In Re: Carco Elec ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-29-2008
    In Re: Carco Elec
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 07-1009
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    Recommended Citation
    "In Re: Carco Elec " (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 745.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/745
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    PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-1009
    ___________
    IN RE: CARCO ELECTRONICS, a California Corporation,
    Debtor
    IDEAL AEROSMITH, INC.,
    Appellant
    ___________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 06-cv-01190)
    District Judge: The Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
    ___________
    ARGUED MAY 20, 2008
    BEFORE: SMITH and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges,
    and STAFFORD,* District Judge.
    *.
    Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior District
    Judge for the United States District Court for the Northern
    (continued...)
    (Filed: July 29, 2008)
    ___________
    George T. Snyder, Esq. (Argued)
    Roy E. Leonard, Esq.
    Stonecipher, Cunningham, Beard & Schmitt
    125 First Avenue
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Counsel for Appellant
    Leland P. Schermer, Esq. (Argued)
    Bryan A. Loose, Esq.
    Michael Monyok, Esq.
    Leland Schermer & Associates
    11 Stanwix Street, 7 th Floor
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Counsel for Appellee
    ___________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ___________
    NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
    *.
    (...continued)
    District of Florida, sitting by designation.
    2
    The question before us is whether a discovery order
    granting a trade secret protection from exposure is immediately
    appealable if the prevailing party is dissatisfied with the scope
    or degree of protection afforded? We hold that such an order is
    neither final nor appealable and will dismiss the appeal.
    I.
    Carco Electronics filed for Chapter 11 protection. Ideal
    Aerosmith Inc., a supplier of precision inertial guidance test
    systems, rotational rate tables, centrifuges, and high dynamic
    flight test tables, improperly took possession of Carco’s
    production facilities without obtaining court approval. Carco
    then filed an emergency petition in the Bankruptcy Court to
    confirm, and thus legitimate this transaction. Acutronic USA
    Inc., a competitor of Ideal’s in the aerospace field, had filed a
    counter-offer for Carco’s assets. Upon learning that Ideal was
    already on the premises and operating Carco’s business,
    3
    Acutronic filed a motion to prohibit Ideal from appropriating
    Carco’s assets.
    The Bankruptcy Court issued a desist order, directing
    Ideal to discontinue using and appropriating the assets it had
    removed and/or converted from Carco. Ultimately, Acutronic
    was the successful bidder and purchased Carco’s assets at a
    court-sanctioned sale. When Acutronic personnel attempted to
    take possession of Carco’s assets immediately following the
    hearing, Ideal employees stalled, retaining possession for
    another day. Acutronic claims that numerous files were copied
    and deleted during this interregnum and requested discovery to
    determine the extent to which Ideal had violated the Bankruptcy
    Court’s desist order.
    Acutronic and Ideal each filed a motion for a protective
    order relating to the exchange of trade secrets during discovery.
    A computer source code for the parties’ motion controllers (the
    4
    Ideal Aero 400 and Acutronic's Cascade) was the central issue.1
    Following a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court entered a protective
    order allowing “counsel and one senior executive of each
    company to see ‘Highly Confidential’ information under strict
    terms.”
    Ideal appealed the entry of the protective order to the
    District Court, which affirmed. Ideal now appeals to this Court.
    II.
    Appellate jurisdiction is traditionally predicated on 28
    U.S.C. § 1291 which gives us “jurisdiction of appeals from all
    final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” This
    finality requirement is an essential element of § 1291 and most
    often requires that a district court issue a decision that
    completely ends the litigation and leaves nothing for the court
    1.
    A “controller” is the “brain” of a motion simulator and
    inertial guidance test system made by both companies.
    5
    to do but execute its judgment. See Coopers & Lybrand v.
    Livesay, 
    437 U.S. 463
    , 467 (1978).     It is axiomatic that
    discovery orders “are not final orders of the district court for
    purposes of obtaining appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
    1291.” Bacher v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    211 F.3d 52
    , 53 (3d Cir.
    2000) (internal quotation and citations omitted). The collateral
    order doctrine, first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cohen
    v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
    (1949), provides
    an exception to the general rule which limits appellate review to
    final orders.2
    2.
    An appeal of a non-final order will only lie if (1) the
    order from which the appellant appeals conclusively determines
    the disputed question; (2) the order resolves an important issue
    that is completely separate from the merits of the dispute; and
    (3) the order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
    judgment. In re: Ford Motor Co., 
    110 F.3d 954
    , 958 (3d Cir.
    1997).
    6
    In this Circuit we have created an exception to the non-
    appealability of discovery orders. In Smith v. BIC Corp., 
    869 F.3d 194
    (3d Cir. 1989), we held that if a party is ordered to
    disclose trade secrets, it can invoke the collateral order doctrine
    to obtain an immediate appeal. 
    Id. at 198-199;
    see also ADAPT
    of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 
    417 F.3d 390
    , 395 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Powell v. Ridge, 
    247 F.3d 520
    ,
    524 (3d Cir.2001)); 
    Bacher, 211 F.3d at 57
    .3
    In Bacher, we specifically upheld our holding in 
    Smith. 869 F.2d at 198-99
    . But, we went to some length to cabin Smith
    3.
    Other courts of appeal have rejected our approach,
    however, and have declined to exercise jurisdiction under the
    collateral order doctrine over appeals from discovery orders
    where privilege issues or trade secrets are involved. See, e.g.,
    FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 
    202 F.3d 454
    , 458 & n. 2 (1st Cir. 2000);
    Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 
    128 F.3d 1122
    , 1125 (7th
    Cir. 1997); Simmons v. City of Racine, 
    37 F.3d 325
    , 327 (7th
    Cir. 1994); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 
    10 F.3d 746
    , 149-50 (10th
    Cir. 1993).
    7
    and, to a lesser extent, Ford, to their specific fact situations. We
    were influenced in Bacher by the Supreme Court’s opinions in
    Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 
    527 U.S. 198
    (1999), and
    Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 
    511 U.S. 863
    (1994) – both of which were decided after Smith.
    In Cunningham, the Supreme Court held that an order
    imposing sanctions on a party's attorney for discovery abuses
    was not immediately appealable under the collateral order
    doctrine. 
    Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 203-204
    . In so ruling, the
    Supreme Court indicated that the separability requirement of the
    collateral order doctrine was not met. 
    Id. at 204-205
    (citations
    omitted).4     Further, the Supreme Court's statement in
    4.
    Similarly, in Bacher, the district court's order
    necessarily entailed some determination as to whether the
    settlement information sought by the Bachers was relevant to the
    merits of the bad faith claim and/or their claim for punitive
    damages. Accordingly, we found it “questionable” as to whether
    (continued...)
    8
    Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order
    doctrine on a “case-by-case” basis indicates that we should not
    attempt to carve out individualized, case -specific exceptions to
    the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately
    appealable. 
    Id. at 206;
    see also In re Pressman-Gutman Co.,
    Inc., 
    459 F.3d 383
    , 397 (3d Cir. 2006).
    The Supreme Court's decision in Digital Equipment
    cautions that the collateral order doctrine is “narrow” and that
    claims for its applicability should be subjected to “broad
    
