Zonak v. Comm Social Security , 290 F. App'x 493 ( 2008 )

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-24-2008
Zonak v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-3143
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-3143
NORA T. ZONAK, as personal representative
for Joseph C. Zonak, Deceased,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-05995)
District Judge: The Honorable William J. Martini
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 25, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 24, 2008)
OPINION
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Nora Zonak appeals from an order of the District Court affirming the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security denying disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) to her
now-deceased husband, Joseph Zonak (“Zonak”). For the reasons that follow, we will
affirm.
I.
Because the parties are well acquainted with the factual and procedural
background of this case, we will refer only to those facts bearing directly on our
disposition of this appeal.
Zonak was born on January 10, 1963. He had a high school education and worked
as a delivery truck driver for approximately 19 years before he retired at the suggestion of
his doctor on May 14, 2003. Zonak filed an application for DIB on June 6, 2003, alleging
an onset date of May 14, 2003 due to dilated cardiomyopathy, coronary artery disease,
congestive heart failure, high blood pressure, and gout. After his application was denied
initially and on reconsideration, Zonak received a de novo hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ evaluated Zonak’s claim under the five-step
sequential evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and made findings
adverse to Zonak at steps three and five. With respect to step three, the ALJ determined
that none of Zonak’s impairments met or equaled any of the impairments listed in 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (the “Listings”). At step five, the ALJ found that
although Zonak was not able to return to his previous line of employment, he was not
disabled because he had “the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of
sedentary work.” (App. at A21.) The District Court affirmed the ALJ’s denial of
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benefits, concluding that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. This timely
appeal followed.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We employ a deferential “substantial
evidence” standard of review of the ALJ’s factual findings, but exercise plenary review of
all legal conclusions. Allen v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 2005). “Substantial
evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. It is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a
mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and
quotations omitted).
III.
The claimant bears the burden of establishing steps one through four of the five-
step evaluation process, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show
that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in large numbers in the
national economy. Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007). We
“do[] not require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in
conducting his [step three] analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. Rather, we require only a
“sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful
review.” Id.
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We easily conclude, as did the District Court, that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s finding at step three that Zonak’s impairments did not meet or equal any of the
Listings to establish disability as a matter of law. At the hearing before the ALJ, Zonak
only asked the ALJ to consider whether his condition met the Listings at 4.04B and
4.04C. The ALJ did this and more. In his written decision, the ALJ noted that while he
had given “particular attention” to the cardiovascular Listings at 4.03 and 4.04, he had
also compared Zonak’s impairments to the Listings at 2.02, 2.03, 2.04, 4.02, 6.02,
11.04A, 11.04B, 14.09, and 14.00B6. Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Zonak had not
met his burden of establishing disability under any of these Listings. With respect to the
cardiovascular Listings at 4.03 and 4.04, the ALJ found that Zonak did not meet the
criteria of section 4.04 because he “had no ischemic ECG changes, and did not experience
chest pain, in connection with the cardiac stress test.” (App. at A16.) As for section 4.03,
the ALJ noted that although tests performed on Zonak on September 5, 2001 “revealed
abnormal left ventricular function with an ejection fraction of 30%,” his ejection fraction
had improved to 45% by June 4, 2003. (Id.) We have carefully reviewed the record and
are satisfied that substantial evidence supports each of these findings.
We are also satisfied that the ALJ did not err by failing to consider Zonak’s obesity
in his analysis. Wholly aside from the fact that Zonak did not allege obesity when
applying for benefits or argue before the ALJ that obesity contributed to his alleged
disability, appellant’s brief greatly exaggerates the facts of record in this case. Appellant
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asserts several times in her brief that Zonak’s obesity must have risen to the level of a
disability because he stood only 5 feet tall and weighed 280 pounds, but, as the District
Court noted, all but one reference in the record lists Zonak’s height as at least 6 feet tall.
In fact, when the ALJ asked Zonak at the hearing what his height and weight were, Zonak
responded that he was 6 feet, 1 inch tall, weighed 275 lbs., and that he was the same
weight when he worked as a truck driver. We agree with the District Court that “to the
extent [appellant] relies on height/weight ratio as an obvious indicator of Zonak’s
limitations, [the] argument[] is misplaced.” (App. at A5.) Moreover, despite Zonak’s
failure to raise the issue of obesity to the ALJ, the ALJ noted in his decision that he had
“fully considered obesity in the context of the overall record evidence in making this
decision.” (Id. at A17.) Given that Zonak bore the burden of establishing that his
obesity, in combination with his other impairments, met the requirements of one of the
Listings and that he failed to raise the issue of his obesity to the ALJ, we have little
difficulty concluding that the ALJ did not err by failing to more fully explore the issue in
his decision.
