Linda Guyden v. Prudential Life Ins , 331 F. App'x 915 ( 2009 )

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-5-2009
Linda Guyden v. Prudential Life Ins
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-3108
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"Linda Guyden v. Prudential Life Ins" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1225.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 08-3108
____________
LINDA GUYDEN
v.
PRUDENTIAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-00-cv-04563)
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 2, 2009
Before: McKEE, HARDIMAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 5, 2009)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a dispute between Linda Guyden and her employer,
Prudential Life Insurance Company. Guyden sued Prudential in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The
Honorable Alfred Lechner compelled arbitration at Prudential’s request. After the
arbitrator ruled in Prudential’s favor, Guyden moved to vacate the arbitration award
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). After Judge Lechner retired, this case was reassigned to
the Honorable Katharine Hayden. On July 15, 2008, Judge Hayden ordered limited
discovery to decide Guyden’s motion. Prudential appeals from that order.
Prudential asserts that we have jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(E),
which allows for appeals from orders “modifying, correcting, or vacating an [arbitration]
award.” We disagree. The District Court’s order did not vacate the arbitration award, but
merely ordered discovery so that it may later determine whether to vacate the award.
Though the District Court’s language indicated it was “grant[ing]” Guyden’s motion “in
part,” “the appealability of an order depends on its effect rather than its language.”
Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1167 (3d Cir. 1986). Although the
District Court’s order might be a prelude to a final order vacating or modifying the award,
it is not a final order vacating an arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 16.
Prudential asserted in its May 27, 2009 Rule 28j letter that jurisdiction lies because
the District Court has (1) “made clear that it intends to decide the enforceability of [the
arbitration] agreement,” and (2) “modified and vacated [the] arbitral decision” regarding
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the grant of discovery. With regard to the first argument, we agree that the District Court
has indicated that it intends to decide the enforceability of the arbitration agreement;
otherwise, there would be no reason to order discovery with regard to Guyden’s contract
defenses. However, by reviewing the enforceability of the agreement, the District Court
has not overturned the arbitrator’s decision; instead, it has effectively reconsidered Judge
Lechner’s decision of August 30, 2001, which held that the question of arbitrability was
to be decided by the arbitrator. In essence, Prudential asserts that the District Court
“intends” to decide the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, not that it has done so
already.
With regard to the second argument, we agree that the District Court’s order of
limited discovery on the issue of enforceability conflicts with the approach taken by the
arbitrator in his decision of December 3, 2004, which found the agreement to be
enforceable without the need for discovery. However, the December 3, 2004 interim
order cannot be fairly characterized as an “award.” Therefore, though the District Court’s
order of limited discovery conflicts with that decision, we decline to find that it
“modif[ied], correct[ed], or vacat[ed] an award.” The final arbitration award — indeed,
the only award in this case, dated February 16, 2007 — remains in place.
Accordingly, the District Court’s order of limited discovery does not confer
appellate jurisdiction, and we will dismiss Prudential’s appeal.
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