Morgan v. Comm Social Security , 295 F. App'x 490 ( 2008 )

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-6-2008
Morgan v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-2657
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-2657
JODY A. MORGAN,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D. C. No. 06-cv-01659)
District Judge: Hon. Stanley R. Chesler
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on June 26, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(filed: October 6, 2008 )
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Jody Morgan appeals from a judgment by the District Court affirming the denial of
her application for Social Security Disability benefits. Finding that the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) is supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
I. BACKGROUND
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly
review the facts and the proceedings below.
Prior to 2003, Morgan worked as a housecleaner. Morgan stopped working in
March 2003, allegedly because of a psychological condition that caused her to talk to
herself while working, be fearful of others, have panic attacks, and suffer from
depression. She testified that she had panic attacks at work that would require her to stop
and focus before she could continue with the task at hand. Morgan further testified that
she experienced back pain during these panic attacks. This problem allegedly makes it
difficult for her to concentrate on anything.
The record indicates that Morgan was evaluated by physicians on several
occasions. One psychiatrist evaluated her ability to relate to co-workers and deal with
work stress as poor or non-existent. However, the other examiners each evaluated
Morgan’s capabilities as sufficient to perform her job as a housecleaner.
Morgan filed an application for DIB and SSI benefits on July 24, 2003. The Social
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Security Administration denied her application on December 8, 2003. Morgan filed a
request for reconsideration on January 9, 2004. The denial was affirmed on April 20,
2004. Morgan requested a hearing, and she appeared before an ALJ on August 8, 2005.
The ALJ issued a decision on November 21, 2005, finding that Morgan was not eligible
for benefits. Morgan filed a petition for review with the District Court, which was denied
on April 4, 2007. Morgan appealed.
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction to review the decision of the District Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. DISCUSSION
We may review the factual findings of the Commissioner only to determine
whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence for such findings. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is
evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Our review of legal issues is plenary. Sykes, 228 F.3d
at 262.
Eligibility for disability benefits is determined according to a five-step sequential
analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the Commissioner considers whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If
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she is not, the Commissioner then reaches the second step and considers whether the
claimant has a “severe impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the impairment is
severe, the Commissioner at the third step determines whether the claimant has an
impairment or combination of impairments which is listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations, or is equal to a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the claimant
does not have a listed impairment, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(e).
At the fourth step, the Commissioner determines whether, despite the severe
impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If so, she will be found not disabled and the analysis
need not proceed to the fifth step. Only the fourth step is at issue here.
Morgan argues on appeal that the ALJ erred in failing to give controlling weight to
the evaluation by Dr. Hussain that she had poor or no ability to relate to co-workers or
deal with work stress.
When confronted with conflicting evidence, an ALJ “may choose whom to credit
but cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186
F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). An ALJ is not required to give
controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, but may “afford a treating
physician’s opinion more or less weight depending upon the extent to which supporting
explanations are provided.” Id.
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In this case, the ALJ explained the evidence that led her to conclude that Morgan
had sufficient residual work capacity to perform the job of a housecleaner. The ALJ
discussed the evaluations of Morgan’s treating psychiatrist, the testimony of an
independent medical expert, and the progress notes of Morgan’s social worker. In
addition, the ALJ specifically noted that she gave little weight to the assessment Morgan
now emphasizes because it was based on Morgan’s non-compliance with her treatment
program rather than mental status and because it was inconsistent with the treating
psychiatrist’s progress notes. The array of medical opinions in the record provides
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision, and the ALJ’s thorough analysis of
the evidence was sufficient to support her judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.
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