Appellant contends, next, that the ALJ improperly rejected the medical opinion of
Zonak’s treating physician, Dr. Ashok Kumar, who stated in a form letter dated May 20,
2003 that Zonak was unable to return to work “until further notice.” We disagree for two
reasons. First, the ALJ was not obligated to give significant weight to Dr. Kumar’s
opinion as to Zonak’s ability to work because the opinion related to the ultimate issue of
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disability—an issue reserved exclusively to the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(e)(1) (“We are responsible for making the determination or decision about
whether you meet the statutory definition of disability. . . A statement by a medical source
that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you
are disabled.”); Id. § 404.1527(e)(3) (“We will not give any special significance to the
source of an opinion on issues reserved to the Commissioner described in paragraph[]
(e)(1) . . . of this section.”). Second, the opinion at issue was provided on a check-box
form and no reasons were given in support of Dr. Kumar’s conclusion that Zonak was
unable to work. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) (declaring that
“[f]orm reports in which a physician’s obligation is only to check a box or fill in a blank
are weak evidence at best”).
Appellant also asserts that the ALJ failed to provide a proper evidentiary basis for
his conclusion that Zonak “had, at all material times, the residual functional capacity to
perform work that involves lifting and carrying objects weighing up to 10 pounds; sitting
up to six hours, and standing and walking up to two hours in an eight-hour workday; and
the full range of sedentary work.” (App. at A18.) We once again disagree. The ALJ’s
decision contains an exhaustive discussion of Zonak’s medical history, most of which was
compiled while Zonak was still gainfully employed. The ALJ relied primarily on the
consultative report of Dr. Francky Merlin, a physician employed by the New Jersey
Department of Labor, who noted that Zonak
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had no difficulty getting up from a seated position or getting on and off the
examining table. There is full use of both hands and arms in dressing and
undressing. Grasping strength and manipulative functions are not impaired.
[Zonak] is able to flex spine forward 0 to 90 degrees, to squat and walk on
his heels and toes. There is pain in the left knee but no swelling, warmth or
deformity.
(Rec. at 273.) Dr. Merlin concluded that Zonak was “able to sit, stand, walk, handle
objects, hear, speak and travel, but . . . should not lift or carry heavy objects.” (Id. at
274.) This conclusion is consistent with the information provided by Zonak in his
application for DIB, where he explained that his chest and arm pains were caused by
“frequent heavy lifting and constant bending” and that the pain typically subsided after he
stopped the heavy lifting and rested. (Id. at 83-84) (emphases added.) He also stated in
his application that he could walk for approximately 20 minutes before he needed to stop
and rest, and that his leg, ankle, and foot pain only worsened after walking “for a
prolonged amount of time.” (Id. at 85) (emphasis added.) Moreover, the ALJ cited
Zonak’s declaration that “he does light household chores, food shopping, cooking,
manages his finances, . . . does laundry, drives a car, and makes dinner for his family.”
(App. at A18.) In short, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Zonak was
capable of performing sedentary work.
Finally, we reject appellant’s contention that the ALJ improperly discredited
Zonak’s subjective complaints of pain. A claimant’s allegations of pain must be
consistent with the objective medical evidence. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d
Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. “Once an ALJ concludes that a medical impairment
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that could reasonably cause the alleged symptoms exists, . . . the ALJ [must] determine
the extent to which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to
which he or she is disabled by it.” Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 362. In making this
determination, the ALJ must consider: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location,
duration, frequency and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4)
the type, dosage, and effectiveness of medication used to reduce the pain; (5) the type of
treatment, other than medication, the claimant received for the pain; (6) measures the
claimant has taken to relieve the pain; and (7) “[o]ther factors concerning [the claimant’s]
functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.929(c)(3).
The ALJ reviewed the evidence and concluded that while Zonak undoubtedly
experienced pain while performing strenuous activities, his subjective complaints of
disabling pain were not entirely credible. For the same reasons articulated above in our
discussion of the ALJ’s residual functional capacity analysis, we conclude that the ALJ’s
decision to discount Zonak’s subjective complaints of pain was supported by substantial
evidence.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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