Doug Grant Inc v. Greate Bay Hotel , 232 F.3d 173 ( 2000 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2000 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    11-2-2000
    Doug Grant Inc v. Greate Bay Hotel
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 98-5291
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000
    Recommended Citation
    "Doug Grant Inc v. Greate Bay Hotel" (2000). 2000 Decisions. Paper 230.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/230
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    Filed November 2, 2000
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 98-5291
    DOUG GRANT, INC., RICHARD ANDERSEN, JUDY L.
    BINTLIFF, LYNN V. BOHSEN, THOMAS M. BOLICK,
    MICHAEL BONN, ROLAND BRYANT, SR., EUGENE
    CLAUSER, ELMER CONOVER, SCOTT CONOVER,
    JOSEPH CURRAN, DINO D'ANDREA, MARK F. D'ANDREA,
    WARREN DAVENPORT, FRANK DELIA, KAREN DWYER,
    DENNIS F. FOREMAN, ROSEMARIE FRANCIS, STEPHEN
    FREEL, STAVROS GEORGIOU, KENNETH GROSS, ADIB
    HANNAH, G. HASSAN HATTINA, LEROY N. JORDAN,
    ROMAN KERN, RICHARD H. KESSEL, SCOTT KLEE,
    JEFFREY S. KRAH, KATHLEEN E. LANE-BOURGEOIS,
    THOMAS J. LOTITO, JR., JAMES MACELROY, MAR TIN
    MALTER, STANLEY P. MCANALL Y, ANNE T.
    MCGOWAN-NOVAK, EUGENE L. MISERENDINO, DANIEL
    G. NAUROTH, MATTHEW S. PELLENBERG, DANIEL
    PILONE, STEPHEN F. PINCIOTTI, ROBERT E. PROUT,
    MARTIN ROSE, LYNN RUFO, VINCENT SALEK, ARLEN
    SCHWERIN, JOSEPH SCIOSCIA, WILLIAM F. STRAUSS,
    DOUGLAS G. TELMAN, AINO TOMSON, ANTS TOMSON,
    THOMAS TOMSON, LINWOOD C. UPHOUSE, DOLORES
    VALANCY, ANDREW R. VARDZAL, JR., GRANT DOUGLAS
    VON REIMAN, KENNETH J. WARNER, STEVEN W ATTERS,
    PAUL V. YANNESSA, DOUG GRANT COLLEGE OF
    WINNING BLACKJACK, INC., SIGMA RESEARCH, INC.,
    BETA MANAGEMENT, INC., FA VORABLE SITUATIONS
    ONLY INC., t/a DOUG GRANT INSTITUTE OF WINNING
    BLACKJACK, JAN C. MUSZYNSKI, LINDA TOMPSON,
    Appellants
    v.
    GREATE BAY CASINO CORPORATION, GREA TE BAY
    HOTEL AND CASINO t/a SANDS HOTEL AND CASINO,
    SANDS HOTEL AND CASINO, HILTON HOTELS
    CORPORATION, GNOC CORP. t/a "A TLANTIC CITY
    HILTON," ATLANTIC CITY HILTON, BALLY'S PARK PLACE,
    INC. t/a "BALLY'S PARK PLACE," BALLY'S PARK PLACE,
    ITT CORPORATION, ITT CORPORATION NV , CAESAR'S
    WORLD, INC. a/k/a "CAESAR'S ATLANTIC CITY ,"
    CAESAR'S WORLD, CLARIDGE HOTEL & CASINO CORP .,
    CLARIDGE AT PARK PLACE, INC., HARRAH'S
    ENTERTAINMENT, INC., MARINA ASSOCIATES d/b/a
    "HARRAH'S CASINO HOTEL", HARRAH'S CASINO HOTEL,
    SUN INTERNATIONAL NORTH AMERICA INC., SUN
    INTERNATIONAL HOTELS LTD., RESORTS
    INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC., RESORTS CASINO
    HOTEL, SHOWBOAT, INC., SHOWBOAT , AZTAR
    CORPORATION, ADAMAR OF NEW JERSEY, INC.,
    (formerly Trop World Casino and Entertainment Resort)
    t/a TROPICANA CASINO AND RESORT, TROPICANA
    CASINO AND RESORT, TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO
    RESORTS, INC., TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO RESOR TS
    HOLDINGS, L. P., TRUMP ATLANTIC CITY A SSOCIATES,
    TRUMP PLAZA ASSOCIATES, L. P., TRUMP P LAZA
    ASSOCIATES, TRUMP PLAZA HOTEL AND CASINO,
    TRUMP TAJ MAHAL ASSOCIATES, TRUMP T AJ MAHAL
    CASINO RESORT, THE TRUMP ORGANIZA TION, INC.,
    TRUMP'S CASTLE ASSOCIATES, L. P., TRUM P CASTLE
    ASSOCIATES, TRUMP MARINA CASINO HOTEL RESOR T,
    formerly Trump's Castle Casino Resort, JOHN DOES
    1-100, GRIFFIN INVESTIGATIONS, INTERNATIONAL
    CASINO SURVEILLANCE NETWORK, L. P.,
    SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION NETWORK, JOHN DOES
    101-200, F. MICHAEL DAILY, ESQ., QUINLAN, DUNNE,
    DAILY & HIGGINS, ELLEN BARNEY BALINT, MERANZE &
    KATZ, CAPLAN & LUBER, LLOYD S. MARKIND, ESQ.,
    RICHARD L. CAPLAN, ESQ., SHARON MORGAN, ESQ.,
    MICHELE DAVIS, ESQ.
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civ. No. 97-04291)
    District Judge: Honorable Joseph E. Irenas
    Argued October 5, 2000
    BEFORE: NYGAARD, GREENBERG and COWEN,
    Circuit Judges
    2
    (Filed: November 2, 2000)
    Howard A. Altschuler (argued)
    66 Saltonstall Parkway
    East Haven, CT 06512
    Attorney for Appellants
    Frederick H. Kraus
    Sands Hotel & Casino
    Indiana Avenue & Brighton Park
    Atlantic City, NJ 08401
    Attorney for Appellees
    Greate Bay Casino, Greate
    Bay Hotel and Sands Hotel
    and Casino
    Adam N. Saravay (argued)
    Tompkins, McGuire,
    Wachenfeld & Barry, LLP
    4 Gateway Center
    Newark, NJ 07102
    Attorneys for the Trump Casino
    Appellees and Co-Counsel for the
    Remaining Casino Appellees and
    Griffin Investigations
    John M. Donnelly (argued)
    Levine, Staller, Sklar, Chan,
    Brodsky, & Donnelly, P.A.
