United States v. Lansdowne , 296 F. App'x 268 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10-16-2008
    USA v. Lansdowne
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-2819
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Lansdowne" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 358.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/358
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _________
    No. 07-2819
    _________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee
    v.
    CARL LANSDOWNE,
    Appellant.
    ___________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    Criminal No. 06-cr-00427-1
    (District Judge: The Honorable R. Barclay Surrick)
    __________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    September 11, 2008
    Before: McKEE, SMITH, and WEIS, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: October 16, 2008)
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    McKEE, Circuit Judge
    Carl Lansdowne appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence that was entered
    pursuant to his conditional guilty plea after the district court denied his motion to suppress. For
    the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
    I.
    Because we write primarily for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts or history
    of this case except as may be helpful to our brief discussion. At the suppression hearing, the
    government argued that the car Lansdowne was riding in was stopped pursuant to a valid traffic
    stop. Lansdowne claimed that the stop was merely a pretext to stop a car containing three Black
    males. He claimed that police searched him, “despite the absence of any reason to believe that he
    was armed or dangerous, solely because a fellow passenger was armed.” Lansdowne’s Br. at
    17.
    Lansdowne asks us to reject the “automatic companion” rule whereby “‘any companion
    of an arestee would be subject to a ‘cursory pat-down’ reasonably necessary to give assurance
    that they are unarmed.’” United States v. Wilson, 
    506 F.3d 488
    , 494 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
    United States v. Bell, 
    762 F.2d 495
    , 498 (6th Cir. 1985)). However, although the district court
    emphasized that another passenger was armed, it did not rest its denial of Lansdowne’s
    suppression motion solely on that fact. Instead, the district court found reasonable suspicion to
    search based on the totality of the circumstances. Our review of the testimony at the suppression
    hearing confirms that the officers had reasonable suspicion to pat Lansdowne down for weapons.
    2
    We begin by noting that this traffic stop was legal from its inception and police had not
    detained the car or its occupants longer than reasonable when they saw what appeared to be the
    butt of a gun tucked inside the waist band of one of the passengers. The Supreme Court has
    explained that traffic stops of automobiles pose a danger to police officers and that the danger is
    heightened by the presence of passengers. See Maryland v. Wilson, 
    519 U.S. 409
    (1997). This
    stop occurred late at night, in a high crime area, and the driver was not able to produce the
    vehicle registration. Although police can not unduly prolong such a detention without probable
    cause, they are entitled to briefly detain a car and its occupants in order to conduct a reasonable
    investigation. See Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    (1968); see also, United States v. Mosley, 
    454 F.3d 249
    (3d Cir. 2006).   Since police saw the butt of a gun during this brief traffic stop, it is
    frivolous to suggest that police could not conduct a pat down search of the car’s occupants for
    their own protection and safety. See United States v. Yamba, 
    506 F.3d 251
    , 255 (3d Cir. 2007);
    Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
    434 U.S. 106
    (1977); and 
    Mosley, supra
    . Under Mimms and its
    progeny, it was clearly reasonable for police to conduct a limited search of Lansdowne to see if
    he was also armed. Indeed, it would have been dangerously foolhardy not to have done so.
    Nevertheless, Lansdowne claims that Ybarra v. Illinois, 
    444 U.S. 85
    (1979), precludes the
    police from searching an individual solely because a fellow passenger was armed. We disagree.
    In Ybarra, police officers obtained a warrant to search a tavern and its owner for evidence of
    possession of heroin. 
    Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 88
    . In executing the warrant, the officers conducted a
    pat down of each customer in the tavern. 
    Id. The court
    held that “a person’s mere propinquity to
    others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable
    3
    cause to search that person.” 
    Id. At 91
    (citing Sibron v. New York, 
    392 U.S. 40
    , 62-63 (1968)).
    That is not this case.
    Here, the district court correctly concluded that the officer’s search of Lansdowne was
    based on more than his “mere propinquity” to the other individuals in the car. In addition, unlike
    the defendant in Ybarra, Lansdowne was not in a public establishment when he was searched; he
    was a passenger in a private car that was stopped pursuant to a legitimate traffic stop. See
    Wyoming v. Houghton, 
    526 U.S. 295
    (1999). In Houghton, the Court found that, unlike a tavern
    patron, a passenger in a car will “often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and
    have the same interest in concealing the fruits or evidence of their wrong doing.” 
    Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304-05
    .
    II.
    For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the district court’s denial of Lansdowne’s
    Motion to Suppress All Physical Evidence.
    4