American Western Home Insurance v. Donnelly Distribution, Inc. , 523 F. App'x 871 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-3753
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AMERICAN WESTERN HOME INSURANCE CO.,
Appellant,
v.
DONNELLY DISTRIBUTION, INC.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-11-cv-01415-BMS)
District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 18, 2013
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: April 26, 2013)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises out of an insurance contract dispute between Plaintiff-
Appellant, American Western Home Insurance Company (“American Western”), and
Defendant-Appellee, Donnelly Distribution, Inc. (“Donnelly”). The question before us is
whether, under Pennsylvania law, American Western has a duty to defend or indemnify
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Donnelly in connection with a civil action filed in Pennsylvania state court (“Underlying
Action”), under the terms of a Commercial General Liability policy it issued to Donnelly
(the “Policy”). The District Court held that it did.
I. Background
A. The Parties and the Underlying Action
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts relevant to
this appeal. Donnelly distributes newspapers, advertisements, and other paper circulars in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Donnelly purchased the Policy from American Western,
providing coverage for commercial tort liability and losses to commercial property. The
Policy contains a provision (the “Premises Provision”) restricting coverage to bodily
injuries “arising out of . . . [t]he ownership, maintenance or use” of 1301-05 N. Howard
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122 (“Howard Street Premises”) and operations
“necessary or incidental” to those premises. App. 32.1 Donnelly‟s Howard Street
Premises is a regional warehouse that serves as a drop point for Donnelly‟s distributors to
pick up materials and deliver them to designated neighborhoods.
In November 2007, Donnelly was sued by a woman who claimed that she was
injured when she slipped and fell on plastic ties that bind the materials Donnelly
distributes, and that its employees negligently discarded. The complaint in the
Underlying Action claimed that the accident occurred on the pavement near 5353 Saul
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The parties also dispute the effect of a provision excluding coverage for “„bodily injury‟
. . . due to the rendering or failure to render [the professional services of paper
distributing].” App. 69. Because we hold that the Premises Provision is dispositive of this
case, we do not reach that issue.
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Street. The parties do not contest that these premises are not the same as the Howard
Street Premises.
American Western agreed to fund Donnelly‟s defense of the Underlying Action
and appointed counsel, but reserved its rights and defenses under the Policy. Eventually,
American Western filed this action in the District Court seeking a declaratory judgment
that the Premises Provision bars coverage of the Underlying Action and that American
Western is under no duty to fund Donnelly‟s defense of, nor to indemnify Donnelly for,
any loss resulting from the Underlying Action. A settlement was reached in the
Underlying Action while this case was pending in the District Court.
B. Proceedings in the District Court
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted
Donnelly‟s motion. The Court concluded that the Premises Provision did not bar
coverage of the Underlying Action, and held that American Western had a duty to defend
Donnelly. It also concluded that because the Underlying Action settled, American
Western had a duty to indemnify Donnelly for amounts Donnelly may be obligated to pay
under the terms of that settlement. American Western timely appealed.
II. Discussion
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court‟s entry of summary
judgment de novo and apply “the same standard as the District Court in determining
whether summary judgment was appropriate.” United States ex rel. Kosneske v. Carlisle
HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009).
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A. Pennsylvania Law on Insurance Contracts
A Pennsylvania court tasked with determining the scope of coverage of an
insurance policy must examine the plain language of the policy to infer the intent of the
parties. Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 540 (Pa. 2010). If
the policy contains any ambiguities, they are construed against the insurer. Id. Where the
policy contains clear and unambiguous language, however, the court is required to give
effect to that language. Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir.
2005).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that an insurer has the duty to
defend an insured if the factual allegations of the Underlying Action “on [their] face
encompass an injury that is actually or potentially within the scope of the policy.” Jerry’s
Sport Ctr., 2 A.3d at 541. If the insurer is doubtful as to whether the complaint may or
may not fall within the scope of the policy, it is obligated to defend the insured. Id. By
contrast, the duty to indemnify is narrower, and only arises as to those losses that are
actually within the policy‟s coverage. Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman &
Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 831 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995).
B. Duty to Defend
The parties agree that American Western has a duty to fund Donnelly‟s defense of
the Underlying Action unless the injury at issue in that action is found to be outside the
scope of the injuries covered by the Premises Provision. Donnelly argues that the injury
at issue in the Underlying Action is within the scope of the Premises Provision because it
arose out of the “operations necessary or incidental to the [Howard Street Premises].”
