John Saranchuk v. Dan Lello ( 2019 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 18-3115
__________
JOHN SARANCHUK; JAMIE SARANCHUK; JOHN R. MACIOLEK; TAMMY
MACIOLEK; JASON KWIATKOWSKI; AMY KWIATKOWSKI;
CHARLES YARICK,
Appellants
v.
DAN LELLO, individually in his personal capacity and as Mayor of the Borough of
Dupont; STANLEY KNICK, Jr., individually in his personal capacity and as President of
the Council of the Borough of Dupont; MARK KOWALCZYK, individually in his
personal capacity, as Vice Chairperson of the Council of Dupont Borough and as head of
the Police Commission; JOSEPHINE HANSEN, individually in her personal capacity
and as a member of the Police Commission and Council of the Borough of Dupont;
BERNARD ZIELINSKI, individually in his personal capacity and as a member of the
Council of Dupont Borough; SEAN MURRAY, individually in his personal capacity and
as Chief of Police of the Borough of Dupont; BOROUGH OF DUPONT, Luzerne
County, Pennsylvania
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-15-cv-00893)
District Judge: Hon. Malachy E. Mannion
__________
Argued June 11, 2019
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 19, 2019)
Andrew J. Katsock, III [ARGUED]
15 Sunrise Drive
Wilkes-Barre, PA 18705
Attorney for Appellants
David J. MacMain [ARGUED]
Laurie A. Fiore
MACMAIN LAW GROUP LLC
433 West Market Street, Suite 200
West Chester, PA 19382
Attorneys for Appellees
__________
OPINION *
__________
PORTER, Circuit Judge.
Appellants are four police officers who worked for the Borough of Dupont,
Pennsylvania. They contend that, because they were members of the local police union,
the Borough either terminated their employments or severely cut their hours. And this
retaliation, they say, violated their property interests under the union’s collective
bargaining agreement with the Borough and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The District Court held that the Borough did not violate the officers’
procedural due process rights because the officers did not have constitutionally protected
property interests in their continued employment. We disagree. We will affirm in part,
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
2
reverse in part, and vacate in part the District Court’s decision and remand for further
consideration.
I1
John Saranchuk, John Maciolek, Jason Kwiatkowski, and Charles Yarick were
police officers with the Borough of Dupont, Pennsylvania. Each of them was a member
or officer of the Dupont Borough Police Officers’ Association (“Union”). The Union
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the Borough that was
effective from January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2016.
The Borough paid the officers by the hour and did not guarantee the officers any
number of work hours per week. None of the officers had employment contracts with the
Borough. Instead, their shifts were determined on a month-to-month basis by the Officer
in Charge, who, from early 2011 to August 2014, was Saranchuk. In general, the Officer
in Charge had absolute discretion to set the monthly schedule, prorating hours among
officers roughly by availability, seniority, and competency.
In August 2014, the Borough appointed Sean Murray to be the new Officer in
Charge of the Borough police department, replacing Saranchuk. Saranchuk was told not
to come back to work until further notice. A few days later, Saranchuk received notice
from the Borough Council to attend a “meeting … regarding a Luzerne County District
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise de novo review over the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing the facts in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, and applying the same standard that guides our district courts.”
Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
3
Attorney’s detective investigation.” Supp. App. 251. That meeting—which the Borough
called a “Loudermill hearing”—was rescheduled twice. Supp. App. 250–52. When
Saranchuk finally met with the Borough, he was told that the hearing had to be
rescheduled yet again and that he would be provided with written accusations against
him. He alleges that his employment was terminated shortly after that, without a hearing,
because of his association with the Union. The Borough contends that Saranchuk was
terminated for misconduct.
The other officers allege that the Borough similarly retaliated against them.
Maciolek asserts that his hours were cut within a few weeks of Murray’s appointment and
that he was terminated shortly thereafter. Kwiatkowski says that his hours were reduced
significantly, starting around October 2014, until he was “[e]ffectively” terminated in
May 2015. Supp. App. 527. And Yarick contends that his hours were repeatedly cut by
the Borough and eventually reduced to zero in early 2016. For its part, the Borough says
that Maciolek and Kwiatkowski were not actually terminated; they were simply not
scheduled for shifts because they were unresponsive or incompetent.
The officers sued the Borough, the Borough Council’s members, the Borough’s
mayor, and Sean Murray in May 2015, asserting a dozen claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and state
common law. 2 In particular, the officers alleged that the Borough violated their
procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating their
2
We refer to the various defendants-appellees collectively as simply the
“Borough.”