    scrutiny.” 511 U.S. at 868
    (“[W]e have ... repeatedly stressed
    that the ‘narrow’ exception should stay that way and never be
    allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a
    single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been
    4.
    (...continued)
    the separability requirement is satisfied.
    9
    entered ....”) (citation omitted); see also We, Inc. v. City of
    Philadelphia, 
    174 F.3d 322
    , 324-25 (3d Cir.1999) (emphasizing
    that the collateral order doctrine is to be construed narrowly).
    Acutronic argues that while this panel may not directly
    overrule Smith, the Supreme Court has already done so, sub
    silentio.5   Admittedly, there are strong statements in both
    Supreme Court opinions and, in particular, our opinion in
    
    Bacher, supra
    ., that seem to suggest that our holding in Smith is
    flawed. But, a reversal of Smith must be left to the wise counsel
    of the Court en banc. The concerns we expressed in Smith for
    orders denying protection to trade secrets remain valid ones and
    5.
    Although our decision in Smith has been widely
    criticized, it remains the law of this Circuit. See Mariana v.
    Fisher, 
    338 F.3d 189
    , 201 (3d Cir.2003) (“‘[N]o subsequent
    panel overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a
    previous panel. Court en banc consideration is required to do
    so.’”) (quoting Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1).
    10
    we conclude that these concerns were not invalidated by
    intervening Supreme Court precedent. As we have explained,
    [a]ppeal after final judgment cannot remedy the
    breach in confidentiality occasioned by erroneous
    disclosure of protected materials. At best, on
    appeal after final judgement, an appellate court
    could send the case back for re-trial without use
    of the protected materials. At that point, however,
    the cat is out of the bag.
    
