Yoder v. Good Will Steam Fire Engine Co ( 2018 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 18-2750
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CYNTHIA M. YODER,
Appellant
v.
GOOD WILL STEAM FIRE ENGINE COMPANY NO. 1, t/b/a Good Will Ambulance;
JSDC LAW OFFICES; JAMES SMITH; DIETERICK CONNELLY; CHABAL YAHN;
SEEBER TOMASKO; JAMES D. YOUNG
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-02693)
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 11, 2018
Before: VANASKIE, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 16, 2018)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Cynthia Yoder appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing her
complaint against the Good Will Steam Fire Engine Company, JSDC Law Offices, and
several of its attorneys. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
In her complaint, Yoder alleged that the Good Will Steam Fire Engine Company
failed to submit to Medicare a bill for ambulance services provided to her father, Rance
Strunk. The bill went unpaid, and, ultimately, the Good Will Steam Fire Engine
Company, through its attorneys, JSDC Law Offices, initiated a lawsuit in state court
against Strunk. In response, Yoder sued Good Will Steam Fire Engine Company, but
that state court case was dismissed as frivolous. Yoder asserted that, although she has
power of attorney for her father, she was “being prohibited to act on Mr. Strunk’s behalf”
in the state court litigation. Separately, Yoder appeared to challenge a sheriff’s sale of
her family’s home, asserting that it violated her constitutional rights, as well as those of
her father, her mother, and her son.
The District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint, holding that Yoder lacked
standing to raise claims on behalf of her family members, and that, even if her family
members were named as plaintiffs, Yoder could not represent them in federal court. With
respect to claims asserted on Yoder’s own behalf that challenged state court judgments,
the District Court held that they were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To the
extent that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply, the District Court stated that it
could not “discern any plausible basis for a claim that Yoder could bring against the
Defendants that would fall within this Court’s jurisdiction.” In addition, the District
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Court held that Yoder’s request to enjoin the sheriff’s sale was moot. Finally, the District
Court concluded any amendment of the complaint would be futile. Yoder appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Yoder’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis
supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
We agree with the District Court that Yoder could not assert claims on behalf of
her family members, over whom she claims to have power of attorney. Indeed, it is well
settled that an individual proceeding pro se may not represent third parties in federal
court. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 672 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also
Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that “prudential standing
requires that a litigant assert his or her own legal interests rather than those of a third
party.”). And although power of attorney may confer certain decision-making rights
under state law, it is sufficient by itself to allow a non-lawyer to litigate on behalf of
another in federal court. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664-65 (9th Cir.
2008). To the extent that Yoder’s claims were based on injuries she allegedly suffered as
a result of state court rulings entered against her before she commenced her federal suit,
the District Court properly determined that the claims were barred under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.1 See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615
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It is not clear from Yoder’s complaint whether the state court proceedings are ongoing.
If they are, Younger abstention would likely be required. See Anthony v. Council, 316
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F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives lower
federal courts of jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court
judgments). In addition, Yoder suggested that the sheriff’s sale violated her Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, but none of the named defendants are state actors. See
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“[t]o state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.”). Furthermore, to the extent that Yoder sought to raise
claims under state law, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction because all parties are
citizens of Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Finally, we agree that amendment of the
complaint would be futile. See Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 288,
292 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that “amendment of the complaint is futile if the
amendment will not cure the deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended
complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion to dismiss”).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Younger abstention is required if there are
continuing state proceedings which are judicial in nature, which implicate important state
interests, and which afford an adequate opportunity for the appellant to present her
federal claims).
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