    3030 Atlantic Ave.
    Atlantic City, NJ 08401
    Attorneys for Casino Appellees
    (other than the Trump Casino
    Defendants) and Griffin
    Investigations
    3
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    This matter comes on before this court on appeal from an
    order entered on May 1, 1998, partially dismissing this
    action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to
    state a claim on which relief can be granted. 1 See Doug
    Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 
    3 F. Supp. 2d 518
    (D.N.J. 1998). The appellants had instituted this action in
    the Superior Court of New Jersey but the appellees r emoved
    it to the district court. Consequently, when the district
    court entered the Rule 12(b)(6) order it r emanded
    appellants' state-law claims that it did not addr ess to the
    Superior Court. In view of the procedural posture of this
    case, we treat the allegations of fact in the complaint as
    true, and consider them in a light most favorable to the
    appellants.2
    The individual appellants are blackjack players who have
    frequented Atlantic City casinos operated by the casino
    appellees. Of the 60 individual appellants, all but six have
    developed card-counting skills for playing blackjack
    enabling them to reduce or eliminate the nor mal odds in
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. In our extensive Introduction and at other places in our opinion, we
    essentially have tracked the district court's compr ehensive opinion. We
    also note that the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Campione v. Adamar
    of N. J., Inc., 
    714 A.2d 299
    , 301, 305-06 (N.J. 1998), discussed the
    countermeasures the New Jersey Casino Control Commission has
    allowed the casinos to take against card-counters. Of course, the
    casinos' use of these countermeasures is at the heart of this case.
    2. Inasmuch as the complaint references and relies on the content of
    certain documents, we consider them on this appeal. See Churchill v.
    Star Enter., 
    183 F.3d 184
    , 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999); Rose v. Bartle, 
    871 F.2d 331
    , 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). Indeed, this case is unusual as the
    appendix consists of four volumes and thus is of a length which might
    be expected on an appeal from a summary judgment rather than on
    appeal from a motion to dismiss.
    4
    favor of the casinos and, indeed, to turn the odds in their
    favor. The corporate appellants are associated with
    appellant Doug Grant, Inc., a New Jersey corporation,
    whose predecessor corporations operated car d-counting
    schools and mock casinos established by the appellant,
    Doug Grant, a renowned card-counter . Doug Grant, Inc.
    also provided the training for several cooperative player
    groups, including many of the appellants her e, who pooled
    their financial resources and agr eed to share their
    blackjack winnings.
    A. The Play of Blackjack, Card-Counting and Shuffling-
    At-Will and Other Countermeasur es
    The gravamen of appellants' complaint is that the casinos
    have taken countermeasures that the appellants regard as
    illegal to eliminate the advantage that a skilled card-
    counter may have over them in playing blackjack, the one
    casino game in which a player's skill may incr ease his
    chance of winning to the point of eliminating the winning
    odds in favor of the "house." See Campione v. Adamar of N.
    J., Inc., 
    714 A.2d 299
    , 301 (N.J. 1998). Car d-counters use
    intellect and memory to identify the time during the course
    of play when a player's odds of winning are better or worse.
    Thus, the individual appellants allege that the casinos have
    impaired their ability to win money from the casinos in
    blackjack. The corporate appellants allege that their schools
    and mock casinos were forced to close as a result of the
    casinos' countermeasures against car d-counters, and
    because of bomb threats, break-ins, destruction of
    property, theft of student lists, stalking and other
    intimidation tactics.
    It is necessary for us partially to describe how blackjack
    games are run in order to put appellants' allegations in
    context. Blackjack is played with decks containing 52 cards
    of four suits (hearts, diamonds, clubs and spades) with
    each suit containing 13 cards (Ace, King, Queen, Jack, 10,
    9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2). See N.J.A.C. S 19:46-1.17. Before a
    blackjack game starts, the dealer receives one or more,
    usually between six to eight, card decks fr om a casino
    supervisor and inspects them in the presence of the
    floorperson. See 
    id. S 19:47-2.4(a).
    After inspecting the
    cards, the dealer takes them to a blackjack table and
    5
    spreads them out in a fan, face upward, for visual
    inspection by the first player or players to arrive at the
    table. See 
    id. S 19:47-2.4(b).
    After these players are afforded
    an opportunity to inspect the cards, the dealer turns them
    face downward on the table, mixes them thor oughly, and
    shuffles them until they are "randomly intermixed." The
    dealer then places the cards into a stack. See 
    id. S 19:47-
    2.4(c); 
    id. S 19:47-
    2.5(a). After the shuffling is completed,
    the dealer asks the player seated at a particular position at
    the table, as defined by the regulations of the Casino
    Control Commission ("CCC"), the casino r egulatory agency,
    
    id. 19:47-2.5(e), to
    cut the deck. See 
    id. S 19:47-
    2.5(b). The
    player cuts the deck by placing a plastic cutting card in the
    stack at least ten cards from either end. See 
    id. S 19:47-
    2.5(c).
    Once the player has inserted the cutting car d, the dealer
    takes all the cards in front of the cutting card and places
    them at the back of the stack. See 
    id. S 19:47-
    2.5(d). The
    dealer then takes the entire stack of shuffled cards and
    cuts and aligns it along the side of the dealing shoe which
    has a mark on its side enabling the dealer to insert the
    cutting card so that it is in a position "at least
    approximately" one-quarter of the way fr om the back of the
    stack. See 
    id. S 19:47-
    2.5(d); 
    id. S 19:46-1.19(d)(4).
    The
    dealer then inserts the stack of cards into the dealing shoe
    for commencement of play. See 
    id. S 19:47-
    2.5(d). The cards
    behind the cutting card will not be used during the game.
    Once play has commenced the dealer deals the car ds to
    the players in a series of hands until the dealer r eaches the
    cutting card. When the dealer reaches the cutting card, the
    dealer repeats the shuffling process and cutting procedures
    described above. See 
    id. S 19:47-
    2.5(h).
    A blackjack player's object is to reach as close as possible
    to a total card value of 21 without exceeding that value. A
    player exceeding 21 loses regardless of the dealer's
    subsequently acquired hand. Persons in the casino
    industry and card-counters have come to r ecognize that, in
    a player's endeavor to reach a value as close as possible to
    21, certain cards are more favorable to the player and
    certain cards are more favorable to the dealer. In particular,
    appellants assert that the Ace, King, Queen, Jack and Ten
    6
    are favorable to a player, but the 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2 are
    favorable to the dealer and thus to the house. The 7, 8, and
    9 are said to be neutral. At any point during the play, the
    cards in a shoe can contain more player -favorable cards or
    more dealer-favorable cards. When there are more player-
    favorable cards, a player's chances of winning are increased
    but when there are more dealer -favorable cards, the
    dealer's chances of winning are increased. Whether and
    when a shoe will turn out to be player - or dealer-favorable
    is purely random.
    Card-counters attempt to "count cards" to determine
    whether and when a shoe is player-favorable. They then
    vary their bets, i.e., betting high when the shoe is player-
    favorable and low when the shoe is dealer-favorable to
    increase their chances of having a winning r ound of play.
