Hanover Insurance Co v. Urban Outfitters Inc , 806 F.3d 761 ( 2015 )


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  •                                       PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 14-3705
    ________________
    THE HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY
    v.
    URBAN OUTFITTERS, INC.; U.O.COM, LLC;
    URBAN OUTFITTERS WHOLESALE, INC.;
    ANTHROPOLOGIE, INC; ANTHROPOLOGIE.COM, LP;
    FREE PEOPLE OF PA, LLC; FREEPEOPLE.COM, LLC,
    v.
    ONEBEACON AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY
    Urban Outfitters, Inc.; UO.com, LLC; Urban Outfitters
    Wholesale, Inc.; Anthropologie, Inc.; Anthropologie.com,
    L.P.; Free People of PA, LLC; Freepeople.com, LLC;
    OneBeacon America Insurance Company,
    Appellants
    ________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-03961)
    District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr.
    ________________
    Argued March 3, 2015
    Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: October 23, 2015)
    Ilan Rosenberg, Esq.            (ARGUED)
    Jacob C. Cohn, Esq.
    Gordon & Rees
    2005 Market Street
    Suite 2900
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Dorothy A. Hickok, Esq.
    Drinker, Biddle & Reath
    18th & Cherry Streets
    One Logan Square
    Suite 2000
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Counsel for Appellants
    Andrew J. Gallogly, Esq.       (ARGUED)
    Margolis Edelstein
    170 South Independence Mall West
    The Curtis Center
    Suite 400E
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Counsel for Appellee
    2
    ________________
    OPINION
    ________________
    ROTH, Circuit Judge
    The “prior publication” exclusion of liability insurance
    contracts prevents a company from obtaining ongoing
    insurance coverage for a continuing course of tortious
    conduct. In this appeal, we consider the scope of the “prior
    publication” exclusion.
    I.
    On February 28, 2012, in the U.S. District Court in
    New Mexico, the Navajo Nation and its affiliates (collectively
    Navajo Nation) sued Urban Outfitters and its affiliates
    (collectively Urban Outfitters) for trademark infringement
    and related common law and statutory violations. Navajo
    Nation’s central allegation was that Urban Outfitters
    “advertised, promoted, and sold its goods under the ‘Navaho’
    and ‘Navajo’ names and marks” on the Internet and in retail
    3
    stores “[s]ince at least March 16, 2009.”1 Urban Outfitters
    tendered the complaint to OneBeacon America Insurance
    Company and Hanover Insurance Company.
    OneBeacon provided commercial general liability and
    umbrella liability coverage to Urban Outfitters prior to July 7,
    2010.     The Insuring Agreement specifically included
    “personal and advertising injury” coverage.2 On July 7, 2010,
    1
    On September 19, 2014, after years of discovery and three
    amended complaints, the District Court in New Mexico
    dismissed Urban Outfitters’ counterclaim seeking a judicial
    declaration that Navajo Nation’s federally registered
    NAVAJO trademarks are invalid and therefore subject to
    cancellation. On March 23, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Tenth Circuit denied permission for interlocutory
    appeal. Currently pending before the District Court in New
    Mexico are various motions and cross-motions, including
    motions for summary judgment.
    2
    “Personal and advertising injury” was defined in the policy,
    in pertinent part, as
    (2) Oral or written publication, in any
    manner, of material that disparages a person’s
    or organization’s goods, products or services.
    This does not include any disparagement
    related to the actual or     alleged infringement
    or violation of any intellectual property rights
    or laws;
    e. Oral or written publication of material that
    violates a person’s right of privacy;
    f. The use of another’s advertising idea in your
    “advertisement”; or
    4
    OneBeacon issued a “fronting policy”3 to Urban Outfitters
    providing identical coverage for which Hanover served as the
    responsible insurer. The policy was in effect from July 7,
    2010, to July 7, 2011. Hanover subsequently issued separate
    commercial general liability and umbrella liability policies to
    Urban Outfitters, which were effective from July 7, 2011, to
    July 7, 2012. The “fronting policy” and Hanover-issued
    policies excluded coverage for “personal and advertising
    injury” liability “arising out of oral or written publication of
    material whose first publication took place before the
    beginning of the policy period.”4
    On April 26, 2012, two months after Navajo Nation
    filed the trademark infringement suit, Hanover provided a
    reservation of rights letter, informing Urban Outfitters of
    Hanover and OneBeacon’s joint retention of defense counsel.
