Jin Hua Yang v. Atty Gen USA , 220 F. App'x 117 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    3-15-2007
    Jin Hua Yang v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-1477
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007
    Recommended Citation
    "Jin Hua Yang v. Atty Gen USA" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1467.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1467
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 06-1477
    JIN HUA YANG,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    On Petition for Review of an Order of
    The Board of Immigration Appeals
    Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie S. Garcy
    (No. A97-949-277)
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    March 8, 2007
    Before: SLOVITER and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
    POLLAK,* District Judge
    (Filed: March 15, 2007)
    OPINION
    AMBRO, Circuit Judge
    *
    Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    Jin Hua Yang, a Chinese citizen, seeks review of the final order of removal by the
    Board of Immigration Appeals denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and
    protection under the Convention Against Torture.1 In our Court, Yang presses only
    arguments relating to asylum and withholding of removal.2 Because we conclude that a
    reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that Yang has a well-founded
    fear of persecution upon return to China, we deny his petition for review.
    I.
    Yang’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal are based on events that
    took place between June and October of 2003.3 In March of that year, Yang’s older sister
    had become pregnant with her third child, in violation of China’s family planning policy.
    On June 17, government officials went to her house after she had missed a scheduled
    “IUD checkup.” Yang’s sister, however, was in hiding at her parents’ home and Yang’s
    brother-in-law told the officials that she was working in another province. On September
    20, Yang’s brother-in-law was arrested by two government officials after Yang’s sister
    had failed to show up for two more IUD checkups.
    One week later, on September 27, two government agents went to Yang’s parents’
    1
    We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
    2
    Any argument based on the Convention Against Torture is therefore waived. See Lie
    v. Ashcroft, 
    396 F.3d 530
    , 532 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Nagle v. Alspach, 
    8 F.3d 141
    , 143
    (3d Cir. 1993)).
    3
    Though the Immigration Judge expressed skepticism about the truthfulness of much
    of Yang’s testimony, she assumed for the sake of her analysis that it was true. We do the
    same.
    2
    house (at which Yang also lived) to look for his sister. She was inside, but Yang’s
    parents answered the door. The officials indicated that they believed Yang’s sister to be
    there and threatened his parents with arrest if they did not turn her in or allow the officials
    to search the house. His parents did not do either. Yang, monitoring the situation from
    upstairs with his sister, then went down to help his parents deal with the officials. A ten-
    minute, heated discussion among the five ensued, during which Yang physically pushed
    the officials. Neither fell to the ground or was harmed, and the officials eventually left
    the Yang home.
    Fearing reprisal, Yang went into hiding at a friend’s house. Government officials
    came looking for Yang at his parents’ home the next day. Two days after that, Yang’s
    sister submitted to an abortion and her husband was released from jail. Yang, however,
    left China on October 12 with the assistance of smugglers and made his way into the
    United States on January 14, 2004. Though Chinese officials occasionally went to
    Yang’s parents’ house in search of Yang for several months after the September 2003
    altercation, they have not done so since February 2004. Yang’s sister and brother-in-law
    were not fined, remain employed, and continue to live in China without incident (as do
    Yang’s parents).
    3
    II.
    A.
    The Attorney General has the discretion to grant asylum to an alien who qualifies
    as a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). The term “refugee” includes those who are unable or
    unwilling to return to their home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear
    of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion.” 
    Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
    Moreover, individuals persecuted “for
    resistance to a coercive population control program . . . shall be deemed to have been
    persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that
    he or she will be . . . subject to persecution for such . . . resistance shall be deemed to
    have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.” 
    Id. § 1101(a)(42).
    The immigration laws also provide that the Attorney General must withhold
    deportation of an individual to a particular country if his “life or freedom would be
    threatened in that country because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
    particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Under this
    provision, the immigrant must show that “it is more likely than not that he will face
    persecution if he is deported.” Chang v. INS, 
    119 F.3d 1055
    , 1066 (3d Cir. 1997)
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
    480 U.S. 421
    , 430
    (1987)). The test for asylum, therefore, “is less exacting” than that for withholding of
    removal. 