    Bets are placed before each individual r ound of blackjack,
    usually within established minimum and maximum limits
    for the table. According to the appellants, successful card-
    counting contains several basic elements including the
    assignment of a point value to each card, maintaining a
    running total of those points during play, betting strategies,
    playing strategies, money management, a sufficient
    bankroll, and "the intangible ability to consistently apply
    these interrelated strategies under fast-paced casino
    conditions." See app. at 24.
    For maximum advantage, card-counters need to be able
    to view, through the rounds of play, as many of the cards
    in the shoe as possible. The greater number of cards they
    are able to view, the easier it is for them to determine to
    whom the remaining cards in the shoe ar e favorable. For
    this reason, card-counters prefer that the dealer place the
    cutting card toward the end of the shoe, leaving a small
    number of cards behind the cutting-card and increasing
    the overall number of cards in play. Car d-counters also
    prefer to have the entire shoe of car ds played. If the dealer
    reshuffles prior to reaching the cutting card, then the card-
    counters' opportunity to bet high on a shoe with a
    remainder of mostly player-favorable car ds is impaired.
    The casinos, on the other hand, prefer to decr ease the
    card-counters' opportunity to bet high on a player-favorable
    shoe. Therefore, it is in their inter est to decrease the card-
    7
    counters' chances of determining whether a shoe is player-
    favorable by playing with fewer cards in the shoe, i.e.,
    placing the cutting card as far from the back of the stack
    as permitted by the CCC regulations. It is also in the
    casinos' interest to reshuffle prior to reaching the cutting
    card when the remaining cards in a shoe are player-
    favorable. These practices, however, come at a cost to the
    casino as the more often the dealer goes thr ough the
    meticulous shuffling process, the shorter the actual time of
    play and thus the smaller the casino's profits.
    Appellants allege that the casinos maintain car d-counting
    teams and/or video and computer surveillance equipment
    to identify card-counters and inform the dealers of their
    participation in a blackjack game so that the dealers can
    take countermeasures against them. Appellants challenge
    these practices, claiming they violate the New Jersey
    "cheating games" section in the Casino Contr ol Act, N.J.
    Stat. Ann. S 5:12-115 (West 1996), which provides that it
    shall be unlawful:
    Knowingly to deal, conduct, carry on, operate or expose
    for play any game or games played with cards . . .
    which have in any manner been marked or tamper ed
    with, or placed in a condition, or operated in a manner,
    the result of which tends to deceive the public or tends
    to alter the normal random selection of characteristics
    or the normal chance of the game which could
    determine or alter the result of the game.
    The appellants make several specific allegations to
    support their claims. See Doug Grant, 3 F . Supp.2d at 524-
    25. First, they argue that the card-counter identifying
    process fundamentally is flawed because it tends unfairly to
    misidentify non-card-counters as card-counters. They claim
    casinos define card-counters as (1) any patr on who
    increases a bet during a player-favorable count, or (2) any
    patron who knows or is related to someone who has
    increased a bet during a player-favorable count. According
    to appellants, a player the casino identifies as a card-
    counter is "branded for life" and never is able to play a
    "fair" game of blackjack without being subjected to
    countermeasures. The casinos allegedly share information
    about suspected card-counters through defendant Griffin
    8
    Investigations and other similar agencies. These agencies
    allegedly keep dossiers containing the pictur es of suspected
    card-counters which casino employees then use to spot
    card-counters for the purpose of knowing when to
    implement countermeasures.
    Second, appellants claim that the casinos utilize what
    they term the "cheating-at-will" pr eferential shuffle and
    which, as codified by the CCC regulations, generally is
    known as the "shuffle-at-will." A dealer r eshuffling prior to
    reaching the cut-card marker shuffles-at-will. A casino will
    shuffle in this manner when its card-counting team
    determines that the shoe is player-favorable at a table
    where it suspects card-counters ar e playing. Appellants
    allege that the shuffle-at-will provides an extra 2%
    advantage to the casino, nearly double its nor mal chance of
    winning, and thus providing the casinos with a windfall of
    millions of dollars. 
    Id. at 525.
    They also claim that a casino
    can shuffle-at-will abusively to the disadvantage of players
    who are not card-counters by shuffling-at-will even when
    its employees do not suspect that there is a card-counter
    playing at a table. 
    Id. Appellants recount
    specific instances in which individual
    appellants allegedly were subjected to shuffling-at-will by
    specific casinos throughout the past ten years. On some,
    but not all, of these occasions, the player r eported the
    shuffle-at-will to the CCC and/or the New Jersey
    Department of Gaming Enforcement ("DGE") official on-site
    at every casino. According to appellants, the casinos never
    have responded to such complaints by admitting to
    counting cards and shuffling during a player -favorable
    count. 
    Id. Appellants also
    allege that because they have been
    identified as card-counters, they are limited to one wager at
    a time, are refused cards, have bets pushed back, and are
    forced to bet below the original posted limit at the table. 
    Id. Moreover, they
    allege that "shills" associated with the
    casinos sometimes occupy all seats at tables at which they
    wish to play. 
    Id. The appellants
    allege that they have been
    treated in these adverse ways even though players who are
    not card-counters are not so treated.
    9
    Appellants also claim that the casinos have denied them
    hospitality "comps," such as meals, after identifying them
    as card-counters. 
    Id. Finally, appellants
    allege that they
    have been threatened, assaulted and stalked because of
    their suspected card-counter status. 
    Id. They allege
    that
    they have been threatened in person while at the casinos
    by both known and unknown casino employees and that
    they have been threatened and sent pornographic materials
    over the Internet by unnamed John Does allegedly
    connected to the casinos. 
    Id. B. The
    Casino Control Act and CCC Regulations
    The New Jersey Casino Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.
    S 5:12-1 et seq. (West 1996) (the "Act"), gives the CCC
    comprehensive authority to define and r egulate the rules
    and conduct of play for blackjack and other authorized
    casino games. See 
    Campione, 714 A.2d at 304
    ; Uston v.
    Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 
    445 A.2d 370
    , 372-73 (N.J. 1982).
    It also grants the CCC "exclusive jurisdiction" over the
    interpretation and enforcement of r egulations governing "all
    matters delegated to it or within the scope of its powers
    under the provisions of [the Act]." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-
    133b; see also 
    id. 5:12-69, 70.
    That jurisdiction delegates
    to the CCC the power to promulgate regulations regarding
    the rules of casino games, including blackjack, 
    id. SS 5:12-
    69-70f, gambling related advertising, 
    id. S 5:12-70o,
    and the
    enforcement of gaming regulations, including the
    investigation, adjudication, and punishment of r egulatory
    violations, 
    id. SS 5:12-
    63b, f, g;id. S 5:12-64; 
    id. S 5:12-129.