    On July 12, 2012, Hanover sought a judicial declaration in the
    U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    that it was not responsible for Urban Outfitters’ defense or
    indemnification. On August 19, 2013, the District Court
    granted Hanover’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
    g. Infringing upon another’s copyright, trade
    dress or slogan in your “advertisement”.
    3
    A “fronting policy” is a risk management technique in
    which an insurer underwrites a policy to cover a specific risk
    but then cedes the risk to a reinsurer. See Douglas R.
    Richmond, Getting a Fix on Fronting Policies, 31 No. 19 Ins.
    Litig. Rep. 629 (2009). Here, the fronting company is One
    Beacon and the reinsurer is Hanover.
    4
    See J.A. at 198, 224.
    5
    The District Court held that Hanover had no duty to
    defend or indemnify since Hanover did not begin insurance
    coverage of Urban Outfitters until sixteen months after the
    alleged infringement began. The District Court found that,
    because the claims in the underlying action alleged injuries
    stemming from advertisements published prior to the policy
    inception date, any resulting injury fell within the Hanover
    policies’ “prior publication” exclusions.5 We dismissed an
    initial appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.6 However, the
    District Court has since addressed our jurisdictional concern
    by entering final judgment for Hanover on its August 19,
    2013, Order, pursuant to Rule 54(b). Urban Outfitters and
    Third Party Defendant, OneBeacon, now appeal that order.
    II.7
    “We review de novo an order granting judgment on the
    pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure.”8 “[I]n reviewing the grant of a Rule 12(c)
    motion, we must view the facts presented in the pleadings and
    the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party.”9 Under Pennsylvania
    law, which Hanover and Urban Outfitters agree governs,
    5
    Hanover Ins. Co. v. Urban Outfitters, No. 12-cv-3961, 
    2013 WL 4433440
    , at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2013).
    6
    Hanover Ins. Co. v. Urban Outfitters Inc., 572 F. App’x 91,
    93 (3d Cir. 2014).
    7
    The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28
    U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    8
    In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig.
    (No. II), 
    751 F.3d 150
    , 156 n.11 (3d Cir. 2014).
    9
    
    Id. at 154
    n.4 (quotation marks omitted).
    6
    “[t]he interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of
    law that we will review de novo.”10
    III.
    Urban Outfitters contends that the District Court erred
    in finding that Navajo Nation’s trademark infringement
    allegations fall under the Hanover policies’ “prior
    publication” exclusions. Both sides acknowledge an absence
    of binding authority, and urge us to derive antithetical lessons
    from the few cases on point. For the reasons which follow,
    we will affirm the District Court’s decision.
    A.
    In interpreting an insurance contract,
    [o]ur inquiry is straightforward. We look first
    to the terms of the policy which are a
    manifestation of the “intent of the parties.”
    [Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v.] Baumhammers, 938
    A.2d [286,] 290 [(Pa. 2007)]. “When the
    language of the policy is clear and
    unambiguous, we must give effect to that
    language.” 
    Id. . .
    . Next, we compare the terms
    of the policy to the allegations in the underlying
    claim. “It is well established that an insurer’s
    duties under an insurance policy are triggered
    by the language of the complaint against the
    insured.” 
    Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896
    . In
    10
    Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial
    Union Ins. Co., 
    908 A.2d 888
    , 897 (Pa. 2006).
