Laufgas v. Speziale , 263 F. App'x 192 ( 2008 )

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-4-2008
Laufgas v. Speziale
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-5062
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"Laufgas v. Speziale" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1644.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1644
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-5062
BERNARD LAUFGAS,
Appellant
v.
JERRY SPEZIALE, (INDIVIDUALLY & UNDER COLOR OF LAW);
CHARLES S. MEYERS, (INDIVIDUALLY & UNDER COLOR OF LAW);
BRIAN S. BENDEL, (INDIVIDUALLY & UNDER COLOR OF LAW);
M.D. MAGDY WAHBA, (INDIVIDUALLY & UNDER COLOR OF LAW);
HECTOR HERNANDEZ, (INDIVIDUALLY & UNDER COLOR OF LAW);
OMBUDSMAN, (INDIVIDUALLY & UNDER COLOR OF LAW, A FICTITIOUS
NAME FOR DESIGNATED EMPLOYED AS OMBUDSMAN AT THE PASSAIC
COUNTY JAIL); REGISTERED DIETICIAN, (INDIVIDUALLY & UNDER COLOR
OF LAW, A FICTITIOUS NAME FOR DESIGNATED EMPLOYEES AS THE
REGISTERED DIETICIAN IN THE PASSAIC COUNTY JAIL); MEDICAL STAFF,
(INDIVIDUALLY & UNDER COLOR OF LAW, A FICTITIOUS NAME FOR
EMPLOYEES & OR AGENTS OR SERVANTS OF DEFENDANT, AT THE PASSAIC
COUNTY JAIL); COUNTY OF PASSAIC, (INDIVIDUALLY & UNDER COLOR OF
LAW); SO HEE YOUNG, (EMPLOYED BY ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL); LIBRADA N.
LISING, (AN EMPLOYED OF ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL); STAFF MEMBERS, (A
FICTITIOUS NAME FOR DESIGNATED EMPLOYEES MEMBERS IN THEIR
FUNCTION AT ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL); ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-01697)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 1, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 4, 2008)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
Bernard Laufgas appeals pro se from the District Court’s entry of partial summary
judgment and from its entry of judgment on a jury verdict. For the reasons that follow,
we will affirm.1
I.
This matter arises from Laufgas’s four-month incarceration at the Passaic County
Adult Correctional Institution, where he was serving a sentence for contempt of court
during Chancery Division proceedings not relevant to the present appeal.2
Prior to his incarceration, Laufgas sent a letter to the Warden of the Passaic
County jail to notify the prison of his special needs. In the letter, Laufgas provided his
physician’s name, listed his daily medications and dietary restrictions, and indicated that
he would need access to the prison law library. Laufgas further noted that, “[i]f for some
reason you will deny me those basic Constitutional rights, I assure you, once I get out I
will institute legal action in the United States District Court against each of you, your
1
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
The full history of the underlying action is set forth in Amoresano v. Laufgas, 796
A.2d 164 (N.J. 2002).
2
department, and Passaic County.” (Compl., at Ex. A.)
Laufgas’s sentence began on February 8, 2002. Immediately upon his arrival at
the Passaic County prison, Laufgas was dissatisfied with the conditions of his
confinement. His primary complaint was that the prison failed to provide him with meals
tailored to his medical conditions; according to Laufgas, he could not tolerate salt, fried
foods, milk, eggs, coffee, or sugar. Because the Passaic County defendants failed to meet
these restrictions, Laufgas commenced a hunger and medication strike that lasted for
several days. In the following weeks, Laufgas carried out two more hunger and
medication strikes. After Laufgas’s third strike, prison officials took Laufgas to St.
Mary’s Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation.3
Over the course of his incarceration, Laufgas lodged various additional complaints,
including complaints about the law library, his prison cell, and his telephone access. In
the end, Laufgas filed approximately 150 Ombudsman Request Forms demanding various
personal items, privileges, or other treatment. Laufgas was released on April 14, 2002.
II.
On April 15, 2004, Laufgas filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey concerning the treatment he
received at the Passaic County jail. The complaint named as defendants the following
Passaic County employees: Jerry Speziale, Passaic County Sheriff; Charles S. Meyers,
3
Laufgas was temporarily transferred to the Ann Klein Forensic Center before he
returned to the Passaic County jail.