    The regulations governing blackjack ar e exhaustive and
    set forth in great detail the rules for the conduct of the
    game. See N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.1 et seq. Indeed, the New
    Jersey Supreme Court has stated that, "[i]t is no
    exaggeration to state that the Commission's r egulation of
    blackjack is more extensive than the entir e administrative
    regulation of many industries." Uston , 
    445 A.2d 373
    . The
    CCC is very aware of the card-counter controversy. As the
    parties have recognized, the CCC carefully has considered
    and addressed in its regulatory capacity the effect card-
    counters can have on the game and the ways in which
    casinos should be permitted to respond to professional
    card-counters. See, e.g., 14 N.J. Reg. 467-70 (May 17,
    10
    1982); 14 N.J. Reg. 559-69 (June 7, 1982); 14 N.J. Reg.
    841 (Aug. 2, 1982); 23 N.J. Reg. 1784 (June 3, 1991); 23
    N.J. Reg. 2613 (Sept. 3, 1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 3350 (Nov. 4,
    1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 3354 (Nov. 4, 1991); 25 N.J. Reg. 3953
    (Sept. 7, 1993); 25 N.J. Reg. 5521 (Dec. 6, 1993). The CCC
    regulations authorize the casinos to use certain
    countermeasures to prevent car d-counters from overcoming
    the statistical advantage that is necessary to ensur e the
    casinos' financial viability.
    The CCC adopted many of its regulations authorizing
    countermeasures in response to the New Jersey Supreme
    Court's ruling in Uston, 
    445 A.2d 370
    , a case considering
    whether casinos have the authority to exclude car d-
    counters from their premises. The court determined that
    casinos were not authorized to exclude car d-counters,
    reasoning that the Act gave the CCC exclusive and plenary
    authority to set the rules and methods of play of casino
    games and that the CCC had not authorized the exclusion
    of card-counters as a countermeasur e.3 The court
    suggested, however, that if the CCC wanted to approve
    measures to neutralize the card-counter threat, it might be
    able to exclude card-counters, provided that the regulation
    did not violate constitutional or statutory limits. 
    Uston, 445 A.2d at 375-76
    .
    Yet, prior to Uston, the CCC had codified a practice which
    the casinos used as a card-counter counter measure even
    though the CCC did not promulgate it for that purpose.
    This regulation provides that: "[a] casino licensee, in its
    discretion" may permit a player to"wager on [more than]
    one box at a Blackjack table." N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.14. The
    CCC had been allowing the use of this practice against
    card-counters through its approval of casinos' internal
    control pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-99. The rule
    specifically grants casinos discretion to allow players
    (usually non-card-counters) to bet on mor e than one box,
    and presumably, in light of the discretionary language,
    allows them to preclude card-counters fr om betting on
    more than one box.
    _________________________________________________________________
    3. It appears that prior to Uston the casinos on at least some occasions
    excluded card-counters and did so with "overwhelming force." See State
    v. Sanders, 
    448 A.2d 481
    , 485 (N.J. Super . Ct. App. Div. 1982).
    11
    After Uston, the CCC held a series of hearings on the
    issue of card-counters and decided to enact r egulations
    authorizing the casinos to use certain measur es to
    neutralize the potential negative effect car d-counters could
    have on their financial viability. See 
    Campione, 714 A.2d at 305
    . The new regulations, which the New Jersey Supreme
    Court urged the CCC to consider in lieu of allowing the
    casinos to exclude card-counters, balanced the statutory
    goals of casino viability and fair odds to all players. See
    N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-100e. The CCC intended the
    regulations to ensure both the fair ness and integrity of
    casino gambling and "the right of the casinos to have the
    rules drawn so as to allow some reasonable pr ofit." 
    Uston, 445 A.2d at 376
    ; see also 14 N.J. Reg. 560-61 (June 7,
    1982); 23 N.J. Reg. 1784 (June 3, 1991).
    Several of these countermeasures involved the manner by
    which casinos could shuffle the blackjack car ds. The first
    approved shuffling method is known as the"Bart Carter
    Shuffle," a "shuffling procedur e in which approximately one
    deck of cards is shuffled after being dealt, segregated into
    separate stacks and each stack is inserted into pr emarked
    locations within the remaining decks contained in the
    dealing shoe." N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.1; see also 14 N.J. Reg.
    559 (June 7, 1982); 14 N.J. Reg. 841 (Aug. 2, 1982). The
    CCC also approved the "shuffle-at-will," which we have
    described above, to allow the casinos to shuffle after any
    round of play. To implement this appr oval, the CCC
    amended the existing shuffle regulation by adding language
    regarding the casinos' authority to shuffle "after each round
    of play":
    (a) Immediately prior to commencement of play, after
    any round of play as may be determined by the casino
    licensee and after each shoe of cards is dealt, the
    dealer shall shuffle the cards so that they are randomly
    intermixed.
    . . .
    (h) A reshuffle of the cards in the shoe shall take
    place after the cutting card is reached in the shoe . . .
    except that:
    12
    1. The casino licensee may determine aft er each
    round of play that the cards should be r eshuffled;
    2. When the `Bart Carter Shuffle' is util ized a
    reshuffle shall take place after the car ds in the discard
    rack exceed approximately one deck in number .
    N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.5; see 14 N.J. Reg. 559 (June 7, 1982),
    14 N.J. Reg. 841 (Aug. 2, 1982).
    The CCC also has approved the use of a device known as
    the continuous shuffling shoe. In place of the dealing and
    shuffling requirements set forth in N.J.A.C. 19:47-2.5 and
    2.6, a casino licensee may utilize a dealing shoe or other
    device designed to reshuffle the cards automatically,
    provided that the CCC or its authorized designatee has
    approved such shoe or device and the pr ocedures for
    dealing and shuffling the cards through the use of this
    device. See N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.21; see also 14 N.J. Reg. 559
    (June 7, 1982), 14 N.J. Reg. 841 (Aug. 2, 1982).
    The shuffling regulations, particularly the most
    commonly used shuffle-at-will, have enabled the casinos to
    lessen the card-counters' ability to deter mine whether cards
    remaining in the shoe are player-favorable. As we already
    have noted, when the cards are reshuffled continuously or
    prior to the dealer reaching the cutting-car d in the shoe,
    card-counters lose their potential advantage over the
    casinos because they no longer can increase their bets,
    secure in the knowledge that their chance of r eceiving
    player-favorable cards has been incr eased.
    The CCC also authorized one non-shuffling
    countermeasure after the Uston decision--an increase in
    the number of decks casinos are allowed to use in
    blackjack play. See N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.2. This change
    helped the casinos combat card-counters by incr easing the
    number of cards card-counters would need to track to
    determine whether a shoe was player-favorable. Plainly, the
    more cards in the shoe, the more difficult a player's task is
    to keep track of the cards.