    7
    determining the existence of a duty to defend,
    the factual allegations of the underlying
    complaint against the insured are to be taken as
    true and liberally construed in favor of the
    insured.11
    An insurer that disavows its duty to defend by reference to a
    policy exclusion effectively “assert[s] an affirmative defense
    and, accordingly, bears the burden of proving such
    defense.”12
    The Hanover policies’ “personal and advertising
    injury” provisions clearly and unambiguously cover Urban
    Outfitters’ alleged trademark infringement and related
    common law and statutory violations.13           Nonetheless,
    Hanover contends that it has no duty to defend since its
    policies specifically excluded coverage for “personal and
    advertising injury” liability “arising out of oral or written
    publication of material whose first publication took place
    before the beginning of the policy period.” The “fronting
    policy” under which Hanover first assumed responsibility for
    Urban Outfitters’ liability coverage became effective on July
    7, 2010. Thus, we must determine whether Urban Outfitters’
    liability-triggering conduct preceded or postdated that policy
    period’s inception.
    11
    Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. CPB Int’l, Inc., 
    562 F.3d 591
    ,
    595-96 (3d Cir. 2009) (footnote and, in final sentence only,
    citation and quotation marks omitted).
    12
    Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 
    735 A.2d 100
    , 106 (Pa. 1999).
    13
    See supra note 2.
    8
    The answer lies entirely within the four corners of the
    underlying complaint.14 There Navajo Nation alleged that
    Urban Outfitters engaged in “trademark infringement,
    trademark dilution, unfair competition, false advertising,
    commercial practices laws violations, and [] violation of the
    Indian Arts and Crafts Act,”15 but offered little specificity as
    to when the offensive conduct occurred. Navajo Nation’s
    relevant allegations are as follows:
    2.      Since at least March 16, 2009,
    Urban Outfitters has advertised, promoted, and
    sold its goods under the “Navaho” and
    “Navajo” names and marks. Urban Outfitters
    offers these goods on the Internet and in stores
    across the United States, and they compete
    directly with the Navajo Nation’s goods.16
    ***
    37.  At least as early as March 16,
    2009, Urban Outfitters started using the
    14
    See Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 
    938 A.2d 286
    ,
    290-91 (Pa. 2007); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Fidler, 
    808 A.2d 587
    ,
    590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (“The obligation of an insurer to
    defend an action against the insured is fixed solely by the
    allegations in the underlying complaint.”).
    15
    J.A. at 748. All citations to Navajo Nation’s complaint
    refer to the First Amended Complaint, which governed when
    Hanover filed the declaratory judgment action presently on
    appeal. Subsequent amendments do not substantively alter
    any relevant allegations.
    16
    J.A. at 749.
    9
    “Navajo” and “Navaho” names in its product
    line, or in connection with the sale of its goods,
    online, in its catalogs, and in its physical stores.
    Defendant’s use has included, and includes (but
    is not limited to): clothing, jewelry, footwear,
    handbags, caps, scarves, gloves, undergarments,
    and flasks. Defendant’s items sold under the
    “Navajo” and “Navaho” names and marks
    evoke the Navajo Nation’s tribal patterns,
    including geometric prints and designs
    fashioned to mimic and resemble Navajo
    Indian-made patterned clothing, jewelry and
    accessories. Urban Outfitters has sold and is
    selling over 20 products using the “Navajo” and
    “Navaho” trademarks in its retail stores, its
    catalogs, and its online stores.17
    ***
    41.    Urban Outfitters began offering
    retail clothing and accessories as early as March
    2009 with the “Navajo” and “Navaho” as
    trademarks to label or describe its products. For
    example, a “Leather Navajo cuff” was offered
    on Urban Outfitters’ website in January 2010.
    Sometime in early 2011, and possibly earlier,
    Urban Outfitters started a product line of 20 or
    more items containing the NAVAJO trademark,
    which Defendant sold on its website and in
    retail stores. True and correct copies of
    Defendants’ more than 20 items comprising the
    17
    J.A. at 759.
    10
    “Navajo Collection” sold at Urban Outfitters, as
    they are or have been displayed for online
    marketing and retailing at Defendant’s website,
    are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit A.