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Ohio App. 32. Donnelly contends that this is so because the injury was caused by the plastic
ties that bind Donnelly‟s papers, which are connected to the paper distribution activities
that are conducted at least in part out of the Howard Street Premises pick-up point.
We reject Donnelly‟s broad reading of the Premises Provision. That Provision
explicitly limits coverage to injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of
the Howard Street Premises, and limits the type of covered operations to those necessary
or incidental to those premises. Donnelly‟s reading in effect means that any accident,
occurring anywhere, that may be somehow connected to Donnelly‟s paper distribution
business is covered by the Policy simply because the Howard Street Premises are used as
a pick up point in that business and are mentioned explicitly in the Policy‟s Premises
Provision. But, based on the plain terms of the Premises Provision, we doubt that the
parties intended a reference to one distribution center to trigger coverage for losses
resulting from the entirety of Donnelly‟s business. Had the parties intended to provide for
business-wide coverage, they surely would have found a clear way to say so, rather than
by including an oblique reference to one particular (and seemingly random) distribution
center.
The court in Colony National Insurance Company v. Hing Wah Chinese Rest., 546
F. Supp. 2d 202 (E.D. Pa. 2008), persuasively explained the proper scope of coverage of
a clause like the Premises Provision. In Hing Wah, an insurer brought an action seeking a
determination that it had no duty to defend or indemnify an insured restaurant in an
underlying action involving a car accident with the restaurant‟s food delivery driver. Id.
at 204-05. The policy there insured the location of the restaurant and contained a
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premises provision identical in all material respects to the one at issue here, providing
that “„[t]he insurance applies only to . . . injury . . . arising out of . . . [t]he ownership,
maintenance or use of the premises in . . . operations necessary or incidental to those
premises.‟” Id. at 209 n.10. Relying on Pennsylvania law, the district court construed the
premises provision as excluding accidents that occurred due to the restaurant‟s delivery
business, reasoning that the phrase “necessary or incidental” referred to the premises that
were the subject of the policy and not the restaurant‟s business. Id. The court
distinguished the act of delivering food for a restaurant business from activities that
would classify as necessary or incidental to the operations of the specifically listed
premises, such as food preparation and maintenance of the parking area, taking delivery
of a new refrigerator, and shoveling snow from the entrance. Id.
We adopt the Hing Wah court‟s analysis. The Premises Provision by its terms only
contemplates coverage of operations that are necessary or incidental to the insured
premises, not the entirety of Donnelly‟s business operations. The Underlying Action
involves an accident allegedly caused by the negligent disposal of plastic ties at a location
other than the Howard Street Premises, an activity not necessary for the operation of the
Howard Street Premises. Moreover, such activity is incidental to Donnelly‟s business, not
to the Howard Street Premises. The Underlying Action does not involve an accident
where, for example, an individual was injured while receiving a delivery of machinery
for use at the insured premises. Thus, the necessary causal relationship between the
Underlying Action and the insured premises is not present and American Western does
not have a duty to defend Donnelly in connection with the Underlying Action.
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C. Duty to Indemnify After Settlement
Donnelly also argues that under our decision in Pacific Indemnity v. Linn, 766
F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1985), American Western has a duty to indemnify Donnelly because
the Underlying Action settled while American Western was believed to have a duty to
defend Donnelly.
In Linn we held that the duty to indemnify followed the duty to defend where
settlement of an underlying action involving multiple theories of liability and several
competing insurers made it impossible to determine which of the multiple insurers had a
duty to indemnify. Linn, 766 F.2d at 766. However, unlike Linn, this case involves only
one insurer and liability is based on a single theory. There is nothing to indicate that in
this case settlement made it impossible to determine whether coverage under the Policy
was warranted. Linn is therefore inapposite. See, e.g., 12th Street Gym, Inc. v. Gen. Star
Indemn. Co., 93 F.3d 1158, 1167 (3d Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Linn where the insured
participated in the settlement of the underlying case).
Moreover, Pennsylvania courts have explicitly rejected Donnelly‟s expansive
reading of Linn, and explained that there is no blanket rule giving rise to a duty to
indemnify where the insured settles the underlying action. See, e.g., Regis Ins. Co. v. All
Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 976 A.2d 1157, 1161 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). To the contrary,
Pennsylvania courts have made clear that the very purpose of filing a declaratory action
in an insurance dispute such as this is to determine whether a duty to indemnify exists in
the first place. Id. at 1161. In this case, because we hold that American Western does not
have a duty to defend Donnelly in connection with the Underlying Action, it follows that
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American Western does not have a duty to indemnify Donnelly for any amount due
pursuant to the settlement of the Underlying Action.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court.
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