    After the CCC authorized these initial counter measures,
    in 1991 it approved another regulation which provides that:
    13
    [A] casino licensee may at any time change the
    permissible minimum or maximum wager at a table
    game, without notifying the Commission of such
    change, upon posting a sign at the gaming table
    advising patrons of the new permissible minimum or
    maximum wager and announcing the change to
    patrons who are at the table.
    N.J.A.C. S 19:47-8.3(c); see also 23 N.J. Reg. 1784 (June 3,
    1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 2613 (Sept. 3, 1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 3350
    (Nov. 4, 1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 3354 (Nov. 4, 1991). This
    regulation gives the casinos the authority to lower the
    betting limit whenever it identifies a car d-counter so that
    the card-counter will not be able to bet high when the shoe
    becomes player-favorable. Then, in 1993, the CCC made a
    further addition to its regulations which, as further
    amended in 1999, provides:
    (b) A casino licensee may offer:
    1. Different maximum wagers at one gaming table for
    each permissible wager in an authorized game; and
    2. Different maximum wagers at dif ferent gaming
    tables for each permissible wager in an authorized
    game.
    (c) A casino licensee shall provide notice of the
    minimum and maximum wagers in effect at each
    gaming table, and any changes thereto, in accor dance
    with N.J.A.C. 19:47-8.3.
    (d) Notwithstanding (c) above, a casino licensee may, in
    its discretion, permit a player to wager below the
    established minimum wager or above the established
    maximum wager at a gaming table.
    (e) Any wager accepted by a dealer which is in excess
    of the established maximum permitted wager at that
    gaming table shall be paid or lost in its entir ety in
    accordance with the rules of the game, notwithstanding
    that the wager exceeded the current table maximum or
    was lower than the current table maximum.
    N.J.A.C. 19:47-8.2(b) to (e); see 25 N.J. Reg. 3953 (Sept. 7,
    1993); 25 N.J. Reg. 5521 (Dec. 6, 1993). This r egulation
    14
    clarified that the casinos could limit specifically the wagers
    of only those patrons identified as car d-counters, while
    permitting non-card-counters to continue betting at higher
    limits.
    The New Jersey courts seem not to doubt the legality of
    the CCC-authorized countermeasures. In particular, the
    trial court in Campione recognized that the practice of
    "shuffling at will," the central concer n in this case identified
    by the district court, is authorized by CCC r egulation, see
    N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.5, and affects all patrons, even those not
    counting cards, at a blackjack table. See Campione v.
    Adamar of N. J., Inc., 
    643 A.2d 42
    , 50-51 (N.J. Super. Ct.
    Law Div. 1993), rev'd on other gr ounds, 
    694 A.2d 1045
    (N.J.
    Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), mod. and af f 'd, 
    714 A.2d 299
    (N.J. 1998). Further, on appeal in Campione, the New
    Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, found that the
    CCC "authorizes the disparate treatment of 
    card-counters." 694 A.2d at 1050
    . The court noted that the CCC has
    approved the countermeasures allowing for betting limits
    and permitting casinos to vary the number of boxes in
    which particular players can wager. 
    Id. at 1047.
    Finally, the
    New Jersey Supreme Court in Campione, while not
    expressly upholding the countermeasur es the CCC has
    allowed, implicitly made it clear the CCC lawfully may
    permit such 
    countermeasures. 714 A.2d at 305
    , 308.
    II. JURISDICTION
    The complaint in this action alleged violations of the
    United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, and the
    federal RICO statute, as well as causes of action under the
    New Jersey RICO statute, constitution and common law.
    Thus, the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    SS 1441, 1331, and 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. S 1291.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Our review of a district court's order of dismissal of a
    complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failur e to state a
    claim upon which relief may be granted, is plenary and we
    apply the same test as the district court. See Maio v. Aetna,
    15
    Inc., 
    221 F.3d 472
    , 481 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, "[a] motion to
    dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted only if,
    accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
    true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to
    plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." 
    Id. at 481-82.
    However, while our standard of r eview requires us to accept
    as true all factual allegations in the complaint,"we need
    not accept as true `unsupported conclusions and
    unwarranted inferences.' " City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn
    Power Co., 
    147 F.3d 256
    , 263 n.13 (3d Cir . 1998) (quoting
    Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light
    Co., 
    113 F.3d 405
    , 417 (3d Cir. 1997)). "[C]ourts have an
    obligation in matters before them to view the complaint as
    a whole and to base rulings not upon the presence of mere
    words but, rather, upon the presence of a factual situation
    which is or is not justiciable. We do draw on the allegations
    of the complaint, but in a realistic, rather than a slavish,
    manner." 
    Id. at 263.
    IV. DISCUSSION
    A. RICO Claims
    Appellants' first count alleges claims for racketeering
    under federal RICO, 18 U.S.C. S 1964(c), New Jersey RICO,
    N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:41-4c (West 1995), and the RICO
    provisions of the Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-127c (West
    1996). As appellees point out, the predicate acts of alleged
    racketeering on which appellants' base their RICO claims
    consist almost exclusively of the use of counter measures or
    alleged violations of other CCC regulations. In order to
    make out a RICO claim, appellants first must show that the
    casinos committed the predicate criminal acts enumerated
    by RICO. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. SS 1961, 1962. Appellants
    claim that the casinos committed the following pr edicate
    acts: shuffling-at-will when the count was player -favorable,
    using computer and video technology to assist in counting
    cards and identifying card-counters, denying comps to
    appellants, using shills, limiting plaintiffs to one hand of
    blackjack at a time, lowering betting limits, and failing to
    disclose the use and nature of the disputed
    countermeasures. See br. 30-41; Doug 
    Grant, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 531-32
    . Based on the premise that these uses of
    16
    authorized countermeasures and other alleged regulatory
    violations are criminal acts, appellants' complaint alleges
    that the casinos' operation of blackjack violates criminal
    statutes regarding unlawful debt collection, transmission of
    gambling information, operation of illegal gambling
    business, and interstate commerce for an unlawful activity.
    The district court believed that the primary purported
    predicate act on which appellants relied is the shuffling of
    cards when the count is favorable to the players.4 The
    complaint alleges that use of the "shuffling-at-will"
    countermeasure constitutes a predicate act of racketeering
    because it violates the criminal casino "cheating" statute,
    N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-115. The trial court in Campione
    rejected this precise claim. Campione , 643 A.2d at 51
    ("labeling of the shuffling at will as `cheating' is specious").
    Moreover, despite appellants' pr otestations, the regulation
    itself makes clear that a casino at its discr etion may shuffle
    at the conclusion of any round of play:
    (a) Immediately prior to commencement of play, after
    any round of play as may be determined by the casino
    licensee and after each shoe of cards is dealt, the
    dealer shall shuffle the cards so that they are randomly
    intermixed.
    . . .
    (h) A reshuffle of the cards in the shoe shall take place
    after the cutting card is reached in the shoe as
    provided in N.J.A.C. 19:47-2.6(1) except that:
    1. The casino licensee may determine after each
    round of play that the cards shall be r eshuffled.