    [FN 5] Exhibit A is an illustrative, and not
    exhaustive, list of Urban Outfitters infringing
    activity. Indeed, Exhibit A only includes screen
    shots from online shopping websites. Urban
    Outfitters sold its goods in physical stores and
    in catalogs, and this has also infringed on the
    Navajo Nation’s marks.
    [FN 5] These PDF images were copied from
    Defendant’s website on October 16, 2011. 18
    ***
    78.    At least since March 16, 2009,
    and possibly earlier as discovery will confirm,
    and continuously thereafter to the present date,
    Defendant has advertised, marketed, offered,
    displayed for sale, and sold goods in manners
    that falsely suggested they are Indian-made, an
    Indian product, a product of an Indian Tribe, or
    the product of an Indian arts and crafts
    organization resident within the United States,
    including Indian products consisting of jewelry
    and clothing in a traditional Indian style, printed
    design, or medium.19
    18
    J.A. at 760-61.
    19
    J.A. at 772.
    11
    Citing a lack of chronological specificity in Navajo
    Nation’s allegations, Urban Outfitters urges us to use
    extrinsic evidence to determine whether Hanover owes a duty
    to defend. We decline for two reasons. First, and most
    importantly, Pennsylvania law provides that the determination
    of a duty to defend depends on the language of the policy and
    the allegations of the complaint20 -- not on extrinsic evidence.
    Second, the premise underpinning Urban Outfitters’
    advocacy of extrinsic evidence is misguided. A complaint
    that features few details as to when the plaintiff was wronged
    is far from exceptional. On the contrary, allegations more
    chronologically cryptic than Navajo Nation’s frequently form
    the basis of advertising injury claims.21 To abandon the
    underlying complaint whenever a plaintiff neglects to provide
    a date-certain tortious conduct timeline would occasion more
    protracted disputes by eroding the predictability that reliance
    on a single pleading ensures.22
    Confining our review to the contents of the underlying
    complaint, we find Navajo Nation’s description of Urban
    Outfitters’ allegedly infringing conduct remarkably
    20
    See 
    Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 290-91
    .
    21
    See, e.g., Transp. Ins. Co. v. Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass’n Ins. Co., 346
    F. App’x 862, 863 (3d Cir. 2009); Maddox v. St. Paul Fire &
    Marine Ins., 
    179 F. Supp. 2d 527
    , 528-29 (W.D. Pa. 2001);
    Applied Bolting Tech. Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar.
    Co., 
    942 F. Supp. 1029
    , 1031-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
    22
    It might be another matter if the facts known to the insurer
    and those alleged in the complaint were in conflict. But since
    neither insurer alleges such a factual conflict here, we decline
    to opine on that decidedly more difficult scenario.
    12
    consistent.   Thus, according to Navajo Nation, Urban
    Outfitters advertised goods in a manner violative of its
    trademark
       “[s]ince at least March 16, 2009” (¶ 2);
       “[a]t least as early as March 16, 2009” (¶ 37);
       “as early as March 2009” (¶ 41); and
       “[a]t least since March 16, 2009, and possibly earlier
    as discovery will confirm, and continuously thereafter
    to the present date” (¶ 78).
    In each instance, Navajo Nation fixed March 16, 2009 (if not
    earlier) as a start date for Urban Outfitters’ alleged
    misconduct. Under the terms of the Hanover policies’ “prior
    publication” exclusions, we must treat this date of “first
    publication” as a landmark.23 Because Hanover was not
    responsible for Urban Outfitters’ liability insurance coverage
    until sixteen months thereafter, the exclusions apply—that is,
    unless the underlying complaint contains allegations of “fresh
    wrongs” that occurred during Hanover’s policy periods.
    B.
    There is no binding authority in this Court on what
    constitutes a “fresh wrong.” The Ninth Circuit Court of
    Appeals, however, recently considered the question on
    analogous facts. In Street Surfing, LLC v. Great American E
    & S Insurance Co., the court defined “fresh wrongs” as “new
    matter,” which in turn “is material not ‘substantially similar’
    23
    See, e.g., Applied 
    Bolting, 942 F. Supp. at 1036
    .