4
employments or significantly cutting their hours with no associated process. After some
discovery, the Borough moved for summary judgment.
Ultimately, the District Court rejected all the officers’ claims. As relevant here, the
District Court found that the Borough did not violate the officers’ procedural due process
rights because, under the CBA, the officers had no constitutionally protected property
interest in their continued employments. And, given that lack of a property interest, the
Court declined to “undertake an inquiry into the adequacy of the procedures that were
provided to the plaintiffs.” App. 22. The officers 3 timely appealed. 4
II
Our procedural due process analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we determine
whether the officers had a constitutionally protected property interest in their continued
employment. See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 177 (3d Cir. 2007). If the answer is
yes, “we then must decide what procedures constitute ‘due process of law’” and whether
3
The notice of appeal also names three of the officers’ spouses as Appellants.
App. 1. But the spouses do not challenge the District Court’s decisions on any of their
state-law claims. And the spouses have never asserted that they have constitutionally
protected property interests at issue here or that the Borough violated their due process
rights. So even though the spouses are putative appellants, they have no claims at issue in
this appeal.
4
The officers purported to appeal the District Court’s decision only as it related to
four of their twelve claims. At oral argument, the officers’ counsel conceded that they
contest the District Court’s judgment only on their procedural due process and Monell
claims. So we address only those claims in this opinion. (The officers’ other two claims
are meritless anyway. Their substantive due process claim fails for lack of a fundamental,
constitutionally protected property interest. See Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d
133, 139–41 (3d Cir. 2000). And their civil rights conspiracy claim fails because they
cannot show any evidence of “invidious” discrimination. See Farber v. City of Patterson,
440 F.3d 131, 134, 143 (3d Cir. 2006).)
5
the officers received such procedures. Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229
(3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Employees like the officers do not automatically have protected property interests
in their jobs. That is, they “must have a legitimate entitlement to [their] continued
employment,” and not merely a “unilateral expectation.” Wilson, 475 F.3d at 177
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether the officers had such an
entitlement turns on state law—here, Pennsylvania. See Kelly v. Borough of Sayreville,
107 F.3d 1073, 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (“State law creates the property rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). And because the officers disclaimed at oral argument any
reliance on Pennsylvania statutes, 5 their only resort is to the CBA. See Pipkin v. Pa. State
Police, 693 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. 1997) (“A governmental employee only has a personal or
property right in his employment where he can establish a legitimate expectation of
continued employment through either a contract or a statute.”).
Article 19, Section 1 of the CBA provides:
No full-time Police Officer or regular part-time Police Officer
covered by this Agreement shall be discharged, suspended or
demoted, or otherwise disciplined, except for just cause, and
5
The officers asserted in supplemental briefing that they also had constitutionally
protected property rights to their continued employments under the Pennsylvania
Borough Code and the Police Tenure Act. Appellant’s Supp. Letter Br. 2–3 (citing 53 Pa.
Stat. §§ 811, 812; 8 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1101). They expressly waived this contention at oral
argument, so we take no position on it here. We note, however, that whether the officers
would otherwise count as members of a “police force,” or whether they would be
excepted from that definition because they are “[e]xtra police serving from time or time
or on an hourly or daily basis,” 8 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1170(4), is an open question. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted a petition for certification on this issue in
DeForte v. Borough of Worthington, 189 A.3d 390 (Pa. 2018) (table).
6
the Borough shall state the reason for just cause, in writing, at
the same time such action is taken.
Supp. App. 778. Under our precedent, this provision creates a constitutionally protected
property interest in the officers’ continued employments. Wilson, 475 F.3d at 177 (“In the
governmental context, … employment contracts that contain a ‘just cause’ provision
create a property interest in continued employment.” (citing Kelly, 107 F.3d at 1077)
(other citation omitted)); Dee, 549 F.3d at 231; Unger v. Nat’l Residents Matching
Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that a constitutionally
protected “property interest arises where the contract itself includes a provision that the
state entity can terminate the contract only for cause”). Put simply, the CBA guaranteed
that the Borough could not “discharge[], suspend[] or demote[], or otherwise discipline[]”
the officers without “just cause.” Supp. App. 778. That guarantee is sufficient to confer a
constitutionally protected property interest.
Yet the contours of that interest are hazy. The Borough regularly emphasized to
the officers that they were not guaranteed any hours of work. And the CBA nowhere
guarantees hours either. So although the officers had an interest not to be “discharged,
suspended or demoted, or otherwise disciplined” without “just cause,” it is unclear
whether a reduction in not-guaranteed hours would impinge on that interest.