    _________________________________________________________________
    4. In their brief, the appellants contend that the district court was
    incorrect in this characterization, as their"central concern is the
    deceptive, unadvertised and clandestine use of countermeasures only
    when the cards favor players." See br. at 31. We will not linger on this
    point for two reasons. First, the casinos take their countermeasures
    quite openly. For example, it should be appar ent to anyone at a table
    when the dealer shuffles before the cutting card is reached. Second, it
    seems clear that, as the district court recognized, the principal
    countermeasure is shuffling-at-will.
    17
    N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.5(a), (h).
    Appellants attempt at length to skew the plain meaning
    of this regulation and the relevant r egulatory history
    leading to its adoption to convince us that the CCC has
    authorized only a "random shuffle-at-will," i.e., not a
    reshuffle that occurs only during player favorable counts.
    See br. at 33. Appellants' restrictive interpretation of the
    shuffle-at-will regulation, however, runs contrary to its
    express language.
    The regulatory history makes clear that the CCC is fully
    aware of and allows the practice of shuffling-at-will when
    there is a player-favorable count as a countermeasure
    against card-counters. When the CCC published the
    proposed regulation to allow the casinos to shuffle-at-will,
    it noted that the casinos might shuffle when the count is
    favorable and that this practice might affect the odds of the
    game:
    The economic impact of this proposed amendment
    would vary depending on when in fact the car ds were
    shuffled. For example, if the cards wer e always shuffled
    after the first round of play regar dless of the point
    count, then the casino advantage against the basic
    strategy player and average player would probably
    remain the same with the advantage enjoyed by the
    card counter being decreased. If the car ds, however,
    were only shuffled in positive point count situations
    and not in negative point count situations, the casino
    advantage against all types of players would incr ease.
    14 N.J. Reg. 470 (May 17, 1982).
    Appellants appear to take issue with the propriety of the
    shuffle-at-will regulation. But even assuming that in this
    action we should entertain a challenge to the r egulation, we
    perceive nothing illegal in it.5 In any event, even if the
    _________________________________________________________________
    5. There have been numerous state administrative and judicial
    proceedings regarding the issues before us but it is difficult from the
    parties' briefs and appendix to discern their exact status. In any event,
    we do not find any state determination inconsistent with the result we
    reach. Significantly, the parties are in agreement that shortly after
    18
    regulation is an improper exercise of the CCC's authority,
    a conclusion that we reject, a casino following it before its
    invalidation hardly could be subject to RICO liability for
    that conduct. In our view, a casino does not commit a
    predicate RICO act when it engages in conduct the CCC
    expressly permits.
    We are disturbed that appellants have couched their
    arguments in dramatic hyperbole obfuscating the real
    issues. Indeed, we are satisfied that the appellants have
    mischaracterized the facts. For instance, appellants
    characterize the use of the shuffle-at-will as"secretly
    removing cards from a blackjack game in progress." See br.
    at 30. But the reshuffle is hardly secr et as the dealer does
    it openly in the view of the players. Moreover , a dealer
    reshuffling does not remove cards from the deck. Rather,
    the reshuffle simply places the cards in a different random
    order for the next hands.
    Appellants further allege that the shuffle-at-will is a RICO
    criminal predicate act because it has a tendency to alter the
    normal random chance of the game. See br. at 32-39. What
    appellants fail to realize, however, is that the normal
    random chance of the game is defined pursuant to the
    statutory rules and CCC regulations. As the CCC has
    explained:
    [T]he normal chance and random character of any
    casino game is necessarily defined and deter mined by
    the rules governing the conduct of the game. Since the
    Commission has the statutory authority to initially
    establish the rules of the game, N.J.S.A. S 5:12-100e
    _________________________________________________________________
    appellants filed this action, the individual appellants "filed a petition
    with the CCC with claims identical to those raised in the federal
    complaint." See appellants' br. at 4; appellees' br. at 5-6. In addition,
    the
    individual appellants later filed a declaratory petition with the CCC
    seeking its "interpretive ruling on pr ovisions of the Act, blackjack
    regulations and casino practices that ar e at issue in this appeal." See
    appellants' br. at 6; appellees' br. at 6. Apparently, appellants were not
    satisfied with the outcome of the declaratory petition, see 31 N.J. Reg.
    555 (Feb. 16, 1999), as they have appealed fr om the determination to the
    New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.
    19
    and 70f, and primary jurisdiction to resolve any issues
    concerning interpretation of the Act and the rules
    promulgated thereunder, . . . it is absurd to allege that
    practices approved by the Commission as being
    consistent with its rules constitute `cheating' under
    section 115 of the Act.
    31 N.J. Reg. 556 (Feb. 16, 1999). While appellants may
    wish to have the CCC rethink the scope of the shuffle-at-
    will regulation, we are satisfied that after being stripped of
    its conclusory legal dressing, there is no allegation in the
    complaint regarding reshuffling sufficient to support a
    RICO claim against the casino defendants.
    Appellants' other alleged predicate acts ar e similarly
    insufficient to support a RICO claim. The alleged violations
    of criminal statutes regarding unlawful debt collection, 18
    U.S.C. S 1962, transmission of gambling infor mation, 18
    U.S.C. S 1084, interference with commerce by threats or
    violence, 18 U.S.C. S 1951, interstate commer ce for
    unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. S 1952, and operating an illegal
    gambling business, 18 U.S.C. S 1955, all derive from the
    allegations regarding the use of authorized
    countermeasures and other alleged but in fact nonexistent
    violations of the CCC regulations. Any debts allegedly
    "unlawfully collected" are those lost by players during
    blackjack games played in accordance with the CCC
    regulations. Any "illegal gambling business" or "unlawful
    activity in interstate commerce" is simply the play of
    blackjack as authorized by the CCC. Similarly, the casinos
    do not engage "in unlawful activity" or "operating an illegal
    gambling business" by not offering appellants or anyone
    else "comps," which are nothing mor e than free gifts from
    the casinos. While appellants claim that the casinos are
    obliged to offer "comps," in our view if they fail to do so
    they are not committing criminal acts in any way impacting
    on the integrity of the blackjack game. If appellants want to
    bring a judicial action to recover the value of"comps,"
    surely their forum should be a New Jersey state court, at
    least in some instances the small claims part. Plainly, the
    casinos' activities of which appellants complain do not
    constitute crimes and therefore ar e not predicate RICO
    acts.
    20
    Furthermore, appellants, although mentioning the use of
    "shills" in their complaint, have not made any allegations
    that the casinos violate the statutory prohibition of the use
    of "shills," i.e., persons who induce potential patrons to
    enter a casino or induce them to play any game. See N.J.
    Stat. Ann. S 5:12-1001 (West 1996). Certainly the casinos
    have not used shills to encourage appellants to play
    blackjack in their premises.
