converted to
    a CBS without firm financial guarantees of complete
    reclamation in place. Although Congress did not speak
    explicitly to its intention on this precise issue, its message to
    America in the form of SMCRA is clear enough – the
    environmental damage resulting from unreclaimed mining sites
    must be mitigated. To this end, we believe the only reasonable
    38
    conclusion in this case is that OSM supervision is required until
    full guarantees of reclamation are in place.
    For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the
    District Court’s judgment with respect to Counts Two and Three
    of the Complaint, sustaining the agency actions in this case, and
    remand to the District Court with instructions to set aside
    OSM’s June 12, 2003 termination of its October 1, 1991 Part
    732 Notice, and the portion of OSM’s October 7, 2003 final rule
    deleting the 30 C.F.R. § 938.16(h) amendment, both of which
    required that Pennsylvania bring its program into compliance
    with 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e).
    39
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-1780

Filed Date: 8/2/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

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