    13
    to the material published before the coverage period.”24 The
    court emphasized that “courts have not considered all
    differences between pre-coverage and post-coverage
    publications, but have focused on the relationship between the
    alleged wrongful acts manifested by those publications. A
    post-coverage publication is ‘substantially similar’ to a pre-
    coverage publication if both publications carry out the same
    alleged wrong.”25
    The insurer in Street Surfing was excused from its duty
    to defend despite differences in pre- and post-coverage
    advertisements. Although the ads featured different products,
    the advertising idea was the same regardless of the product:
    the products all used the allegedly infringing identification
    “Street Surfing.” The Ninth Circuit held that the post-
    coverage ads were not “fresh wrongs” because (1) the
    underlying plaintiff did not “allege that the post-coverage
    advertisements were separate torts occurring during the policy
    period” and (2) the advertisements “arose out of each term’s
    similarity to [plaintiff’s] advertising idea.”26
    We find this approach persuasive but we will attempt
    to build on it. Under Pennsylvania law, “[a]n insurer’s duty
    to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify.”27 However,
    reasonable limits may be imposed on that broad duty, as for
    instance in cases of alleged advertising harm. There, the prior
    24
    See Street Surfing, LLC v. Great Am. E & S Ins. Co., 
    776 F.3d 603
    , 612 (9th Cir. 2014).
    25
    
    Id. at 612-13.
    26
    
    Id. at 614.
    27
    Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 
    2 A.3d 526
    , 540 (Pa. 2010).
    14
    publication exclusion serves to limit the coverage for an
    ongoing course of wrongful conduct. Nevertheless, if a new
    infringement has superseded the original infraction, the
    insurers (and courts) must distinguish between “fresh
    wrongs” and mere variations on a theme.
    As with the duty to defend, the allegations in the
    underlying complaint control.28 Where a plaintiff alleges a
    substantive difference between allegedly infringing
    advertisements, published before and during the relevant
    policy period, the later advertisements are “fresh wrongs” that
    fall outside the “prior publication” exclusion. But variations,
    occurring within a common, clearly identifiable advertising
    objective, do not give rise to “fresh wrongs.”
    When a purported advertising violation stems from
    such common, clearly identifiable objectives, the “prior
    publication” exclusion applies to excuse an insurer from its
    duty to defend if that insurer has assumed coverage
    responsibility after the insured has commenced the liability-
    triggering conduct. In determining whether two or more sets
    of advertisements share a common objective, courts may look
    to whether the plaintiff charged the insured with separate torts
    or an agglomeration.29 Other significant, factors include
    whether the complaint describes a significant lull between
    pre- and post-coverage advertising initiatives and whether the
    28
    See 
    Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 290-91
    .
    29
    See Street 
    Surfing, 776 F.3d at 614
    .
    15
    advertisements share a common theme relating to the alleged
    violation.30
    Urban Outfitters stands accused of an apparently
    continuous string of trademark infringement and related
    violations. In the underlying complaint, where Navajo Nation
    affixed dates to Urban Outfitters’ purported misconduct, the
    dates were generally accompanied by qualifiers denoting
    continuity (e.g., Urban Outfitters has infringed “since” or
    “[a]t least as early as” March 2009). Navajo Nation provided
    more chronological specificity only in describing particular
    Urban Outfitters advertisements which fit the alleged pattern
    of infringement. Thus, it alleged, “[f]or example,” that Urban
    Outfitters offered certain infringing products on its website in
    January 2010 and in retail stores as well “[s]ometime in early
    2011, and possibly earlier.”31 Navajo Nation attached screen
    shots of the later product line as an exhibit to its complaint,
    but cautioned that it was “an illustrative, and not exhaustive,
    list of Urban Outfitters infringing activity.”32
    We may not infer from Navajo Nation’s attachment of
    only post-coverage advertisements as exhibits that those
    advertisements substantively differed from pre-coverage ads.