    In their brief, appellants further assert that the CCC
    stated in an administrative proceeding that it would be
    deceptive for casinos actively to solicit a player to count
    cards in its casino without letting the player know that
    countermeasures will be used against those suspected of
    counting cards. See br. at 11, 25. Appellants, however, fail
    to cite the full text of the CCC's statement, which
    concluded:
    [T]he Commission does not believe that any of the
    exhibits submitted by the commenters come even close
    to supporting an allegation of active solicitation of card
    counter play by a casino licensee.
    31 N.J. Reg. 556 (Feb. 6, 1999). Thus, appellants' r eference
    to the CCC's statement adds nothing to their allegation that
    the casinos' use of shills constitutes a RICO act.
    Appellants also assert that it is deceptive for the casinos
    to fail to provide players with a complete text of the rules
    governing the play of blackjack. This allegation also fails to
    support a claim for relief. As we set forth above, the rules
    and regulations governing blackjack ar e numerous and
    thus they do not lend themselves to inclusion in a short
    manual. Further, the sample casino br ochure in the
    appendix explaining blackjack on its face is not deceptive.
    See app. at 832-34. While it does not purport to set forth
    all of the blackjack rules, it does give the infor mation
    needed by a player to play the game.
    The appellants also allege that it is impermissible for the
    casinos to require one player's wager to be less than that of
    other players at the same table. See br . at 40 (citing N.J.
    Stat. Ann. S 5:12-100g (West 1996)). As we mentioned,
    however, the CCC has adopted a regulation that specifically
    allows casinos to set different wager limits, even among
    21
    players at the same table, if a player is suspected of card
    counting. See N.J.A.C. S 19:47-8.2(b)-(d). As a result, the
    casinos cannot be said to have violated the Act in a manner
    to support a RICO cause of action. While appellants may
    wish to challenge the propriety of the r egulation, they have
    not stated a RICO cause of action against the casinos
    whose actions are in compliance with the law and the
    CCC's regulations.
    Appellants next argue that the casinos' failur e to obtain
    prior approval for the countermeasur es they implement
    constitutes a predicate act. See br . at 40-41. Yet appellants
    also recognize that the CCC has determined that the
    casinos do not need prior approval to implement the
    measures. See 
    id. at 41.
    While the appellants note that that
    ruling is being challenged on appeal, it will be time enough
    for a federal court to consider the RICO implications if and
    when the CCC determines that the casinos' practices are
    illegal and the casinos do not comply prospectively with the
    CCC's determinations.
    The only alleged predicate acts that ar e not based on
    CCC regulations are the allegations of assaults, threats,
    and stalking-in-person and via the Internet. Appellants
    allege that one appellant was knocked off his seat on one
    occasion, that some appellants were followed ar ound
    casinos, and that one appellant was grabbed by the arm
    while being escorted out of a casino. However , these minor
    altercations cannot be regarded as conduct egregious
    enough to serve as predicate acts sufficient to support what
    appellants apparently believe is massive litigation, in which,
    before trebling, they are seeking at least $347,532,800 in
    damages. See Doug 
    Grant, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 522
    n.1. Nor do
    the appellants' claims of receiving anonymous
    pornographic, offensive and threatening messages over the
    Internet from John Doe defendants constitute predicate
    acts attributable to the appellees, as appellants put forth
    no basis for concluding or even alleging that anyone
    associated with the casinos sent the messages. Accor dingly,
    we will affirm the order of the district court dismissing the
    state and federal RICO causes of action.
    For the reasons we have set forth, we have r eached the
    conclusion that appellants' allegations that the casinos or
    22
    any appellee has committed predicate RICO acts are
    completely insubstantial and border on the frivolous. In the
    circumstances, inasmuch as appellants have failed to allege
    any predicate act upon which to base a RICO claim, we
    need not determine conclusively whether appellants
    properly have pleaded injury to business or pr operty as
    required for a RICO damages action. See 18 U.S.C.
    S 1964(c); N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:41-4c (W est 1995); 
    Maio, 221 F.3d at 483-84
    . Nevertheless, in this r egard we do make the
    following observation which demonstrates why this action,
    which has generated a large recor d and required a
    considerable expenditure of time and no doubt money is, at
    bottom, at least with respect to the claims we have
    considered, a fatuity.
    Unlike an ordinary RICO victim, in this case the allegedly
    injured plaintiffs, i.e., the players, can avoid any injury
    simply by walking away from the alleged wr ongdoers, the
    casinos, by not playing blackjack in casinos. In fact, that is
    what the casinos apparently want them to do, at least as
    long as they count cards. While this abstention would
    deprive them of the opportunity to enrich themselves at the
    casinos' expense, surely it would be difficult to characterize
    that lost speculative opportunity as an injury to"business
    or property." If the appellants have played blackjack in the
    past, aware of the casinos' countermeasur es, and if they
    continue to play blackjack in the future in the hope of
    profiting by counting cards, they have suffered and will
    suffer self-inflicted wounds. Accordingly, at least with
    respect to individual players who are awar e of the casinos'
    countermeasures, it is difficult to consider this case within
    a RICO formulation.6
    _________________________________________________________________
    6. In their brief, the casinos assert as an alter native ground for
    affirmance that the statute of limitations has run as to some of the
    appellants' claims. See br. at 14 & n.5. Appellants respond that they
    have alleged continuing violations that render their claims timely. See
    reply br. at 9. Appellants seem to overlook, however, that the corporate
    plaintiffs all ceased operations by 1992. See app. at 930-32. In the
    circumstances, inasmuch as appellants instituted this action in 1997,
    the corporate appellants' federal RICO claims ar e barred by the four-year
    RICO statute of limitations. See Forbes v. Eagleson, No. 99-1803, ___
    F.3d. ___, 
    2000 WL 1529852
    , at *10 (3d Cir. Oct. 17, 2000).
    23
    B. Leave to Amend
    The appellants originally pleaded a cause of action under
    the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, but omitted that
    claim in their amended complaint. In the district court, and
    here, they have asked permission to amend their complaint
    to reinclude the Consumer Fraud Act claim. The district
    court denied appellants leave to amend because it found
    that the Consumer Fraud Act claim was completely without
    merit and it would be futile to amend the complaint to
    include a meritless claim. See Doug 
    Grant, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 536-37
    .
    As noted by the district court, the New Jersey Supr eme
    Court recently has held that the Consumer Fraud Act does
    not apply to a heavily regulated industry to the extent that
    application of the statute would create a "r eal possibility" of
    conflict between the Consumer Fraud Act, as administered
    by the Division of Consumer Affairs, and the r egulatory
    schemes of other administrative bodies. See Lemelledo v.
    Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 
    696 A.2d 546
    , 553 (N.J.
    1997). Thus, the Consumer Fraud Act is inapplicable where
    "the other source or sources of r egulation deal specifically,
    concretely, and pervasively with the particular activity,
    implying a legislative intent not to subject parties to
    multiple regulations that, as applied, will work at cross-
    purposes." 