    Id. It does
    not require that persecution be more likely than not, as “[f]ear can be
    4
    well-founded ‘even when there is a less than 50% chance of the occurrence taking
    place.’” 
    Id. (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca,
    480 U.S. at 431). Therefore, if an immigrant does
    not make the requisite showing for asylum, he does not qualify for withholding of
    removal a fortiori. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 
    386 F.3d 556
    , 561 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004); Mulanga
    v. Ashcroft, 
    349 F.3d 123
    , 132 (3d Cir. 2003).
    Persecution is “extreme conduct” that is so severe as to constitute a “threat[] to
    life, confinement, torture, [or] economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real
    threat to life or freedom.” 
    Chang, 119 F.3d at 1066
    ; see also Fatin v. INS, 
    12 F.3d 1233
    ,
    1240 (3d Cir. 1993). “[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society
    regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional,” 
    Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240
    ,
    though considering the nature of a petitioner’s potential prosecution and punishment on
    return is appropriate, see 
    Chang, 119 F.3d at 1059
    –62. In addition, a petitioner’s fear of
    persecution must also be “well-founded,” a concept both subjective and objective. See
    Lin v. INS, 
    238 F.3d 239
    (3d Cir. 2001). “An applicant can demonstrate that [he] has a
    well-founded fear of future persecution by showing that [he] has a genuine fear, and that a
    reasonable person in [his] circumstances would fear persecution if returned to [his] native
    country.” Gao v. Ashcroft, 
    299 F.3d 266
    , 272 (3d Cir. 2002).
    “We must uphold the BIA’s factual findings if they are ‘supported by reasonable,
    substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” 
    Lie, 396 F.3d at 534
    n.3 (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 480 (1992)). Substantial
    evidence is lacking in the context of a case such as ours only where “a reasonable
    5
    factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.” Dia v.
    Ashcroft, 
    353 F.3d 228
    , 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). “We will reverse only if the
    evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” 
    Guo, 386 F.3d at 561
    .
    B.
    We will assume for purposes of this case that Yang’s actions constituted
    “resistance” to China’s family planning laws and thereby could qualify him as a
    “refugee” under § 1101(a)(42). See generally Cao v. Att’y Gen., 
    407 F.3d 146
    (3d Cir.
    2005). Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the record evidence compels the
    conclusion that Yang has a well-founded fear of persecution if he were removed to
    China.4
    Quite simply, nothing in the record indicates what, if anything, would happen to
    him once there. Indeed, Yang’s own testimony about his family’s experience since 2003
    itself constitutes substantial evidence that he would not be subject to persecution in
    China. His brother-in-law was released from jail when his sister submitted to an abortion,
    and neither was fined for his or her initial resistance to China’s family planning policy.
    Both remain employed. Moreover, Yang’s parents have suffered no reprisal for their role
    in concealing Yang’s sister, despite the fact that they were involved in the same
    altercation with the authorities as was Yang. “[W]hen family members remain in [the]
    petitioner’s native country without meeting harm, and there is no individualized showing
    4
    Yang does not argue that he has suffered from past persecution.
    6
    that [the] petitioner would be singled out for persecution, the reasonableness of [the]
    petitioner’s well-founded fear of future persecution is diminished.” 
    Lie, 396 F.3d at 537
    ;
    see also Krasnopivtsev v. Ashcroft, 
    382 F.3d 832
    , 839 (8th Cir. 2004). Finally, the record
    indicates that though government officials periodically inquired as to Yang’s whereabouts
    for some time after the relevant events, no official has done so since early 2004. In short,
    a reasonable person would not be compelled to conclude that Yang should fear
    persecution upon his return to China.
    *   *   *   *   *
    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the BIA is supported by substantial
    evidence, and we thus deny Yang’s petition for review.
    7