Pryer v. Slavic ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2001 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    7-5-2001
    Pryer v. Slavic
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 00-3297
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001
    Recommended Citation
    "Pryer v. Slavic" (2001). 2001 Decisions. Paper 147.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/147
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2001 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    UNREPORTED       NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 00-3297
    _____________
    RAYMOND T. PRYER
    v.
    C.O. 3 SLAVIC; C.O. 1 COOK; C.O. 1 D. BURSEY,
    Appellants
    _____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 92-1461)
    District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
    _____________
    Argued
    October 26, 2000
    Before: MANSMANN, ALITO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
    _____________
    ORDER AMENDING OPINION
    _____________
    The opinion filed on May 30, 2001 is amended as follows:
    Page 18, line 2   delete the word "effectively";
    Page 18, insert the following paragraphs before the paragraph
    beginning
    "Rather than reversing . . . .
    The majority seeks to justify its departure from
    our
    established standard of review, and its consequent substitution
    of its discretion for that of the trial judge, by invoking two
    purported exceptions: First, the majority asserts that no
    deference is due "where a trial court fails to explain its
    grounds for exercising discretion, and its reasons for doing so
    are not otherwise apparent from the record". Supra at 7 n.4.
    However, the District Court's reasons for limiting the second
    trial to damages are made abundantly clear in its opinion: As
    the Court explained, "a new trial is appropriate on the issue of
    damages because the court failed to properly instruct the jury
    on damages" (by, inter alia, giving an unwarranted nominal
    damages instruction), and because the resulting nominal
    damages award was against the weight of the evidence.
    Implicit in the Court's recital of errors in the damages
    instructions and award was its recognition that there was no
    error in the liability instructions or verdict. Ordinarily, the
    presence of error limited to a single issue should be
    considered reason enough to limit retrial to that issue.
    Although the majority may consider the stated reasons
    insufficient, it cannot fairly be said that the trial Court
    "articulated no rationale".
    Second, the majority asserts that the District
    Court's
    grant of a partial retrial "turns on the application of a legal
    precept to the evidence". Supra at 7 n.4. The majority does
    not identify what "legal precept" it deems controlling. The
    due process and fairness concerns set forth in Gasoline
    Products clearly speaks to discretion, and we (and other
    courts) have always considered its application to be an
    exercise of discretion, rather than a legal determination. The
    majority's cryptic invocation of the "legal precept" exception,
    without identifying a controlling question of law, threatens to
    eviscerate the abuse of discretion standard: potentially, every
    exercise of discretion may be subjected to plenary review at
    the whim of the reviewing court by pointing out that some
    "legal precept" is somehow involved. By substituting its
    judgment for that of the District Court (in which the discretion
    is intended to be reposed) on the basis of such ill-considered,
    amorphous exceptions, the majority has fundamentally altered
    our standard of review, effectively overruling sub silentio our
    decisions in Vizzini and Stanton.
    Page 19, line 2   delete "finding an abuse of discretion by" and
    substitute
    "overriding"
    Page 19, line 3   after Court add "'s discretion"
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
    /s/ Carol Los
    Mansmann
    Circuit Judge
    Dated:   June 5, 2001
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-3297

Filed Date: 7/5/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015