    30
    The Seventh Circuit has analyzed the “prior publication”
    exclusion under a different framework. See Taco Bell Corp.
    v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 
    388 F.3d 1069
    , 1072-74 (2004). To the
    extent Taco Bell requires that pre- and post-coverage
    advertisements be identical (or nearly identical) for the “prior
    publication” exclusion to apply, we disagree that the
    exclusion demands such rigor.
    31
    See supra note 17.
    32
    
    Id. 16 In
    fact, taking Navajo Nation’s complaint as true compels the
    opposite conclusion.33 Navajo Nation did not charge Urban
    Outfitters with committing separate torts before and during
    Hanover’s coverage period. Nor did it hint at a hiatus in
    Urban Outfitters’ tortious pursuits between March 2009 and
    the complaint’s filing. Navajo Nation alleged that Urban
    Outfitters “started using the ‘Navajo’ and ‘Navaho’ names”
    via all relevant instrumentalities of infringement (use “in its
    product line, or in connection with the sale of its goods,
    online, in its catalogs, and in its physical stores”) well before
    Hanover’s coverage period commenced.34 Moreover, the
    “Leather Navajo cuff” offered on Urban Outfitters’ website in
    January 2010 (six months before Hanover’s coverage period
    33
    Similarly, we reject Urban Outfitters’ suggestion that,
    because Navajo Nation’s allegations “lump defendants
    together and are insufficiently specific to determine the
    precise allegations directed against each individual
    defendant,” the court must inquire further as to “the precise
    claims against each insured.” In the very first sentence of its
    complaint, Navajo Nation alleges that it “brings this
    Amended Complaint against Urban Outfitters, Inc., and its
    wholly-owned and controlled subsidiaries, entities, and retail
    brands (collectively ‘Urban Outfitters’ or ‘Defendant’).” J.A.
    at 748. Urban Outfitters accurately contends that Navajo
    Nation did not distinguish thereafter between the various
    defendants, but that is precisely the point: Navajo alleged
    that each Urban Outfitters affiliate engaged in the same
    course of wrongful conduct. It is not our task to discern the
    plausibility of Navajo Nation’s allegations. On the contrary,
    we are required to take them at face value.                See
    
    Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 290-91
    .
    34
    See supra note 16.
    17
    began) appears thematically consistent with the more than
    twenty post-coverage advertising examples Navajo Nation
    identified.35
    It is apparent from Navajo Nation’s complaint that
    Urban Outfitters’ advertisements, which predated Hanover’s
    coverage period, share a common objective with those that
    followed. Thus, we conclude that the latter ads are not “fresh
    wrongs.” The “prior publication” exclusions apply, and
    Hanover has no duty to defend Urban Outfitters in the
    underlying action.
    IV.
    Risk is a concept with which we are intimately
    acquainted.36 Those who wager correctly are rewarded and
    those who guess wrong suffer losses. The purpose of
    insurance is to disperse that risk. But “[a]n insured cannot
    insure against something that has already begun and which is
    known to have begun.”37 The “prior publication” exclusion
    prevents a continuing tortfeasor from passing the risk for its
    misconduct on to an unwitting insurer. Taking Navajo
    Nation’s underlying allegations as true, Urban Outfitters
    engaged in similar liability-triggering behavior both before
    35
    See J.A. at 786-809.
    36
    As early as the sixteenth century, popular English proverbs
    cautioned of risk and its vagaries in terms familiar to present
    usage. See, e.g., Adam Fox, Oral and Literate Culture in
    England, 1500-1700, 140-41 (2000).
    37
    See Matagorda Ventures, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co.,
    
    203 F. Supp. 2d 704
    , 716 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (citation and
    quotation marks omitted).
    18
    and during Hanover’s coverage period. We therefore hold
    that the exclusion applies.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
    Court’s order granting Hanover’s motion for judgment on the
    pleadings.
    19