3
prison warden; Brian S. Bendel, deputy warden; Officer Hector Hernandez; and Magdy
Wahba, Director and Head Physician (the “Passaic County defendants”). The complaint
also named as defendants St. Mary’s Hospital and two doctors at St. Mary’s Hospital’s
Psychiatric Emergency Services (the “St. Mary’s defendants”).4
In the complaint, Laufgas first alleged that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his needs by: failing to honor his dietary restrictions; failing to provide two
hot meals a day; housing him in unsanitary conditions; denying him use of his pre-paid
phone card; subjecting him to second-hand smoke; depriving him of recreational
facilities; depriving him of proper bedding; depriving him of a shower and clean clothing;
and disposing of his personal belongings. Next, Laufgas alleged that his constitutional
rights were violated when he—a Jewish individual—was housed with individuals from
Arab countries and of Muslim faith. Laufgas further alleged that he was deprived of his
right of access to the courts because he was prevented from using the law library, the law
library was “outdated,” and he was denied use of his pre-paid phone card. In a related
claim, Laufgas alleged that his incoming mail was censored. Next, Laufgas stated claims
for “ombudsman abuse” and “denial of request for indigent status.” In his final three
claims, Laufgas alleged that he was forced to undergo an unwarranted psychiatric
evaluation, that the prison had conspired with St. Mary’s Hospital to deprive him of his
“basic human needs,” and that various supervisory employees at the prison were liable for
4
Laufgas also named several fictitious parties as defendants.
4
the alleged constitutional violations under a theory of respondeat superior.
After discovery had been completed, the Passaic County defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment. On August 31, 2006, following oral argument, the District Court
entered an order granting in part and denying in part the motion. Specifically, the District
Court dismissed with prejudice 13 of Laufgas’s 17 claims, but permitted four claims to
proceed. (App. at pp. 3-25.) Soon thereafter, the District Court dismissed the St. Mary’s
defendants from the suit.5 (App. at pp. 29-33.)
On October 30, 2006, a jury trial commenced on Laufgas’s remaining claims,
which appear to have been condensed into the following two issues: (1) whether the
Passaic County defendants acted with deliberate indifference and deprived Laufgas of a
special diet for his medical condition; (2) whether the Passaic County defendants
seriously deprived Laufgas of basic human necessities while incarcerated. (Verdict
Sheet.) On November 8, 2006, following a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict of
“no cause for action” in favor of the defendants. The present appeal followed.
III.
A. Claims Dismissed on Summary Judgment
Laufgas first appeals from the District Court’s August 31, 2006 summary
judgment order dismissing the majority of his claims. In its opinion, the District Court
5
Laufgas does not refer to this order in his notice of appeal or otherwise challenge it in
his appellate brief. Accordingly, we will not review the District Court’s order dismissing
the St. Mary’s defendants from the case.
5
found that Laufgas failed to provide sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment
on his claims that the Passaic County defendants violated his constitutional rights when
they: interfered with his access to the courts; exposed him to second-hand smoke; and
housed him with individuals from Arab countries and of Muslim faith. Next, the District
Court dismissed as frivolous Laufgas’s claims that the Passaic County defendants
violated his constitutional rights when they: failed to provide him two hot meals a day;
deprived him of his personal property; subjected him to an unwarranted psychiatric
evaluation; precluded him from using pre-paid phone cards to telephone home; denied
him use of recreational facilities; and generally conspired with St. Mary’s Hospital to
deprive him of his constitutional rights. The District Court also dismissed Laufgas’s
claims for “ombudsman abuse,” “denial of request for indigent form,” and “superior
respondent” on the ground that they were not separate causes of action.
We review a District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Pennsylvania
Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is proper
only if it appears “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Carrasca
v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 832-33 (3d Cir. 2002). If a motion for summary judgment
demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party must set
forth specific facts showing a genuine material issue for trial and may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Connors v. Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483,
489 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). We agree with the District Court’s
6
reasons for dismissing all of these claims, and will only summarize them here.
First, the District Court properly entered summary judgment against Laufgas on
his access to the courts claim. In the complaint, Laufgas alleged that he was unable to
submit a timely brief in his pending habeas action because he was prevented from using
the law library, the library collection was “outdated,” he was denied use of his pre-paid
phone card, and because the prison prevented him from receiving the paper and pencils
that a friend had mailed to him.6 According to Laufgas, this amounted to interference
with his constitutional right of access to the courts.
