Albert Robinson v. Section 23, Property Owners ( 2019 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-1081
__________
ALBERT ROBINSON,
Appellant
v.
SECTION 23, PROPERTY OWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC.;
KEATHEL CHAUNCEY, Esq. as Trustee; FRESH LEGAL PERSPECTIVE PL;
ELLIE TENG; SCOTT HUNDLEY; ZACHARY HEATHCOTE;
SUZANNE BARNHART; STAN WISNIEWSKI; BRUCE EMERSON;
BONAFIDE PROPERTIES, LLC; JAMES SHAEFER; JOHN MCNAMARA;
STEVEN JOSEPH BUTCHER; JAMIE ELAINE MILLER;
DAVID MELVIN; DEVIN CRAIG SHULER; JASON MATLOY;
DAVID KEITH OAKS; AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY;
THE LAW FIRM OF HENDERSON, FRANKLIN, STARNES & HOLT;
RICHARD BARTON AKIN, II, Esquire; MICHAEL PAUL VERSNIK;
JANE AND JOHN DOE HERNANDEZ; PATRICIA SCHAEFER;
CHELSEA SMITH-SCOTT; CURTRIGHT COLLINS TRUITT;
JOHN DOE THIEF; THE LAW FIRM OF CURTRIGHT C. TRUITT PA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-09384)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 23, 2019
Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 25, 2019)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Albert Robinson alleges that he is a Texan living in Georgia. He filed in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey an amended complaint naming
as defendants a collection of Florida-based law firms and lawyers, as well as other
Florida-based individuals and entities (collectively, “Defendants”).1 Robinson purported
to raise claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),
various federal civil rights statutes, Florida’s “Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices
Act,” and unspecified state tort and contract law.
The animating theory of Robinson’s claims is that Defendants “set about
fraudulently exploiting the Plaintiff, his family, numerous elderly handicapped seniors,
banks and the federal government in a criminal scheme that has been in effect for 20
years,” resulting in the foreclosure and ultimate sale of his mother’s home in Punta
Gorda, Florida. Robinson alleged that many of his personal belongings (e.g., “firearms
and ammunition,” “prototypes”) were taken during the foreclosure process. He also
alleged that Defendants interfered with his many business ventures (e.g., “The Plaintiff
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Three of the Defendants are based outside of Florida. Specifically, Robinson alleged
that defendant Zachary Heathcote is a citizen of North Carolina, that defendant Steven
Joseph Butcher is a citizen of Washington, and that defendant Auto-Owners Insurance
Company “is a corporate resident of the State of Michigan.”
2
was engaged in supplying police equipment to the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago Police
Force to fight in the war on drugs.”).
Just about all of the Defendants moved to dismiss Robinson’s action for lack of
personal jurisdiction. And the District Court determined that it could not, consistent with
due process, exercise personal jurisdiction in this case.
The District Court accurately surveyed the law of personal jurisdiction, including
the “minimum contacts” standard from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945), and the tests for “general” and “specific” jurisdiction. Cf. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco County, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779–80
(2017). The District Court concluded that Robinson failed to show that any of the
Defendants “had or has any contact with New Jersey whatsoever, let alone ‘minimum
contacts.’” DC Op. at 11. The District Court concluded as well that Robinson had “failed
to provide any proof that his claims are related to or arise out of activities by Defendants
that took place in New Jersey, and he has failed to provide any proof that Defendants
have conducted ‘continuous and systematic’ business activities in New Jersey.” DC Op.
at 11; see also DC Op. at 11 (“Defendants are all Florida or out-of-state individuals or
entities involved in the alleged fraud scheme that arose in Florida and allegedly
victimized Plaintiff in Florida by depriving him of a tenancy in his mother’s Florida
home.”).