On remand, the District Court should take three steps. First, it should determine
whether, in view of the officers’ variable month-to-month schedules, the officers’
reduction in hours was a form of “discipline,” or was dramatic enough to constitute a
“demotion,” “suspension,” or constructive “discharge.” Supp. App. 778; see Ferraro v.
7
City of Long Branch, 23 F.3d 803, 806–07 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that “constructive
discharge” may constitute a deprivation of a protected property interest). If so, the Court
should next decide whether “extraordinary circumstances” rendered pre-deprivation
process infeasible. Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2011); see Dee, 549
F.3d at 233. And lastly, if an officer suffered only “discipline” or “demotion” under the
CBA, the Court should decide whether these adverse actions even trigger the Due Process
Clause’s protections as a matter of federal constitutional law. See Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005); see also, e.g., Perez v. Cucci, 725 F. Supp. 209, 243
(D.N.J. 1989) (finding property interest in not being demoted), aff’d mem., 898 F.2d 142
(3d Cir. 1990).
The Borough contends that “[n]o [p]rotections [a]ttach to [the officers] [u]nder
Article 19, Section 1” because the officers “waived their right[s] to proceed” under that
section by failing to complete the formal grievance process under the CBA. 6 Appellees’
Supp. Letter Br. 9–10. Put differently, the Borough thinks that because the officers did
not seek to validate their interests through arbitration under the CBA, they never had any
protected property interests in the first place. But this conflates the two parts of our
procedural due process analysis. First we examine whether a property interest exists; only
after answering that question do we turn to whether grievance procedures (if any) were
adequate or availed. Dee, 549 F.3d at 229. Our answer at the first step is not contingent
6
Article 19, Section 2 provides that “whether ‘JUST CAUSE’ exists” under
Section 1 “shall be subject to the grievance/arbitration procedure” in Article 17. Supp.
App. 778.
8
on whether, at the second step, the plaintiffs adequately pursued available procedures. In
short, whether the officers arbitrated their claims says nothing about whether the officers
had a property interest entitling them to pre-deprivation process.
The Borough’s waiver argument is incorrect anyway. The grievance procedure
under the CBA is designed to sort out “whether ‘JUST CAUSE’ exist[ed]” for the
Borough to take adverse employment action against an officer only after the fact. Supp.
App. 777–78. Yet, “absent extraordinary circumstances, due process requires notice and a
hearing prior to suspension without pay, even where union grievance procedures, after
the fact, fully compensate erroneously suspended employees.” Schmidt, 639 F.3d at 597;
see Dee, 549 F.3d at 233 (“Only in extraordinary situations where some valid
government interest is at stake is it permissible to postpone the hearing until after the
deprivation has already occurred.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Ordinarily, our next steps would be to determine whether the Borough in fact
infringed on the officers’ protected interests, and, if so, whether the officers received
sufficient pre-deprivation process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dee, 549
F.3d at 232–33; Wilson, 475 F.3d at 178–79. But because the District Court stopped at
step one, and given the remaining factual disputes in the record, we decline to take these
next steps here. See Dee, 549 F.3d at 233. Instead, we will simply reverse the District
Court’s initial determination that the officers lacked a constitutionally protected property
interest under the CBA and remand for consideration of the remaining Procedural Due
Process analysis consistent with this opinion.
9
To be clear, we take no position on whether the officers other than Saranchuk
were in fact “discharged, suspended or demoted, or otherwise disciplined” under Article
19. Supp. App. 778. Nor do we express an opinion on whether, assuming the officers’
property interests were derogated, the Borough afforded the officers sufficient due
process. The District Court is better suited to answer these questions in the first instance
on remand. And any conclusions by the fact-finder will inform the District Court’s legal
determination of what process each officer may have been due. See Midnight Sessions,
Ltd. v. City of Phila., 945 F.2d 667, 682–84 (3d Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds
by United Artists Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400–01 (3d Cir.
2003).
Finally, because the officers’ Monell claim may rise or fall with their procedural
due process claim under § 1983, we take no position on it here. We will vacate the
District Court’s decision on that claim and remand it as well.
* * * * *
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision on the officers’
substantive due process and conspiracy claims. We will reverse the District Court’s initial
determination that the officers had no constitutionally protected property interest under
the CBA. And we will vacate the District Court’s decision on the officers’ Monell claim.
We will remand the officers’ procedural due process and Monell claims to the District
Court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
10