In order to survive summary judgment, however, Laufgas had to provide evidence
that he was actually injured by the Passaic County defendants’ alleged interference. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-55 (1996). Actual injury can be demonstrated by
showing that the defendants’ action hindered the prisoner’s ability to pursue a legal claim.
Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
Laufgas failed to provide any evidence that Judge Bassler’s decision to dismiss Laufgas’s
habeas petition was impacted by the belated filing of Laufgas’s brief. To the contrary,
Judge Bassler dismissed the petition because it wholly lacked merit. Therefore, we
believe the District Court properly granted summary judgment on this claim.7
6
The District Court treated Laufgas’s mail censorship claim as part of his claim that he
was denied access to the courts.
7
The record shows that Laufgas was able to correspond with Judge Bassler throughout
his incarceration to complain of his inability to file his brief on time. Indeed, due to
Laufgas’s complaints, Judge Bassler granted him an extension and then issued an order
7
We also agree with the District Court that Laufgas failed to provide a sufficient
evidentiary basis on which a jury could find in his favor on his allegation that he had been
harmfully exposed to second-hand cigarette smoke. In order to withstand summary
judgment on this claim, Laufgas had to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was
being exposed to dangerously high levels of environmental tobacco smoke, and whether
prison authorities were deliberately indifferent to his exposure. See Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-37 (1993). As the District Court found, Laufgas failed to
offer any evidence to support either prong under Helling.
Next, we address Laufgas’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated when
he was housed with individuals from Arab countries and of Muslim faith. According to
Laufgas, the Passaic County defendants deliberately deprived him of his constitutional
rights when they placed him with “detainees from Arab and or Muslim Countries, in a
hostile environment, since Plaintiff is a Jew and immigrated from Israel.” (Compl. at ¶
305.) Although prison authorities may, in very limited circumstances, “take into account
racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and jails,”
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506-07 (2005) (internal quotation omitted), Laufgas
failed to provide any evidence that the Passaic County defendants had reason to believe
that segregation was appropriate here. Therefore, we agree with the District Court that
the Passaic County defendants were entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well.
directing the prison to permit him to use the law library.
8
We also agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Laufgas’s claim that the
prison’s failure to provide two hot meals a day constituted a violation of his constitutional
rights. As the District Court stated, while prisoners are guaranteed a nutritionally
adequate diet under the Eighth Amendment, see Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 571
(10th Cir. 1980), there is no constitutional right to hot meals. See Brown-El v. Delo, 969
F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding frivolous prisoner’s claim that his constitutional
rights were violated when he was served cold food).
Next, the District Court properly dismissed Laufgas’s claim that prison officials
impermissibly disposed of his personal property, as a prisoner’s cause of action based on
unauthorized deprivation of property by a state actor is not actionable under section 1983
unless there is no adequate post-deprivation remedy available. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 542 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327(1986). As noted by the District Court, Laufgas failed to show that a conversion claim
under state law would have provided an inadequate remedy.
The District Court also correctly concluded that the Passaic County defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity for their decision to take Laufgas to St. Mary’s
Hospital for a psychological evaluation. A government official is entitled to qualified
immunity if his “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Berg v. County of Allegheny,
219 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). As the District Court
noted, Laufgas’s “indisputably strange behavior” gave prison officials ample reason to
9
request a psychiatric evaluation.
The District Court also properly dismissed Laufgas’s claim that he was deprived of
basic recreational facilities. The District Court concluded that although lack of physical
exercise can, under certain circumstances, constitute a constitutional violation, see
Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1031-32 (3d Cir. 1988), Laufgas did not allege facts
sufficient to make out a such a claim. Specifically, Laufgas failed to allege the amount of
exercise in which he engaged, the extent to which the Passaic County defendants
allegedly precluded exercise, or any specific physical injury resulting from lack of
exercise. Therefore, we agree with the District Court.8
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s entry of partial summary
judgment in favor of the Passaic County defendants.
B. Claims Dismissed Pursuant to Jury Verdict
In his appellate brief, Laufgas also challenges the jury’s verdict on his remaining
claims. Laufgas, however, fails to specify any points of error at the trial. Rather, he
merely re-argues the merits of his claims, and baldly states that the jury committed “plain
error.” Given that Laufgas fails to direct us to any errors, we have no reason to question
the jury’s verdict.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting partial
8
As for Laufgas’s remaining claims, we have carefully reviewed the record and agree
with the District Court’s disposition of these claims.
10
summary judgment. We will also affirm the District Court’s entry of judgment on the
jury verdict.
11