The District Court rejected Robinson’s various arguments in opposition to
dismissal. For instance, the District Court rejected the argument that personal jurisdiction
could be conferred on Defendants either because Robinson’s mother currently resides in
3
New Jersey, or because she had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in New Jersey and had
identified the Florida property as an asset in her bankruptcy schedules.2 In addition, the
District Court rejected Robinson’s argument that Defendants had agreed to personal
jurisdiction by virtue of a so-called “Terms and Conditions” document created solely by
Robinson that he had displayed at the entrance to his mother’s home in Florida.
The District Court then turned to a motion for sanctions against Robinson under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, filed by several Defendants. Earlier in its opinion, the District Court
had observed that Robinson filed many cases involving his mother’s Florida residence
“against the same Defendants here and others in Florida state court, the Middle District of
Florida, the Southern District of Florida, and New Jersey state court.” The results of this
filing fusillade, noted the District Court, included the entry of a litigation-preclusion
order against Robinson in Florida (and perhaps in Texas as well). Based on that litigation
history, Defendants argued in their motion that “Robinson’s decision to bring an action
that is essentially identical to the ones he is barred from bringing in Florida is a clear
attempt to relitigate unsuccessful claims in a new and improper forum.” DC Op. at 21.
The District Court denied the sanctions motion. The District Court explained that
it could not consider the substance of the sanctions motion because the moving
Defendants had failed to comply with the second of Rule 11(c)(2)’s two procedural
2
The bankruptcy trustee apparently abandoned the Florida property (as an asset) based
on its “inconsequential value,” due to “the nominal difference between the outstanding
mortgage lien and the property’s value.” DC Op. at 14.
4
requirements, i.e. the requirement “to serve Plaintiff with their motion and provide the
21-day notice period before filing the motion.” DC Op. at 23.
However, noting that Robinson had recently filed three similar cases in the District
of New Jersey concerning the allegedly massive fraud and conspiracy involving his
mother’s Florida property, the District Court considered whether Robinson’s conduct
made it appropriate to enter a filing injunction using its power under the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).3 The District Court ultimately found that “an injunction against
Plaintiff from litigating his claims concerning the money laundering fraud scheme against
any defendant he believes is liable for that scheme without first obtaining permission
from this Court may be warranted.” DC Op. at 28.
Accordingly, in addition to dismissing Robinson’s case for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the District Court ordered Robinson to show cause why a filing injunction
should not be entered. Robinson responded to the show-cause order only by rehashing
his arguments regarding personal jurisdiction. Robinson then appealed.4
3
The three similar cases that Robinson filed in the District of New Jersey are (1) the
instant one, (2) a case that Robinson ultimately dismissed voluntarily, and (3) a case that
is the subject of a separate appeal by Robinson (C.A. No. 19-1310).
4
After Robinson filed his Notice of Appeal, the District Court entered an order imposing
on him the filing injunction described in the order dismissing the case. Robinson did not
appeal the filing injunction order, nor did he attempt to challenge it in his opening brief,
so we will not review it.
5
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo whether the
District Court properly dismissed Robinson’s case on personal jurisdiction grounds. See
Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 205, 223 n.90 (3d Cir. 2016).
In arguing that the District Court erred in its analysis of personal jurisdiction,
Robinson initially relies on 18 U.S.C. § 1965, a statute that contains RICO’s venue and
service-of-process provisions. See Br. at 10-11. Robinson argues, specifically, that
personal jurisdiction can be established over defendant David Melvin, Esq.—and thus
over all other defendants—pursuant to § 1965 because Melvin is an attorney that, while
Florida-based, is licensed to practice law in New Jersey.5 Defendants, to the extent they
are participating in this appeal, take the position that we cannot reach the merits of
5
Under § 1965(a), a RICO action may be filed in any federal district court “in which [a
defendant] resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.” A RICO defendant
residing outside of the filing district may by summons (and the aid of a United States
marshal) be haled to court if “it is shown that the ends of justice [so] require,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1965(b), or instead may be served with other process in any district “in which such
person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs,” 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d). For
his specific argument, Robinson relies on the holdings of several courts of appeal that the
foregoing provisions of § 1965 establish that “[w]hen a civil RICO action is brought in a
district court where personal jurisdiction can be established over at least one defendant,
summonses can be served nationwide on other defendants if required by the ends of
justice.” Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1998); Butcher’s
Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986); FC Inv. Grp.
LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But see ESAB
Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626-27 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 1965
abrogates the “minimum contacts” requirement of International Shoe); Republic of
Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 948 (11th Cir. 1997)
(same). For purposes of addressing Robinson’s argument only, we will assume, without
deciding, that Robinson’s reading of § 1965 is the correct one.
6
Robinson’s § 1965 argument because it is raised for the first time on appeal. Cf. K.D. ex
rel. Dunn v. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2018).
While Defendants’ position is counterfactual, see, e.g., ECF 31 at 25-27; ECF 81-
1 at 10; ECF 91-1 at 12; ECF 116 at 9-11, Robinson’s argument nevertheless fails on the
merits. The mere fact that Melvin at some point obtained a license to practice law in
New Jersey, unaccompanied by any evidence or indication that he ever practiced law or
otherwise conducted business in New Jersey, is insufficient to demonstrate the “minimum
contacts” required for the District Court to exercise personal jurisdiction. See Katz v.
Katz, 707 A.2d 1353, 1356 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (“[D]efendant’s license to
practice law in this state does not afford a basis to exercise in personam jurisdiction over
him in a matter totally unrelated to his professional license. * * * We agree with the
views expressed in Lebkuecher v. Loquasto, [389 A.2d 143, 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)],
in which the court said ‘[t]he mere possession of a license accomplishes nothing in the
way of pecuniary gain; it only broadens opportunities for such gain. It is the actual
practice of a profession in Pennsylvania and not the possession of the right to practice
that brings a person within the jurisdiction of a ... [c]ourt ....’ ” (collecting cases,
emphasis added, citations omitted)); cf. Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that defendant law partners and partnership lacked requisite minimum
contacts with Indiana where sole contact was a partner’s trip to Indiana on one occasion
to take depositions in a case unrelated to the controversy at issue).
Robinson next argues that the District Court could have exercised personal
jurisdiction over defendant David Oaks, Esq. under the criminal mail fraud statute, see 18
7
U.S.C. § 1341, because Oaks “has been using the U.S. Postal Service to run the fraud
scheme in [New Jersey] for the past twenty five (25) years and has mailed to my Mother
and me, in [New Jersey], material used in [the Florida foreclosure case] to steal our
home.” Br. at 15. Defendants again take the position that this argument is waived due to
Robinson’s failure to raise it below, and Defendants are again incorrect. See, e.g., ECF 31
at 25; ECF 116 at 9. Robinson’s ‘personal jurisdiction via § 1341’ argument, however, is
wholly without merit. See generally Laupot v. Berley, 865 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1988) (per
curiam); cf. Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir.
1999) (“[W]e agree with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and hold that Congress did not
intend to create a private right of action in enacting either the mail or wire fraud
statutes.”).
Robinson also argues that the District Court should not have dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction his action against certain pro se Defendants (“the pro se
Defendants”) who chose to answer the first amended complaint, see ECF 52 (‘Answer’ of
Stanley Wisniewski), or instead filed motions to dismiss that did not clearly raise the
issue of personal jurisdiction, see ECF 95 (‘Motion to Dismiss’ of Devin Craig Schuler);
ECF 102 (‘Motion to Dismiss’ of Jamie Elaine Miller and Steven Joseph Butcher). See
Br. at 15-16. We recognize that “a court may not sua sponte dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction,” Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1969), regardless of whether
the plaintiff (like Robinson here) is proceeding in forma pauperis, see Sinwell v. Shapp,
536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976). That said, we will not send this case back to the District
Court, as the claims against the pro se Defendants are completely lacking in merit. See
8
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) (“[A] suit may sometimes be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes . . .
is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”).
None of Robinson’s remaining arguments on appeal persuade us that the District
Court committed reversible error in this case. Accordingly, for substantially the reasons
given in the District Court’s opinion regarding dismissal, we will affirm.
9