United States v. Doe , 309 F. App'x 571 ( 2009 )

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-9-2009
USA v. Doe
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-2679
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-2679
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOHN DOE,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-07-cr-00402-1)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 27, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 9, 2009)
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
John Doe,1 a career offender, appeals the sentence imposed on him by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania after he pled guilty to
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As this case remains under seal, the identity of the appellant has been withheld.
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We
affirm.
I.
On April 25, 2007, an undercover police officer with the Harrisburg Bureau of
Police made a controlled purchase of 1.1 grams of crack cocaine from Doe. On June 7,
2007, other officers pursued and detained Doe after he fled from them while carrying a
bag containing 51.9 grams of crack cocaine. On June 29, 2007, an undercover police
officer again made a controlled purchase from Doe of 1.1 grams of crack cocaine.
Based on this evidence, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Doe
with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine in violation of
§ 841(a)(1). He pled guilty to the charge pursuant to a plea agreement. Because he had
17 prior arrests and three prior convictions for drug offenses, the District Court
designated Doe a career offender with a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history
category of VI. This designation correlated with a Sentencing Guidelines range of
151–188 months. The Court, after considering evidence related to Doe’s background and
criminal history, imposed a sentence of 151 months. This appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review
the District Court’s sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207,
217–18 (3d Cir. 2008). In this regard, “our role is two-fold.” Id. at 217. First, we must
ensure that the Court “committed no significant procedural error.” United States v.
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Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). This requires us to consider, among other
things, whether the Court gave meaningful consideration to the relevant factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).2 See id. at 230–32; United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329
(3d Cir. 2006). Second, we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under
an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Wise, 515 F.3d at 218.
III.
Reflecting the two-fold nature of our review, Doe argues that the District Court (1)
committed procedural error by failing meaningfully to consider the § 3553(a) factors, and
(2) entered a sentence that was substantively unreasonable. We disagree.
2
For reference, § 3553(a) reads in part as follows:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines
....
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To satisfy the requirement that it meaningfully consider the § 3553(a) factors, a
district court “need not discuss every argument made by a litigant,” nor “discuss and
make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors,” as only the relevant factors matter.
Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329. It must, however, provide more than “a rote statement” of the
factors if the defendant or the prosecution properly raises a ground of recognized legal
merit at sentencing. Id. Here, the District Court stated:
Well, I’m hearing about [Doe’s] background and troubles that he’s had in
his family throughout his life. That’s certainly very appealing. I also
agreed with [the prosecutor]. When I looked at the record here, . . . [Doe]
had all kinds of opportunity to change his thinking, to change his outlook,
and I noticed that even when he served the three to six year sentence . . . his
parole was revoked I believe on two occasions, so that he has not performed
well at all.
. . . . I think that the guideline range is a reasonable one given the
background . . . in the presentence report. We’re dealing here with a serious
offense. The defendant’s history has been mentioned here and was very
poor. I think there’s a need for deterrence and a need to promote respect for
the law and provide a just punishment, so that I think the guideline is a
reasonable one and I will not vary from it at this point.
App. at 49. The Court also noted that Doe was “very much in need of drug treatment.”
Id. at 53. These remarks evidence sufficient consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and
adequately establish that the Court did not commit procedural error in imposing Doe’s
sentence.
With regard to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, the
pertinent inquiry is “whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the
permissible statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration
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of the relevant factors.” United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006).
Considering Doe’s recidivist tendencies, periods of failed parole, and multiple missed
opportunities for reform, we conclude that the Court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing the lowest sentence within the recommended range. Doe does have a troubled
personal background, but his proclivity to engage in serious criminal conduct justifies the
sentence imposed.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the District Court.
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