United States v. Caplan , 283 F. App'x 61 ( 2008 )

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-19-2008
USA v. Caplan
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-1362
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"USA v. Caplan" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1003.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1003
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-1362
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DOUGLAS CAPLAN,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 04-cr-00299-9)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas M. Hardiman
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 5, 2008
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 19, 2008)
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Douglas Caplan appeals his jury conviction in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania for money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956. He contends that the District Court should have suppressed the evidence seized
during the search of a business he owned and that the prosecution presented insufficient
evidence to support his conviction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and affirm the judgment of the District Court.
This case stems from Caplan’s ownership of a nightclub in Pittsburgh.1
Government agents sought and received a warrant to search the nightclub for drugs and
related evidence after intercepting a large number of phone calls from various associates
of Caplan. These calls suggested a link between the nightclub and a drug distribution
ring. The agents who performed the search discovered financial records indicating that
the nightclub had served as a means by which a number of these drug distributors (who
were indicted as co-defendants and pled guilty) laundered a portion of the proceeds of
their illegal sales.2 Caplan moved before trial to suppress the results of the search on the
ground that the affidavits submitted by the investigating officers did not establish
probable cause and that the warrant lacked sufficient particularity. Caplan also moved for
judgment of acquittal after the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the money laundering
charge.3 He argued that the evidence did not show that he had been willfully blind to
1
We provide only a short summary of the facts and procedural history because we
write exclusively for the parties.
2
Caplan does not dispute that the Government established the existence of a money
laundering conspiracy.
3
The jury acquitted Caplan of three counts of engaging in monetary transactions in
criminally derived property in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957(a) and 2.
2
illegal activity occurring at the nightclub. The District Court denied both motions.
Caplan timely appealed after imposition of a sentence of incarceration for 48 months and
supervised release for two years.
We review the District Court’s denial of the suppression motion for clear error
with respect to underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review over the
application of law to fact. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). Like
the District Court, we “exercise only a deferential review of the initial probable cause
determination made by the magistrate.” United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 (3d
Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original). Caplan’s challenge to the warrant fails under that
deferential standard (even assuming that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
what was searched). The information included in the supporting affidavit could have
been fresher and could have tied the illegal conduct under investigation more closely to
the nightclub, but, considering the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a
substantial basis for determining that “there [was] a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime [would] be found [at the nightclub].” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238 (1983). Moreover, even if the magistrate did err in that determination, the officers
who performed the search relied reasonably and in good faith on the warrant. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). We also reject Caplan’s assertion that the warrant
listed an overly broad set of items for seizure. The officers did not perform an illegal
general search in this case. See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
3
We sustain a jury verdict in the face of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge
where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. See United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 100 (3d Cir. 2007). The evidence
presented by the Government in this case meets that standard, as it would allow a
reasonable jury to conclude that Caplan was willfully blind to the fact that drug money
was used to purchase the nightclub. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 155
(3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that willful blindness can support a money laundering
conviction).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4