Heather Seibert v. Lutron Electronics , 408 F. App'x 605 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 10-1091
__________
HEATHER SEIBERT,
Appellant.
v.
LUTRON ELECTRONICS
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-08-cv-05139)
District Judge: Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel
________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on November 4, 2010
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 24, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Heather Seibert appeals the order of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting Lutron Electronics’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. Background and Procedural History
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will only briefly revisit the facts
and procedural history here. Seibert began working for Lutron in 1996 as a part-time
summer employee and began working as a full-time employee in June of 1997 in
Lutron’s Technical Assistance Program. Although Seibert received promotions and
raises, she began to receive complaints about her work attendance as early as 1999.
Seibert began suffering from symptoms of depression in 2005. She requested a
leave of absence in May for her depression, which was granted. After her return to work
on October 6, 2005, Seibert told her counselor that she was no longer experiencing
symptoms of depression. In January of the following year, Dr. Liaw, Seibert’s physician,
submitted a Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) notice to Lutron explaining that
Seibert continued to suffer depression, which would continue for an indefinite period of
time, that she was taking medication and receiving counseling, and that she might miss
work ―2 or 3 days once a month‖ due to her symptoms. Seibert missed 70 days of work
between January and July of 2006.
In July of 2006, Seibert requested – and was granted – maternity leave. She
returned to work on October 6, 2006, without any restrictions. While on maternity leave,
Seibert was informed that she had exhausted her FMLA time and was ineligible for more
leave until she accumulated a certain number of work hours. Upon Seibert’s return,
Lutron reiterated the importance of her regular attendance in a document entitled
―Conditions of Heather Seibert’s Return to Work—October 2, 2006.‖ Consistent with
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Lutron’s ―cross-training‖ program, Seibert was rotated out of her position as a
documentation specialist and into a position as an inventory control specialist. She was
also asked to train a male employee in the documentation specialist position. That same
male employee was asked to train an incoming female documentation specialist when he
rotated out of the position.
Seibert’s absences continued. Between January and March of 2007, Seibert
missed seven full days and three half days, seven of which she attributed to caring for her
children, not depression. In violation of Lutron’s absentee policy, Seibert marked these
absences as ―vacation days.‖ On March 23, 2007, a Human Resource specialist at Lutron
indicated to Seibert that her absences were causing problems for her department and had
prevented her from obtaining the necessary professional development. Seibert was
offered the choice between termination and resignation and chose the latter.
Seibert filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) on July 24, 2007, and another with the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission (PHRC) on July 26, 2007, alleging discrimination based on sex
and disability.
Seibert filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. On
October 8, 2008, Lutron removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the case proceeded to discovery. At the close of
discovery, Lutron moved for summary judgment on all of Seibert’s claims. The District
Court granted Lutron’s motion. This appeal followed.
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order granting summary
judgment and apply the same standard that the district court should have applied. Farrell
v Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is
appropriate ―if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‖ Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d
765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
III. Discussion
A. Seibert Was Not Disabled Under the ADA
The first issue is whether, drawing all inferences in favor of Seibert, the District
Court correctly determined that no reasonable factfinder could conclude from the record
that Seibert was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000). The ADA defines a
disability as (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of an individual; (b) a record of such impairment; or (c) being
regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Transitory,
temporary or impermanent impairments are not considered an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. See Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375,
380 (3d Cir. 2002); McDonald v. Com. of Pa., Dep’t. of Public Welfare, Polk Center, 62
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F.3d 92, 94-97 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, the record demonstrates that Seibert’s depression
was not permanent, but instead was induced by specific, non-recurring events and thus
was not a disability under the ADA.
Even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Seibert, a reasonable
jury would conclude that her depression was temporary and thus not a disability within
the meaning of the ADA. See, e.g., Ogborn v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, 305 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2002); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12,
16 (1st Cir. 1997). Therefore, it was proper for the District Court to grant Lutron’s
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Seibert’s disability discrimination claim.
B. Seibert Failed to Exhaust Her Regarded-As Disabled Claim
The second issue is whether the District Court properly granted summary
judgment on Seibert’s regarded-as claim because she failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies as required. A disability discrimination plaintiff must exhaust her
administrative remedies by filing a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC before filing
a civil suit. Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984). The facts alleged in
Seibert’s EEOC filing could not reasonably support a claim that Lutron discriminated
against her because it wrongly perceived her as disabled. The District Court properly
determined that Seibert failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to this subset of
her disability discrimination claim and granted summary judgment on Seibert’s regarded-
as claim.
C. Summary Judgment on Seibert’s Remaining Claims Was Proper
The final issue is whether the District Court properly granted Lutron’s Motion for
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Summary Judgment because Seibert failed to point to evidence sufficient to establish the
existence of the elements of her gender discrimination claim.1 The District Court granted
Lutron’s Motion for Summary Judgment because Seibert provided no specific evidence
to support her claim that she suffered an adverse employment action when Lutron
assigned her to a new position and replaced her with a male employee. Seibert’s transfer
was consistent with Lutron’s ―cross-training‖ rotation of employees. Seibert’s transfer,
moreover, was not met with a reduction in compensation, did not alter her employment
rights, and did not affect her seniority level. Thus, she has not met her burden of
demonstrating that her transfer was adverse by providing evidence that the transfer
―denied [her] of any employment opportunity or altered any employment rights.‖
Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
Finally, the District Court concluded, and we agree, that there is no record
evidence to support Seibert’s contention that Lutron’s explanation for her transfer was a
pretext for discrimination. Because Seibert has failed to demonstrate that her transfer
constituted an adverse employment action, Seibert cannot set forth a prima facie case of
gender discrimination.
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Seibert’s PDA claim fares no better. Seibert alleged that she requested, but was
denied, accommodation in the form of a reclining chair. Because this allegation was not
asserted in Siebert’s EEOC charge, she has failed to preserve her claim and it must
therefore be dismissed. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d). Seibert raised new claims in her
response to Lutron’s Motion for Summary Judgment that she was ―singled out and forced
to use her vacation time simply because she was having post natal problems with her
twins.‖ Even if these claims were timely raised, they lack merit. See Piantanida v.
Wyman Center, Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that post-natal childcare
duties are not within the protections afforded by the PDA).
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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