    Ford, 110 F.3d at 958-664
    .
    However, when the appealing party objects solely to the
    form or scope of the protection given, these same concerns do
    not provide sound jurisprudential footing to appeal. Orders that
    grant some protection to trade secrets are clearly distinguishable
    from orders that deny all protection to trade secrets. The order
    here grants protection from disclosure, and as with any other
    garden variety discovery order, may be appealed in due course
    and only when a final order is entered.
    11
    III.
    Parties like Ideal who believe they have been granted
    insufficient protection are not without remedy. They can still
    seek permissive review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) if the district
    judge agrees that an interlocutory order “involves a controlling
    question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
    difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
    order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
    litigation.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000); see also Chao v.
    Roy's Const., Inc., 
    517 F.3d 180
    , 188 (3d Cir. 2008).6
    Mandamus relief is also available to the parties in challenging
    6.
    We have noted, however, that a discovery order will not
    ordinarily present a controlling question of law and that an
    immediate appeal from such an order, in most circumstances,
    will not materially advance the termination of the litigation. See
    Cippolone v. Liggett Group Inc., 
    785 F.2d 1118
    n. 14 (3d Cir.
    1986).
    12
    the grant of a protective order to alleged trade secrets. See, e.g.,
    Cippolone v. Liggett Group Inc., 
    785 F.2d 1108
    (3d Cir. 1986).
    Finally, a party could refuse to comply with the protective order,
    be held in contempt and then appeal the contempt order. See
    Church of Scientology v. United States, 
    506 U.S. 9
    , 18, n. 11
    (1992) (citing United States v. Ryan, 
    402 U.S. 530
    (1971)).
    IV.
    In sum and for the foregoing reasons we will dismiss the
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-1009

Filed Date: 7/29/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

Authorities (19)

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Successor in ... , 202 F.3d 454 ( 2000 )

in-re-pressman-gutman-co-inc-employersponsor-of-the-pressman-gutman , 459 F.3d 383 ( 2006 )

we-inc-ta-university-coin-laundry-william-schoepe-jr-ta-university , 174 F.3d 322 ( 1999 )

Maureen Bacher Richard Bacher v. Allstate Insurance Company , 211 F.3d 52 ( 2000 )

Chao v. Roy's Construction, Inc. , 517 F.3d 180 ( 2008 )

Lynn E. Boughton v. Cotter Corporation Commonwealth Edison ... , 10 F.3d 746 ( 1993 )

Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc. , 128 F.3d 1122 ( 1997 )

kenny-simmons-v-city-of-racine-pfc-police-and-fire-commission-officer , 37 F.3d 325 ( 1994 )

antonio-cipollone-individually-and-as-the-of-the-estate-of-rose-d , 785 F.2d 1108 ( 1986 )

robert-mariana-michael-j-mcfadden-karen-m-moran-edward-m-nankervis-v-d , 338 F.3d 189 ( 2003 )

adapt-of-philadelphia-liberty-resources-inc-marie-watson-marshall-watson , 417 F.3d 390 ( 2005 )

in-re-ford-motor-company-susan-i-kelly-administratrix-and-personal , 110 F.3d 954 ( 1997 )

david-powell-shelean-parks-patrice-everage-julia-a-davis-yvette-bland , 247 F.3d 520 ( 2001 )

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay , 98 S. Ct. 2454 ( 1978 )

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. , 69 S. Ct. 1221 ( 1949 )

United States v. Ryan , 91 S. Ct. 1580 ( 1971 )

Church of Scientology of California v. United States , 113 S. Ct. 447 ( 1992 )

Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc. , 114 S. Ct. 1992 ( 1994 )

Cunningham v. Hamilton County , 119 S. Ct. 1915 ( 1999 )

View All Authorities »