    Id. at 554.
    Certainly the Casino Control Act evidences the New
    Jersey legislature's intent to vest in the CCC exclusive
    control of the regulation of casino gaming, including the
    content of related advertising. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-
    133b (West 1996); 
    id. S 5:12-70(o);
    see also Greate Bay
    Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 
    34 F.3d 1227
    , 1232-33 (3d Cir.
    1994). If we allowed claims such as the appellants'
    proposed consumer fraud claim to proceed in the district
    court, we would interfere with the CCC's regulatory
    scheme. The regulation of the game of blackjack, including
    shuffling-at-will and the advertisement regulations, is
    within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CCC. Mor eover, the
    CCC has particularized expertise in these matters not
    possessed by courts and juries. While it is true that the
    Supreme Court of New Jersey in Campione, approving our
    opinion in Tose, 
    see 714 A.2d at 307-08
    , held that the
    24
    courts were not ousted of jurisdiction over common law
    damage claims against casinos merely because the claims
    arose from gambling transactions, this holding does not
    inform our result here on the very different question of the
    applicability of a different regulatory act to casino
    operations with respect to running blackjack games. Thus,
    the district court properly denied appellants' motion for
    leave to amend for, as a matter of law, the amended
    complaint would not have stated a claim on which r elief
    could be granted. See Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic
    Ass'n, 
    139 F.3d 180
    , 190 (3d Cir. 1999), vacated on other
    grounds, 
    525 U.S. 459
    , 
    119 S. Ct. 924
    (1999).
    In reaching our result on this point, we emphasize that
    the goals of the Consumer Fraud and the Casino Contr ol
    Acts are not entirely consistent. The Consumer Fraud Act
    is concerned with the protection of consumers. The Casino
    Control Act, however, has dual purposes that must be
    balanced -- the protection of gambling patr ons and the
    protection of the financial viability of the casino industry.
    N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-1b (12) (West 1996). Thus, the Casino
    Control Act presupposes that the consumers as a group,
    i.e., the players, will lose their money, a contemplated
    result that hardly is the object of the Consumer Fraud Act.
    C. Dismissal Against John Does with Prejudice
    The sixth count of the complaint alleges various state
    and federal statutory claims against John Does for sending
    offensive messages and alleged threats over the Internet.
    But while the appellants in the complaint sought r elief
    against the casino appellees for these acts, see app. at 104,
    they failed to offer any link between the John Does and the
    casinos. Thus, the district court properly dismissed this
    aspect of the complaint, though it did so with pr ejudice. We
    conclude, however, that the dismissal should have been
    without prejudice, allowing appellants to bring a claim at a
    later time if they uncover sufficient facts to per mit them to
    plead facts supporting a conclusion that the casinos were
    responsible for these acts. Accordingly, we will vacate the
    order dismissing the sixth count with pr ejudice to the
    extent that it included claims relating to the sending of the
    offensive messages and threats over the Internet, and with
    respect to that aspect of the order will r emand the matter
    25
    to the district court to modify the order so that it dismisses
    the count without prejudice.
    D. Constitutional and Civil Rights Claims
    Appellants' sixth count also alleges violations of the
    Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, Article 1,
    paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, and 42 U.S.C.
    S 1983. As the district court correctly noted, this count fails
    to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for several
    reasons. First, appellants' allegations of state action are
    insufficient. State regulation and the CCC's authorization of
    casino activities do not transform the casinos into state
    actors. See Uston v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 
    448 F. Supp. 116
    ,
    118 (D. Nev. 1978); State v. Sanders, 
    448 A.2d 481
    , 486
    (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (sear ch by casino
    employees does not constitute state action). It is well
    established that "[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the
    initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify
    holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the
    terms of the Fourteenth Amendment." Blum v. Yaretsky,
    
    457 U.S. 991
    , 1004-05, 
    102 S. Ct. 2777
    , 2786 (1982);
    Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
    419 U.S. 345
    , 350-51,
    
    95 S. Ct. 449
    , 453-54 (1974). Second, appellants have not
    suffered any equal protection clause violation inasmuch as
    under the rational basis test applicable for a non-protected
    class such as card-counters subject to CCC r egulations,
    see Bally Mfg. Corp. v. New Jersey Casino Contr ol Comm'n,
    
    426 A.2d 1000
    , 1005 (N.J.) (casino regulations examined
    under rational basis test), appeal dismissed, 
    454 U.S. 804
    ,
    
    102 S. Ct. 77
    (1981), the countermeasur es used by the
    casinos and authorized by the CCC are rationally related to
    the legitimate state interest in protecting the financial
    viability of the casino industry. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-
    1b(12). Third, we are satisfied that the appellants do not
    have a constitutionally protected property interest in the
    opportunity to gamble and thus the activities of which they
    complain do not violate their due process rights. Therefore,
    the district court properly dismissed the constitutional and
    civil rights claims in the sixth count of the complaint for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.7
    _________________________________________________________________
    7. We hasten to add that we do not suggest that our holding means that
    the casinos have carte blanche in dealing with their patrons and they do
    not suggest otherwise. For example, both federal and state
    discrimination laws would be implicated if casinos discriminated among
    their patrons on the basis of their inclusion in protected groups.
    26
    V. CONCLUSION
    We have carefully considered all of appellants'
    arguments, including those that we may not have
    addressed specifically, and have concluded that the district
    court properly dismissed this action with pr ejudice with
    respect to the counts of the complaint that it addressed,
    except that it should have dismissed count six without
    prejudice to the extent that the count r elated to sending
    offensive messages and threats over the Internet.8
    Consequently, we will modify the order of dismissal to
    provide that count six partially is dismissed without
    prejudice, and we otherwise will affir m the order of
    dismissal with prejudice, and will affir m the order
    remanding the remaining aspects of the complaint to the
    Superior Court of New Jersey. We will r emand the case to
    the district court to enter an order consistent with this
    opinion. Costs on this appeal will be taxed against
    appellants.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    _________________________________________________________________
    8. Immediately before oral argument on this appeal, appellants filed a
    motion requesting "an evidentiary hearing on possible conflicts of
    interest of the district court" because of what appellants said were their
    "serious concerns" that the court "may have undisclosed conflicts of
    interest or financial interests." W e have considered this application
    carefully and will deny the motion as we find it to be without merit. In
    any event, the appellants' "serious concer ns" are quite immaterial, as we
    have exercised plenary review on all the issues on this appeal so that it
    would not matter if the appellants' concerns were justified. While we
    recognize that we review the denial of a motion for leave to amend on an
    abuse of discretion basis, here we ar e upholding the denial on the legal
    basis that the proposed amendment would not survive a motion to
    dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See 
    Smith, 139 F.3d at 190
    . Thus, we have
    not deferred to the district court on any issue on which we have passed.
    27